Book. II. Chap. 1^st.

|I| It hath been a ^\very/ Ancient Controversy in y^e world Whether all things are Fatally Necessary, or there ^\are/ some things ἐφ' ἡμῖν In our own Power. |And| In the begining of y^e former Booke, we have observed, That y^e Fatall Necessity of all Actions and Events, has been maintained upon three severall grounds; whence arise those \proceed/ three Fatalisms, or False Hypotheses of the Intellectuall System of y^e Vniverse, wch \that/ are ^\all/ severally to be impugned by us. And First some have asserted ὑλικαι ἀναγκαι A Material Necessity of all things wthout a God, they makeing y^e First Principles of all things, to be either Senseless and Unqualified Atoms, as Leucippus and Democritus, or at least inanimate Matter \Bodies/ as y^e other Atheists ^\one {illeg}ing another from without/ This it is that ^\w^ch/ Epicurus in his Epistle to Menoeceus calls τὴν τῶν φυστικῶν ἑιμρμένην, the Fate of Naturallists, y^t is indeed of Atheists It cannot be denyed ^\is true indeed/ that in Ancient writers the Materiall Necessity ^\where one thing is moved by another from without/ is many times opposed, not soe much to Contingent Liberty as to Mind and Vnderstanding Councell & Wisdome; ^\from within itselfe/ ordering things for Good Thus is it s^d by Plato, that in those Ancient times, Astronomers Geometricians and Physiologers were commonly suspected by the Vulgar, for friends to Atheism, because they dealing soe much in Naturall th in Materiall things, & Naturall Causes, would be thereby disposed to think, y^t all things came to passe ἀνάγκαις, ἀλλ' ου διανόιαις ρουλὴος μη ἀγαδῶν πέρι, by Materiall Necessities, and not by the Determinations of Mind and Will for y^e sake of Good From ~ whence it is y^t ^\this/ Necessity and Fortune are joyned together in the same Plato, where he describes y^e Atheistick Hypothesis, κατὰ τύχην εξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσδη that things being moved & mingled together, ffortuitously, out of Necessity, Heaven and Earth and all y^e things ^\there/ in ^ it were thus produced w^thout any Mind or God Where Fortune is taken for y^e Temerarious Motion of Atoms, undirected for Ends, \and Good,/ w^ch well caus\eth well/ w^{th Materiall Necessity}. \+/Nevertheless it is certaine y^t according to y^e tenor of y^e Atheistick Hypothesis that \w^ch/ Deriveth all things in y^e Vniverse for Sensless and Inanimate Bodies, moved \one another/ Necessarily from without \& Fortuitously/ \Though all be Fortuitous/ there cannot possibly be any such thing admitted ^\any where/ or Contingent Liberty \{Cōtingence}/ or Free Will because there is noe Foundation for it in the Principles Which Epicurus being well aware of, that if y^e Motions of Atoms were all Necessary, Soules & Minds being Generated out <55> out of them, they must needs be Necessary too in all their Cogitac~ons and Volitions, but \y^t which/ being convinced from y^e Phenomena, that there was in all Animalls, selfe-Motion, and in Men Fatis Avolsa Voluntas, a Will free from Fate, he therefore, though in all other things ^\com̄only/ Apeing Democritus, yet in this one thing departed from him, & devised a Third Motion of Atoms whereby they should uncertainly Decline from y^e Perpendicular ^\vncertainly/ both b as to time & place. Nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo thinking by this means, to Salve Liberty of Will \X/ Whereas nothing could be more Sensless & Sotish then this; it being indeed to Atribute Liberty of Will to Dead and Inanimate Atoms, or at least \and/ as Cicero observeth, to introduce Motion without a Cause, w^ch to all Physiologers is the greatest absurdity. For w^ch Cause And he is accordingly for this utterly abandoned by all y^e Democritick and Epicurean Atheists of these latter times. Nor ^\indeed/ is this Liberty of Will onely inconsistent w^th y^t Democritick Atheism, but alsoe w^th all other f|F|orms thereof, they agreeing in this, that they derive all things from inanimate Matter, ^\necessarily moving & acting;/ insomuch y^t Spinos|z|a himselfe, who at last discarding Hobbianism, was transformed into a kind of Hylozoick Atheism, he Atributeing a kind of Life to all Matter, explodes Liberty of Will, as an Impossibility, and conted|n|ds for Universall Necessity Wherefore this First Atheistick Fate is thus described by Plotinus, οἱ μὲν ἠγχὰς σουματι καὶ θέμινοι, ὁῖον ἀτόμουι, τῆν τούτων φορᾶ, καὶ πληγαις καὶ συμπλοχαῖς πρὸς ἀλλυλα ἓκαία ποῦντει, καὶ ὅταου εχων γίνεσθας ᾗ ἐχεῖνᾳ συνέστη ποιεῖ τε καὶ πάχες; καὶ ἁμετέρας ὁρμὰς και διαθέσιν ταυτη ἔχειν αὑ ἂν ἐκεῖνα πνιῶσι ἀνάγκε την παρὰ τούτων εἰς τὰ ὄντα συμεγουσι. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ τες σώματα ἀρχας διδῶ, καὶ ἐκ τουτων τὰ πάντα γίνεσθας τῶ παρὶ τουτων ἀνάγκα δουλένειν ποιεῖ τὰ ̔ντα These Philosophers who suppose Corporeall Principles, as Atoms, Generateing all things from their Motions, Impressions & Complications from with one another, and makeing them to Bee, Doe, & Suffer, accordingly and consequently our own Motions, Dispositions and Volitions to be such as they produce, from these their Principles \introduce Necessity and Fate/ into all things whatsoever And though one should suppose other ^\Sensitive/ Bodies, besides Atoms ^\& Elements &c/ to be y^e ffirst Principles and derive all things from thence, yet must he in like manner make all things serve Necessity. And againe afterward in y^e \his/ Confutation of this Atheistick Hypothesis he concludes thus; ὁ ολως γὰρ τὸ <56> ἡμετερον ἐριον, καὶ τὸ ξὤοις εῖναι ἀπολεῖτας, φερομίνων ᾖ τὰ σώματα ἄγει ὠθοῦντα ἡμαῖ, ὥσπερ ἄψεχα πίσματα, τὰ ὀντὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ προὶ τουι ἕτερα σώματα ἀιτὶα τῶν πάντων τιδεμινους In a word this ^\Democritick/ Hypothesis, leaves noe Action \to be/ our own, nor our Selves \to be/ Animalls, we being ^\alwayes/ carried as y^e Atoms drive & impell us, like inanimate Bodies. And the same is to be said {illeg} \also/ ag^t those other Atheists, who make other Bodies (besides Atoms) y^e Causes of all things, that they must needs introduce a Vniversall Fate or Necessity or Fate.

