Of Liberum Arbitrium or Freewill

The faculty of y^e humane Soule commonly expressed by y^e name of Liberum arbitrium or freewill is a matter of great Consequence as to y^t Doctrine of morality to be asserted & vindicated, but it is a thing of noe small dificulty, to doe it clearly & convincingly as may appea^^r from y^e obiection made against it in y^e former part. And y^t is not only true in a morall sence y^t the most difficult Knowledge of all is to Know a mans selfe but alsoe in a philosophicall wee can not soe easly acq^ueint ourselues with our own oficeations nor Know \y^e man̄er of/ our Soules Cogitations & its manner of acting, as wee can vnderstand other things without us & more remotly distant from us, our S bodily Sight can not perceive an obiect in too {nere} a Distance nether can y^e eye possibly see it selfe otherwise then made a distant obiect from it & inflected to it without by som polite Superficies nether can one mind without much \some/ pain & labour turne in its animaversive Ray & fix it long vppon its selfe in a reflexive Consideration of its own actings wher by the the same thing becoms as it were two both Obiect & Spectator at once the Soule seems to be as it were too nere to its selfe to See & Know its selfe, so well as \it may/ other things - Here if w^t I shall say concerning Freewill seem vnsatisfact. to any, it wi I shall thinke it no marvell at all, th~for I never was myself fully satisfied in any Discourse w^ch I read of it; Though I {beleive} those Authors y^t wrote thē were satisfied in what they wrote -

Wee will first indeavour to lay down som intelligible Hypotheses tending to the clearing \of/ this point and then Compare these phænomena with them & demonstrate the truth ^\of them/ from thence the first thing y^t wee shall lay down \propound/ is this y^t |y^e| human Soule is a selfe-acting|ve| Being by w\ch/ I \here/ mean a Being w^ch hath a Spring or fountain of Activity within it selfe & whose motions actions & Cogitations are not all passivly impressed vppon it vppon \frō/ som other thing without it, but som of y^m at Oy^t if not all are otriginally exerted from itselfe, now this one thing Stricks a great Stroke in this ^\whole/ Controversy for the main foundation w^ch the late great Champion for Necessity builds vppon, \is this/ y^t there is noe selfe active being in y^e World ^\in this sense/ nothing y^t can move act or change it selfe unless it \but must be/ be moved & acted vppon by som other being without it, y^e plain meaning of w\ch/ is y^t there is noe other being in y^e World, but body of w^ch it may be well Concluded y^t it hath noe self-moving nor selfe-acting power in it, but what ever body is moved is passivly moved by some thing else; wherefore if there be noe other being in y^e World but body then y^e Soule of man must needs be Corporeall, & its in all its actions Cogitations & Volitions be moved mechanically & impelled noe other wais then a Stone or loge is ^\or a Clock or watch/ & soe can have noe Imperium over it selfe nor power to determine its own Volitions, but this Author doth never prove but beg this principle or appeal ^\in it/ only to his phancy & Imagination as y^e only Judge of \for y^e/ Truth \of it./ wheras it is most vndeniably evident from this very position ^\of his/ y^t noe body can move it selfe y^t there must be som autokeneticall \or/ selfe moving & selfe acting|ve| being in y^e world, y^t is another Kind of Substance w^ch is not bodily but incorporeall; for if there be motion in y^e world as it is plain there is & noe body can move it Selfe there must be som other being besids body from whence motion doth begin \takes its originall/ & indeed by w^ch it is ^\still/ continued, as ^\For there is nothing/ this Author doth \did/ not seem to be aware of but {oscitantly} & {supinly} pass it over <2> for if noe body \can/ move it selfe noe body can continue to move longer then it is actually impelled by som other \body/, & according to this Principle it is plain ^\according to w^ch principle/ y^t a Ston should \cease to move/ when it is out of y^e movers \throwers/ hand & \{illeg}/ still continues \its motion after/ to move after==wards or a humming top & |y^t| Spins round a long time after y^e first impelling body \stroke/ & {pemend} from it & doth noe longer impell it since it could not move itselfe & yet is not moved by any other body must needs derive its motion by som other Corporeall being in y^e Vniverse y^t allwais keeps on & maintains y^e sam quantity of motion in y^e \whole/ mass of matter but this philosopher grosly deceivd himselfe in taking \on/ Cartesius ^\Hypothesis/ in to his ^\Atheisticall/ philosophy that whatsoever body was one mou’d vnless it did impart & commvnicate that motion in to \some/ other resisting bodies it would never cease to move {illeg} the reson of this \w^ch hypothesis/ was because \he/ supposed God or y^e Soule of y^e world \or/ som Incorporeall Substance allwais to renew & Continue & soe keep a {illeg} {one send} y^t sam quantity of y^e motiō in y^e Vniverse for otherwise noe on body could move a moment after it was impelled by another body because then it must needs move it selfe w\ch/ body can not doe & therefore if one shoud suppose halfe y^e Corporeall World should have one I know not how a {illeg} \one Push/ or {illeg} y^t matter would in y^e same moment have communicated its motion by impulsion vppon all y^e remainder of Contiguous matter y^t was impelled by it \to give it place/ & then immediately this motion would all cease \& vanish into {noth^g}/ vnless it were Continued & renued by som externall Cause \and selfmov^g Being/ wherefore the Continuation of y^e motion in y^e Vniverse doth vnquestionable prove an incorporeall Substance as y^e Active cause of it

But if wee should here grant him this w^ch he absurdly begs y^t a body once impelled would ^\move/ to eternity vnless it was hindred or Stopt (w^ch is flatly Contradictious to his own principle y^t Quicquid movetur ab vlto movetur & y^t noe body hath selfe activity, for y^t w\ch/ moves after \it/ is impelled by another body must needs move it selfe, there being noe other cause of its motion), yet I say if wee should grant him this he must of necessity come to som first mover w\ch/ was not body & w\ch/ was not itselfe moved by som any other Substance but was y^e active Cause & first originall of motion y^t is to an incorporeall Substance for though he would fain Shufle it off in y^e & hide himselfe in y^e obscurity & incomprehensibility of a successive Eternity a parte ante, still running further backward & from \backward/ an endless repedation, yet this will not serue his turne for soe long as noe body can move it selfe – there is a demonst\r/ative necessity y^t som thing besids body \&/ in order of nature before it, must activly move this Coeternall body, w^ch the far more Sutle & acute Cartesius though led by his principles to hold y^e eternity of y^e world as well as {y^e} |its| Infinity, yet saw necessity of acknowlidging an Incorporeall Substance as y^e mover of it

Thus much to show y^t there must be in y^e world a - selfe acting|ve| autothinæticall being for all body being only <3> ετεροχινετον vnable to produce motion within itselfe but only capable of receiving it being impress'd vppon it there must needs be ἀυτοχὶνετον τὶ in the Vniverse & In y^e next place to Shew y^t the humane Soule is a selfe active selfe moving being & therfore an incorporeall Substance shal \It may/ be made abondantly evident for first to begin with Sence w^ch yet is y^e most passive or Sympatheticall Operation of y^e Soule, wheras that Author maks \it/ to be nothing but y^e action \or motion/ of Corporeall Obiects vppon y^e outward orgains or braine, & our passions or at best |but| Secundary reactions ^\or {reactions}/ only Soe y^t all Sencible Ideas & Conceptions are according to him not only produced by y^e Soule but |by| y^e Obiects without this is evidently false because y^e action of those obiects without is nothing but locall motion & the Apparence or Phancy wee have of things that wee have \perceve/ by Sence, theres \beares/ noe resemblance at all to those locall motions or y^e figure or Sight of parts expressed by them then Phancy of flame light Colours or Sounds are not things Caused by the Obiects without for there is nothing in those object lik vnto y^m \as {plain}/ noe more then when a man is prick with a pin there is any such thing as that phancy of pain in y^e Pin wherfore ^\This allso appears by y^e Glassy Prisme looking glasses / all these things must needs be \Echoes,/ out there being to y^e activity of the Soule itselfe the perception of Sence it selfe must needs be the Soules originall action though occasioned & invited by an Occation \Motion/ made vppon y^e body w^ch the Soule is vitally vnited to may be saide vitally to Sympothize with, this is a notion w^ch Diverse of y^e Old Platonists Suggested long agoe as appears by Boetius De Consulatione ^\& others/ but was never \so/ clearly made out till the Cartesian Philosophy appeared \stept/ vppon y^e Stage Nether will it at all advantage this author to say y^t phancy & appearance is noe reality & y^t in Sence there is really nothing but locall motion as if there was not a reality in phancy or obiective & perception as well as in locall motion nay as if Cogitation had not more reality in it then locall motion

But to let this of Sence pass it is plain y^t phantasies & Imaginations are often activly excited by the Soul itselfe when there is noe Corpooreall motion from y^e Object to produce it for when a man hears another make an \long/ oration for an Hower or two together though all the Severall Words \or sounds/ y^t soe swiftly Succede one another yet as fast as those words turnd out thus noe resemblance at all to those things or notions of the mind w\ch/ they Signify^\ed by them/ yet as fast as they tumble out doth y^e Soule or mind of y^e hearer actively raise phantasms & Ideais correspondent to y^m all for if a man will Say y^t there were all those severall locall motions kept distincly in the brain before without Confusion w^ch is not conceivable to be possible nor that they should Continue without Dying soe long as forty or fifty years together wheras y^e tremulous vibration of a bell made by y^e more {ver} <4> {vertigineous} stroke of the clapper vppon it melts & vanisheth away {illeg} empty {illeg} find out every motion {illeg} {illeg} a throng or Croud corresponding to every word nay it could not possibly tell what to looke for if it had not an {illeg} {illeg} phantasme or Idea of it before for he y^t looks for any thing must needs have a phantasme of what he looks for or else he will never be able to Know when he hath found it Wherefore it must needs be y^e active power of y^e Soule y^t must immediatly {illeg} & phantasmes proper for every word & commands y^e Spirits in y^e brain to move in y^e same manner as they doe when an such Corporeall things was perceivd by Sence

The like may be collected from memory w^ch can not possibly be Corporeall motions continued in y^e braine but must proceed from an active power in y^e Soule it selfe & if y^e Phantasmes of all things wee remember be soe many motions continually acted in y^e brain all together imagination & memory being nothing but y^e remainders of locall motions & Sence there can be noe reson given but evry one should have so many phantasmes actually in his mind as he hath of those locall motions for why should one of y^m be a phantasy or phantasms as well as another soe y^t a mans mind should have at once have as many severall distinct Cogitations in it as there are beese humming in a full hive or Swarme

Wee else where demonstrated in this Discourse y^t there are intelligable Ideas distinct from phantasmes & y^t there are vniversall & abstract Conceptions & Notions ^\of things/ as well as names w^ch must needs proceed from y^e active Energy of y^e Soule & y^t there are inumerable Ideas of such things as never could com in by y^e windows of y^e Sences.

And lastly y^e Soules activity appears in fixing & determining its cogitations & volitions purposes & designes for a long time together vppon y^e Same obiects in regulating & gviding its thoughts in a long train or Series to one End in inventing long \voluminous/ Coherent contexues of con sen\t/entious or Judicious Thoughts \&/ when wee seriousy shall Consider these & many other things of this nature must needs conclude y^t whoesoever shall make all Cogitations to be nothing but mechanically pas motions passivly received without not only to be far more phenaticall \than they can be chargd to be/ then any y^t hold incorporeal Substances but to be as perfectly {quod hoc} as any in Bedlam

By severall of the former instances it alreddy appeared y^t the Soul hath not only a Selfactivity \another kind of selfactivity/ in the Sense before\here/mentioned: i.e. to be the beginning and originall of motion & Action or ^\a power of/ Acting from it self, but alsoe in another Sense of Acting uppon it self ^ i.e. a power of Self=excitation. For it is from the Soul and from an originall Activity in it y^t some of them doe rise and springe up in us as it were of themselves ^\stealing {vpon vs}/ preventing our animadversion or attention they surprize us and invade us and seem to be obtruded uppon \vs/ w^ch

^\Of this Nature are/ Those thinges the Schoolmen call motus primo primi and determined them not to be subject to the imperium or Command of our will, they arise \vp/ from y^t inward ^\& ever bubling/ fountaine of life of \in/ the Soul itself, and present our attention or election \anticipate both Affētiō &/ election the Springe or fountaine of the ^\w^ch Naturall/ Animal or natural \which/ life ^\vs \it is/ as Naturall or Animal/ (as we elswhere show), is restless self=desire w^ch can never be extinguished but by the extinction of life or annihillation of being, \for/ this does alway ἀναβλύειν or Scaturine w^ch passionate or affective thoughts particular appetites, & desires, y^t come ^\or steal/ uppon us before we thinke of it \it/, and whether we will or noe, and though these seem to pertake of y^e generall ^\Nature of/ volitions or will, yet they are a kind of involuntary or unelective volitions ^\& Velleities/ and we Commonly attribute them unto nature. \as y^e cause of thē we being but passively active in them./ as if they were natures Activity in us and not our owne ^\2/: And there is ^\allso another signall between/ a difference in these kind of motions for ^\there are/ two Sorts, or species of them, one are the Suggestions of naturall appetite and the other are the Suggestions of naturall conscience (a thinge as alltogether \as/ unextinguishable in humane nature as the former and \w^ch/ doth as much obtrude if self uppon us ^\as appears especially in y^e Morsus conscientico y^e {Checke} of Conscience -/ an internall dictate of w^at ought to be done or not done not electivly produced p~ \by/ us but ^\as it were/ comming ^\or stealing/ uppon us ^\& that with more {majesty & autority} then importunity or violence/ Now this y^t we have hitherto spoken of is a certaine simple life \Energy/ or Activity of the Soul \but/ there is another reduplicat^\ive/ life, or activity, an \its/ animadversive \&/ selfexertive and self=determinated\ive/ power y^t we are conscieous of w^thin our Selves ^\to come y^mselves/ whence we are ^\since by that we seem to be/ Κυριοι Lords, & Masters and \to/ have a command or imperium, and these thinges are sd to be at \put in/ manu et consilis nostri these thinges the Stoicks call τὰ Ηροιρετικα \& τὰ {illeg}/ and Aristotle mae\ea/ns the same thing p~ his Ηροαίρηοις w^ch we ^\haue/ thus described by a reduplicate\ive/ self=Activity a self=exertion\ve/ self=determination\ve Power of y^e soul/ w^ch is y^t thinge in generall in w^ch all blame and commendation, as Attributed \belonging/ to persons, \proper/ and not to thinges, is founded in as we shall shew afterward -

But there is a certaine kind of Psycology which hath been \much/ entertained in these latter ages w^ch hinders the understanding of y^t w^ch wee are now about and very much obscurs this whole Doctrine concerning y^t Liberty or free agency of man, w^ch makes him capable of sinner\ning/ culpable for the same; and that is this y^t there are severall Facultys in us w^ch are |3| not \{illeg}/ really distinct from \frō one another but allso frō y^e soul itself/ w^thin us but really from the Soul. ^\3/ but the cheife ^\of these Fac./ w^ch carry all the stroke in a man are the Faculty of the understanding and the faculty of the will, the one of w^ch they would have to understand, or to be the efficient cause of al intellections, and the other the will or to bee the adæquate cause, & subject of volitions w^ch they make as it were to bee two distinct persons from one another, wherof the one does \purely/ doe nothinge but vnders^td w^thout any the least affection, appetite, volition and desire; the other does Doe nothing but will w^thout the Least mixture, or complication of knowledge intellection, or Light

And therefore is said to be perfectly blind, & darke, morover they tell us y^t the nature of these two Facultys are \is/ such, that the vnders^tding always goes before being the Δαδαύχος or Torch=bearer in the Soul,\I/ and then y^t the blind Faculty of will necessarily and unavoidably follows after, from where the Action does necessarily alsoe, follow \ensue/ for the will (Though blind) is the absolute and uncontrowlable Queen or Empress of the Locomotive, and all other the inferior facultys whose Command all the \Spirits/ Nerves and mussels w^thout dispute obey; Now the Result of this Psychologicall Hypothesis is this y^t there is noe ὁυτ' ἐξουσιας \{illeg}/ power, nor self-exertive, self=determinative Ability Lodged any where y^t the whole Soul does no where act uppon it self ^\as being one with itselfe & within itself/ but always one part of it necessarily uppon another ^\that there can be no such thing as Endeavour or Striving/ and y^t consequently y^t there can be noe foundation of praise, or dispraise nor disert of punishm^t or reward, for first the understanding ^\Fac/ is a purly necessary Agent it understanding necesssarily this or y^t to be true or fals Good or Evil and w^th no more election then the Eye sees & distinguishes colours and then the Faculty of willing doth as necessarily dictate \{illeg}/ what the Last will \Dictate/ of the underst^ding determineth to be done, and lastly all men grant y^t the executed\ive/ powers are subject to the will it haveing a despoticall power \Dominion/ over them, so y^t all the links of this ^\{illeg}/ chaine are fatal and Adamantick\ne/, and necessarily connected ^\with one another/ & \allso/ w^th y^t other greater Adamantine Chaine the Series of physicall causes & materiall motions w^thout us, for thinges being soe and soe w^thout, and althing appearing as the doe to the vnderstanding ^\Faculty/ in every particular moment of time no man could possibly doe otherwise then he does \or has done/ and \For/ according to this Doctrine it is plaine y^t no man or Angel since the first Creation could ever have varied on title from w^at he did nor possibbly have done otherwise in any \y^e least/ thinge, nay if they should all be put to run over the stage of there lives againe, as some suppose they will do \be/ in the revolution of the great Platonicke yeare, haveing all externall thinges the same w^thout y^m \it must be granted y^t/ they could not but \all/ play over the same lesson, \in every {mixing & evolution} without any varying/ and dance the same measures throughout, \& lead every step as/ y^t they did before, wherefore the Authors of this Hypothesis though they hould unquestionably incorporeall Substances and selfactive being in the first, sense namely such as is an Originall of Action \th it/ exerting intellection and volition actively, yet they must needs destroy selfactive being in the second sense, (i.e.) outexousiousness, suipotency\poterity/ and selfdominion ^\over actions/ w^ch is a higher ^\& more noble/ Energy of immateriall being then the former:

Wherefore to give a censure to \of/ this Doctrine w^ch is the Maine philosophicall Pillar \Basis/ of y^t \such a / necessity, \& Natural {illeg}/ that is destructive of morality and Religion we say in the first place y^t it is very absurd to make these Facultys of understanding and will to be thinges really distinct from the Soul ^\as it were/ thinges clapped uppon it and fastened ^\on/ or nailed to it, \and to attribute actions to them as substantiate Beings, or Persons & make a Family of/ but it is no great marvell if the same Phylosophy w^ch made substantial formes Qualitys and Accidents to be thinges really distinct from matter & Body \and attributed actions to them,/ |should| used the same grossness and clumsiness in ^\handling/ the doctrine of Spirits ^\or/ of cogitative beings wherfore I say it is absurd to Attribute the Actions of vnderst^ding and will not to the Soul it self but to the Faculty|s| of vnderstanding and Faculty of \Fac:/ willing w^ch is \and it is/ altogether as ridiculous as if a man should say y^t the Faculty of speaking speakes \Fac: of seeing sees/ y^t the Locomotive Faculty walkes or runs and the Faculty of risibillity Laugh's for as it is the man y^t ^\speakes sees/ walkes speaks and Laughs and not his Facultys so it is not the underst^ding y^t vnders^ds or the will y^t wills, but the Soul |y^t| both underst^ds and will's -

Morouer if it is as ubsurd to think that thar can be so gret a diferens betwen thes fackolts them selfs as that on of them might Exersis it self a lon with out the lest Com moxtur of the other for how is it posabell to Will with out the lest know ledg or understanding of that which on Wils or to dilebreat Consult & rashosenat with out wiling so to doe or \self/ determining of the under standing both to its Exersis & to its obgeckt A Wharfor it is plane that it is on & the thay ar not to distenkt fackoltes in us of under standing & Wiling in us that ackt Seueraley by them selfs but it is on & the same Sole that booth Wills understandingly & understands Wilingly Which whole understanding & wiling sole hath a reduple Catefe life or Self acktefety in it wharby it is anamaddarsiue self exertif self determinatif and can exarsis an emperum apon it self both as understanding & Wiling exite & a waken it selfe it Ether infors or {reprev} its inferor afexans or ^\{Penderosities} &/ inclenasions and so be Mastar of its on \selfe &/ axons or put forth strong conatasus and indeuours towards it.

