Chap: i^st

It is vulgarly conceived y^t Sensitive Appetites, Passions, & Hormæ whether they be meerly Corporiall \such/ as Hunger, & Thirst & y^e like; or whether they partly arise from some antecedent Cogitation; as Anger & Feare & such others; hath|ve| not properly any Liberty; Freewill or Self-power in them. Which seems to be collected from mens inward Sense & Experience, forasmuch as these Appetites Passions & Horma|e|tick Inclinations seeme to invade us, & obtrude themselfs uppon us, we find them alsoe to be stubborn & contumacious, Stiff & refractory thinges y^t refuse to be Governed. Animall Appetites & Passions are thinges w^ch have no power over themselfs to stop or excite \their own Career/ retard or accelerate theire owne force \no more then a Stone flung hath/ but are meer Swinges & impetuocitys of Nature. Wherfore y^t of y^e Author of y^e Booke de Homine may be allowed to be true in some Sense \concerning them/ ne Appetitus Noster ne fuga nostra Causa est quare hoc vel illud cupimus vel fugimus; (h: e) non ideo Appetimus quia volumus, nec fugimus quia nolumus sed quia tum Appetitio tum Aver{t}|t|io ab ipsis rebus cupitis vel Exosis generata est Sequitur necessaria præconceptum Iucundita molestiæ ab ipsis objectis adfuturæ, quid enim? an Esurimus cætera naturæ necessaria Appetimus quia volumus an fames Sitis et Cpidines voluntariæ sunt Appetentibus \Agere,/ quidem Liberù esse potest ipsum autem Appetere non potest

So that if Brutes be supposed to have no other Principle of Action in them than Particular Appetites & Horma|e|tick Inclinations, arising by \of/ themselfs or obtruded by Nature \in them/ it seems consequent heeruppon y^t though they may be said to have a Liberty \or Power/ to doe what they have an Appetite unto, <2> When there is noe Externall impedim^t. to hinder them yet they cannot be said to have a Liberty \or Power/ over theire Appetite themself or a Power actively & Originally to determin theire owne Actions w^ch is y^t w^ch is Com̄only meant by Liberum Arbitrium & therfore {s}|t|hey cannot be said properly to be y^e Cause of theire owne Actions as men are so as to deserve blame & Commendaco uppon y^t account \for/ of what they \doe/ it being not so much themselfs y^t act, as Nature y^t acts in them.

But notwithstanding this; it is utterly false w^ch the forecited Author contends for, y^t all these Animall Appetites (w^ch \he/ calls volitions) are nothing els but meer Passion from y^e Objects without, Meer Corporiall Motions mechanically produced in us. for \as/ we have before shewed, outward sense it self is not a meer Corporiall Passion and nothing but \frō/ the Activity of y^e outward Objects uppon us, as he determins every Conception, (& therfore Intellection as well as Sense, & Imagination) to be y^e Action of the thinge conceived & only y^e Passions of y^e Conceiver. f|F|or \in Sense/ besides the Locall Motion impressed upon us in sense from without, to w^ch the Sentient is meerly Passive there is al{so} p|P|hancy Apparence, & p|P|erception w^ch is a Motion or Action of ano{ther} kind, and such as the sentient himselfe is the Originall and a|A|ctive c|C|ause of; not a locall mocon or mocon from place to place as this Author rediculously conceits cogitacon to bee, \but/ a mocon of a different species from that, such as doth not belong to body, but is peculiar to incorporeall substance. Fancy and p|P|erception is a thing really distinct from y^e locall mocon antecedent and a far greater reality \in Nature/ then that, being not an heterokinesy as locall mocon is, but an autokinesi, a certaine mocon which though it be occasioned and invited, yet it is not \efficiētly/ caused by any thing without y^t which is moved, but doth originally spring from the sentient and conce|i|pient it selfe. y^t is from an incorporeall substance, whose nature is to bee selfe-active or to exert mocon activity and energy from it selfe. It is true indeed y^t h|H|unger thirst and y^e like are sensacons of something that is troublesome to y^e body with an appetit <3> or desire consequent thereupon to be eased or freed from y^e same, whence it is |comes to passe| that these have been thought by some to be nothing but corporeall passions, from somthing \{(} {sic}/ without. But there are certaine other animall apetites which none y^t well considers them will deny but that they are the Origin\all/ activities of the Animall or soule it selfe: such as are Emulation Ambition Pride Desire of Precellency or of Honour and Applause which to think to be nothing but meer mechanicall motions is either madnesse or stupidity. These things cannot be meer passions or impressions from the corporeall Objects without which have really nothing in them \transmitted by Sense/ but magnitude figure site and mocon. \And {illeg}tionall spi{illeg}/ a|A|nd therefore they must needs arise from y^t inward active and bubbling fountaine of Animall life in us \Wherfore/ In appetites sensations and all cogitacons whatsoever there is at least a single selfe-activity of the soule, but because diverse of these energys doe necessarily arise and come forth upon such and such occasions and circumstances and because they doe not determine or bound, measure, and moderate themselves therefore Wee are not commonly thought to be so much the cause of them as Nature in us. Wherefore we are in y^e next place to enquire what is that Will and freewill in us that is so commonly distinguished from appetite and ho ὁρμὴ y^t it is supposed not onely to pertake of the nature of Lubency and to be such a single selfe activity of the soul as was before declared to bee in sense and appetite in those necessary motions and emotions of Sense and Appetite \Servāts to sen{sat}iō/ but also to be above its own accon or to be Master of It & com̄and it, which indeed is a thing y^t we are as plainly sensible of within our selves as wee are of the Swinges and impetuosities of Appetite but what it is & how to define it there seems to bee noe small difficulty.