2 Wherefore it is to be here observed that neither the Greek Εἱμαρμένη nor the Latin Fatum were alwayes soe taken as ^some suppose \commonly is supposed/ to signify Decree, Destiny, or Appointment, nor for a Divine thing, but sometimes for y^t w^ch is meerly Naturall, & hath nothing at all of Decree or Appointment in it. As for Example, when Epicurus in his Epistle to Menecus writeth thus Κρῖπτον ἠν τῳ περὶ θεῶν μόδῳ ακιακολουθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν ειμαρμένῃ δουλευειν It were much better to adhere to ye Fate of y^e Gods, then to serve y^e Fate of Naturallists or y^e Pysec Physicall Fate; the one promising to men a possibility of declineing and avoiding evills by means of y^e Worship and Invocation of y^e Godds, \but/ y^e other \quite hindering/ all such hopes by an undeclinable, and inexorable Necessity Where as this Fate w^ch is opposed to y^e beleife of the Godds ^\& as & {illeg}/ is called Physicall or Atheisticall, soe hath it nothing at all of Decree or Destination in it In like manner when Lucretius tells us of Epicurus his designe, in his third Motion of Atoms declineing uncertainly from y^e Perpendicular, to finde out thereby, Principium quoddam, quod Fati Cordera rumpat Such a Principle as might breake all y^e Bands and Leagues of Fate; That this is not at all to be understood of a Divine Fate, or Fatall Decree but a Naturall Fate onely, the Necessary Conection of things in themselves \as shall be {illeg} afterward./ Evident from y^e following verse, and y^e whole Context We say therefore y^t by Fate in generall is meant nothing else but necessity, and accordingly \and thus is it/ and accordingly Fate is designd \as it is/ defined \in generall/ by Senecca to be Necessitas omnium rerum actionemque quam nulla vis rumpat, the Necessity of all things and Actions w^ch noe Force can breake or interrupt W^ch <57> Wch \Now this/ Necessity \of all Events/ may be either made by y^e Things themselves & their Train & {Sucession} or else by Divine Decrees. That Fate w^ch arises from the Nature of Things things \themselves/ w^thout ^\any thing/ of Divine Decrees, is y^e Naturall and Atheistick Fate; such an Necessity of things as follows from the Principles of all Atheism, according to the genuine Tenor of them, and w^ch hath been asserted by all Atheists in their several Ages ^\accordingly/ onely Epicurus and a few such \thus/ Excepted \as was said by/who \indeed/ offered violence to their own Principles. For Atheism is that w^ch deriveth all things from ^Inanimate Bodies as the First Principles; and noe Inanimate Bodies can move y^mselves Contingently, but whether they be moved Naturally as y^e \Epicurus his/ Atoms in ^\their Descent/ descending downward, or \els/ by Externall f|F|orce, as in their Plagæ, they are alwayes move\d/ing necessarily; Nor can any Contingent selfe-Motion or selfe-Determination, ever - Emerge out of such Principles ^\as these/ But because when ever any such Body y^t was before quiescent, or devoid of Action, doth begin to move or a|A|ct, this is alwayes caused by y^e f|F|orce or Impulse of something els ^\without/ moveing it without or acting upon it, therefore is this Physicall or Atheisticall Fate Commonly described, as ^\/ Series, Chaine, or Concatination of Causes Motions and Actions, one things necessarily moveing another ^\& that w^ch followes being \alwaies/ linked with that w^ch went before,/ and y^t ^\thus/ from all Eternity and \or/ w^thout beginning Thus is it called by Cicero, Continuatio Causarum, and Ordo Seriesꝗ Causarum, cum Causa Causæ nexa, rem a se gignat; and described by Lucretius after this manner; Quum Semper Motus connectitur omnis, Et Vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo, And, Ex infinito quam causam causa sequatur. |p215.|And Accordingly Alexander Aphroditius declares y^e sense of these Fatalists ^\For y^e Stoick herin agreed with y^e Democtricks/ ως αει το πρωτον γεγονος ἀντιασθας τοῦ μετὰ τοῦτο παὶ ποιεῖν επισυνδ καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπισυνδεσιν τινα καὶ συνεχιαν τῶν ἀιτίων, That alwayes that w^ch goes \something going/ before, is y^e Cause of something that follows after, and soe there is made a Connection & Continuity of Causes. Which Connection or Chaine of Causes, \also/ as y^e same Alexander addeth, was supposed by them alsoe to be backeward Infinite; πιῦς οῦκ ἄπειρον \ατοπον/ τὸ λέγειν ὁς επ' ἄπειρον εἶναι τὰ ἄιτια, καὶ τὸν εἱρμὸν ἀυτῶν και ἐπισύνδεσιν, ὡς πρῶτον τι μὴ εἶναι μύτε ἔχατον. In w^ch supposition of theirs alsoe this is very absurd \How is it not Absurd/ <58> That there should be an Infinity of Causes, & their Chaine & Series such as hath nothing neither first nor Last As if every thing must have a Cause, whereas though whatsoever be made, have a Cause; yet it does not therefore follow y^t every thing must have a Cause, because every thing is not made. Wherefore according to these Physicall or Atheisticall Fatalists, y^e whole Cause of every Action, is not ^\is neither the Agent itselfe nor/ that Motion or Action that went Immediately before it, but y^e whole \whole/ Infinite Chaine ^\or Series/ of Causes \t/ backward from Eternity and w^thout begining. Moreover ^\becaus/ besides y^e Proper Efficient Cause of every Action, there ^\are/ many other \improper/ Collaterall Causes, of y^t Kind that is commonly called, sine qua non, such as w^thout w^ch the Effect could not be produced; therefore did they suppose y^t there was not onely one ^\such/ Chaine ^\backward Infinite/ but alsoe many \other/ Chaines runing together paralel from Eternity, y^t did \someway/ concur to y^e production of every Effect, since without them it could not have been. To this purpose is that cited out of Ennius by Cicero, Vtinam ne in Nemore Pelio securibus Cæsa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes Licuit (saith Cicero) vel altius, Vtinam ne in Pelio nata vlla vnquam esset arbor: etiam suprà Vtinam ne esset mons vllus Pelius; similterque superiora repetentum, regredi in Infinitum licet. Neve inde navis Inchoandæ exordium Cepisset. Quorsū hæc præterita, quia sequitur illud Nam nunquam hera errans mea efferret pedem Medæa, animo ægro, amore sævo saccria – Not that y^e Beach Bowes \Beames/ cut