But if it Should be her obgeckted that the deficolty will still reman the Same though this Childish hypotheses of fackoltes of the Sole destinkt from on a nother was \quite exploded &/ layd a Side for it cannot be Emagened that \a/ rash Rashonall & intelegabell being shold ackt otherwis ^\or be moved/ then by the |T| \Force of an/ aperant of good first understod, & that it Shoul'd not be nesesarely determened by the apparans & aprehenshan of good & efell to chus on & avoide the other and by the propondransy of good & efell that the Scale should not be turned by the greter Waite for the embrasing of on & the estewing of the other for if a leser good of which the understanding is iudg might be chosen & prefered befor a greter thair \could/ cannot posably be any Cause \as/ defined of this determinasion thar being nothing in Nature to prepondarat that {Waiye} and it is as Concefabell that Efell as such shold be {stayabell} as a leser good

To this wee answer y^t though this be \seem/ a plausible argumentation & a thing w^ch in som Sense \is true/ yet there is a Nicety in y^e right vnderstanding of it wherfore for y^e clearing of this bvisness wee shall suggest these following Considerations \as/ first y^t y^e τὸ αρωτον κινουν y^e beginning of action & motion both in y^e Soul of man & all perceptive beings (concerning w^ch Aristote is the only philosopher wee know of y^t hath started any question) is not {define} speculative Intellection or raciocination for it is ^\indeed/ Ends w^ch are y^e Beginnings of perceptive & cogatating|ve| motion & ends doe not \spring frō/ {fall} vnder \or proceed frō/ deliberation Consultation ratiocination but prevents them ^\& sets their wheels on work{er} and this/ w^ch the fore mentioned Aristote often obserues, The \First/ Ends w^ch are indeed y^e beginnings of all motion are not Sought for, invented & elected by us, but as was before hinted are obtruded vppon us & may be said in a Sence to proceed from naturs activity in us though not without oure owne \allso/ |T| As Common Notions are y^e principles of all Speculation soe Ends are y^e principles \or Beginings/ of all Cogitationnsultations & action. In y^e Animall life y^e first Spring of activity are|is| not Syllogisms made in mood & Figure nor long ^\{Conscious}/ catenations of rationall Consequences \{operosely}/ inferring at last such Conclusions but it is somthing w^ch is never to seeke \but is beforehand with vs./ as we \y^t/ prevents all our inquiries obtrvding it selfe every where vppon us y^t \It is an/ inward ever bubling fountain of sel\fe/ Desire together with a presentaneous Consciovsness of all the Capacities ^\in vs we have/ belonging therevnto. With in y^e Sphere of this animall Life men are never to seek for ends but only for means & ways, Naturall instinct a more Simple thing & more redy at hand then raconation prompts Ends wⁿ to us in this animall Life, Life would be at a Stop & all activity would cease if ends w^ch are y^e Springs of Life & Desire should ever fiale us or be to seeke a perfect Languor Torpor & Lethurgy ^\& Death/ would immediatly cease vppon us ^\for it would be like y^e stoppage of y^e Pulse or Motiō of y^e Heart in y^e Life of the body:/ & as there is another Life w^ch is cald divine Soe y^e principle of all Activity & motion in y^t ^\allso/ is not drie ratiocination nether, w^ch {hath} a slow & tedious buisness \progress & motiō/ & could not set it selfe a work nether nor make its own wheels move vnless it were \excited/ Spirited inlivened & awaked\end/ by somthing else but it is an inward simple Divi^\ne/ principle w^ch is prompt & ready at hand a Svperrational & Svperintellectuall Instinct, this is both End & Beginning this doth not only excite all indeavour but measure all means & action & of this Aristotle speaks {κινεί πως ἀ παυτα θειοί καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν} it is a divine thing in us y^t is y^e first mover|s| ^\all/ y^t is, in y^evirtuous life, \&/ to conclude this therfore the fist beginning of {notion} \& motion/ in y^e humane Soule & all perceptive being is not ^\vnderstanding in this sense y^t is/ as is ratiocination but \for/ this it selfe is ^\allwaies existed &/ set on work by somthing ^\else/ y^t is more simple and preventive.

Again as the first Spring of vitall action is not from the Speculative vnderstanding soe nether is drie & insipid ratiocination the \only/ measure & Rule of good & Evell. Ends & Goods are all one for Good is nothing but what is agreable to Ends, w^ch proceed from a more simple ratiocination nature in us then y^t of ratiocination for \which/ cause y^ePlatonists make τάγαγον in order of nature to be inf\sup/eriour to Νούς or Intellect it is not their {a} speculative Knowledge <9> that is y^e proper rule or Judge of Good or Evell \unhindered by any th^g else/ but vitall Tuches Lusts & Sapours, the Speculative Vnderstanding alone by itselfe \{&}/ want|s| a principle ^\{illeg}/ to discern y^m & Judge them by, y^e Speculative \It/ is here but like y^e Moon w^ch Shines with a borrowed derivative Light: the first principle by wch good & Evell are distinguished is vitall & not notionall. soe long as men adhere to y^e b|B|etter p|P|rinciple they See y^e things of Morality in a true light but assoon as they diviet & turne y^mselves from it they turne away from the light & are \wrapt/ in obscurity & darkness. The light of the Speculative Vnderstanding as to Good & Evell is a certaine principle of Life. & as they keep close to y^t or deviate from it accordingly is their Judgment different to w^ch y^t of Aristotle is consentaneous {ὀποὶοι πὰρ ἑκετις ἐτὶ τοίυτο καὶ τὸ τὲλος φαίεται αυτῷ} according as a \every/ mans vitall disposition is soe is a mans Judgment divesified conserning ends & Goods, & accordingly he tells ^\vs/ y^t ευφυία is \a/ thing y^t much Conduceth to a right perception & descernment of Good & Evell & he y^t is εὔφυκ \is he y^t/ {& y^t} hath a right vitall principle in him hath \w^ch is/ τὸ μίγιστον καὶ τὸ κάλαιτον καὶ ὁ Λὰρ έτερου μή οὶεντε λαβεῖν μηδε μαδειν hath y^e most excellent noble & pretious thing w^ch it \is/ not possibly for a man to get by mere Study or learning \frō another/ as all Speculative Knowledge may be allowed \acquired/ {illeg} There is a great diference in mens as to this εὐφοῖα there naturall right Sapour & descerment of Good & Evell is not supposed by Aristotle & seems to be a thing out of Quastion ^\& the cause of it is obscure/ but the Platonists venturd to determine y^t the originall of it was εκ τῶν σροβη βιομενων \&/ from a different Vse of there αυτεχουσιος power in som former State However those y^t seem most to want it y^t internall principle w^ch is {ὅσπερ ὀψας ἥ κρενεί της \εν α/ καλωί καὶ τὸ κατα ἀλήθιαν ἀγαθὸν ἀιαποετας} w^ch is as it were Sight or an Eiye by w^ch a man may See & Judge of y^t true Good, yet they are not vtterly distituted of the same, though it be obscure in them & \however it {were} seeme to be obscured/ by the ex right vse of their Autexosious power & y^e utmost exersion of y^e same according to their presant Ability may recover it by Degrees more & more By all w^ch y^t wee have Said it appears y^t mens Volitions doe noe more Depend uppon their Knowlidge in morall things then their Knowlidge doth vppon them \willings & actings, but that they are concomitant {thogt}/ & the same Soule being both Knowing & willing both are Knowing\ledge & will in moralls are do/ & acting depends a like \fall vnder y^t/ autexousious things \Power/ & depend vppon y^emore or less exerting of \the same/ there autexousious power & this \mens/ wachfullness & circvmspexion

The truth \sum̄e/ of what wee have said \is/ y^t it is not an antecedent right of y^e Speculative Vnderstanding y^t begins & \previously/ determins all Volitions & actions ^\& is y^e first Distinguisher of Good {& Evill}/ but y^t it is a vitoll touch Sapour & Relish w^ch in those y^t doe not allwaies stand vppon their guard & have an awakned exertion of Spirit {of} \{towards}/ altered by their magicall {affecxion} \alurement/ of the lower animall Life in \at/ y^e same & time & in y^e same steps degres & proportions y^t they remit of their exercion & Circvmspexion Soe y^e both {doe please at} Ignorance & weakness steels vppon y^m at once & the truth of this will Appeare by mens own experiance to them y^t will Consult it \+/ {such \y^t/} Speculation alone without another internall Light to gvid & direct it will never com to an End nor arrive \arrive/ to any Satisfactory resolution of mind concerning good & Happiness <10> w^ch appears from the Diversity of Opinions amongst Philosophers in all Ages concerning Summum Bonum \or Happness/ {w^ch} is not a thing at this day generally agreed vppon & resolued soe y^t if a man should never will or act any thing before his Speculative Vnderstanding were clearly resolued concerning this Sum̄um Bonum & happiness he should happily demur & suspend all his lif long & never doe any thing at all \+/ Wee find y^t Religion is a far m generally a far more \greater/ good to y^e world than Philosophy (I speak here of y^e Christian y^t only true Religion) because it rouseth vp & aweakens y^e autexousious power ^\(by all motives imaginable)/ & soe is overmodate to all wheras morall Philosophy requirs a peculiar preparedness & prædisposition of Spirit ^\{illeg}/ for the reception of it ^\som/ prævious purgation of Spirit \Mind/ without w^ch it may be rendred ^\alltogether/ ineffectuall

Wee conclude y^t \Again/ the Hypothesis before mentioned is noe way agreeable to y^e phænomena for if that were true ther needs no thing else to be done in order to vertue but only y^e informing of a mans Speculative Vnderstanding concerning y^e nature of good & happiness by Study Meditation & Discipline \Institution/ & then all Vertue would be got in a moment \as soon as y^e vnderstanding was Convinced/ there would be noe need of exortations & provocations noe need of Ascheticks of Lat indeavour \cōtētion/ \excitation/ wachfullness & Asuefaction or y^e acquiring of Habits, there wou'd be noe more to doe to make man perfecty good & vertuous A then there is to learne y^e Demonstration of som Theorem in Euclid

To inform his Vnderstanding about his True Good & Happines & what most conduces to it as y^t the Diagonon of a Square is assimetrall and incommensurable to the sides ^\For/ because the understanding being once rightly informed, all the other follows easily, because necessarily and unavoidably, so y^t from henc it must be granted, y^t there is no anomalous or refractory princilpe in the Soul, nothing contumatioius to the governm\t/: thereof no new \νευρυοκα τα/ Ροσηαστον nor ἑτεροκίνητον; nothinge obtruded uppon us; but what ^\easily/ springs from our one vnderst^ding and will So y^t all will be smooth & easy, nor ἀντέρισμα or renitency ^\in/ y^t wiged Chariot of y^e Soul w^ch the philosopher speaks of the ενίοχος or Charioters will govern and order all the winged steeds thereof w^thout any trouble or difficulty & p~ the meer becke of thought & will |1+| This \w^ch/ doctrine as it makes all humane Actions & volitions necessary|ily|, so likewise (as Aristotle |2| rightly hath observed) it destroys the τὸ ἄλορον. |2|

In the next place we must now proceed to give a more particular account of this liberum Arbitrium or Autexousious power in the right explication of w^ch there seems to be no small difficulty for the generallity of the assertors of it state it and define it after this manner as if it consisted in A p~fect indifferency of Acting, or not Acting of doing this or y^t Good or evill after all this prærequisite are put to engaged never so much one way more then another, y^t the will is in a this is the privilidge and perfection of the humane will, to be in a perfect æquilibriousness the very next moment before it becks, or nods one way or other

[EDITORIAL NOTE TO READER: fo. 11r contains three lengthy notes in a mixture of Latin, English, and Greek; fo. 12r is blank.]

Thus much shall Svffice here for the rectifiing of the Philosical\losophical/ Hypothesis concerning y^e mode of manner or prosess of y^e Soules operations in order to y^e better clearing autoxousious power, but in y^e next place Wee must now proceed to a more particular & pvnctuall Distinction of this liberum arbitrium or Autexovsious Faculty because many great champions for liberty & freewill gives such an accovnt or explanation of it as may seem Justy exceptable \exceptionall/ & give great advantage to their Antagonist in this Cause for they Declare Liberum arbitrium to Consist in a Perfect Indifferency after all things were put that were prærequisite to determine it one way or other ether to Doe or not doe wh^ch they call a Liberty of Contradiction or else to Good or doe Evell w^ch they call a Liberty of Contrariety & they make essentiall to y^t this glorious prærogative of y^e will of man called Liberty y^t it should not be only non necessitated by any thing without itselfe but allsoe y^t it should not be in itselfe \pre/Disposed more to one then to y^e other more to good then to Evell but y^t it should hang equally lose to both till y^t very moment y^t it is actually determind \by itselfe/ to ether whervppon som take Occasion triumphantly to bost of this their free will y^t it is a greater privilidge then God himselfe hath it being supposed that he can not doe any thing y^t is vniust but man by his freewill hath a prerogative of willing what is morally evell \& Vniust/ as well as is Good ^\& Just/ & herby can withdraw it selfe from y^e yoke of Subiection from \to/ Gods Authorities & Commands & both be free from God & freer then God. It were not amiss to give a Tast of this high Rant in a late Learned \Fam Famous/ treatise de Libero Arbitrio

Prærogativa et prævilegium hoc tantum est ut eo magus creatum a Deo accipere non potuerit per illud enim eo vsq; saltim eximitur Divinæ omnipotentiæ vt independenter ab omni alia {illeg}quasi agat vt posset nolle Subejcti Deo et contrarium {illeg} is q^d Deus esse præcepit a glorious prævilidge indeed to be exempt from Divine Omnipotence & to be able to act independently vppon it & refuse to be Subiect vnto God & to be able \but/ to act Contrary to his Commands but I could never persuade my selfe otherwise y^t this indeed is any other Glorious privildge & Liberty then y^t very same w^ch the Serpentine Svggestions kindled of ^\a {illeg}/ our first Apostatizing progenitors that they should be as Gods Knowing Good & Evil & that those men doe as sillyly bost at y^e Acquisition of y^t a privilidg & <14> power & Liberty & perfection to be freed from y^e necessity of doeing nothing but Just as our first Parents are w^ch is at best weakness & impotency if not Servitude & Captivity w^ch \as/ our first Parents very sillily ambitious to purchase the same to y^mselves & transmit to their Posterity

For how can this be any power or Faculty any perfection or privilidge Liberty or freedom for any being to be indfferent to its ^\owne/ Good & free to it \own/ Evell? For is God|od| w^ch is y^e rule & measure of all perfection hoc ipsvm q^d dicitur Svi {Jovis} esse ratione & gratia boni est volendum, it is good w^ch is y^e only ratio of Appetability & Volatibitity ^Volibility all power & Liberty consists in promoting its \a mans/ own Good & it can be noe Evell \Freedom/ to procure any hurt or Evell to a mans self; & therefore there is a monstruous non-naturality in this pretended faculty of Freewill as it is thus taken \stated/ to be an absolute indifferency to oure owne Good or Hurt, this is a broken & vnShatre'd ^\confounded/ principle & an vnnaturall Nature; w^ch is partly confessed by these Authors themselues when they acknowledge y^t the will can not be free (w^ch \y^t is/ in their Language is y^e same will indifferent as to a mans happiness & Summum Bonum. \2/ whence |2| wee may gather alsoe \collect/ y^t the true meaning of this Assertion y^t the liberty & perfection of mans Nature consisteth in an Indifferency \of will/ to {switch} to morall Good to|&| Evell, is noe other then this y^t what is commonly called morall Good & Evell hath ^\haue no necessary connexion with happiness or misery/ noe reall or physicall Goodness or Evell in y^m or that they are not Good & evell per Se but by accident only, as because Commanding|ed| by an omnipotent being y^t can bestow y^e greatest rewards or punishments; from whenc it will follow y^t the highest privilidg \or perfection/ y^t humane Nature is capable of is to have & ^\Fore that y^e/ will ^\may be/ Vndetermined by any thing but by it selfe \+ & indifferent to Honesty or Dishonesty/; w^ch in plainer words is to will nothing else but to what vnacountable Lvsts & Appetits determins a man to & i|I|ndeed a late famious writer De Libero Arbitrrio giues this account of y^e wills ^\being/ vndetermined to Good & Evell though it hath noe indifferent freedom to Happiness, because y^e only Good w^ch is Desird propter se is bonum Jocundum vel delectabile Solo delectabili bono fevitne homo boni honesti nulla per se est fevitio to w^ch he superaddeth Recti et Honesti Species vsq; quaq; cuta non est q^d enim huic populo huic homini honestum & rectum est id allui in honestum est & turpe at bonum delectabile omnibus populis nationibus hominibus vnum prorsus Idemq; est. (Episcop; p202) according to w^ch Author all Honesty Josh c. {illeg} & Vertue is noe otherwaise Desirable then it may be a means to being a man after this life to an iudjment of y^e Delectable Good, \or Pleasure/ to y^e full; y^t is of Gratifiing all his Appetits & Desirs w^ch are \1/ y^e measurs of it & therfore noe wonder if a mans will have naturally noe bias vppon it to incline it to choose morrall Good rather then morall evell but be alike indifferent to them both. In sum̄ the meaning of this Doctrine is y^t the nature of man is in it selfe indifferent & hath noe bias vppon it to Determin in|t| to will or not will Morall Good or Evell but hangs alike loose to both but if not soe indifferent to Jocundity & Inivcundity for freewill is y^e highest faculty in humane Nature & that vppon w^ch all Actions doe depend <15> Now \Again/ from this Doctrine it follows y^t it is nether possible for y^e Will of man ever to be determed to Good only, or to be fixed in a state of Holiness or Rightiousness nor if it could would be a Desirable Perfection to it for it would be a most \vn/naturall Violence & essentially contradictious to his liberty A man can not be free if there be any necessity vppon him to Good but his freedom Consits in a per Keeping himselfe in a perfect equilibrious indifferency as to all other things soe to morall Good & evill Honesty & Dishonesty So y^t God is not free, nor Beatified saints & Angells -

Moreover if a mans essentiall freedom consist in an Indifferency to good & evell & every thing else it will follow from hence, because noe Essentiall property can ever be taken from any being y^t it would be allwais as easy for him to doe one as y^e other & y^t in noe state or Condition in w^ch a man is in will their ever need any more Conatus more Streanth or Vigerous Exertion in doing Good or \then/ Evell it being but the chancable turning of this indifferent versatile thing called Liberty \Freewill/ this way or that There being \are/ noe pervious propensions in y^s will y^t is allwais essential \it/ by dissenting to turne ether way |&| it|f| being as {subtlely} \as easily/ determinable it selfe\ed/ by being as {illeg} \by it selfe within/ as y^e posture of y^e weathercock is by y^e wind without w^ch Hypothesis if it was true it would the wickedest Person y^t is might at any time at \in/ a moment by his freewill make himselfe as holy as the highest Seraphim. But these things are not agreeable to y^e Phenomena.