< insertion from p2v > To define Will as some doe to be y^e last Appetite in deliberacon which Deliberacon is supposed by them to bee nothing els but the Alternacons of Appetites & fancy, or of Hopes and feares is nothing but to deny the thing it self or to affirm y^t there is noe such thing as Will distinct from Appetite & Passion and therefore noe Liberum Arbitrium or Freewill and whereas

< insertion ends >

Will as distinct from Animall Appetite is vulgarly defiined {sic} to be a Raconall {sic} or Intellectuall Appetite that is a thing which doth so depend upon & result from raconall understanding in men as Appetite & ὁρμὴ in brutes |depends vpon Phancy and Imagination.|

\Nay/ It is here readily objected y^t if Will be a Raconall Appetite then there could be noe voluntary act against Reason for a voluntary act is that which proceedeth from the Will and no other which seems to destroy the nature of all Sin & Vice y^t are supposed to be nothing els but \volūtary/ deviations & deflexions from a Mans own reason & understanding. Moreover those Scholastick Writers themselves tell us y^t y^e understanding is determined both to its exercise & its object by the Will, wee being Sensible in our selves of a free-power over it whereby we can determine it at pleasure either to \exercise itselfe/ act or not act, & to \think/ act either \exercise itself/ upon this or y^t. Object & \now/ & y^t. Will which \{hath}/ exercised such an authority over the understanding cannot well be thought to be y^e \Consequēce/ result of it. \y^e vndersta{n}ding itselfe/ Lastly if Will be a raconall or Intellectuall Appetite; then it can never re {sic} dissent from y^e last dictate of the understanding It being indeed nothing els according to this Hypothesis but Intellectus extensus the understanding it selfe extended outward towards accon. To say y^t y^e Will is a Racconall Appetite & yet y^t it doth not alwayes follow the last dictate of the understanding but blindly determines itselfe which way it pleases are perfectly contradictiouse and all one as if one should say y^t y^e Will is both a Raconanall {sic} & \an/ irraconall Appetite: Now if y^e Will do alwayes necessarily follow y^e last dictate of y^e understanding the understanding having noe Liberty in it but acting necessarily, & the Will necessarily following y^t necessary understanding, it is plaine y^t there can be noe liberty any where in y^e whole Soule noe selfe-flexibility or or power over our own accons, but our whole Soul would be as stiffe and unwieldy as any senslesse cor {sic} corporeall matter machine

There are indeed severall Philosophers who assert y^t the will doth not alwayes follow the dictate of the understanding <5> but I cannot find y^t these \pretend to give/ give \any/ definition of Will as distinct from Appetite, or render any intelligible account of it, what it should bee.

Wherefore for y^e Salving \of/ this Phænomenon of Freewill & rightly explaining y^e nature of it wee have found it necessary to propose another psychologicall Hypothesis after this manner That whereas there \is/ are in y^e Soule \a multiplicity of congruition &/ lower & higher principles \capacities/ of life & accon \w^ch often clash with one another/ as perticular appetites & passions Inferior Reason which is a larger comp^rhension of o^r own utility, and Superior Reason or the instinct of honesty besides y^e speculative understanding & l|L|ocomotive power there must of necessity be in y^e Soul one common Focus or Centre in which all these lines \may/ meet, Someth one thing in which all is recollected and knet together, somthing y^t is Conscious of all its own congruities \& capacities/ both higher and lower of all the cogitative powers & facultijs in the Soule. For the Seminal plantall & plastick ones \(if there be any such)/ belong not to its cognizance Which same thing can also weild steer & guide y^e whole Soul & exercise a power & dominion over it \arbitrate all Difference & determine all Strife & Discord in it/ now this can be no other than y^e whole Soule Redoubled upon it Selfe \& selfe coprehensive/ which being as it were with in it selfe, & comp^rhending it selfe, & holding it selfe as it were it in its own hand, hath a Suipotence\testas/ over it selfe & can command itselfe or turne it selfe this way & y^t way.