down in y^e Pelian Forrest; nor yet y^e making of ships out of them, were any \true/ cause of Medias Frantick Love, any more then ^\as Cicero expresseth it/ Viator bene vestitus est causa granatori cur ab eo spoliaretur; a well clothed Travellor is y^e cause of a highway mans robbing – but becaus without this, she could not have gone to Sea in that Ship And thus is the Necessity of All things maintained by Hobbs in his Questions concerning Liberty and Necessity Numb~ ch 16:^th The Necessity <59> The Necessity begins from y^e first Motion towards y^e Action, that is from Eternity, where indeed there is noe First; and accordingly he concludes Numb y^e 10^th That y^e last dictate of y^e Judgment concerning y^e good or bad y^t may follow any Action, is not properly y^e whole Cause, but the Last part of it, (that is the last Linke of y^e Chaine of Causes from Eternity) and yet it may be sd to produce y^e Effect Necessaryly, in such manner, as y^e last feather - may be said to breake an horses back, when there was soe many laid on before, as there wanted but that one to doe it Indeed he affirmeth, That w^ch Necessitateth & determineth every Action, to be y^e sum~e of all those things, w^ch being now Existed Existent, Conduce & Concurre to y^e Production of that Action heareafter; whereof if any one thing now were wanting, y^e Effect could not be produced, Soe that y^e whole Cause of every Action ^\(according to him)/ consisteth of y^e Concourse of all Agents & Causes, and therefore does not make one Simple Chaine or Concatenation, but an innumerable number of Chaines Joyned together Thus againe Number y^e 21^th I ^attribute not y^e necessity of y^e Will ^\to y^e Influence of y^e starres/ But to the Aggregate of all things together y^t are in Motion; where \he/ advances this further Paradox, That there is not any one Action in y^e world to y^e Causeing of w^ch, Concurres not whatsoever is in Rerum Natura: w^ch he defendeth in \after/ this manner, If I should say y^t all Action is y^e Effect of Motion, and that there cannot be a Motion in one part of y^e world, but y^e same must alsoe be communicated to all y^e rest of the world, \my {Adversaries}/ would say, that this were a great Paradox, But yet if I should say, that if a lesser Body as a Concave Spheare or Sun were filled w^th Aire or other liquid matter, and y^t any one little particle thereof were moved, all the rest would be moved alsoe; he would conceive this to be true; or if not, a Judicious Reader would. It is not y^e greatness of y^e Sun, y^t altereth y^e Case, and therefore y^e same would be true alsoe, if y^e whole world were y^e Sun From whence it would follow|s| that upon never soe little motion, made in any one part of y^e world, as upon the skipping of a flea, the matter of y^e whole vniverse, must be put into motion, and that not onely y^e fluid parts thereof; but even the most Solid, As the Earth Sun Moone & Starres must communicate therein Which Absurd Paradox, was founded upon y^e grosse ignorance of Physiology, or y^e not understanding y^t there is in all Motion a Circle, soe that though there should be a Plenitude ^\in y^e world/ without any Vanity yet would neither Motion be hindred, nor yet communicated to the ^\matter of y^e/ whole world, but onely to a \certain/ Circle of Matter, equall to y^e \in to y^e/ biggness of y^e Body Moved: nor is there any more necessity, that the Matter of y^e whole world should be disturbed by the Progressive Motion of every Body, then by the turning round of a Vaste Circle or Spheare, if it could move of it selfe, Wherefore though Hobbs <60> Speakes sometimes of Divine Decrees as whereby y^e frame of things in Nature was ^\set &/ determined and would draw an Argument from for y^e Necessity of all things from Divine Prescience and sometimes he pretends not to differ from y^e Stoicks save onely in this that he substitutes God Almighty in y^e roome of Jupiter ^\whē they Define Fate to be Effatum Jovis;/ nay he sometimes cites S^t Paul and Calvin and Perkins too, yet we may I hope \think as I suppose/ w^thout any great breach of Charity conclude that ^\all this was but a Blind & that/ he was really neither Calvinist, nor Stoick, nor any Divine Fatalist; but an Atheistick one and y^t according to y^e Democritick forme; he plainly and possitively declareing else where, that there is noe f|F|irst Mover or cause of Motion but that one thing moved another from Eternity w^thout any first Cause or ^\Vn/Moved Mover, w^ch is all one as to deny a God

3 Thirdly \Now/ We have in y^e f|F|ormer Booke fully confuted all the severall Atheistick Hypotheses or Formes of Atheism, not onely the Democritick, which was an Anomæomery or Dissimilar Atomology, ^\& w^ch Generated all things {illeg} but the Substance of Matter, & produced thē out of nothing,/ but alsoe y^e Anaximandrian which was an Homœomery or Similar Atomology, this latter makeing ^\Eternally/ Qualified ^\& selfexistent/ Atoms, (as the former u|V|nqualified ^\{ones}/ to be y^e first Principles of all things, Againe the the Pseudo-Stoicall & Cosmo-Plastick or Cosmo-Physicall Atheism, w^ch makes ye whole world not be an Animal, ^\hath not \nor/ Produced nor Governed by any Vnderstanding Nature/ but a ^\huge/ Plant or Vegetable onely; that is, \not to be Produced or Governed by/ not to be governed by any Animalish conscious ^\Vnderstand^g/ Nature, but a Plantall and Plastick, onely \onely/ such as Herbs ^\Plants/ and Trees are shaped ^\out/ by; and lastly these Stratonick and Hylozoick Atheism, w^ch attributes to all Matter as such, (their onely Substance and first Principle of all things), Life and p|P|erfect Vnderstanding too, but w^thout Animality, Sense, and Consciousness. Nor indeed can there well be any ^\other/ f|F|orm of Atheism ^\but what may fall vnder one of/ besides these foure; because the first Principle of all things, if it be not an \no/ Animalish & Conscious Nature, must either be Matter ^\altogether/ u|V|nqualified, or ^\els/ q|Q|ualified \but/ w^thout any manner of Life, or else endued w^th a Plantall & Plastick Life onely, and \or/ Lastly w^th a strange kinde of ^\Fictitious/ Knowledge & Understanding also, \yt is/ devoid of all me Animality, Sense, and Consciousness. I say we have demonstratively proved the Impossibility of all these severall f|F|orms of Atheism & particularly \or {other} wayes so/ to Omitt other things from hence, \as by other mediums, w^ch we shall here omitte, so from hence, all agree in this y^t/ because they all bring something out of Nothing; that is they bring all y^t Animal Life and Conscious Cogitation or Understanding ^\y^t is in y^e whole world out of/ Matter, that is utterly devoid thereof, or \y^t is/ from Nothing; and consequently they \consequently so/ suppose it to be caused by Nothing, or made w^thout a Cause. Now all y^e severall f|F|ormes of Atheism being confuted that y^e Atheistick Fate or Necessity ^\y^t is/ derived from any \one/ of them, must needs be ipso facto confuted alsoe