Again if this be a naturall faculty of y^e humane Soule to have a will indifferent as to other things Soe alsoe to Morality or Good & evell then they will \a man/ can not possibly be Jusly liable to blame or fault for y^e Vse of this freewill etherway, because there can be noe fault in the mere Vse of any naturall power & faculty according to its |true| nature Nay there would be as much perfection ^\& liberty/ in y^t w^ch is Commonly \called/ Sin & vice as in y^e Contrarity; Nature never sees nor Sins \sinne is a Præternaturall thing/ Now there is noe Deviation from nature when this Equiliberous naturall faculty turns itself one way more then another Freewill is \ac/Counted y^e Glory High Previlidge ^\Crown/ & prerogative of humane nature y^e Pherfect Dowry w^ch God hath bestowed vppon it & therfore nothing can præiudicate y^e Same, externall laws writen down in books or if they were ingraven vppon y^e Vnderstanding cannot cast any obligation vppon this will w^ch is free from all prævious Dictats or Deveinnations, & is y^e Soverain Qveen \& Empres/ of her own actions For her to svffer herselfe to be determined wi by any thing without it selfe would be to abandon its own right & previlidge w^ch God & Nature hath bestowd vppon it & therfore must needs be faltless in what ever |2| it dos

But further if free will w^ch is y^e principle y^t detemins all humane actions be it selfe Indifferent & Vndetermined therefore can not be said to be Κυριος Lords & Masters of our Volitions or to have any autexousious Command over our selues but must be perfectly subiect to mere chance & Fortune Sitting at y^e helme & Steiring all our Determinations \x/ & what a Condition is man Kind Subiect vnto & to what purpose were those faculties of Reson & Vnderstanding given him if when wisdom Prudence & Sage Experience have long debated & liberally concerning his {affaires} <16> chance folly & madness indifferent blind & fortvitious will must \{at last}/ resolue & determine all moreover it can not be conceived as \{nor}/ well expressed in y^e Obiections how indifferency & indetermination can be y^e cause of any Determination there being noe reson to be given why it should produce this Effect more then that & therfore to make indifferent freewill to be y^e Cause of all humane Determinations seems to be to make y^m have noe cause at all

Lasty wee might add here y^t according to this Hypothesis there can be noe inlet nor avenue for Divine Grace Inflvence & Assistance to approch y^e will of man or lay hold vppon it it being a thing w^ch God himselfe by making it essentially \in/different hath put out of his own power & exempted from his Jvrisdiction for that he can not though he would never soe fain by all his omnipotence promote or Advance the Good or Sanctity of any frewilled Being.

Having thus made it manifest y^t this can not be a right Discription of Liberum Arbitrium or freewill y^t it should consist in an absolute indifferrency to doe or not doe anything & to doe Good or Evell determined although \therefore/ not by {mere} Light or Good but mere Contingency & Casualty; & that this can not be a as it is noe perfection soe it could not be \{such}/ a power of faculty in any being nether could God make any such thing ^\as this/ Wee must now proceed positivly to shew what it is & to explain the Nature of it in Such a manner as y^t it may not be clogd with such monsterous absurdities & Inconvenienceis as y^e Vsuall way of its explaining it is

Wee have shown before y^e Genericall Nature of this Liberum arbitrium or frewill y^t it is a selfe active power in y^e Soul & y^t in two Senses not only as y^eSoule is y^e principle & originall of this activity y^t it flows from it as y^e first Spring & Fountain for indeed all y^e other actions & Energies of y^e Soule are such for they are not ὁδισμοι or ἕλ{ξερι} Frasions or Fraxions as in inanimate & Corporiall beings y^t have noe selfe activity at all in y^m

But secondly this is alsoe a selfe activity in another sence, as y^e Soule doth not only act from it selfe but alsoe in a reduplicative manner vppon itselfe Wherby it doth excite gvid Stare determine & excite itselfe as being itselfe both agent & Patient passive to itselfe & active vppon it selfe w^ch therfore may be will be called not a Simple life or Energy but a reduplicative life of the Soule

Wee shall now promove a {cl} litle furthar & in y^e next place add y^t this Liberum arbitrium is a true perfection & naturall power & faculty of y^e Soule w^ch is in its own nature Good & primarily intended for the promoting & advancing y^e Good of it ^\& nothing else/ though because indeed it be a Midle Perfection \or/ a Power & Perfection, in a Being not perfectly perfect, & therfore may be said Comparativly in Respect of God & if there be any other beings absolutly impecably to be an imperfection & though by accident & by y^e Ill Vse of it \{or non exercize therof}/ Sin Blame & Guilt fetch their Originall from it.

Yet it is a true & reall perfection in itselfe wherby humane nature is advanced above the Condition of Bruttes soe far as we can gvess of them by y^e Phænomena & by y^e proper Vse & exercise therof as it is primarily intended by God & Nature may be elevated \improved/ to a participation of y^e Devine or deiforme Life Nay though Sin be formally an Imperfection & Defect yet peccability it selfe is a Comparitave perfection in respect of Brutts it being fovnded in a Principle Svperiour to y^e animall Nature & svpposing a power or possibility of Doing Moraly well for nothing can Sin w^ch is vncapable of Morality or Vertue

Wee say \y^t/ y^t L A or frewill το αυτεχουσιον & τὸ ἐφ' ἥμῖν is a true perfection & active power of y^e Soule wherby it can advance & promote itselfe to attempt Good & Perfection w^ch its Nature is capable of & having Severall Powers & Faculties in it can rouse vp excite & awaken the best things within itselfe, & determine itselfe to adhere to y^e better ^\& more Interior/ principles within itselfe against y^e worse & excite a Conatus force & power, from within itselfe to bare down y^e worser principle when it is factiously & seditiously {resilent} & against y^e better & at lest in time by a Continuation of this exerted Conatus, perfectly prevail over all Worse things within itselfe, banish all |H| Eutochinecy all faction & discord out of y^e Soule & reduce it to Vnity by making the best things to rule Over the Worse, & by this means to make y^e whole Soule to be Compass Sui or Svipotent & the man Κρίτων ἑαυτοῦ & Κυριος ἑαυτοῦ Superior to himselfe & Lord & master over himselfe this is the true nature Scope & End of y^t w^ch is Commonly called Ella L. A. a ^\selfexerted/ power & perfection, Streanth & Vigour tending only to Good.

But before wee proceed any furthar wee must obserue here y^t there is a doble L. A. or autexousion (though wee doe not find it at all taken notice of) y^t might \ust/ be distionguished from on another for first there is a L. A. with in y^e sphere of y^e Animall life only w^ch wee shall explain thus when a Desire riseth or a pashion is suddingly Kindled towards the attaining of som particular good nigh at hand by y^e avoiding of som im̄inent Evell this \whereby y^e Soule falls itselfe/ Stimulat|ed| provocked & {flexes} \Urged/ Soule to Action, but being Conscius within itselfe of a higher power or faculty y^t it hath then this of pashion, wose light is ^\but/ narrow turbid & Misty namly y^t faculty commonly called reson y^e can {longivs prospicie^t} look further before it & alsoe rovnd about it & consider what Inconveniencies may arise from y^e gratification of this vrging Appetite how it may hinder y^e gratification of more or greater & afterwards \&/ procure a greater pain & Inconveniance then y^e greater plesure & Conveniance is, w^ch faculty is much improved by experiance of y^e hurts wee have ^\formerly/ fovnd soe by yealding to present Appetite & plesure. y^e Soule \It is conscious allso y^t it/ hath a selfe active autexousious power to con excite & command a full Consultation Deliberation & search concerning what is most prophitable or will tend to y^e promote y^e greater & more durable plesure? & then ^\Power allso/ to determine itselfe to y^e {illeg} of it & though the foresaid Appetite is as it still importunatly urge to pursue som \that/ particular presant Good or avoid som particular Evell & doe in a manner ^\with force/ hold it & pull it that way, yet \y^t/ it can exert a certain ^\{illeg}/ natur force & strenth against y^t Conatus of Appetite & Passiones prevaile over us \it/ soe to proceed and act theron & perhaps it ^\that/ may continue {remurmer}\ing/ a good while after <18> but it is possible y^t the Soule may be here defective in y^e exertion of this autexovsious faculty ether in consulting or continving sufficent deliberation or else in not exerting a Sufficient Conatus Streanth & Vigour but Succvmbing passivly to y^e vrging importunity of y^e presant appetite & Pashion ^\{illeg}/ suffer itselfe to be carried away with it & then it is conscious to itselfe y^t it is faulty & blame worthy not as guilty of any morall Evell properly called Sin but because it was wanting to itselfe within y^e S\{pan}/hare of y^e Animall Life ^\as to Private {vtility}/ & herevppon follows after repentance allsoe & regret of mind Selfe Displeasure & dissatisfaction all w^ch plainly argue ^\according to/ the Sence of Nature y^t here was a Defect of exercising an autexovsious power for it is nonscence y^t nature should prompt a man to be angry with himselfe & take revenge vppon himselfe or pvnish himselfe with greife or Indignation (for Soe y^e Case plainly is) for y^t he could not possibly helpe or avoid ^\and so we/ blami|e|ng of a mans selfe and alsoe of other men for being wanting only ^\to thēselves/ in respect of \their own/ private Vtility; though there be nothing of y^t w^ch is properly ^\called/ morall evell, \which/ plainly Shows y^t t|T|here is ^\therfore/ a lower Species of L. A. besids y^t w^ch the Moralists talk soe much of; & alsoe y^t there is an |H|eterocinesy & Norospathy to|in| y^e Soule of man as acting in y^e animall life only a Diversity of ^\subordinate/ powers & principles ^\y^e Inferior &/ factiovsly opposing \y^e higher/ one another causing |3| Scisme & Discord in it \3 Tell y^e {Revenging} and com̄anding Power/ & alsoe a superiour {roving} power to arbitrate & determin those Differences \& with some Labour & {cōtētion to cōpose them} w^ch is a certain/ w^ch is That Power autexovsion or L. A. without w^ch the Soule win in y^e animall Life would be a many headed Montur & \a/ mere ^\confused/ Democrasy of Confusion. I cannot think as Epicurus did Seem to Doe y^t there is such a liberum arbitrium as this \were/ in brutts \{tho ꝑhaps}/ ther being noe Appearence y^t they have soe large a Prospect\ing/ nor soe free a faculty as y^e discursive \& freely discursive Faculty as that/ reson as in men is, about motiue of {illeg} & Vtility, only but y^e Discord w^ch is between y^m is of thins \coordinated/ {illeg} on the same levell, a Discord of ^\{narrow}/ Short at Scighted pashions alternatly schuffling with one another to here the Victory \at/ last naturally falls to |2| y^e Strongest but y^e autexovsious faculty is only exercisd where there Is somthing Inferiour & somthing Svperiour. & it is a power or {str} Streanth in y^e Soule of determining its actions according to y^e better thing in it & the furthast Discovery ^\or Prospect made/ of its own Good.

Wee thought it necessary to take notice of this Species of liberum arbitrium & to Discribe it distinctly y^t it may appeare how much it differs from y^t other Species \of it/ y^t follows after because wee obserue y^t there is a frequent vndiscerned æquivocation in y^e Vse of this name or Word Liberum arbitrium or freewill it being many tims taken only in this Sence w^ch wee have discribed & yet never the less mistaken for the other Species of it w^ch is very different from y^t Same & therfore y^t Attributed to y^e former w^ch belongs to y^t latter only It is an Opinion of som y^t there needs noe more to y^e begetting of Morality Duty & obligation & consequently of Morality Justice & Iniustice of Actions but only free will & a law externally promulgated And there by freewill & they tell us a power of Determing our wills & actions otherwise then by Pashions & Appetits as Brutts doe but after y^e Vse of Reson & Deliberation y^e will then resolving itselfe to doe & not Doe./ but by Reson here they mean nothing else but ether ratiocination or Syllogisation making inferences <19> or Conclusions from speculative Principles or else y^e Reson of a mans priuate Vtility Soe y^t they conceive, to a being y^t is elivated soe far above brutts y^t its volitions are not its merly ill Sensitive Appetites but y^t it can raciocinate & deliberate & afterwards ^\freely/ will there is nothing more requisite to beget morall Obligation in it but only y^e giving of an externall Law, but wee conceive this to be a great Errour proceeding from an equivocation in y^e Words frewill & Reson

And wee concieve that if God should make a world of Creaturs in humane Shape & indue them not only with Brutish Appetits & Pashions but alsoe with a power of Deliberating according to Reson concerning their own Vtility by comparing the presant time with y^e future & considering with |of| all else as \&/ consequences of Actions, & after this Activity freely to choose or will but should Superad nay I may ad Nay if they should have \give them/ power alsoe to make Syllogismes in mood & figure & demonstrate all y^e Geometricall Theorems in Evclid & Archelsides & after all this, give y^m a frewill to choose & elect what they ple|2|ased; but Superad nothing more \other Principle/ to y^m ^\whatsoever Lawes he should give them/ they would be noe more capable \2/ of ^\Obligation or/ Morality nor have any ^\more/ Sence ofo Conscience or of y^e Discrim\en/ Honestorum & turpium then Foxes Apes & Babons, They having really noe principle of Obligation in them to any thing but their own private Vtility & plesure w^ch doth not proceed from reson \neither/ but Animall Appetite & \nat/|rall| selfe=love; for it is very plain that here is nothing y^t can beget morall Obligation morall \in y^m/ their Actions would be measured & circumscribed by their own private Emolument & plesure, & their ratiocination is \would be/ only about means in order to and ends w\ch/ it doth not mak|d|e but Supposed ^\by it/ [but concerning Syllogisticall & Methematicall reasing how this cannot alone fond morality is discorsed more largly in another place] but a law externally given can only ingage s the externall law promulgated could not other wais Operate or cease Vppon them but by taking hold vppon their naturall selfish Pashions feare of pain & Pvnishments & hope of externall rewards & he y^t will allow of noe other obligation then this ^\vtterly/ distroys {air} all morality

Wherfore besids this animall freewill w^ch wee have discribed ther must be another Species of morall frewill & as y^t animall frewill is radicated in y^e amplitude of reson, or the power of ratiocinating concerning y^e power of our private Vtility & its Svperiority above the narrowness of Pashion & Appetite Soe y^t freewill w^ch is truly morall, is radicated & originated in another principle of life Superiour to y^e animall, & as y^e first is a selfe acting\ve/ power wherby a man ^\may/ Dominers over y^e Captivity of perticular Pashions in adheri|e|ng|ce| to y^e freer Dictats of Reson concerning his own Vtility Soe this latter is a selfe acting|ve| Selfe Determining power, \or/ a selfe exertadig Vigour, wherby a man may be released from y^e bondage & Servitude the Scholers \Shackles/ & fetters of y^e whole animall Life & therfore not only \of/ y^e pashions but alsoe το φρόυημα & φρούηο{illeg} very Reson & prudence of it in adhering to y^t other large & free principle of y^e Intellectuall or Divin Life.

Wherfore for the better explination of this it must be first supposed that besids y^e Spring of Animall Life ^\there is in y^e soule/ a Spring or Principle of another Superiour Intellectuall Life but y^t This is not in us as it is in God & if there be any {such} \in whatsoever other/ beings as be absolutly impeccable if there be any such besids him, y^t is Essentially or naturally wee are not it ^\it is not our nature or essence/but have a participation of it only wee & it are such & wee have an Inferiour principle of animall Life in us {illeg} \besides/ w^ch could not be if wee were the other Essentially If the actuall possession of this intellectuall Life (w^ch is all holiness Righteousness & Vertue) were naturall or essentiall to vs then wee should be impeccable & should never fall or degenerate from it Wherfore \since/ wee are not this by nature wee can not ^\be/ by {us} any otherwais then by selfe-active-exertion, y^t is by voluntarity adhæsion, by or selfe-Determination by an aweakned watchfullness & vigilant Attention ^\{illeg}/ y^tis not by a simple but reduplicative Life or Energy; It In a word by liberrum ^\Arbitriū/ frewill or an autexovsious power. & this thing w^ch wee call freewill in a morall Sence, it is y^e vertuous or Intellectuall Life if wee were this Essentially there needed noe selfe excited power. noe reduplicative selfe-activity of our own noe Conatus or Indeavour to hold us to it the autexousious power of freewill is a powre in such beings as are not essentially Good, but yet Capable of being vnspottedly holy & Virtuous \Pure & holy/ & having a participation of y^e nature of Goodness (w^ch is y^e Intellectuall & Divine Life) to fix themselues in good selfe-altruity, or if lapsed & fallen from it to promote themselues towards y^e recovery of it.