This is y^t. which in all freewilled & selfe powerfull Beings is y^e head & summity or topp of them the τὸ ἡγεμο\νι/κον or ruling principle in them, \A/^[1] < insertion from p4v > A And that in y^e Sense of y^e very Stoicks allso themselves who vse y^t word so often, as whē Epictetus L. 3. C. 5. Ar x. speakes of τὸ ηγεμονικον κατὰ φύσιν ἒχον τηχῆσαι, of keeping y^e Hegemonicō in a Right Temper according to Nature — He cannot mean Reasō or y^e Naturall Vnderstanding it, but y^e Soule as Redoubled vpō itselfe & selfactive, w^ch is the sum̄ity of it. /Of ye ἡγεμονους — —\ < insertion ends > & not y^e notionall & necessary understanding as some conceit the inconvenient consequences of w^ch. assertion <6> been \allready/ suggested and yet this is not a thing devoid of light & understanding neither as that blind Will which some others would have to be y^e M^rs. & Governesse or Queen Regent of the Soul. & to weild y^e scepter of it forasmuch as this compriseth & comp^rhends all y^t is in y^e whole Soul It being \as it were recollected/ y^e whole Soul \summed up together/ moving and determining it selfe. This is y^e Abritrator of all differenc\ces/ y^e Umphire of all controversys y^t where y^e ultimate decision of all things is made. This is y^t which holds y^e whole Frame & Machine of y^e Soul & (if we may so Speake \thus/) together & makes it move or act coherently & consistently & therefore when this is relaxated or consopited into a languor (as \(it seems)/ in sleep) all y^e other strings of the Soul plaid upon without it or rather Sounding by themselves make noe musick or harmony, but thoughts prove absurdly incohærent with one another This is y^e ἀυτὸ-ἑκαστος in every one \y^e T{rue} Personality is in this/ or y^t which is properly called wee for there be many things \in us/ ἡμέτερα \Ours/ y^t are not ἡμεῖς wee our selves, οὐχ ὅσα ἔχομεν ταῦτὰκὶ ἔσμεν We are not every thing y^t wee have in us, wee Animall appetites suggestions of honesty and Conscien\ce/ notionall knowledge as such are things y^t wee have but are \them/ not. t|T|hat which is concocted into this \the Soul/ redoubled \&/ selfe active life of the Soul It is our very selves and nothing els whatsoever morall disposition is lodged here denominates y^e whole man such. This determines all y^e passive capability of every mans nature, and makes every man such. \as he is./ This is y^t which p:^rsides informs and actuates y^e whole Soul, & all other things in it are but ὕλη or matter to it|, w.^ch are variously stamped from it.|

Now to this y^t is to y^e Soul thus redoubled upon it selfe and p^rsiding over y^e whole man belongs that which is comonly called Will when y^e word is taken stricktly <7> not for any Lubency in generall, but for somthing distinct from animall appetite. For this is the whole Soul recollected and knitt up together into it selfe hanging tite, and loose, hovering & suspense actinging {sic} upon it selfe & determining it selfe being nimbly selfe-flexible this way & y^t way.

Againe this is y^t to which Iudgment properly so called ought to be attributed. In practicall things it seem{s} to be very plaine y^t it cannot be one y^t thing y^t judges practically what ought to be done or not done; \in Particular Cases {directing}/|,| and another thing y^t commands action or willeth, but y^t one & y^e same thing doth both, y^t is both judgeth and willeth Nay it may very well be questioned whether there be any difference at all betwixt y^t Iudicrum practicè practicum y^t is so often \barbarously Call {sic}Call/ menconed by Scholastick writ.^rs & ascribed by them to y^e understanding as a distinct faculty from y^e will & y^e Will it selfe or y^t Imperium y^t commands y^e action or whether they be not really one & y^e self same thing. Or \Indeed/ rather, without dispute we may well venture to conclude; \hesitancy/ y^t these are either nothing but 2 names for one & y^e same thing, or else y^t all y^e difference y^t is between them is not Rei but Raconis, in our mode of conception of them \onely/. Which being once perceived, y^t vulgar controversy will \presently vanish {&}/ appear to be ridiculous whether y^e Will doth always follow y^e last practicall judgm.^t or not It being really all one as if they should dispute whether y^e will follow it self but y^t opinion most absurdly falls\lse/ which determines \Negatively/ y^t y^e will doth not alwayes follow y^e last practicall judgment, in their sense, y^t is y^t it dissents from it; which is all one as to assert y^t one & y^e same thing may dissent from itselfe. But it is very true y^t y^e Will & last practicall judgm^t w^ch are really y^e same thing do often dissent both from y^e dictate of honesty which <8> is superiour Reason & from y^e notionall understanding in us as also from y^t Inferiour Reason which comparing y^e future with y^e present dictates more truly & impartially o.^r own private utility. It determining it selfe to adhere to y^e p.^rsent appetite But y^e not distinguishing of these two S|R|egions in y^e Soul whereof the one is Nature y^e other reduplicative selfe activity (to y^e latter of which both Will & practicall judgment belong) hath caused so much intricacy \obscurity/ & confusion in this whole Controversy.