Nevertheless we have \also/ further particularly confuted, alsoe that a atheist ^\Democritick/ Fate, w^ch is y^e Principall, after y^e same manner: For where as, this is built wholly upon this s|S|upposition, t|T|hat Nothing \in/ y^e whole Vniverse can move ^\or Change itselfe/ it selfe. Nor Act from it selfe, but onely as it is Moved and Acted upon, by some other Agent w^thout it, w^ch Democritick Principle ^\& Ground of Necessity/ is thus laid down by Hobbs, Numb. 30. Nothing taketh begining from it selfe but from the Action of some other im̄ediate Agent w^thout it selfe And that therefore when first a man had a Will to something, to w^ch Immediately before he had no Will, the Cause of his Will, is not the Will it selfe (nor indeed y^e man himselfe) but something else not in his own disposeing: soe y^t voluntary Actions have all of y^m Necessary Causes: We have ^\in y^e Former Book/ clearely showed, that if nothing could Move it selfe, nor Act from it selfe: ^\then/ all y^t Motion that now is in the world must have come from Nothing or been made w^thout a Cause. Nor is it \It being 1^st vtterly Vn/conceivable, how \& Contradictious y^t/ Motion should ever have entered into y^e world; if from Eternity Nothing could ever Move it selfe \or Change itself for it would have been a Passion from no object/ To make an Infinite Progress here in y^e order of y^e Causes of Motion, \according to/ w^ch Democritus that ^\did not/ Aristotle ^\rightly observeth/ ^\it/ to deny it to |#| have any Cause at all \#/ Moreover ^\we might object/ it is a gross mistake of these Democriticks, when they take it for granted, that if once but never soe little Motion could get into y^e world by chance or any^\they know not/how; or if some part of y^e Matter should have \but/ one such \but one onely/ given |to| it; that from thence ^\forward/ one thing would ^\still/ continue to move an other ^\without ceasing cessation/ to all Eternity, without ceasing. It is true indeed as y^e Case now stands w^th things in y^e Corporeal world; that as no Body w^ch is in rest, can cause it selfe to move, soe ^\can/ no Body y^t hath an Impetus of Motion upon it, as a Bullet shot out of Cannon, or an Arrow from a Bow ^\or a Stone from a sling/ stop y^t Motion or Cause it selfe to Rest And though Animals grow weary of Motion & are tired out w^th it \& feel a lassitude therupon/ yet is there no more labour or difficulty to Inanimate Bodies, in Motion then in Rest, Nor doe all Bodies, as the Peripateticks suppose, natu Naturally of y^mselves tend to Rest, and seek repose and quiete. Nevertheless y^e continuation of Motion in Bodies after an Impression once made upon them, is not from hence as if a Body could of it selfe continue to move w^thout any Impetus or or Act of\tive/ f|F|orce upon it, or after y^e ceasing thereof \of such Force,/ but because there is a continuation of y^e Same Quantity of Motion or Active f|F|orce upon y^e Corporeall Vniverse, full \always/ maintained & kept a foote by y^e same Cause y^t first produced it; and w^ch by y^e Law of Natures Imutability still abideth in y^e same Bodies \whence it was/ untill it be hindred ^\or distracted/ by some Externall and ^\Cause or Impediment &/ \or/ Transferred upon other Bodies Though there be as much f|F|orce <62> required to stop a Body y^t was in Motion & make it Rest, as \to/ make a Body that Resteth Move, yet \is/ Motion is \is/ Action and ^\so is/ at Rest nor is there required any continued Active f|F|orce to keep a Body in Rest, as there is to keep it in it selfe, or stop all y^t Motion that is upon ^\it or damp it & extinguish it/ nor is it a thing y^t could fade |dy| or decay of it selfe as being contrary to y^e Nature of Body ^\meerly a violent thing/ w^ch therefore ^\Nature/ would at length prevaile over it Notw^thstanding w^ch if y^t w^ch Acted upon it |&| made it at first Move ^\should cease ^\to Act/ or withdraw itself Force/ the whole world would immediately become Stagnant, and be fixed into as great a hardness as any Rocky or Diamond \Adamantine Hardnes./ Wherefore both our Ancient & modern Democriticks ^\haue been here guilty of 2 Grand Errors/ y^e first \not only of/ of bringing Motion into y^e world w^thout a|n| ^\efficient/ Cause, and \alsoe that/ y^e Second after they had swallowed \down/ that; \of supposing/ That Motion once begun, they know not how, ^\& without a Cause any efficient Cause/ would necessarily of it selfe, continue to all Eternity, without any Conserving Cause -

Inanimate Body as such cannot Move it selfe nor indeed c|C|hange it selfe ^\any way/ {illeg} \not/ f|F|rom Motion into r|R|est, \any more thē frō Rest to Motion/ but it follows from hence undenyably, y^t there must be something else in y^e world y^t is Selfe-Moveing, and Selfe-Active, and can c|C|hange it selfe or other things; because it is Impossible that otherwise there should ever have been any Motion ^\or Change/ in y^e world, Wherefore as y^e Democritick Fate is built upon this f|F|oundation, that Nothing is SelfeActive or can c|C|hange it selfe, but y^e Action of every thing is a Passion from something w^thout it, soe this being removed, y^e whole structure thereof falls to y^e ground; the ^\selfe Active &/ selfe-Determineing Nature, \w^ch must vnavoidably begin to quite/ breaking y^e Chaine of y^e Naturall Fate, the Necessary Concatenation or l|L|inking of things together ^\things together & Actions of whatsoever follow to it what went before it/ from Eternity to Eternity.