This faculty of frewill therfore is really nothing but a selfeactive power in order to Good, towards the Keeping or recovering a Dominion over our lower Appetits & Inclinations w^ch is y^e only perfect liberty or fredom when wee, y^t ^ is, our better part rules over our worse for every being properly is y^e best thing in it be But if it be then be Demanded how it comes to pass how |y^t| all sin vice & morall Evell is imputed to y^e autexovsious pow faculty or frewill as y^e only fovntain & originall of it {will} |{then}| wee answer these three thinges first y^e peccability or possibility of Sinning doth in deed by accident proceed from this faculty of freewill not as it is properly a Selfe active \a/ power in y^e Soule towards Good, but only from y^e Defectivness of it; for a Voluntary selfe active power towards good is therfore of necessity defectible because it is but Voluntary & selfe active & therfore \so/ may voluntarily remit this \its/ selfe activity a voluntary power of Doing Good doth plainly imply in it ^\a non necessity of doing Good &/ a possibility in it of Doing evell. Soe y^t peccability \indeed/ proceeds from freewill not as it is a power but as it is a defectuous power. Secondly wheras there are two things in ^\morall/ evell & vice, y^e Evell of it & the blameworthiness of it, w^ch are different things (because every evell thing is not blame worthy, but many tims comiserable\passionable/ & excusable) now the blame worthiness of Sin, proceeds from y^e \by accidēt frō the/ autexousious \autexousious/ power ^\by accidēt allso if it to good volūtarily neglected/ when neglected or Abvsed yet is by accident alsoe for nothing can be blamed for doing ill y^t had not a power of Doing well ^\But/ Thridly all particular Sinfull actions are to be imputed <21> indeed to y^e voluntariety of y^e doer but they ought not to imputed to high activity of his autexousious faculty or freewill ^\in him/ they proceed from a voluntary non exercise of freewill & it is a Common Errour to mestake this Voluntariety for the ^\power or/ faculty of freewill it selfe; for that w^ch wee in Inglish \call/ freewill & y^e Schoolmen can L. A. was \is/ more properly called by y^e Græecks αυτεχουσιον & τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν & by Cicero Svipotestas or selfe power wherfore there are two things contained in y^e nature of frewill first power over our Selves in order to Good (& indeed there is noe other power then that) Secondly Voluntariety w^ch voluntariety may ether \Tis a volūtary selfe Power/ \of in/ exert\ing/ or not exert\ing/ this Selfe power of frewill in us, now many mistake it is Volvntariety alone ^\without y^e power & strength to Good/ for freewill & for this cause define freewill to be a pendulous vncertain indifferent Voluntariety, y^t may \be/ easly be detemind any way ether to Good or Evell leving out that w\ch/ is essentiall to this faculty of frewill, power & Stregnth towards Good, for this indifferent pendulous voluntariety is a most feeble & infirme thing y^t hath noe Tone Streanth exertion in it & ^\that w\ch/ it is at y^e/ the botome of this Opinion as wee did before Intimate is this y^t there is noe physicall naturall or reall Evell in vice Dishonesty Sin & wickedness nor noe physicall reall Good in y^e Contrary that y^t w\ch/ is called Justice & Rightovsness is really nothing but an hampring of our Liberty ^\by Lawes/ to be free from morall Obligation is a Desirable & perfective Liberty, a Disease it seems Hereditary to y^e Sonns of Adam, & transmitted to y^m ex traduce from their first Parents, whose first Taint & Infection was y^e imbibing or y^e entertainment of this ^\false/ prejvdice; but this being vtterly false & the Good & evell of morality being Physicall & Reall; pendulous & indifferent Voluntariety is \can be/ noe perfection but a most feeble & impotent thing, not only because there is noe tone or nervosity in it but alsoe because the power ^\& liberty/ of Doing evell is but an abvsive expression, it being both impotence & servitude. Frewill is selfe power, \&/ besids volvntariety, it contains in it, power tone & strength in Vigour & activity towards Good; their is noe activity of Freewill exerted in Sinning, but it proceeds only from y^e non exertion of our selfe power our selfe vigour & activity uppon our selues, in order to Good. it is indeed a Voluntary that is a Spontaneus vncoacted vnnecessitated & nonextion of y^e power & Streanth tone & sinew of frewill to God|o|d, |but| its voluntariety can not make it y^e efficiency of frewill, it being but a voluntary non exercise of freewill a voluntary ^\voluntary/ Deficiency weakness & Impotency ^\a volūntary not being free./ for frewill being a voluntary selfe exertive power it can not fail against our wills; but it must needs voluntarily fail in us; Sin is not by \from/ y^e activity of freewill or selfe power for the power to Good, can never be active to Evell; it is a voluntary remission & languour of the selfe exertive power of y^e Soule, towards Good; & not exciting & aweakning our Selues & putting forth y^t power wee have in us, wi\ch/ is y^e first originall of all Sin.

From what wee have said it follows y^t vitious & wicked Persons doe not only not exercise their freewill but alsoe have y^e lest of freewill in them the streanth of it being much divicited & weakned in them. & those beatifid Spirits above w\ch/ are conversent in Good have in soe much y^t they are in a manner necessited to doe nothing but Good have y^e most of freewill y^t is of selfepower in them

Sin therfore is not be imputed to freewill as if it were activly willed by freewill or the ^\a positive/ activity of freewill were exerted vppon its ^\productiō/ it being nothing but a Difficiency of y^e exercise of freewill or a voluntary relaxation of our selfe power & and activity towards good by reson of its naturall {Perfectability} & want of Vigilance Attention & Circumspexion. So that this is not a nico & nedlo Suteltey or a difrent mode of explocasion ondly out of an afecktashon of nofeltiy & singelartiy ^\y^t comes to the {source of that}/ but a nesesary hypotheses or rather an unauodabell truth and that of no small moment tha as may partly aper from what was before suggested it being imposabell thair should be any such naturall ^\{illeg}/ fackolty as is indiferent to good & euell \exerted by God/ Sins is nothing but a volentry defesency of a good pouer which being not exerted the Sole or the το μεσον of or y^e midell of it as Plotinus Cals it is desarmed of its strength whare upon the Naturall pondorosity and grauitasion of that lower part the Anamall life in its afexons prevailing by its on force unavoadably draws it pasafly succumbing in to a Complyanc with it

But for a fuler explecasion her of we will elustrat the whole bisnes by a simeletut Supposing a paire of Scalls apon the plaine of on in on of which is put a gret plumbu\r/s W\eight/ate or Mase of lede \or Iron/ but in the other a quantity of much beter metell as of gold enferor for bulke & Waite is placed \but superior for worth & Value/ which, though it ought \therfore/ in respekt of the worth of it to preponderat yet would be unauodably lefted up by the dispvporshanabl grafety of the other Skall, did not a liuing arme \or hand/ that hath a Self Exerting power lay hold apon it & acktefly Kep it in a dew preponderasion ouer the other, \& therfore/ whare if we should supos this lifing Arme to let goe its Volentarily Exerted forse ^\or remitte the same/ the heuiyer a loden Scall wold Emedatly preuaill ouer {it}|y^e| \other/ whare this leden Waite in on Scalle may represent the ponderosety & Grafatashon of the lower Anamall affections, and so plato cals thes lower affections μολυθδιδα leden Waits - that ar allwais Sinking & urging of the Soule dounWard ^\and y^e attractions of it {illeg} Goldē Attractions/ but the other |Gold| /Golden weights\ Scall that hath beter metell in it May represent that Superour instinkt of intelecktall life whos atraxans the Same Phelosefer Cals μιχσυσεχι ἕλξεις milde & gentell but golden atraxtions And the liuing arme or hand not unfetly resembels the Self acktife Autexousious power of the sole which by a Contenell Wigelent & wachfull exertion of it selfe may allwais kep ^\this/ in a dew preponderasion ouer the other but if it remit of exerting that uolontary strength of its on both it & the beter \Golden/ Scall with it must neds pasifly yeld to the force \& Gravity/ of the other

And thus \Accordingly herunto/ we may gife an a Count of the first Entrans of Sin of we should supos Sols or men Created in that state in which adam was at first, Right and blamles <23> but yet and resen ^\as to subject ourselves to the same/ and to be ^\therby are vnable/ parfecketly M^rs of them selfs or at thair on desposall ^\{for it might be supposed}/ that thay war infeckted with tow gret a tange of the eror though parhaps undisarnedly to them selfs, for this planly leyes at the botom of thair asersion that thair is no fesekal or natural good or Euill in morall things in iustes & in iustes honestey & dishonestey but that thay ar externall hindrensas & empedements of our lebertey cast a pon us by the will or comand of Sum \other/ mor powerfull Being \nature/ or things artifishaly made by men and th at best things desirabell ondly by axedent for the proquring of a greter plesurabell good or avoiding of a greter paine; & tharfor acording to simpell natur unsufestikated by \{course}/ poletishans & \scrupulous/ theologars human lebertey consesteth \as they conceve/ in an indifrensey, to determen it Self to doe that which is eather morally good or Evell which can be nothing elce but in a power of doing what on listeth or hafing unde folowing undetermened or unbounded Euels & appetits which Erour it Sems is an hereditory {lifes} transmited from our first parents dounward to thair posterity ^\the Persō of w^ch/ which having transfused it self in to Phelosefy & tinktured mens understandings hath \thus/ esely begoten that parswasion that Fre will is a power & facoltey in all men whar by the will is equaley indiforent to good or euell This is the first and most Epedemecall openan in the World {destinibus}\{De Tenebris}/ that a mans ultemat hapenes and trew lobertey consisteth ondly in the \unbounded/ gratification of the afexons & apetits of the anemall Nature thay Suposing that thaire is no other rell prensopell of life in the human natur besids this and that all that that Semeth to be contrary her unto is nothing but Openan & Lawe or \Hindrāce of y^e other by force/ sumthing which is desired by axodent ondly and not for it Self Wharfor Sense {licks} \or necessitated choice/ and apetits depend altogether upon Externall things thay conclude that Power ^\ouer externall things/ is the ondly thing that Can make a man hapey and a cordingly define hapenes to be ^\nothing but/ a power to doe what on will and this is realiy the same openan whoe make with that which maks plesur as plesur to be the ondly good \for/ thair \for/ being no other rule of plesur but euerey mans on Sens or appite thay which ar plesed as most men are with the gratification of thaire anemall apetits must neds be tharefor in a state of hapens or Lebertiy in thos inioyments

But others clerly parsefe that trew hapens & lebertiy go this is ondly the purswasion \a Delusion/ of men deply lapsed and Sunk so far in to the Anemall & Senshall life as that thay haue letell Sins left in them of aney other good \no/or of the dicktats of honestiy any otherwise then as impertenantly trobelsom things that all this lebertiy & hapens is nothing Els but Vaseleg & Captiuity that trew leberty Consisteth Suipotens or Selfe dominion and the exaltasion of that inward beter prensapell of life which is our trew selfs into full power & Soueranity in the Sole And That thes are the ondly parsons haue power to doe what thay will that is what is agreabell to the \trew/ inward will of thair humain Nature which power maks them independant on externall things & not to stand in ned of an \that/ unsartain power ouer them

This is the trew Suipotens self power or self dominon and th which I haue now described and tharfor the trew libertiy of rashonall beings and non are trewly free wiled but thos that haue ether atained to this or els are in a Contenall Contenshon aftar it but this liberty of Suipotestes is a State & not a Fackoltiy thair is a nother lebertiy ^\autexousiosnes/ Suipotestus or self power which is a fackolty or naturall power of the humain Sole and this is that which is comonly haled by the Name of liberum {Lib} or fre will <24> which we haue alrediy showed for |y^e| genericall natur of it that it is a reduplicatif self acktiue power We haue also in the next place confuted that openan that would make this self acktiuity which is properly Caled fre will in morals to be absolutly indeferant to good or euell for fre will is Vlgerly defined to consist first in indifrenceiy and then not ondly in indifrensey to doe or not doe or to doe this or the contrarey when booth are alike lawfull but also to doe eather that which is laufull or unlaufull that which is iust or un iust moraly good or Evell For inded her are to grose Erors at ons in Cluded together in this defenishon First that the Esens of free will consisteth in an Absolut indifrensey of the Will to Will on Way rather |^| then a Nother till that Verey moment that it wileth |^| the trew ground of which openan was ondly this to a Voide Nesetiy Nesesity & liberty Say thay are contredixous to on a nother and tharfor liberty must neds consiset in Indifrenciy and Absolut Continganciy and this thay concour to be demonstratly euedent proued from the nature of Sine becaus a man could not be giltiy of Sine if he ware aniy waiy Nessesateted or previously determined so that he Could not as esiley \well/ haue don otherwais as that which he did But it is plain that this prenounsed uniuersaty that the fredom or leberty of the will doth esenshaly Consest in Absolut in difrensiy and parfeckt contengenciy is repugnant to comon Sense for then thair could be no stediy designs & purpose in mans life no fexed resolutions and what euery man should doe or will to morow would be altogether as unsartaine as what wind should blow naye inded fare mor for the wind depends apon Sartain causes in Nature nesesary in them Selfs though unknown to us, but absolut contengansy |3| and parfeckt preuious indiferency is Suposed to raine in the will of man & to be the esens of his leberty and so neuer Seperabell from it and what a Mockerey would this be in nature if men Should be indewed with fackoltes of understanding to make {large} consultasions graue dibats long deliburations A bout thair most Waighty affairs and when all was don thair will should be determened by the drawing of a loatt or by the casting a diye nay by that which is mor chansabell then lottariy for sum tims thair is a nosetiy in that though unknoun to |2| us by mer Chaunc it selfe

2 The next Eror is this that libertey consesteth in indeferansiy or contingansiy as to good or Euell the ground of which is taken in like maner from ^\y^e Phenomenon of/ sine becaus men doe by thar free will as often or raither fare oftener ^\sinnd/ then thaiy doe otherwis not with standing which it is aparantly falce eather that god can make a power or fackoltiy contingently indiferant to good or Euell or that aniy being what so euer can by its on Nature be indifrent to its on good or hurt for that is no nature nor the other aniy Naturall power or fackoltiy, but booth nonsense and contredixon which cannot prosed from the fountain of all parfexon And it is altogether as ubsurd and erashonall to argew from hens becaus men sine as often or oftner then thay doe well that tharfor thay haue a Natturall fackolty of free will created by god that is esenshalley indifrent to a mans good or Evell as if on should argew from hence, that becaus men often tims are in thair iudgments consarning truth & falshod in speckelatiue things, that tharfor the Mind Understanding or Judgment of Man, is a naturall fackolty made by god indifrent to truth or falshod. and inded this instans consarning erour in iudgment is mor pertenant to the {illeg} then we may be a Ware ^\of/ for it is the same Authexousius & self determing power that is <25> the caus both of eror or Falshod in iudgment and also of sine or euell in volishans & axsons axsions, the understanding as such being nothing but nature in us neuer Erse truth and nature ar all on and Eror is a preternaturall thing no Eror theorem or Conclution that is falce as such can be understod and what so euer is understod to trew be so or so is trew no intelexan knowledg or siyens can be Falce the human understanding by resen of its naturall emparfexon may be ignorent but it being a trew Naturall power made of god it can neuer ere Eror springs not from that which is Nature in us frō her Energiy or operasion which we ar in sum sens pasife to but from that which is properly Wee our selfe, our self ackitiue Autoexousous & redublikatiue light fr and hens it is that we ar alwais lyabell to blame for Erours and sumtims giltiy of sine for our rudemends ar tow fold Eather speckelatiue conserning truth or falshod, or prackticall consarning good & Evell & though in the first ^\erronious Judgments/ when thay haue no influens apon morall axons we ar not Comonly Counted giltey of Sine yet we are alwais iustly to be a Counted blame worthiy becaus though we cannot Chuse but to be ignorent of many things yet we may neuer ere if we will; for in iudgment thaire being thes tow things mexed & blended together sum thing of nature whch is nesesariy and that is intelexan & sum thing of our owne of the self acktefe Outousexous power of the Sole, which we haue the comand of, if we restraine this latter and with hold our assent from euery thing which is not clerly understod \or w^ch we do not certainly know that we know,/ (which is in our power to doe) thoug we haue neuer so much ignorens in us, ^\yet/ we shall neuer erre- Now sin depending much upon antesedent prackticall eror errors which ar Autexousious things (for we may Autexousely erre consarning good & euell as well as truth & falshod) ^\whē we do so/ we must neds be giltiy of fault or blam ^\or sinne/ in this |o^r| Voilishans & axans. where ^\forasmuch as we/ we ware blame Worthy for thos false iudgments that did Antesedently Cause them; but yet not withstanding it is as Ubsurd to say that the Authosousexs power in us whareby we iudg pracktaicaliy of good and Euell in life is indiferent to make Eather a right or rong iudgment & consequently to sine or not sine; as if on should say that the Autesousex power of iudging consarning truth and falshod in mer spekelatiue things is in its on Nature indifrent |to Truth and Falshood|

That suipotestes ^\or selfPower/ that is a fackoltiy of the Sole is intended by god & nature in ordar to the proquring of that other Suypotense or self domenan befor |2| menshaned that is a State \2/ it is an power in its on proper Natur tending to Good as is euident from the oregenall of it befor Expressd which is from that hiyar Capasitiy or congreuetiy of the sole which ^\w^ch some call Reason &/ we often Calle a Vitall intelecktall instinkt or a partisipashon of the deuine life, for if thaire ware no hiyer prensepell of devine life in us then the Anamall or Senshall inclenations or|&| affexons, and the resen that is Subseruant to them, thair will be no such ^\faculty/ selfe power ^\or Freewill/ in the Sole as wharby it Could determin or Exet\ert/ it selfe to^\ward/ the good of honestiy nor becom culpbell ^\or giltey/ doing any thing as sine or morally euill. morouer this L A or free will is not ondly a Selfe determing power but also a pow as is Vlgurly Suposed but also a ^\Power/ Self Exerting powerve of a Vigourous conatus or forse to Contend with & resist thos Animall inclenasions that ar repugnant to the dicktats of honestiy, it is not ondly a mer will but it is also a volentary strength ^\Nervosity/ or power which the Sole may Exert towards the mastring of all the worser inclinashons in it and the subdewing of them to the Better <26> it sems ^\{indeed}/ to be a comon Supposishon that the Autexous power or free will is nothing Els but a power in the will to Nill this way or that Waye with out anay mor strength or forse on Way then a Nother; whare as in truth the forse and acktif strength of it is ondly towards good the promouing of the Sole forward towards the life of uertue or to adher & Cleaue to it and to resest the fors of thos Animall inclinasions that are repugnant to it ^\the same/ so that it doth but pasifly null or yeld the other waye all the force & Vertew of Visoius inclenations Springing from below that Careyeth the Superior Autexous power as \away/ Caitiue & {uanqueshed} under it that hiypothesus of a {pendulos} Equilibrious free will that is ^\naturally/ indifrent to good or euill honestiy or dishonestiy thus it could not be giltey of Sine faulte or blame, in what soeuer it dide, it ackting as agreabily to Nature on Way as a Nother {For \But/} Sin is not ondly the doing of sumething which might {harden & Mould} or els as many {vulgar} \uulgarly/ supos that was prohibeted by an outward lawe of sum mor powerfull parson, but it Consesth|e|th in ackting preternaturaliy or unnaturale or Contrariy to the nature of that ^\very thing/ w^ch ackteth, hens ar the regrets of minde and thos lashes of Conshans that Shame and Self confusion that insewe upon ^\y^e Com̄ission of it/ it whare as if this ware the Natturall libertiy of the Will to haue an indifranciy toward good & euell it Could be geltiy of no annomoly in what so euer it did