4. In Wherefore besides this Naturall & Atheistick Fate w^ch hath nothing at all of Devise or Destination in it ^\it being onely y^e Naturall Connection of things in themselvs/ there is another Divine Fate directly opposite thereunto, w^ch is wholly made up of Decrees and nothing else; it supposeing a Deity or Knowing & Unerstanding Being Omnipotent, w^ch from Eternity Decreed all particular Actions & Events whatsoever, and does accordingly in Time, Physically Predetermine all Agents whatsoever to those severall Decreed Actions & Necessitate them to y^e same. W^ch Divine Fate is soe far from \denying y^e existence of/ supposeing Contingent Liberty, and Selfe-Determinac~on ^\or frō supposing it to/ to be πραγμα ἀνυποστατον (as the other Naturall Fate doth) a thing y^t hath noe Existence ^\any where/ in Nature; and that \or has y^t/ Necessity it is \to be/ Essentiall to all Agents \or/ and as Lucretius expresseth it, Quod res quæque Necessum Intestinum habeat, cunctis in rebus agendis, Et Devicta quasi cogitur Ferre Patique - <63> that on y^e contrary it asserts Contingent Liberty & Arbitrary Will to be the Essentiall Perfection of y^e Deity: and we shall afterwards show, y^t some of these Divine Fatalists themselves, acknowledge ^\also/ that Created Wills alsoe would have y^e same Contingency ^\in them/ were they left to y^mselves, and did not y^e Deity enterpose w^th his Decrees & Influences; by means whereof their Determinations would be altogether u|U|nforeknowable: Wherefore the Necessity of the Divine Fate, is indeed a Necessity made by Contingency, Or by y^e Arbitrary Will of an Omnipotent Deity, determining all things. Nor is there here any o|O|rder, ^\or Commectiō any/ Chance, or Concati|e|nation of Causes, however some of these Divine Fatalists, affecting it seems to Symbolize w^th tho|e|se other Fatalists in their Language, have talked of an Armilla Aurea, a Golden Chaine, and of y^e Order of Causes of Salvation & Damnation, they meaning nothing else hereby, but that order of y^e Divine Decrees, w^ch is Fancied by them; whereas there is indeed according to this Fatalism, but One onely ^\single/ Cause of all things, the Deity Arbitrarily Willing & Decreeing them. Nor is there any Orderly Conection or ^\dependent/ Concatenation of things or actions in themselves, but or in their Immediate Agents or Second Causes; but all is here Abrupt, i|I|nCoherent and i|I|ndependant: the Deity w^thout any respect to y^e n|N|aturall i|I|nclinations and Wills of Creatures, determining them to such & such Actions, or necessitating and Compelling y^m ^\(though not be any outward force \or compulsion/ but by a secret Irresistible Influ./ to y^e same: Upon w^ch account it is that we call it \this/ Divine Fate violent. |Becaus the Necessity therof arises not of proceeds not frō the Nature of the things themselvs but from an Extrinsecall Cause.|

5 Furthermore besides these two Fatalisms, the One Naturall & Atheisticall w^thout Decrees, the other Divine & Wholly made up of Decrees, there is yet |a| another \Third/ Fatalism, wherein both these ^\the Former/ are in a manner compounded together; it both supposing ^\both/ a Deity that did contrive, set, and Decree, the generall f|F|rame of things at y^e begining of y^e world; and after a Naturall Concatination of Second \Second/ Causes, all things afterwards necessarily following from y^t first f|F|rame: and not onely soe, but ^\even y^t/ y^e Deity it selfe alsoe, to be\is/ in a manner Involved, & l|L|inked in y^e the same Chaine, w^ch is supposed to be Infinite, w^thout either f|F|irst or l|L|ast. This as we shall afterwards show, was that Fate asserted by the Ancient Stoicks, and it is called by us, y^e Divine Fate Naturall, in opposition to y^t other Divine Fate soe properly soe called, w^ch hath of Nothing of Naturality in it, but is all ^\both/ Arbitrary and Violent. And therefore we must here ^\needs/ reprehend Lipsius ^\besides others/ who in his Constancy, perverts these men ^\Notions Divine Characters/ and contrary to evident truth, calls y^t Stoicall Fate Violent, and the other Divine Fate, Naturall. \A/

6 And as we have the in y^e f|F|ormer Booke, fully confuted, together w^th y^e Grounds of Atheism, y^e Naturall and Atheistick Fate, or Materiall Necessity of all things, soe shall we now proceed, w^th y^e Divine assistance, to y^e Confutation <64> of the two other Divine Fatalisms, both y^e Violent, & y^e Naturall; we intending to substitute in y^e roome of them all, for \as/ y^e true Hypothesis of y^e Intellectuall System of y^e Vniverse, that of a προνοῖα {η} ἰλασιμος ^\as M. Antoninus calls it,/ a Placable Providence of a Deity Essentially Good ^\Just,/ and Wise, w^ch made all things after y^e best manner Possible, and therefore Rationall Creatures w^th Liberty of Will, and \doth/ still conserveth them in y^e free Exercise \of y^e same/ thereof, we excludeing hereby y^t severe Tyraness and Implacable Tyraness (as Epicurus calls it) of Universall Necessity \reigning over all/ that leaves nothing in ^\Nostra Potestate in/ our o|O|wn power, but takes away all hopes of \{illeg}/ Bettering our \own/ Condition in outward or inward things, either by our own endeavours, or by our Prayers & Supplications to y^e Deity; according to w^ch w^tsoever \Nothing/ is possible ^\but what/ is necessary, and whatsoever c|C|an be m|M|ust be & Shall be; & whatsoever i|I|s, was u|U|navoidable, and whatsoever i|I|s n|N|ot, i|I|mpossible to have been.

Notwithstanding w^ch, we shall \intend/ not quite \to/ take away all manner of Fate ^\or Necessity neither/ nor banish y^e Notion of it, but acknowledge such a thing in s|S|ubordinate|iō| to Divine Providence, and \in/d|D|ependant upon y^e same, For Fate according to y^e best and \of the/ Ancient Philosophers, \being in/ differs t|T|hus |distinguishd| from Providence, that y^e one is onely in y^e Mind & Councill of God, the other in t|T|hings themselves, executive thereof; soe y^t y^e Deity is not Necessitated ἀυτουργεῖν ἅπαντα to doe all things it selfe immediately, in y^e world \it/ haveing this Vicarious Instrument of Fate, to doe it, to be as it were the Χειροτέχνης or Manuall Opificer \& Drudging Exec./ Wherefore we acknowledge ^\First/ a certaine g Fate ^\derived frō Divine Providence/ governing the whole Corporeall world, & ruleing over y^e matter, w^ch we have already showed to be an Artificiall a certaine Regular, or Artificiall and Methodicall Nature distinct from y^e Deity, but depending on the |it| Deity, or a Perfect ^\Mind,/ and wholly d|D|irected & i|I|nspired by it, to c|C|onfirme that loose p|P|ossibility, and fluctuateing i|u|ncertainty of things, & to take away \temerarious/ Fortuitousness \of them/; it Acting for e|E|nds, and doeing \in its Sphere/ all for the Best And this was the onely Fate, that Aristotle acknowledged, as Alexander the Aphroditian Philosopher declareth ^\I mean no other then Nature/. Neither does this extend onely to Inanimate Matter, but alsoe to Vegetables as to herbs & Plants, and even to y^e Bodies of Animals, it Artificially Frameing & Organizeing them, soe as y^t noe h|H|umane Art or Wisdome, can possibly comprehend all the Intrigues & Consequences thereof And this is that Fate w^ch y^e Platonicks call λόγον σπερματικὸν the Spermatick Reason of y^e world. Besides which we acknowledge alsoe even in Rationall Creatures and in Humane Soules y^mselves though prevented y^e free use of their Liberty, a certaine Fate e|I|nterwoven in their very Natures, <65> ^\& in y^e order of ^\Second/ Causes,/ by means whereof, though their volitions & Actions be not \all/ necessarily determined, yet y^e Consequences of y^m are respectively, and they are silently carryed ^on, by a certaine Fatall Magick ^\of Nature/ & disposed of into such severall Places ^\or Regions/, Bodies, and Companies; as is agreeable to their former Actions^\ngs & Dispositions X by an Adrastian Law/ soe y^t in y^e Evolution of y^e world ^\{without any} {illeg}/ the Divine Justice ^\is made to/ appears in every thing \silent/ and all things are carryed on in Exact Geometricall proportion and ^\& though of differēt & Cōtrary kinds yet are made to/ conspire into one Vniform Order \& Harmony/, that w^ch of it selfe is most Extravagant, & goes out of Order \being/ is strangely overruled by y^e Art y^t Guides all and made ^\of that great Choragus & Præcenter y^t guides all separable/ to contribute ^\& brought into another Order &/ to y^e Musick of y^e whole But though there be such a Divine Fate i|I|nterwoven in y^e ^\very/ Nature of things, and y^e Order of Second Causes themselves, and what is done by it, is done by it is done by God himselfe who ^^{acteth in all &} cannot therefore be s^d to be a meer Idle Spectator but Acteth in it all yet doe we not deny but y^t God Almighty may sometimes alsoe - immediately interpose, ^\extraordinarily in y^e Oeconomies of things/, whensoever there is need of a θεος ἀπὸ μηχανῆς as in y^e Tragick Dramata of y^e Ancients: and ^\accordingly/ as we beleive in that Article of our Christian Faith; concerning the day of Judgment and Resurrection; that is, y^e Righteous then ^\pompously & solemnly/ receiving their \their Crownes of Glory or their/ glorifyed Bodies; & wicked \the Incorrigibly wicked both/ men & Spirits, \being/ cast into y^e Lake of Fire, or \those/ Infernall Flames, of the Earths Conflagration.