Wharefore if we would salv the Phenomene of Sine and morall Vice rightly we must neds Make a nother hiypotheses consarning free will or a \that/ power Superio^r to the Anamall inclenasion That it is a thing which in its on Nature Tends to good or honestiy but yet is a thing so defecktabell and abusabell as that it may ^\possibly/ ackt or raither be pasifly Caried in a Waye contrarey to its ^\own/ trew natur, a thing that may by it selfe be {Vishated} and depraued, and thaire by becom a selfe confounded ^\a broken̄ {illeg} selfe contradicting {illeg}/ thing it is \displeased we must suppose it to be/ a strang kind of nature, power & fackoltiy that may ^\by itselfe/ be degenerat as to ackt \into/ un|Non|naturaliy, for by the self determinatife power of it or its Volentarietiy, it may Suspend its Self exertiue power of strength & Vigourus Conatus towards good, and \or/ against evell; & by that mens be passiueley lede a Waiy by the forse of the anamall appetits & passions and thus may a man by the ill use of that naturall fackoltiy of Suipotestus or self power mak him ^\become make himselfe/ selfe-impotent, by his trew will, but to be haled a waye unwillingly to what he would not thus by his liberty or free will he may make him selfe a slaue & Vasell propria Libertate captivū, a Captiue by his on libertiy; pasiue & febell by his owne power and acktefity, and on ^\a thing/ that ^\always/ Volentarily ackts unwillingly, |and is Unhappily intangled as it were and hopled /and birdlimed\ as it were by y^e Length of its own wings -|

In like maner as the fackolty of fre will is not a thing indiferent to good or Euell so neither is Contingansiy as is suposed by many to be essenshall to it; it is inded most trew that L. A. or free will is a thing |4| absolutly inconsistant with Exeternall Nesesetasion \4/ nay not ondley so but also with that inward nesesity of Naturality such as we suppos to |5| be in bruts who though thay haue appetite ^\allreadiy/ exerted with in them selfs \5/ yet becaus thes ar Naturs produxans ondly \in them/ and thay ar naturaly \necesssarily/ {severd} by thos appetits a Cording to thair respecktiue preuelensy, thay Can not be said to haue the fackoltiy of free will & Selfe power. <27> Nay it is uerey Observabell that the Case is the same also consarning |2| that hiypotheses of sum befor menshoned that the understanding ^\is a power |2|/ allwais goth befor eueriy ackt of the will and then the fackoltiy of the will nesesa|3|rily foloweth aftar for her is nothing but nature in all this |3| and tharfor such a nesesitiy as \is/ inconsistant with libertiy, no selfe acktiue power that is |1| self exhiting self exerting and self determening. \1/ mor ouer \in y^e {same} place/ it must be granted also that in all sinfull axans to make them truly culpabell or blame worthy thaire was sum time or other a ^\non-necessity of contingency/ contenganciy or non nesesitey in the doar, to Sine \of them/ and that thair \is never any/ should be alwais no other nesesity in the siner then what had sum time \or other/ resen or was \been/ contracted by a self determination \of {illeg}/ b|B|ut otherwise contingansiy is not a thing alwais esenshall to libertiy but that which the esens of that libertiy consisteth in which maks men culpabell in sin is self determination, which \yet/ when it is to sin or morall euell is ^\but/ a spurious mongrell captauated self inthraling libertiy, for becaus the siner might sum time or other haue don otherwais and was unnesesateted \thervnto/ tharfor he is said to haue sened fralliy and to be culpabell for the same thair \was not at first an/ being no antesedent ^\prevētive/ nesesitiy tho but \he had {illeg}/ a Contingansiy of sining or \& possibility of/ not sining, though he ^\there must however we might/ aftarwards have contrackted a kind of subsequent nesesity of sining upon him selfe. How euer contengansiy is not alwais esenshall to libertiy but ^\Wherfore/ on the contrariy, the more aniy man doth by his self ackitue self determing power as it ware nesesetat him self to good & exklud and banesh the contengansiy and unsertentiy \& Possability/ of doing good or Euell the hiyer degre of lebertiy is he partaker of, for as much as he most of all exerts from with in him selfe that Volentariy strength which he hath to good and is thairby be Com partaker of the trew hand of the fackoltiy of lebertiy, which is the lebertiy of state; most Seuipotent in the better sens most spontanius and Volentariy, when that which is most him self the best thing in him, subdewes & exersiseth dominion ouer that which is lest him selfe baneshing all hethro heterochinesy and neurospastiy out of the sole and |4| setling parfeckt pece unity & concord in it. \4/ nesesity or non contingansiy ^\of good/ caused by an acktefe & vigorous selfe determination of the sole to good is the fulest and most parfeckt degree of lebertiy. \5/ b|B|ut such a lebertiy as hath in it a contingansiy & a kind of sartain \vncertain/ indifrensiy to good or Evell, though it is a nufe to make men culpabell and blam worthy in doing efell yet it is a lower and weker degree of libertiy. But the lowest degre of all ^\is/ when men haue ^\in a manner/ exkluded contengansiy by a kind of a self contrackted nesesity of doing \to/ euell for the \acktif/ selfe determening power is \here/ for the most part pasifly determend by the inferior lusts and appetits and if it chans at aniy time acktefly to determen it selfe in Compliyans with the superiour dicktats of honestiy and the lawe of the intelecktall natur not yet uterliy extengwished. yet its self exertiue pouer of fors & conatus towards the same is monstrously debeletated and becom flacce|i|d and langwed|, and Paralytick, in it.|

Wharefor we may mow make a full or complet defeneshon or description of this ^\{illeg}/ power or fackolty in man caled free will morall & that it is a self acktiue self determenig self exerting power of the sole \wher/by it is inabled to put forth Vigourous indeuours towards the atainment of the \its/ higest good which is a parfeckt self Vicktoriy ^\{self principle}/ in the deuine or in the intelecktall life and to fix it self to the same and \consequently/ in order tharunto to resest and supres the inormas and extrafegnt mosions of the animall or selfesh life ^\repugnant to it/ but yet such power as is ^\{illeg}/ defecktabell and by it self abusabell in to non naturality and thaireby by axodent the cause of sine

But parhaps sum will presently her say \object/, that ther is a discripsion of such a thing as god could neuer make, without being him selfe Culpabell, it being planly repugnant to the diuine goodnes to bring forth such a Cretur as this is in to the world, which how euer intended in order un to good might be \prove/ the Caus of so much euell in \it/ the world, evell in respeckt of god him selfe, it being a thing that by it /whether\ axedentally or not, may resest his \own/ will, opos his lawse & rebell against his gouerment and Authority ^\in y^e world/ Euell to the free willed Acktor it selfe, as warby hee may degenerat in to non Naturality, lay under the euill & gilte of Sine, ^\{Absurd thô is non-sense & selfe-Contradiction}/ and thaireby in volfe him self in many other euils of Calamity and paine; ^\wherfore/ sartanliy \either/ god ether could not produse |such| a thing that \as/ posably might be the caus of so much disordar in the world, and whareby his Creturs them selfs might be maide such self confounded contredexous things, as to ackt wilingly and unwilingly at the sam time and by ^\their own/ fredom it self to becom in Vaseled ^\themselves/ or els if he did Creat such a thing, he would sufer it to ackt ondly as it was primaraly intended toward good, and extriyordenarily \or forcibly/ interpos in such a manar as to hinder it to \frō/ abusing it self to sin or euell

But her liyeth a vat oshan \ocean/ now befor us which if we should lanch out un to this part of our discors must neds exed \swell into a {Bigger bingend}/ what the preporsion and decorium of the whole would alow it, & yet sumething must of nesestiy be expresed consarning t|w|hat which is her suggested, wharfor we saiy that this obgexan proseds from narow sightednes and a short comprehenshan of things, and though it may carey a spesious plausibelity \at first sight/ yet it hath no soled foundasion of truth at the bottom

for First this Outexousous self acktiue power is ^\in itselfe/ a nobell parfexon in it selfe, wharby we not ondly transend the pasef and stuped state of brute Anamals, in the Consarnmente of the lower life, hafing booth a largar spear of comprenshan and an acktiue self Comanding power, but also in \as to/ Morals ar Capabell in sum mesur, of the hiyest parfexon that is in the scall of entitiy, that is the deuine life or nature of god him selfe, Nay peckabelity it self considrd comparatiuely with the brutish state, is a parfexon, as it is an imparfexion of bruts that thay haue not by resen of thair low and stupid pasife-ness thay haue not the capasity or posebility of sining, which alwas supposeth a morall prinsepell and \{creates}/ ^\implies/ a posability |2| of doing well \virtuously/ And though this be a defecktife power and posably \perhaps/ not the best thing that god could make 2 though whether thair be aniy absolutly impeckabell Creturs or no or whether thair could be any such is a thing not sartanly known to us <29> yet it is no way repugnant to diuine goodnes and parfexon to make sum thing which is not the best, but rather to display his fecunditiy to the produxan of all degres of parfexon is the mor {illeg} {illeg} on thing comending a nother; if the {face} were all nothing but {illeg} things that be ^\now/ the gretest ornement in it yet it would then haue no {illeg} \Beauty/ at all and if a Paintor or {limor} should draw all in glitring colors thaire would be a sensabell want of ^\some/ {dimer} colors & |3 5| shadows to recomend them. \3 5/ Morouer thair would be a gret \{vast}/ chasam an hiatus in the Vniuers of betwixt beings absolutly parfeckt and impackabell and ^\y^t lower Order of/ bruts that ar uncapabell rather of uertew or Vise the ^\great/ intermedous spase or \great/ intelegabell distans should not be filed up with beings Capabell of uertew but \though/ mutabell 4 Nay thair would sem to be a great lack of sumthing ^\y^t ought to be/ in the worlds, if thair shold be no such beings as by thaire on free Choyce should prefer uertu befor Vice ^\{illeg}/ light befor darknes, and by Volentariy adheshan shold freliy cleaue to that which is good notwithstanding \many/ all alurments and temptasions to the contrariy, if thair should be no other goodnes in the world but what is naturall and nesesariy then it|God ever| would want that comendasion, which the free choyce of thos that ar Capabell of sumthing els refleckt upon ^\might contribute to it/ it and that becoming and fiting testemony of its price \worth/ and exitensy. That is in a Word if thare ware no such thing as uertew for Virtew is not Naturall or Nesesariy but self eleckted goodness; if the deuine life ^\{there would be a} {illeg} {no suitors if it}/{illeg} ware not Corted ^\by any/ if thare ware no ernest discors and breathings aftar it no agonis and contenshans for it no dificoltes or harsdhips undertaken or incountred for the sake of it by such as are \were/ inamred with |2| her butiy at a destans \thē it would seem to want its due state & Power & not to haue y^e other/ that thay might inioy the same then thaire might iustly seme that thaire ware sumthing wanting which it might {chaleng} as dew and of right belonging to it There must be Goodnes & Righteousnes in motion and Conatus in y^e Vniverse, as well as in Essence & im̄utable Nature. and the autexouseon as w Sui-Potestas, or Freewill as was befor suggested, is nothing but Righteousnes ^\& Holines/ and in a way of motion, self-activity, and Endeavour; not in im̄utable essence as it is in God.

Now, To supos that though god should make such a Cretur as this is a self acktiue selfe determening self Autexousous being and yet shall him self extreordenarily ^\or {illeg}ously/ interpos as to hinder its self determenasion towards Euell \and all Possibility {therof}/ and to sufer it to ackt ondly the other Waiye towards that which it was primarely intended for that is to good, is to suppos what emplyeth a contredixan, for if a thing shold haue a self determing power tow wais ether this waye or that way and \& yet to suppose thē that it should be {desisted frō determing Itself}/ sum externall force shold hinder its moshon on of ^\one of/ thos wais it being then \would be/ nesesetated the other waiye it is plain that then it did not \neither could it/ acktefely determen it selfe That waiy that \any way/ it went but was \would be/ pasefly determend to it, and thairefor \so y^t/ {en so fashion} was this power \would be/ destroyed and becom a slugish and inert thing that is no longar a self acktiue \& {sui potent}/ {being} It is trew that with out the distruxan of such a powar \{illeg} y^e/ externall axen or exequsion might be hinderd so that though thaire <30> ware such a thing yet it might not be subict to Ackt destrucktfully^\ively/ or hurtfuly to aniy thing besids its self ^\{illeg} in y^e execution/ but then sine that is locked upon as so gret an euell in it selfe, would not be preuented, for it consisteth ondly in a wrong exersis of the inward self determening power or to use the Vlgar scholastick terms, the Acktus eliticus of it would remaine although the acktus imperatus war stoped & hendred, and tharefor this would not reach the bisenes but if its elisiting power also ware disabled from chusing on waye then it would be no longer a self determening being but the ueriy natur of it would be smothred and stifled \& extinguished/ {illeg} that I say is planly to suppos a Contradixan, to supos a power self determening and not self determening and to supos an outward force that doth not ondly hinder the externall axan\ction/ but also the inward nature and esens of a thing, which can not be, \is impossible/ to supos a Fre self ackteue Vigour to be so choked and so \fully/ {claminated}, that it cannot be eternaliy self acktive, that is what it is; to supos a ^\sartain/ natur not to be that nature, and |3| thairefor at ons to be & be not be Morouer; ^\3 Rigteousnes/ lay a side the seurety of this truth a litell, ^\{admit the possibililty hereof}/ this will be planly to make god a bunkling artifiser alwais making and unmaking of the same thing, still doing sumthing and nothing, at the same time besids the \here is an/ indecomrum of making god to step out of the clouds parpetaley to hinder the frame of natur, or ^\& chuse/ the naturall acktivitiy of things, ^\w^ch/ as if we should supos the dramists ^\or Poet/ him self euer and a non to step out apon the stage ^\abruptly/ and disturb the acktors in thair seuerall parts; besids the \& there is allso an/ emputation that is herbiy Cast apon god is if he had not Skill and Arte a nufe to bring the afeckts of all naturall powers and acktivites ^\about/ in to one ^\consistent/ ordar & harmony in the univers.

Whare as the menest Artests and Crafts men that are do famelerty mak that which is unhansom harsh and displesing in it self, to be^\com/ hansom delightfull and ornementall in the Contextur of the whole. which is the gret triyumfe & vicktoriy of Art ouer the \its/ Mattare. nay Arte|i||sts| doe many tims chuse such things on purpos as a lone by the selfs ar odd & ungratfull that is, euell in a sense, to giue aduantag \greater/ comendasion and aduanteg of pulcretud & parfexon ^\& rellish of sweetnes/ to the Whole. for the most ralishing and dilisious musek ^\y^t is/ could not be, ware it not for harsh & discordant noats. it is the propertiy and power of all arte αγαθο ποιειν τὰ κακὰ to bonify ^\{illeg} reconcile thē to Good/ and to make what is singly and a part bade, to be good in Combination. nay and raise the pulcretud of the whole to a hiyer pich therby. and tharfore Cartenly it cannot be doupted but {illeg} god whoe is the best artifiser can so harmonis the whole world as that the ueriy discordansiy of sine & euell, shall contrebut to the melodiy of it. Wharefor a pon all a counts if thare be aniy such outexousious power Created by god it must ^\in reason/ be parmeted to haue a scope and swinge though in such a maner as that other things prouedenshaliy contrived may iontly & \2/ pesably without ofering Violens to this Nature, but in a maner Agreabell to the same, hinder the enormus extrafigensiy thaireof, as for exampell that this self acktiue Autexousius prensepell in the sols of men and Angells should neuer haue <31> haue ackted in such a maner as yet might be {illeg} that thay should haue eueriy on of them haue determined them selfs to sine that is to \&/ falle and also to contenens thaire in for euer. now we afferm that this may be prouided for by that supriour prouidens which doth all that is nesesariy for the good of the whole {illeg} strongly and swetliy; and that with out aniy rudnes to that free prensepell of self acktiue light in them, but to make a large exqusation her apon would be in this place unsesenabell. But if \2 Wherfore But/ it be well considred with a larg & comprehesiue Eiy, this parmeshan of sine \(y^t possibility whereof/ which could not haue bin nesesaryly hindred with out the utter expelushian of a whole nobell ranke \or order/ of beings, out of entity or exestans) will not seme so tragicall a busenes as to a slight and superfeshall glaunce it may aper nor so desprat a thing to be reconsiled with the hypostheses of infenet goodnes; for first It is a rong suposall ^\y^t is made/ as if Sine ^\really/ hurted god, or as if god waire hurtabell by aniy thing with out him. and whare as it is pretended that it is an affront to his Authoritiy, it ought to be understod that gods laws are not in of rightousnes or holens, ar \not 5/ laws made by \of/ will ondly \made/ by such a being as delights to ostentat his power and to ^\imperiously to/ domener; but thay are the lawse of nature, life and, parfexon, the laws of good, which no being can Violate with out injuring of it selfe. god is not a being indegently or empotently self seking |y^t| indeuouring|es| to pack up y^e defisensiy \{illeg} broken/ at hom, by borowing and takeing in him sumthing from a broad \continually,/ with out him selfe, we cannot mor Rong the deity then by aff \vnworthily/ fastning on it such things, as ar condemned for \levities &/ imparfexons \even/ in our selfs, as Vaine gloriy, and ambishon thirst aftar applaus poppular breth \& applaus/ externall homag & crouching of others \done to it/ to it, swagring and domenering ^\over others/ and all such afexons as argew dependans \vp/on sumthing with out it, and tharfor argew insufisensiy \at home/ with in it selfe.

but it is obsarfabell that besids the laws of gods esenshall goodnes communicabell to man which is such \so Noble &/ a thing as |y^t| it is unbecoming of it and below its worthiynes, to \y^t it should/ be uildly up|in|truded upon his Creturs, but ought to be freliy chosen by them, to be ambesously courted and ernestly contended for ^\by them/ or otherwais thay are to be sufred ^\in scorne/ to goe with out it, which it self is the gretest puneshment of thair faulte, I saye besids thes laws to which it is unnaturall ^\& contradictous/ to compell obedians, thaire ar sartain other lawse of his made by his enfenet goodnes and Wisdom which are Adrastian and inevitabell, the laws of diuine fate, which thos that doe transgres the formar \fall under &/ laws can neuer transgres but are ineuetably subgekt to them, and intangled \{illeg}/ in them ^\whatever thoug they {retired never} so much/ thes are not {illeg} laws which powarfull Malefacktors may brek through, but the weker fleys \are/ kached in them \only/, but thay are adamantan and inuensebell, thos Autex. free Willed siners that think it a fine thing to be at thaire oune disposing to be Free from the bonds of all obligasion and not to be hampred with the lawse of dutiy & righetousnes and consait that thay haue her by a great scope and fredom to roue and rambell in, ar all this whill held fast in the chains of fate so that thay cannot moue or stir out of them and that divine diche and nemeses which atend the deuine throne which are inded noting but Gods goodnes to the hole <32> apering in the Visard and disgiuse of wrath and displesur to the \a/ part wholds them fast with in its cluches neither can aniy wrigling of thairs get them out

All the euill of sine as such is properly to the Sinner for sining is nothing but self hurting so that it careyeth its punesment in it selfe and the same parson is both a doar of it and a suferer from it the fault it self is its on Afengar and Exequshoner a siner is nothing but a self made brute of that wich might a ben a god Partaker of the devine nature. and if thair can be aniy Exqus for him, the best is this, that he neuer Erse or wandors from god (I mene her, god as a Nature and not as a Will ondly) but that he lacheth aftar sum obsqur shadow of him that is a lower and fainter degree of goodnes a siner Can neuer escape deuin Vengans or the forse of gods authority for his Abused laws of rightousnes for it is \{in essence}/ assenshaliy interwouen with |in| the sine it selfe, And that ^\Moreover/ apon this ocation of mens abusing thaire free will to sine thaire is a farther ^\Providētiall/ displayi|e|ng of the deuine fecundity & acktefety in the vnivers which other wais would a \have/ lane ^\asleep/ Silent that is the light of devine goodnes in/y^e light of Divine Goodnes\ a peqular modification of it as it \as it is/ may be diuersly Coloured in the exersis of distribbutife Justes \vpō them/ whar it semeth to burn in gloing and firiy ^\red hot/ indignashon as \while w^ch y^e same thing appeares {no} again/ the same thing hath a Milder and mor \{smiling}/ plesing aspeckt in the \when it/ rewarding of thos that use thaire self acktefity a right, and so {are} \stand/ otherwais postared towards it, |of w^ch we should speak mor afterward.|

it is trew indede though ^\sinne & vice/ it be but a facktishous bruteshnes and manhode un made, yet it is mor acktiuely distrucktife of the good of other men then aniy naturall bruts are to thaire on kindes the resen Whare of is becaus it is bruteshnes armed & Weponed with what of right doth not belong to it but was mayde to be subservant to sumthing Els \better {i. e.}/ reson Wite understanding & Segasitiy, which maks it mor punga|e|nt and penetriue Naye it is also Wheted Stumelated and mor sharply Edged also by a pequler \eagernes & poynant/ ackrimony in its appetite which transends the dulnes ^\& sluggishnes/ of |mere| brutish apetite, in regard that a Vastar desiyer of sumthing else that ought to Work upward, being defeted & disapoynted inrageth, the lowar appitit beyond its naturall intenshan; but this eather lights upon good or bade men, and as to the bade it is but the instrument of deuine iustes, vengans and emesens \and Nemesis/ upon them, and for the good parfecktly good it cannot hurt them, nay thos which ar but in a Medriocety of goodnes will be much benifited by it, and ^\as for/ the outward hurt ^\& Iniury/ which thay recefe from it, thay well haue a bondant Compensasion by that ^\devine/ Auenging Nemesis that will her display it selfe.

Nay, though it may sem a paradox yet it is a trew on that the laps or falle of Sols in to Sine ^\& Mortality/ is an Ocation ^\to many of them/ of the exersis of greter Vertue then Could in other Wais haue put forth them Selfs and also of a mor ferm Estableshment of them in good ^\afterwards/ her being opertunity gifen for the Exersis of a more profound selfe deniyall, self resegnation and self anehelasion, {humely} pashons constansiy resolusion faithfull adherans unto god <33> ware thar is no sensebelaty of Joy & Comfort to suport the Sole in the midle ^\not only of Atheism but allso/ of darke privations Cloudiy obsqurites ^\{of mind}/ and biter aggonis ^\deferred/ for had all conteneued in an unlapsed state of rightousnes bles and hapenes, thaire could not a bin thos Euell and hard Surcomstanses, that giue ocation to the Exersis of those ^\{same}/ but now by resen of Eniurys don to on a Nother, and other Calametis and Casaltis that belong to this Mortall State, her is a more through Exersis of grace and Vertew in all the Emaginall posture of it invited and Caled forth; \as/ to deniy a mans on life for the loue of god & rightousnes to indewar all bodily torturs and inward desershans of minde \spirit/ with fermitud & constansiy and by faith to Cleaue to god when Sight and Sens fails us when the World rageth and the heuens Sem to ^\{frown or}/ lower, and neither Sune mone nor Stare apperes with the last glimse of cherfull light to sustaine the Speret then is thaire an \Here is y^e/ exersis of pure grace and Vertew, and a triyall ^\of its {illeg} &/ of what it will doe ^\alone/ with its on Natiue Strength; when disarmed and left Naked Vexed and tortured discouers it selfe but it is most trew of grace vertew and the seeds of the diuine life

Morouer whare as the heuenly and intelecktall life ought to acktuat all the afexons & pashons of the anamall life thaire ar Sartain pashons of the mind of man in this Mortall and Sinfull State exerted and Caled forth which Vertu Could neuer Shine in ^\& irradiate/ aniy whare else, thaire are sartain strings \or Passions of y^e Soule/ of the human pashons, which in an unlapsed and blisfull state ar alltogether silent and neuer sound and tharfor \and therfor can make no musick {which are here} {illeg} being/ can neuer be played upon or ackted \y^e head/ by \of y^e/ Musicall Skill, \{making} very good Harmony/ Such are thos \strings/ which make sade and |2| Mornfull Nots, ^\only & melanchony accounts, 2 and {has o other}/ Crass and turbed affexons pequlerly belonging to the groser Compages of this Erthly bodiy, which also ar mor contumasious then aniy thing that can put forth it self in that puror stat, and \&/ require greter Exersion of strength to master, as likewis several irasabell Comosians, so that in this lapsed state all the strings of the anamall life \sounding and played vpo~ by Vertue so the Touch/ ar played upon & euerey on sounding and brought in to harmoniy make up a full and parfeckt consinans |gentle & musicall Touch, make vp y^e larger & fuller ^\musick/ harmony - - thē if m many of |4| thē had ^\{broughth forth} {illeg}/ {lovder} sounded| |4|

it is trew that all our Autexousous beings being amphibious things and haueing a Naturall quriosetiy in them to triy all conclusions yet haue may haue a great {iche} to make an experiment of euell as well as good, this also flatring them with |3| an apperans of sum Libertiy yet hauing \3/ ons shasiated thair lower appitits & desiars and finding as thay neds musts that all is Tohew ē Bohew, Vanity ē Emptines and that thay did nothing but power Water in to A life which could neuer be filed thay recouering then <34> them selfs again by degres prone mor hastily senserly and Confermedly uirtious then if thay had ben allwais forsidly kept up in a demur posture like Children in a Woden frame or standing {stoole}. so that many of thos solse being of so weke a nature as that thay Can |^|not be sufeshently sensabell |^| till thay haue mayde triyall and experiment and tasted of all things, may by resen of thair lapse rebound up hiyer |6| in to a \far/ greter generositiy of Vertew then thay had befor \6/; Also indignashon which is an Anamell and Irasabell pashon will be kindled in them and s against that which thay haue ben ons \found themselfs/ deseued by and subseruently help to fortify thos holy resolutions recouered and reuifed |2| in them; A quick sine of the euill of sine, \once/ experemented and tasted of \2/ will exedingly spur and semmulat the self acktife powers of the Sole annd Exite and awaken a mor Vigelent Wachfulnes & Curcomspecsion Against the same for the futhor

If thair had ben no lapse sole would ondly haue hade a thine noshanell ideale of the Evell of sine, \& its deformity/ but when sum ware realiy Falen in to that miyer, thay would exhibet to others a more strong & sensabell representation of the Vglines and deformety thaire of when thaay saw not ^\in as {illeg}/ an ideah or a landskepe but "the thing it self how \what/ lamentabell and deplorabell, squalled and nastiy, wreched and forlorn things sine \hath doth/ mad|k|e sole to be |them.| I might ade her how sole recouered from thair lapsed state and finding them selfs resqued from thos dangars and perels, that guffe of death and destruxan which had almost deuoured them find them selfs \will be elevated {illeg}/ Elevated with \into/ a fare greter triyomf of ioye and hapenes then Euer thay should haue ben sensabell of if thay had ben kept in ^\a/ bare un\non/sinning mediocrite, and the hethen Philosofer spoke rightly heare that the the scope or mark that thes selfe \active/ beings ought to ataine \aim at/ to is not εξω ἁμαρτίας εἱνας ἀλλὰ θεον εἰναι not barliy to be voide of sine but to be heroicaliy and deiformly |4| Vertious. |4| Againe this Autoexousous Self mofing power of sole wharby thay may asend or desend and a Cordingly receve rewards and |3|punehsments ^|3| furnesheth \out/ The seane \of/ the world with gret Verietiy and exhebets a uery plsing and delightfull specktakell ^\to entertaine/ to thos superiour powars aboue |y^t| \are/ setled in ferm blise, and are specktatours of thes transaxans more then aniy tragiy Comick plot histrionicaliy represented ^\upō y^e stage/ can be to us, thare being infenit and fracksous windings and turnings in the sucsesif euolution of the acktivitiy of thes beings and the Witte of the poet or dramatist, that is the prouidens of god almightiy, his wisdom goodnes, and other attrebuts displaying ^\thēselves variously {illeg} itselfe/ in all must neds beget unspekabell plesur to the Contemplatours, whoe will still be bewiched and drawne on with an \a constant/ Expectasion of what will alwais folow till the close and upshot of all. They must neds be plesed ^\entertained with much delight/ that looking down from that Arched Rofe \of heaven/ a boue -

behold not as \idle &/ unconsarned spektators but as introsed Well wishers the Ernest indeuours of thos that ar indefatecably employed, here below, in running of \those/ Races, wrastling and fighting & striving for those Vndefiled Rewards

lastly by that free Exersis of self determenashon wharby sum sols may falle in to sine thos other Autoxousous beings that contenew unfalen, are awakned in to a fare hiyer degre of acktivity or self exertion then otherwais thay would be not ondly in respeckt of them selfs seing that horid dounfall and presepeses of sin to fixe them selfs in thair stashon mor fermely by wachfulns and resolution but also in respeckt of thos lapsed beings them selfs for as much eueriy good sole and Jenious thinks him selfe consarned in the Welfair of all others to Contrebut the utmost of thaire acktiuitiy acording to that spher a cording t which prouedens hath aloted them for the resquing and recouering of them as like wise thos other lapsed beings being led a waiy by strong & powerfull delushans stirife and contend to inlarge thaire partiy and gaine mor & mor proselets to them by mens whar of her

as plato rightly obsarued a parpetuall ware in the world \allways kept up/ betwixt to Kindoms or polites of beings the on of light the other of darknes incamping as it ware against each other and parpettualiy skermishing together and wacking all aduanteges against on a nother by means of which ware contenshan and oposishan the acktiuity of the hole world is raised & screwed up to the hiyst picke with out which it would be langed, ineart, dull, lethargekall and slugesh, the good prensepall that is in free beings is quikned roused up and invigarated by the oposeshan of the contrariy & tharfor sine it selfe doth sum \many/ ways contrebut to the good of the hole uneuers

\Here followes p. {23}/ We must now proceed to shew how since the Autexous. Fac. or Freewill is not in itselfe essētially Fortuitous and Contingēt, but a Fac|ulty| intended by Nature for Good, by w^ch the Soul is inabled to ascend and \or/ raise itselfe \vp/ aboue y^e Animal Inclinations or Affections, and is \so y^t it is/ not necessarily determined to y^e Brutish Life, how y^e Soul can by reason if this Power act Contra-naturally & Sinne, or hu that is act contrary to his own Good.

I doe not understand that thaire can be aniy other noshan of sins or morall euell which on is Culpabell or blame worthiy for then ackting contrariy to the perfexon of on's own being when on might haue don otherwais as likewis \of/ a Verteous & praise worthy axan but ^\y^t did/ an axan Agreabell to the parfexan of a being that might posably have don other wais wharfor ^\both/ to euell axans Culpabell and good axans praise worthy is presuposed that the acktor is an oregenall Cause & prensapell ^\of y^e Action/ and that he was neither pasifly determened acted or nesesatated \therto/ with \by/ aniy being with out him self nor pasefly subgeckt nor meerly ackted apon by the nesetiy of Nature, as in such ^\brutish/ appetits and desiars which are obtruded apon us and which we do not acktiuely determen and exert \frō/ our selfs; for in such though thaire be lubensiy and spontanietiy yet thaire being no Autoxousous selfe acktefetiy, We doe not so much ackt as Natur ackts in us and tharfor whare thaire is no hiyer prensepell of self ackteuety neither blame nor praise meret nor demerit is to be atrebuted; to it, but when by ackting apon our selfs we ^\& not Nature/ doe determen our selfs from within our selfs to any axen that is eather agreabell or disagreabell to the parfexon of our oun Natur then is it said to be culpably Euell or laudably good

But now it seemeth a thing dificult to be conceued how a sole or Autexousous being Created by god in recktetud and integritiy with out aniy ^\actuall/ flesh in it can posably by aniy power intended by god and nature for good or that it may acktiuely aither \thereby/ be its on parfexon or becom a means that such a being should acktuly ^ {vish it and Marr} it, or ondly bring it self in to an unnaturall state.

Which \{illeg}/ dificoltiy is comonly farther Vrgd in this maner that a Sole as yet untanted and unflawed must nede be indeued |1| With a right knowledg ^\vnderstanding/ consarning its own good & Euell and it cannot be conceued that ^\y^e soul/ by its on selfe acktiue power would wilfuly determin its self contrary to its own known good |& so cannot sinne|

But this as was intimated befor is nothing els but to disput sine out of the \d{illeg}s/ world or else to make it consist in nothing but the relashan of a spontanous axon to an externall lawe and to aknoledg no self acktiue Vollontoritiy but al ondly passiue and Naturall

But if thaire be aniy sine which is a reall Euill to the siner and hath a malam culpe in it or an Euell of fault it cannot posibly fall in to it otherwais then by the use of a self Acktiue Autexousous power becaus if it be nesesated ether by Natur or aniy other Externall agent it Cannot be blame worthiy |2 3| or blamabell for what it doth |2 3|

Wharfor for the solushon of this dificoltiy we afferm first that the soull being Natrualy an Autiexousous being it may exersis thos Autexouss or self determening pouer in many Cases upon its on Judgments & openans and tharfor upon its openans of its \concerning its own/ good and Euell whens it is plaine that sine will folow

We haue often Aserted the truth of this poseshan that if thair war no free will no selfe determening power in the Sole thar could be no more Acount gifen of Erour of ^\in vniversall/ Speckelatiue maters \Theorems/ then of Sine ^\in mere Actions or |or| Manners/ for it is not Consevebell how Nature Cane Ea|r|re, Eror being tharfor Euell becaus preternaturall as well as sin̄e; all that the understanding can doe is ether to know or to be ignorent, if the understand|ing| which is pure Nature Could eare then thare Could not posably be aniy, Creterian of truth or falshod nor aniy Naturall difrens bitwext them, nay to say that thaire ware erour apon the hipotheses war nonsens and Contredectexon for it would be to say that the same thing ware Contrariy to Nature n̄ not Contrariy in side man to say that all our axans uolishans ar naturally nesesariy is all on as to say that thaire is no sine nor fault in rerum natura for then the same axan would be booth Agreabell to Nature and Contrariy to it

Wharfor in iugments & openans besids the ackt of the understanding thaire is a complekated ackt of the Autexousous power and this is that we call asent which Autexousous Asent though it be autexousious yet it is necessary in things that are Clearly & distinctly cencored by the Vnderstanding to be true. in the Same maner as the gretest assertars of free will do Conklud, that as to a mans Sum̄um bonam his Cheff good and hapenes Clerely ^\apprehended/ {handled} the Will, that is the Autexousous power, is not indifrent but Nesesarily determens it self by the Embrasing of it. But in proposisisons not clerly aprehended as trew or falce the Autexousous asenting power, being larger then the understanding, the Sole by it may ^\rather/ assent, Opine, & iudge of them, which iugment and opinan sum tims proues trew and sum tims falce which is the originall of all Erour <37> When by our Autexousous fackolty we determin our selfs to asent to or dissent from things not Clerly aprehending|ed| by the understanding \\

Now if this be trew (as we must belef it is till sumbodiy \elce/ Can giue a beter a Count of Eror) is it not very esiy to concefe that the same may hapen also as to opinans of good & euell when thair ar deuersitiy of sentements in the sole, consarning them that the sole Autexously iudging of them may many tims eare and be mistaken consarning them

For the farther clering of which we must Againe repet What was before suggested that the light or knowledg of good and Euell ar \is/ not properly the dicktates of the spekilatif understanding, but thay are sartain sensibell touches Tasts and releshes; For when the senshall appitit strongly inclins to aniy thing thare is a sartane \lightnes/ light of parsepson goth a long withe the apitite, for that which we desiar we allwais aprehend as good; in like maner when the intelecktuall instinkt inclins to honestiy, that is not without A sartain Corespondant light, whareby we aprehend that to be good also, though in a nother kind, n|N|ow when Sols are created as Adam was \supposed to be/ in Enosensiy, with out aniy Acktuall flaw, yet not in such a state of parfexon but that thay ar sensebell of booth thes Atraxans, the lower as well as the hyer, and then as thay had two seuerall inclenasions in them so thay would be sensabell of low prackticall lights also, in which Case, aftar thay had a whole contested with thair lowar apetits and supresed the sam by thaire selfe acktiue Autexousous power, begning at length to grow Weriy of standing alwais apon thaire gard, and being tempted with the loue of change & Varietiy which hath sum apperans of lebertiy thay Rashly by thaire Autexousous fackolty asent to y^e light & Verdict of thair lower apetits as propounding the greter good, or at lest so Fare as that thay will make triyall and experement whether it be not such indead. |+|