But though there be such a Divine Fate as this, Interwoven in y^e very Natures of things, and in y^e Order of second Causes themselves; in respect whereof God cannot be said to be a meer Idle Spectator, what is done by it being wholly done by God himselfe; yet doe we not deny \we deny not/ but y^t besides this generall Providence, there is another more particular special Providence alsoe, exercised upon particualr persons, here in this Life, by y^e Ministry of Good Spirits or Angells; And alsoe \over & above/ y^t besides both these God who \constantly/ w^th a watchfull Eye presides over all ^\with a watchfull eye,/ doth himselfe sometimes immediately & extraordinarily interpose, whensoever there is need of a θεος ἀπομαχησης, (as in y^e Tragick Dramata of y^e Ancients) and for y^e more signall manifestation of his Goodness and Justice; Instances whereof, as to the generall Oeconomy \of/ things, we have in those Articles of Our Christian Faith, concerning y^e Humanition and Incarnation of y^e only begotten Son of God, y^e Eternall word, and alsoe of y^e future ^\Solemn & pompous/ day of Judgm^t and the Resurrection; to be transacted ^\also likewise/ by our Saviour Christ as Gods Vicegerent

7 We shall now begin w^th that Divine Fate, w^ch supposes God Almighty, who Acteth nothing Necessarily w^thout himselfe, to have Arbitrarily Decreed from all Eternity, all Events and particular Actions whatsoever, done by Angells ^\& Devils/ Men and Inanimate Creatures, and by a Physicall Influence in Time, necessarily to determine y^e respective Agents thereunto \accordingly/ Where that we may not seem to ^\combate/ fight w^th a Shaddow, and confute a meer Chimera or Figment of our own, we must first make it appeare; That such a Fate as this hath been really asserted And because it will be undenyably Evident, that ^\some in/ many of y^e Reformed Churches, are to be charged herewith; to prevent all mistakes and prejudice, we must of necessity declare, That as y^e Prophetick Spirit in y^e Scriptures did predict, that there should be an Apostacy and Degeneracy in the Christian Church; soe doe we undoubtedly beleive that this hath already accordingly come to passe It haveing been Lapsed into Pagan-like Idolatry and overrun with many \other/ grosse Errours and Corruptions, the Contagion whereof as it did overspread the face of y^e whole; soe was y^e Roman Church most infected therewith, and most Active and Industrious in promoteing the same t|T|he seaven Hilled City is ^\plainly/ the Metropolis of this Apostacy, and y^e Roman He|i|erarchy, that Apocalyptic Whore y^t rideing|th| y^e ten horned beast w^th \or/ Civill Power, and ^th whome the Kings of y^e Earth have com̄itted fornication, and w^ch hath made her selfe drunk w^th y^e bloud of y^e Saints and of y^e Martyrs of Jesus. Wherefore as we can never be sufficiently thankfull to Almighty God for freeing us from this Yoke of y^e Roman and more then Egyptian Bondage soe ought all <67> those worthy Hero’s who have been Instrum^ts of this happy Reformation ever to be had in ^\perpetuall/ honour by us Nevertheless it does not therefore follow that they were all of them in every point infallible and perhaps it was not w^thout a Divine Providence that they should have ^\be permitted to haue/ something of humane f|F|railty and fallibility ^\appearing in them/ least otherwise that they should have been too much Idolized ^\by vs/. And the first Reformation seems to be but the dawning or d|D|ay breake, after a long night of Egyptian darkness, of that Light w^ch is to grow more & more unto perfect day; or y^e milleniall & new Jerusalem brightness, when y^e Light of y^e Moone shall be as the light of y^e Sun and the Light of the Sun ^\shall/ be Seaven fold as y^e Prophet speakes

That first Wickliff and ^\then/ Huss were somewhat engaged in this opinion of the necessity of all Actions done by y^e wicked as well as good appeareth from hence; because this was one of y^e Articles objected against them both in the Councell of Constance Quod omnia de necessitate Absoluta eveniant –

8 That our Countryman John Wickliffe was an asserter of y^e necessity of all Actions made by Divine Decrees is Evident from y^e Acts and Records of the Councell of Constance, w|W|here amongst y^e forty five Articles of his Doctrine Condemened we find this for One Omnia de Necessitate absoluta eveniunt: That all things come to passe by Absolute Necessity Where ^\that/ by Absolute Necessity is not to be understood a Necessity intrinsecall to the Nature of everything but an Extrinsecall Necessity cause by Divine Decrees is evident from y^e certaine Manuscripts of y^e Said Wickliff, still preserved and as John Huss and Jerome of Prague followed Wickliff herein soe did Luther alsoe in his f|F|ormer writings, as in his a|A|ssertion of y^e Articles condemned by Leo |Fol. 112.| the Tenth. Malè dixi quod Liberū Arbitriū ante Gratiam sit Res de solo Titulo, sed simpliciter debui dicere, Liberū Arbitriū est Figuratū in rebus, seu Titulus sine Re. Quia nulli est in mana quicquam cogitare Mali aut Boni, sed omnia sub Deo sunt, \&c/ contra quē nihil possemus nisi quantū permittit aut facit ipse. Quod et Porta voluit quandò dixit Certa stant omnia Lege. Wherefore - Erasmus in his Collation De Lib. Arbitrario, ioyneth Luth Wickef & Luther together in this manner, Docuit Wicklevus, Lutherus asseruit, Quicquid fit a nobis nō Lib. Arbitrio sed Onera necessitate fieri. Though to doe Luther right in his Booke De Servo Arbitrio he seems to retrench this business againe and onely to deny free will in Spiritualls before Grace But after Luther Zuingleus engages \to/ in the same Cause y^t \He/ Wickliff \before him/ had done, and maintaines y^e Vniversall Necessity of all Action Caused by Divine Decrees he supposeing Divine Providence & <68> Liberty of Will in men to be directly contradictious to one another and concludeing, ea quoque quæ Fortuita et Contingentia vocamus, none essi Fortuita aut temereria, sed Numimi insui ac dispontine cuncta geri. We shall content our Selves here w^th \a few/ only one \or two/ more passages examples \more/ out of his Booke De Providentia Dei, wherein \{as first} opposing Chrysostom/ he endeavours ^\ag^st Chrysostom/ to Reconcile Sin & Punishment, with Gods Necessitating |Fol. 365| or Impelling men to all Actions. Hæc tam lati tractamus, in Chrysostomi quorimonia quinquam moreat, quasi dum omnia Divinæ Providentiæ referamus; iniuria Supplicio adficiamus Sentes, et cætera, quæ ille ρητορικῶς multa queritur. Nam cum Lex Homini est data, semper