But ^\Wherfore in y^e/ in the next place we shall ade farther that ^\as the/ To Meson \μεισον/ of the sole that is the self acktiue Autexousous and redub|p|lekative life in us hath a selfe power as to iugments & openans in which it doth not allwais ackt nesesarily, as it hath an Autexousious iugment so it hath in like maner an Autexousous strength & vigour by the Exersis whareof it maye becom Volentarily and self dedermenedly eather Stronger or Wekere for it must be suposed as was before expresed, that all Autexousous free Wiled beings when thay ar good, are not so by emutable nature or esenshaliy, but by thaire on choyce and elexan, nether ar thay aniy otherwas held up and confermed in the same, then by a selfe exerted Strength & Vigour of thaire on, Which folontariy self exerted strength, the mor it is exersised the more Puise|a|nt it groweth, and doth its work with a greater ease ^\facility/ and sequrity but ^\here it is exercized &/ the more it is remeted & relaxated it groweth not ondly the mor slugish listles ^\dull/ and Lethargick but also realy the Weker nor flaxed and Empotent, Wharfor solse or Angels suposed to be created in a faultles condishon yet so as that thay war sensabell of a duality or duplesity of Vitall prinsepels in them the lower of which ought <38> with a stife and straight raine to be held constantly in and the hiyer to be invigored|ated| by a self acktiue exersion of his natiue forse, it is veriy esiy to conceue that sum of them might aftar a whill without much colsultashon or deleberashon, by \mere/ negligens remit of thair wachfulnes and of thair self atenshan and introspecktion, and of the Vigourous ^\& {illeg}/ Exershon of thair strength that \{illeg}/ should be reinforsed \anew every moment/ parpitaliy; all which remoshan maye be said to be uolentariy & self determined, becaus thay might haue kept up an Awakned wachfulness a Constant Self atensham & self exertion. but apon the rele negleckt of it thay \Wherupon/ imediatly \they will/ grow weake & langed and the lowar apetits and enklenashons cariy them away passive\ave/ly becom bent thaire unto, and thaire iudgments of good & Euell are /will be\ acordingly Vishated and depraued as thar introspexan & self exershon was {reported}; and thus thay might not ondly comet one actuall sine, but also graddaliy fawle|ll| lower and lower \into a|n| ^\{habituall}/ sinfull state/ the whirle poll of the\{ir}/ lower lusts & appitits mor strongly sucking them in ^\continually/ unles by a quick & Vigourous recolexan \&/ a\d/ding now so much mor ^\conatus and/ indeuour by how much thay have|d| lost of thaire strength thay quickly recouer them selfs againe. So \Wee see then/ that such beings as this might los that stat of integritiy, of recktetud & hapens in which thay ware created by mere noding & slumbring, for want of a constand|t| awakened Wachfulns self atenshan reinforsed resolushan and Vigours Exershan, which ware allwais to be renewed for her apon a langor and imbesiletiy will emediatly sese apon them and the pondorositiy of the anamall and sefesh life would by its naturall fors preuaile |ouer thē and carry them away captive. - Here want of Introspectiō or selfe attētiō seems to be y^e Principale & most originall Defect -|

|Here followes p. 22. But for a fuller explicatiō herof we will illustrate &c & p. 21.|

Wharefor we do now afferme that if it ware suposed god sholde Creat to or mor solse ethar of men or Angels demons /in an vnsinning Mediocrity\ casting them in the veriy same molde, and making them parfektly of the same size or strenth, and put them in to all exaktly the same condishons & Curcomstanses with out them ^\superadding nothing to make a differāce but {leaving} them in y^e hand of their own Counsell/ it is not nesesariy or sartain that thay would all doe a like; that is stand a like or falle a like but sum of them might kep thaire stashon and, improue them selfs mor and mor to farther parfexon others might lapse them selfs in to sine and degenerat still mor & mor further & |3 2|farther |3 2|

Haueing now gifen an a Count how apon suposall that Autexousouse beings ware Created faultles or in an unsining Medriocitiy sins might first ^\creep in/ get entrans \2/ or foting \1/ in to them by an Abuse of thaire Autexousous fackoltiy that is by a negleck or remishan of thaire self atenshan introspexan an self exersion we may farely well reconsill this doctren with thos seuerall other Openans that haue ben intertained Consarning this mater the most Comon and ordenary whare of is that the oregenall of sine is from ignorans which will veriy well agree with eather of thos wais we haue set doun

The first whare of was that the begening of thair miscareg was from an Autexousious Erour consarning thaire good, and the other that it was from a Volentariy remoshan & self wachfulns & self exershon <39> for her apon the sole was Emediratly ouer Clouded and ouer Cast \with mists/ by mists {illeg} {illeg} as it ware with an {illeg} that it is parfaktly ^\{illeg}/ {illeg} and in tosticated and an no longar iudg a right Consarning its on good & euill the oregenall of the fall of men and Angels may be said to be from ignorans eather an ignorans primarily \volūtary/ or Secondarily ^\how euer but/ a self contrackted ignorens and tharfor it is most trew παί πονηρνι δγνοεί that eueriy wicked man is ignorant

Anoter openan is that all sin and wickednes proseds from {ἂδοναις τά} weknes & imbeselity But Weke \or/ That Vice is a langor & impotensiy of minde; for Autexousouse beings at first had a Voluntariy Strength and Consequently might becom Volontarily Wek and then empotently Subgeckt to be Cariyed a way with thair lower apetite from which folentariy |1| waknes at first was ^\afterward/ contrackted also a nother inbeselitiy in volentariy; of which we shall spek mor aftarward \anon/. Nay it is not emposabell to reconsill with our hiypotheses that doctren of thairs {whoe} labour to Mantaine that no man is Wilingly wicked for as we shewd before this Autoxousious fackoltiy though intended for good is that which may be so abused ^\as that by it/ men may wilingly doe that which is most Contrariy to thar Most inward will and trew good for n|N|o man realy doth that which he would in a full & parfekt sens, but he that is vertious holiy & rightous all others being under a Nurospastiy and hetrochinesy. \convulsive motion/ and are drawn a way by sumthing which is not them selfs & held Captiue under it which is not so much by the \a Positive/ exersis of thair free will as by the ^\privative volūtary/ negleckt of that self exertiue power which is Contained in it -

But lastliy it is most of all obsarfable how from this our hipotheses it appers that sine is realiy no thing but a difeshensiy or preuashon of sum parfexon |y^t| shold |2| be in us |2| thaire is inded a great acktiuity in it but all which \that is such as/ would a ben Cheked and restraned by that superour prensopell, which sould haue gouerned which thos selfe deprauing beings haue abandoned subgexan to.

the chife ground of that Contrariy openan so egerly osserted by \the/ same that Malū et Peccatū est quid Positivū that sine and euell is not a priuataf but a positiue thing sems to be this that thay supos it to Consest ondly in the positive Violashon of sum externall and abatrary lawe either in Cometing sumthing Contrary thaire un to or wilfuly ometing what was required by them |it| thay haueing not atained as yet to the Comprehenshan of this truth that the first lawe of rightousnes & holeness is not Will & Comand \but/ the laws of naturall good and parfexon, which non can posably transgres but by faling short of thair \their own Happines &/ what thay ought to haue attained unto, by Weknes ignorans and infermity, but yet not such an ignorens & Weknes as was unavoidably obtruded upon them but booth self contrackted it is not a mer passiue prevashon such as blindnes and lamnes often \Deafnes com̄only/ is in the bodiy for then thair would be no Culpebility in it but it is a volentariy self acktefly censed pashon or priuashon

Sin is not the mer wilfull oposing of the arbitriy comand of a nother parson but it is a faling short from naturall parfexon and the law of life and or the lefing law of rightousnes, and all the acktiuity that sems to prosed from it \arises/ is founded in an internall weknes langor and imbesility, tis an acktifetiy and furious Violens of lust and pashon in thos which ware not naturaly but by self Contrakted Empotinsiy subgekt to the same, as the Outragous acktefety of madd men is an Acktifetiy of thair inflamed Sperits but the Madnes franteckness & irrashonality of this acktiuity is from the Weknes of the intellecktall powers

Inded sum think them selfs maruilously hapiy witty in deviding the Doktren of the priuitifnes \^ation/ of sine and morall Euell as if it would folow from thens that Sine is nothing as if it and tharfor thaire ought to be no reckning at all made of it by us ^\but &/ as if all that gret a doe that ware \made/ a bout it in the world ware ondly a bout nothing nay that god him self was angriy with men for nothing, \w^ch is for no lesse then Adams Eating of an Apple/ and that he punesheth men with exquisite torments in hell for n|N|othing which is all on as to say for no cause

but this flash of Wite as brisk as it semeth to be and as much as men ar plesed with it is in ded it selfe nothing but ^\privation or/ a defeckt of sumthing that is \{illeg}/ inded of understanding for it is all on as if thay should argew, that men ought not to be so solesitous about the auoiding of pofertiy & want ^\{Def|a|fness Blindness to Stupor} & lethargicknes nay death itse about Death itselfe/ becaus it is|therefor| but a privation, and thairefor nothing, but angar blam or puneshment ar direckted toward sine because it is not a stuped and mer passiue preuashon but becaus it is a uolentariy and self contrackted on and becaus men doe freliy self determin them selfs to ackt Contrarily to thos mesurs preporshans and decorums which the lawe of the best nature the intelecktall life preskrips, un to them, thay ar puneshed partly to maintain the honour and did dignitiy of the scornfuliy negleckted deuine life or life of god comunicabell to men partly to aueng by a iust Nemoses thair iniurous acktings toward other rashonall Creturs that had a naturall right to be delt with other wais Contrariy to the preskripts thare of ^\that law/ thay ar puneshed also in ordar to thair on futar good if reclamabell or \otherwise/ for the Comon good of the whole mundan polty or sistem of rashonall beings

Lastliy thair puneshment is \in part/ also but Last thair ranking & plasing them in the world but ack|c|ording to what thay now are, for it is fite that Vesels of dishonor and things of a Vild condishon should be plased a Cordingly to what thay ar below |so much below other thing Beings as thay haue debased them selves vnder them -|

We haue alrediy shewed how sine might get footing in to blamles and no wais defecktiue beings, by the misuse or Volentariy negleckt of the Autexousous fackolty and tharfor haue hether to speake of Lib Ar or free will acording to that stat of strength which it had in unlabsed beings

Now it is a thing if you will \α/ a truth not ondly to be be|l|esed becaus religion & reuelashon dicktat it unto us by but also from the Euidans of Natraul light & tharfor belongs to the Doktren of naturall Ethecks as well as of Christanity that mankind her on Earth ar generaliy in a lapsed state <41> or {flawed} \fallen/ Condeshon and tharfor must neds haue ben Created by god otherwais eather in them selfs or in Adame ^\{illeg}/ this was expresly aknowledged by the plattonests and was an esenshall part of thair Philos Hiypotheses and this the Complant of Phelosefer Poets historiens of all Ages ^ testefiy, the pracktis of law makers and the Constant experans of human life Conferms

Wharfor we must now speke of the Autexousus or self Comanding power or free will of man as it is in this lapsed tate whare though the Indifrent free Wilers make ^\that/ thair free will to be esenshaliy indivisabell equall in all stats and Condishans of men and tharfor that the wilse of mankind and falen Angals ar as free as the wils of thos that are beattifyed and Confermed for it being an esenshal indifrens of the Will that fredom Consisteth in Can neuer be taken from it yet a Cording to that difeneshan which we haue giuen of L A or free will as a pouer wharby the Soule may Voluntarily raise it selfe aboue the spher of the hole anamall life and supress the Moshans of it in ordar to its adhering \to/ that prensepell which it hath in it of a Superour intelecktall life we cannot but acknowledg but by man laps in to a sinfull stat this naturall power \of/ is exedingly wekned & debelated in him|it| nay thos them selfs that plac free will in indefransiy not ondly of Contredixon but also of Contreriety and thairefor to good & euell will not be abell to deniy ^\according to their Principles/ but that thos whoe are exedingly under the power of Waked habets haue by so much the less of indifransiy in them \to Good & Evill and therfore y^t {lesse} of Freedom &/ in any axan by how much the mor thay ware predetermened to Vice by thaire inclinashons and thay must neds saiy the same of thos which ar habitaliy rightous

But acording to thair docktren the most of free will wil be in thos which ar in a midill state betwen Vertew and Vice but we confidently afferme that thaire is not ondly most of suipotence ^\selfdominion/ which is the lebertiy of state in thos Sols which ar most parfecktely estableshed in good and the heuenly life, but as also mor suipotestas which is Autexousousnes, Self acktivity, and Self Comand, and that the Naturall power of freewill is most Strongly and Vigourousliy Exersised in them.

and againe that thaire is less of Free will or that this naturall power is weker in thos Sols that ar in an indifrensiy betwiext Vertew and Vice, and \lastly/ that this power is wekest of all in thos that ar ^\captivated/ under strong habits of wickednes for it is plain that naturall powers may be strongar or Weker, whilst the power still remains|ig|, as in the powers of understanding and memoriy. and the fredom of free will doth not properliy Consist in that it is Free to morall efell as well as to good but that it is a power which the Sole hath but that by resen of it, the Sole is not nesesarily determened and Confined to the Contrackted Narounes of the Anamell or Selfesh life but hath a ^\Liberty or / power of Countermanding ^\and controling/ the Moshans and afexons of it, and to adher to that hiyer prensepell of life in it; and it is by vertew of this power that the Sole hath, of raising it selfe a bout that lowar Anamall life, that it Can be sede to self determen it selfe thaire un to; becaus if it had no hiyer power then that it Could neuer be self determend un to it <42> being \but would be/ naturaly determend and nesesatated to that ondley. wharfor this power in the Sole of raising it selfe a boue the selfesh anamall life being Voluntariy, when the Sole Voluntarily remeting \y^e Exercise of/ the same life pasifly Comply with thos lower axons it is {said} freley to determaine it self thaire un to, becaus it might ^\or tis a {Liberty} to/ haue don other wais The sum is, that self determing power to good or Euell is not the intiyer full and renewing \genuine/ Noshan of free will; but it is the Soles Volontariy power of raising it selfe aboue the Anemall appitits, and determing it self to adher to the intellecktuall light, which is the direckt noshan of it; but oblightly \give/ and by axodent ondliy doth the Sole by it, determen it self to Euell, for not exerting that Voluntariy power that it hath Aboue the Anamell appitits ^\& Passively yielding {illeg}/ by resen of that power becaus it had the power of doing otherwais it is said to selfe determin it self un to them; eueriy naturall power fackoltiy and Abelity is so far forth a power as it tends to good and parfexan ^\And/ but To beget mor perpesquitiy yet, we must in free will distingwish thes tow things, first Volentariy self determenashon, and secontly Power and strength to good, booth thes things to gether make up Autuxousousnes self com power or free will but the self deterening pouer a lone Considred indifrently to Euell or \as well as/ good, is but an inadiquait in Compleat and spurious Consepshon of it; the power of determing in ons self to efell is nothing but the impotensiy which is Naturaliy \necessarily/ anexed to that Volintariy power of doing good becaus it is Volentari ondly and not nesesariy, for with out the power of doing good thair could be naither aniy doing of Euell, nor aniy selfe determinashon to thos lowar affexons which now in sartan Curcomstanses are Euell. Free will is the Sols Capasitiy \voluntarily/ of exersising or exerting a hiyer life then the Anamall wharby a man is axs\cc/edentaliy Capasitated also to determen him self to those Anamall affexons which otherwis would be mer natur in him and he would be Nesesatated un to \not selfactive will./ the direckt Exersis of the power of free will is nothing els but selfe determenashon and self exershon to good, self determenashon to Euell is but an Axedentall and Oblique stroke of it. Wherefor we Conklud that the les strength or power aniy Cretur hath to promote it selfe toward good morall the les Autexousnes suepotestus and selfe power it hath; or which is all one that y^e Power of Lib. Arb. or Freewill is the Weaker in him. free will tharfor in the lapsed stat is Wekned and impared and that by so much the more as man in his lapsed stat is captavated and inthraled to sine for to refer to the formar simbolicall illustrashon

First the Plumbous waite by its propondransiy being Com \swayed/ doun to the bottom and the other golden scall being elevated to the Tope her is a Naturall inCrese of the strength atracktif and grafatating {fors} of one and A <43> dimunashon of the other and besids this the lifing Arme the self exertiue Autexousious power is not ondly groun mor strength but also habitiualiy Wekned and dibeletated sum ar veriy sutell her and do tell us that the Will & Free Will is the same in lapsed beings as in others, will as will being abell to Will on thing as well as a nother but thay Confes that the potestus the pouer strength and abiletiy of it is empared but thos Authors neuer define what thay but we haue sheud alrediy that power and strength is an essenshall part of free will nay the self determening power also is properly A strength or Abilitiy which the Sole hath of Comanding the inferiour affexons and determining it self to a hiyer good & tharfor if the power be wekned the free will must neds be wekned for free will is not mer Will with out power and inded the Authors neuer define what thay men by Will; for will is tow fold eather Naturall Apetit and inclenason lubensiy and spontinietiy, which semeth as it ware to be naturs acktiuitiy in us, or els it is self acktiue determenasion which is not natur but our selfs ackteng\ve/ apon our selfs the rise of which self ackitue life of ours is from hens becaus the Sole haueing seuerall pours and capasitis in it sum superiour to others \&/ betwen which being \those is/ distrackted thair must neds be sumthing in it which is Conshous of all which also hath a self power in it to that Eand that it may determin it self to the best, for its acktifity Consisteth ondly in that but when it is determend to the Wors it is raither slugeshly pasiue ^\though volūtary/ then acktiue in that determenashon so that if will be taken for Naturall appitite & lubensiy this is as much in bruts as it is in men and if for the self acktiue self determining power of the Soule, this is not at all in bruts nor so much in Visous \vitious/ as Vertious men, for though vis\i/ous men ar said by thair free will to determen them selfs to Vise yet the resen of that is ondly for this becaus hafing a superiour power of determining them selfs to Verteu ^\w^ch they {arts they do not expresse}/ thay ar by Consequens saide to ditermen them selfs to Vice, but this is but a passive and indereckt self determenashon the Sole is neuer acktifly self acktiue but when it dedermens it self to the hiyer good so that thaire is not ondly los of strength in ordar to a Conatus or indeuour agnst Vice in the lapsed state but also thaire is los of Will, if will be taken for self acktifitiy and selfe determinasion, the Sole not so much determining it selfe acktifly as pasifly \{illeg}/ submiting when it yelds to the lowar appitits. if thair ware nothing elce but appitite & lubensiy in men as it is in bruts all Agree thaire would be no Will at all though \& yet/ that apitite \all/ might desiar aniy thing as well as the Will Wil aniy thing; and Whare in men thos naturall appitits holiy swaye thair is nothing but lubensiy & spontaniety no self acktife will exersised and Consequently no free will exersised

b|B|ut not withstanding free will is hardly euer so uterliy extenguished in humain Sols but that y^t thay have sum power of selfe determenashon and self exersion ouer the lowar powers/appetites\ in ordar to the hiyer intelecktall life for if it ware then thay could haue no gilt in them for whatsumeuer wicked axaons Cometed otherwais then in referans to that powar thay formarly had ^\in Acting/ & Wilingly lost. for want of a self acktiue exersion of it thaire would be no new Contrackted gilte in doing euell if thaire ware no power at all left to good & if this be the condishon of all the sons of Adam as summe Emagin, that neuer sens his fall thay had the lest pouer or free will to good, then thaire Could not be aniy new consented gilt apon anniy of them \for/ what som euer thay haue don ^\{in at}/ all thaire gilt would ondly be a pon the score of thaire forfather |x| Adam in whos loyns ^\included/ thay had a power and lost it |+| But inded we Cannot say that Morall free will Autoxesousousnes & suipotestus is utarly extenguished in any rashonall being so long as any Discrimē honestorū & turpiū, aniy disernment of the difrans of good and Euell ^\any thing of Conscience/ remains in them for though thay ar not abell to Comand notwithstanding this light of Constans \presently/ \to Com̄and/ thair habituated afexons and in Clenasions when \as/ thay please yet thay haue alwais a power ouer thaire outward man for the doing of Externall axons and also for the abstaning from such axans Wharby thair lustfull appitits will be fede and in |^| Creased ^ and if thay Vigourously Exert that power that power whch thay haue we haue no resen to think but that by degres thay \it/ may gaine aduantag and thair free will and self pouer maye be mor Corobarated in them.

in a Word so long as mens oune conshanses tell them that thay liy under new Contrackted gilt for sins Cometed by them so long thay Cannot deniy unles thay be arant self condemned hipokrets but thay haue sum fre will or self power toward good left in them, for the cheke of Conshans is nothing els but a Naturall Exprbasion to men of thair not doing what good thay might or thair doing of what Efell thay might haue avoided this is the \verdict &/ testimoniy of god and natur in our Souls and tharfore ought to be belefed and locked upon as mor Authentick & infalabell then the dicktats of aniy thoelogekall D\r/s What so euer I say \y^t {illeg} {since y^e Fall no one} hath any Freewill to Good -/ thoug not a pouer ouer thair inward afexons |2| yet \Deniy/ a powar ouer thair outward axans \2/ which faithfuliy used will by degres weken thair inward afexans also But if thaire be aniy that are so fare {πεπηραμὲνοι πρὸς ἀρπὰν}, and {λὸλω βημὲνοι τὸ κριτηριον} to use Aristotels Expreshons Veriy pertinant to thus purpos so fare mamed and mutalited as to Vertu that thay hau uterly lost the Creterian of good Euill the facoltiy of fre will a morall self power in them must neds be laide a slep like wise and becom <45> like a Wethred Arme in them and ^\indeed/ such men thaire are in the |x| World if we will belef what them selfs saye who Confut|klude| Morality to haue no Naturality in it and whiy may not men as well haue this facoltiy of morall free will Wethred in them as haue thos other Naturall fackoltes and in scripshons and \or/ Comon Noshams of good Euell defased and obleterated, nay the formar ^\of which/ depends upon the latter, & morall free will as we shewed befor Springs ondly from that hiyer Instinkt that dicktats honestiy to us If those πατρικα {illeg} inscripshons of the deuine lawe & life can eather be Raised out of aniy mans solse or be so bloted and besmered that thay are not aniy longer legabell if Conshanses canbe so far Cothorised and stupefiyed as not in the least to cheke men for aniy thing thay doe as Morally Efell then morall free will and self power must neds be in the same degres wekned or extengwished

Nether will this be aniy perfexon atained to by such men that thay may iustliy bost of becaus thay are now free from the posabelity of contrackting aniy new gilte, for it war much beter for them to be sensabell of gilt and \{check} of/ Conshans; thair being so long hope of thair recoueriy, but now thay beng quit dead in sins and trespases and past all felling, \&/ hauing no prensapell in them to be rought on thay ar utterly Vnqurabell and in the most desparabell ^\ately deplorable/ condishan that may be.

But though in the lapsed stat of mankind Autexousousnes or self poure to good be not unefersaliy extengeshed in all yet it being so muche Wekned as it is the dificoltiy of mans recoueriy is thaire by becom so great, that it is veriy ^\imp/probabell with out sum farther \devine/ asistens thaire would Veriy few if aniy \many would/ emerge out of that state, and thairfor here is a fitting opertunity for the deuine grace and goodnes to display it selfe and \{apearing holy}/ and in ofring farther strength unto them, partly by outward prouedenshall dispensations partly by suggestan of thoughts that may Ocashanaliy exite pashons and resolusans, partly by inward excitasions and Attraxans in the Botom & Sentor of thair Souls; and partly by Coroborashon \of them {self exertive Power}/; but all in consistansiy with that Naturall self-acktive and self exertive pouer of the Sols grace not destroying|ed| but ondly asesting and helping Nature ^\for/ whare the deuine life of holines and Vertew is not esenshall |2| thaire it must neds be by self acktef exershon ^\of o^rselves/ or not at all.

But now that thaire may be no mistaks at all in this docktren we shall her freliy ^\& ingenuously/ acknowledg, that thaire is sumthing aimed at and ment, by the selous aposers of free will, which is indede a great truth, that is \but is/ litell or nothing taken notes of by the ordenariy Contenders for \y^e same/ free Will. and that truth is this that Free will or the self acktiue power of the Sole towards good must not be conceued as if it ware a power of forming or framing holenes & rightousnes with in a mans rightousnes is not a Cretur of free will ^\or human {illeg}/ or a thing begoten or prodused by it, but it is a life Spert or Nature which can owe its being to nothing but to god. for all other Naturs doe so but this in a a mor <46> espeshall extriyordenariy maner for it is the \a/ diuine {action} or the partisapated life of god him selfe ackting on human sols for which Caus it is rightly most treuly \{illeg}/ in the holy Oracle the Speret of god. it is not to be thought |y^t| this life of Vertous holines and rightousnes is such a thing as that free will and the self acktife pouer of man can s by its on besiy acktefity ^\alone/ can scribell a pon the Soule or \print &/ stamp a pon it \y^e souls {illeg}/ the power of free will is to be conceued no otherwais but ondly as an \self/ Acktiue convershon or turning, & promoting of the Sole towards it, that is, such {thing} \that {better} inwards Principle/ that is not of our oun making or produxan. rightousnes is no artifeshall thing, but a lifing forme, which man doth not acktualiy produs but is pasive to, it being acktuated quickned and enlifned by it. in which sens we are said to be gods Workmanship and x that is, the deuine life is said to be formed not by us but in us. this a Cording to the formar distrebushon made of the energies of the Sole is not selfe acktifity but nature, though not a Comon natur but θειαφύσις a deuine natur, or the Emag of god partisipated by men; which in our lapsed state sems to be at a great distans from us but by holiy indeuours and \self/ acktefeitiy, the Sole doth as it ware promote is self nerar and nerar towards ^\it/ and or with draw it self from the contrariy life of Carnaletiy sensheuality & selfeshnes; and the more it aduanseth it self this Way, the mor doth that deuine Nature grow strong Vigourous and attractiue in it. \Now/ this is that which an many me^\a/n by grace for thay sensably and experementaliy find it to be sumthing Aboue thair oune Acktfetiy which thay are in a maner pasive to, a thing that ruls and gouerns them, informs and acktuats thair Sols, and tharfor thay Cannot but look on thos as superfishall morelests, merliy l mer leygalists and lyttalests ^\litteralists/ which attreubut all in relegon and Moraletiy to ^\thar on/ self acktiuity and free will; And inded the reall ground of this misaprehenshon and of \or/ such an exsesive atrebushon to free will is from nothing els but ondly a perswashan that the trew law of rightousnes is nothing els but A leter and outward Comand \of a Person Observasion {illeg}/, and then inded thair shold ned no mor to Complet rightousnes but the exersis of that first sort of free will bifor menshoned, to kep that righten lawe and ^\tharfor/ thes men. likewis sensur the others as \for too/ misticall inthusasticall, and fenaticall sperutialests; but if this be inthusasem to asert such an inward and lifing form of rightousns, a boue Free will or mans produxan, then it is plaine that the doktren of the gospell techeth inthusasme, and our Sauour x him self was a mer inthusasticall doktar, where he deskrips regenarasion to the deuine life and the birth out of the Speret, to be like a Wind blowing whare it lesteth that though a man her the sound thaire of yet he knoweth not whens it Cometh nor whither it goeth; Sartainly to be born of the Speret is sum thing els \more/ then to be born of our owne free will and self acktivity.

and her by the Waye we may obsarue that in the Word inthusasme thair is a great Equivocation for sumtims it is taken in a bade sense when men ar riden and empotently ackted by furous and dark <47> lust \impuls/ and i\r/rashonall afexons though pretending religios seall |&| and inspiration \y^e spirit/ and again sumtims in a good sens when \reasoning/ men ar acted by a diuine instinckt a thing which is not below but a boue resen that which wings and sperets \{illeg}/ that and all other fackolties a Cord men on with Vigour and alackretiy which is in ded theopathy being pasiue to god working in us and thaire by raised A boue our selfs and thos Sobar considerasions of self entrest which sum a Count the ondly resen & prudens grafity and discreshan. When euer men ar Careyed with a swing towards aniy thing so that thay find them selfs not \so much/ ackifly mofed but \as/ pasif to a forse emputos and impt puls that is apon them thay ar comonly \may be/ then said to be {amide} an \some kind of/ inthusisme ^\good or bad/ for this is at lest the generekall natur of all inthusesm so that thaire is a kind of inthusesme in senshall appitits ^\& {illeg}/ and thaire may be a deuine inthuseme towards vertew and the heuenly life, as in all such as are Souls to be heroicaliy Verteous and good, for thay are sensably Cariyed with a Swing and Empetos toward that which is good and doe not ondly {hafe} and tuge them selfs on to it. thay find them selfs ackted by a power superiour to them selfs, by a deuine afflatus which is a mong the Veriy hethens them selfs may haue ben sensabell of |for| Aristotell himself tels us that thare is a || kind of inthusesm in Vertew |^| and Plato also comd|a|nds {illeg} diuine madnes as well \y^t is as Good a thing as/ {ανθρωπινα εαφαὺνη} a humain sobreity, and others haue obsarued that thaire was neuer any thing don or \w/reten Well and Transendandly in any Kind, with out a sartain inthusasm \inspiring y^e Actor/, now thaire is a great difrans betwen thos tow inthusames, when men ar Caried with a swinge and \are/ inspired with thair lower lusts and appits, and when thay are inspired by a diuine instinkt, to that which is moraley good, the on of thes being a prinsapell below reason \& of y^e cōtrary to it/ and the other the deuinest prensopell in a man which is superiour to reason and inteleckt ^\but allways a {illeg}/ but thair ar weriy many whach are great enemis to all deuine and morall anthusasme which \and/ thay are Wiling to brand \it/ with \out Distinctiō in to/ the name of Phentesme. Enimis to deuine ^\Spirit or/ insperashon which yet ar maniy tims strongly inspired by thair lower lusts & appitits, thay that ar most for morall and deuine sobriety |&| auarse from all devine inthusesme \calling it Fanaticism {may} {be confident to} yet are/ will be often time will be often time inthusasticaly and phenaticaliy Venerious inthusasticaly and Phanaticaliy ambisous, nay when thay ar most Sobarliy Caried out to parsew thaire oun self intrest though this be a Counted by them the ondly grafetiy and dis Creshan yet thay ar then hakned \red/ {rale} and inspired by that which the deuin Orakls Call the Speret of the World, or a mundaine Sperit, thay that ar most Auers from a deuine inthusesm and {sn}eer at graces inspired and in blown thay are \content/ all the whill \{together}/ under a mundain inthusesme or phenatism being inspired and in blown by that darker Speret of the lower nature but thair is inded a relegous inthusesme and phanetesme that is iustly to be sensured when men with out trew light and being merly ackted by lower and darker impulses ar turbinently furously and sadisously furiously and Violently ^\{illeg}/ Vncharitably & biterly {illeg} (in pretens) for god and religon. |But of enthusiasme more again afterward|

the sum of what we haue said her a mounts to this that rightousnes and holenes ar not things prodused by mans self actkifity or fre will not artefeshall or self mayde things but thay ar a life natur or sperit and that free will is ondly a power wharby we can promot our selfs toward it ^\{illeg}/ or remoue and estrang our selfs from it

But as her is a plain mistake of sum ^\Assertors of/ free will {lest that} y^t thay Atrebut mor to this power then thay ought to thaire is likwis a Contrariy Erour cometed by many of the Eager antagonests thaireof Who sem to supos that which thay call grace to be a thing Cla\s/ped \on/ upon the Sole from with out a thing holiy forain to the Nature of it, extrainous and advintesous \to/ of it, and for this reason ^\{mētioned}/ deniy that free will or humain self acktifetiy are contrebut aniy thing at all toward the produxan and recoueriy of it, no more thē o^r Freewill can \cōtribute to make/ make the Sū to shine vpō vs or y^e Raine to fall - /or {heavens} to descend vpō vs\

This sems to be the mening of thos tholegars who contend that man by his Fall is not ondly habetaliy wekned \& wounded/ as to good but also that the veriy dunamack\ic/ the pouer it self is lost and that in grace and regenerashon thaire is a new power all is introdused from with out and inspired and infused in \after/ a grose maner in to the Sole. Gratia non vita operatur in Conversione, quasi reliqua sit Facultas quædā ad Spiritualia, incorrupta hac natura, ex prima nativitate in sita, et in{illeg}; quæ peccati quidī laqueri ita est constricta id attenuata, vt nisi per gratiā Dei excitetur it confiemetur nō ponit in actū prodiri, Quando verō accidit gratia excitans et adjuvans tūc naturalī illā δυναμιν progredi ad efficacī actū vt ponit concipier motus et elicire actimes Spirituales grace doth not work in convershan aftar such a maner as if thaire ware aniy \A/ power or fackolty lif left in the Sole to Speretall things which \onely ar/ was fetred and chained by Sine that it could not com forth in to ackt unles it ware in\ex/sighted and confermed by divine grace but ^\as if/ when devine grace had in\ex/sighted confermed and strengthend it then that naturall pouer doth \did/ prosed to \acting {activity to comon}/ efecatious moshans \spirituall/ and Volishans. it is trew in ded that thos D\r/s assert this out of a pious Seale to aduans the grac of god and a good desiar that all the gloriy of well doing may be atrebuted to god ^\entirely/ and not to the Cretur but whether this Seale \here/ be here {κατ ἐτέχνωσω} it may very well be qustaned her. For and if y^e new life of rightousnes in regenerasion be such a Foran thing introdused into the Sole and clapt \on/ upon it, if thair be no prensepell of Congruity with it in the Nature of man, though deply opresed buriyed and ouer Whelmed in our fall, which is aftar ward revifed to grace and self acktivity then it will folow unavadably that rightousnes is παρὰφυσιν a Contra naturall thing and that it is a mer force and Violens. for the Sole to liy under it, nay it will folow unavoidably from hens that Sine and dishonestiy is not Euell but good for thair can be no other defeneshan of Euell, then that it is what is Contrariy to the Nature of aniy being, if rightousnes and regenerasion be a Contra naturll thing then it must neds be euell for if \If to/ be sanctifyed \made a saint/ be nothing els but to be unman̄ed and to haue Violens ofored to our humain Nature this will doregat exedingly from the comendashon of it. more ouer if regenerating grac and Sanktity be a thing that Coms <49> wholy from with out then it is but an Asesting form and not an informing form, like Aristot intelegensa which he bestoweth a pon eueriy selestall Orbe or Spher to {mof} them round aftar such a maner by an Extrensikell prinsaple ^\w^ch instickt in there Nature/ then no beatifyed Sole in heuen can ackt that which is good freliy naturaliy hartily and spontanusly from an inward lifing prensapell of \its/ his owne but his trew Nature and inward Vitalitiy wold be checked, and Curbed \shifted/ and all that he did Eather Artifeshaliy or forsidly, thaire Could be no Concord nor harmony in the Sole for the Nature of euery being is muensable unrepugnabell \&/ undestrayabell and tharefor thair must neds be parpetall Jaring Ware and Contenshon in a Sanktefyed and regenerat man and Eueriy good thing will be unwilingly don by him But the ground of this Erour is a Nother Erour consarning Sine and the fate Now this Openan Eather suposeth that when Adam and Angels ware at first Created inosent & pure \Grace/ rightousnes was not \præter/ Naturall to them, and so inded sum {Pontefekat} D^r determen that it was but \{illeg}/ Aurem frenum a golden bridell or fetter a golden\uilded/ Bondage, A pretar or contranaturall thing for this is nothing but a finer fraise for an euell thing ^\for {to discover a thing} an evill thing/ the botom of which doktren can be nothing else but what Sum Phelosefers maintaned of Ould in Other Words, that Justes or rightousnes was but alienum bonum but proprium matum an others good and ons on Euill |or| a thing which is good ondly by axodent, that thair is no intrinsicall goodnes nor Naturality in holenes and rightousnes but that it Consesteth ondly in a forsed Complyans with the Will and Comand of sum other being, or Els it \this opinion/ suposeth that though rightousnes ware natturall to a man befor his fale, yet by Sine and the fale his Veriy Nature was destroyed in him, that his Naturall powers and fackoltes ware not ondly wekned and unpared but also that Sumthing of them was Eradicated and that he had now ondly a new Nature a Nature of Sinfulnes in him, ^\that sinne was his very Nature/ and then aftarward by grace this Veriy natur was \again/ altred againe a Secont time and that ^\there/ he had a nother Nature put in to him. But thaire is no Phelosefy in \at/ all \in/ this to suppos the Nature of things to be \thus/ arbitrarabell and altarabell\iously stopt & changed/ at plesur, whare as Eueriy Nature is emmutabell, as likewis; to supos that thaire is aniy Nature of Sine, Whare as Sine is no Natur but a pretueranturall thing a force or Violens ofered un to nature and if thaire be no Natur of Euell and Sine, then of Neseity rightousns must be natur, and the trew nature of man or all intelecktall beings; but to say that to Adam and Angels created in thaire first integrity, rightousnes was ^\not Nature/ but a golden bridell that is a gilded Euell or bondag, that it was not naturall un to them but a forsed Confinment of thair Naturall fredom, in keping them in a forced Complyans with Exeternall laws and Comandments is all on as we haue alrediy Showed with afferming that thair is no naturality in rightousnes and un rightousnes honestiy and dishonestiy and that Sine is nothing but a Name for non Complyans with the Arbetriy will & Comand of <50> sum other being

But not to parsew aniy longar such wild and extrafagent Consaits it is plane y^t thaire is ^\not/ nor can be aniy natur of Sin ^\in y^e world/ nether can aniy being be giltiy of Sin which hath not a prinsipll of rightousnes in the natur of it ^\w^{ch {can} strayed from}/ grac and the define natur is no foran and auduentisous thing but it is the trew inward Natur of all intelecktall beings which though by the Abuse of thair Autoxousous power thay May becom alenated and Estranged from, and as it ware remoued in to ^\another Complex/ a great distans from it yet it remains unextengeshabell in the botom and Sentar of thair beings though ^\they/ bured low stifled and opresid in them. in regenerashon is nothing but the recouery of the trew Anchant natur and the bringing of them back as it ware from the Surfas of thair being and thaire out side in to thaire most inward selfe. to find god an return to him by grac is nothing but to find our selfs and to return to that define prinseple in the botom of our beings. god and the define natur is no foren thing \extraneous advētitous thing/ to the Sole nether is it to be sought with out \must it come to it frō without/ and to be introdused in to vs|it|, it is that which our sols ar bult & grounded apon. God is neerar to vs thē we are aware \of/, in him viz {του γαρ γένος εσμεν} for we are his Ofspring & in him we live and move and haue our Being: And the Kingdome of God (w^ch is his Life and Righteousnes) is within vs. Non opus est vt id nūc demū in animū intret, est enim rim ante in eo sed Incognitum. Cū dicitur operetur ad id vmire aut vt in animū veniat, porinde ut ac si dicas id esse sentiendum et Olfaciendum. Whō men are {tretized} to God and Righteousnes, they may say as that Holy Patriarch did ^\after his vision/ Behold God was in this place that is, within myselfe and I was not aware of it.