peccat cū contra Legem favet, quantum vis seu sit, nec vivat, nec operatur, nisi in Deo, ex Deo, et per Deum. Sed quod Deus operetur per Hominē, Homini vetis vertitur, non ^\etiam/ Deo. Hic enim sub Lege est, ille Liber Lege Spiritus et meus – Vnū igitur atque idē Facinus, putà Adulteriū aut Homicidium, quantum Deò est Authoris, motoris et \ac/ Impulseris opus, primerū non est, quintū autem Hominis est Crimen ac Scelus est. Vt Adulterium David quod ad authorem Deum pertinet, non magis Deo sit Peccatum, quam cū Taurus totum Armentum inscendit et implet. Et cum occidet eum etiam quē per Latronem, aut Corruptum iudicem trucidat, non magis peccat, quam cū Lupū Lupe aut Elephantū Dracone interficit. Sua enim Sunt Vniversa &c. Idem ergo Factū quod Deo Authore ac et Impulsere fit, illi honorificum est, at homini crimen ac erefas. Jure igitur perituntur Sorites; in Legem enim pruarunt non quasi autheres, sed quasi Instrumenta, quibus Deus liberui pro suâ voluntate, vti potest quem Paterfamilis aquam aut bibere aut humi effundere. Cumque movet ad opus aliquod quod prefeciendi instrumento fraudi est, sibi tamen non est. Neque Instrumento facit iniurians, cū omnia sint magis sua, quam cuiusque opificis instrumenta, quibus nullà facit iniuriam, si nunc timam in malleū et contra malleū in Limā convertat Movet ergo Latronē ad accidendū innocentem &c. Nec dicet quisquam innocem igitur est Latro, Deo enim Impulsore occidit; nam contra Legem peccarit. At inquies, coactus est ad piaru ^\dum/ <69> Permitto inquam Coactū esse, sed in hoc eret alter (iimoēs scil. interfectus) transferretur, alter (Latro) cruci adfigeretur. Hic hallucinantur Liberi Arbitrij defenseres, et subind proinde Providentiæ Dei Adversarij; consistunt enim postquam dixerunt, Si impulsare Deo trucidavit Latro, Ergo iniuria plectitur; cum semper debeant progere, vtipsa Providentia nunquam cessat, et dicere, Percussit Latro impulsere Deo in hoc, vt et percussus in cœeles hinc migret, (aut si illequoque perfidus est ad Inferes,) et Latro a iudice cruci affigatur P Prompta igitur est responsio dū Providentiæ adversarij sic dicunt, si in homine prorsus nullū Liberū est consitiū, eam fateri cogimur, Divina Providentia, facta, homicidia et omnia scelerū genera fieri. (Sic enim Providentiā, inquam, agnoscimus vt omnia curantis atque gerentem) – \Nam/ Imputit Deus latrinē vt occideret, sed æque impellit Judicem, vt Percussivē iustitia mactet. Et qui impellit agit sine omni suspicione, non enim est sub Lege. In w^ch passages of Zuinglius God is plainly made to be not onely the Impulser but y^e Author of all wicked Actions done by men as Adulteries & Murders & Robberies and the like, he being excused onely from hence, because he is above Law w^ch men are subject to.

After Zuinglius Calvin Espoused the same Cause \Opinion/ managing it not onely |more| industriously but alsoe w^th much more witt & Eloquence He in y^e first Booke of his Institutions he in like manner plainly makeing the Providence of God to ^\be/ his Immediate Determining and Doeing ^\of/ all things ^\to be one & y^e same/ For first as to Inanimate things, whose ordinary Actions are commonly referred to Nature, not onely \but such as was/ at first caused by God, but alsoe \and is/ still conserved by him & Ꝑpetually dependent on him; himselfe granting ^\acknowledging/ that, in genere quidē arcanæ Dei Inspiratione Vegetari omnes mundi partes et Philosophi docit, |Instit: L.1.c.16.| Et humanæ mentes concipiunt, that in generall according to Philosophers and vulgar apprehension it is \all/ y^e parts of y^e world are secretly acted & inspired by God But Calvin is not satisfyed \not being contented here/ with this but in y^e ordinary course <70> of things would have something more and therefore writeth ^\he supposed God im̄ediately to Act all himself therin He writing thus first/ thus concerning |Inst. L.1. c.16.#2.| inanimate things in this manner Ad Ac de rebus Inanimatis sic habendum est, quamvis Naturaliter singulis indita sit sua Proprietas, vim tamen suam non exercere, nisi quatenus præsenti Dei manu diriguntur. Sunt igitur nihil aliud quam instrumēta, quibus Deus assiduè instillat quantum vult efficaciæ, et pro suo arbitrio ad hanc vel illam Actionē flectit ac Convertit, and againe in his Booke De Prædestinatione, Divinitus omnia fiunt, h|H|e would of \have/ all the things in Nature to be done Immediately & m|M|iraculously by God himselfe Thus does he afterwards determine, Non cadere pluriæ guttam nisi certo Dei mandato, and Nullū ventum oriri vel surgere, nisi speciali Dei iussu. In like manner as for all humane Actions, he rejects y^t com̄on opinion as false Hominē a Deo moveri secundū Naturæ suæ inclinationē ipsū ante convertere motū quò visū fuerit, That man is moved by God according to y^e inclination of his Nature but y^t himselfe converteth his motion whether it seemed good to him And therefore whereas St Austine somewhere writes Partim Libero hominis Arbitrio, partim Dei Providentia omnia geri, that all things in y^e world are carried on partly by y^e free Will of Man & partly by y^e providence of God he soe interprets the|i|m as to make this distribution signify nothing. Again he thus condemns the same, \vulgar opinion/, Qui hominem volunt Libero voluntatū suæ arbitrio huc atque illuc se convertire, ita inter Deū et Hominem partiuntur vt ille motionem sua virtute inspicet qua agere sperint pro naturæ sibi indite ratione, hi autem actiones suas voluntario consilio moderētur. Previter Dei p|P|otentis, sed non Destinatione res hominū subionare volunt they who would have man by his own free will \though dependently vpō God/ to turn himselfe this way & y^t way divide it and halfe it betwixt God & Man supposing y^t God does inspire Active Power & Vertue into man whereby he may Act according to his Nature but y^t he doth govern & determine his Actions by his own voluntary Councell these men would have y^e world and |all| the things of men to be governed by the Power of God indeed \onely/ but not by his - Destination. Wherefore Calvin on y^e contrary concludes all y^e voluntary actions of men to have been decreed by God from all Eternity & in time to be executed and brought to passe by his im̄ediate influence soe that none of them come to passe Contingently but all Necessarily I say he does not conclude this onely of Good Vertuous & Spirituall Actions but alsoe of all other Actions of humane Life and even sinfull action y^mselves |L2.4.6.| For first su as to such as are in themselves of a middle and indifferent Nature He writeth \Præfaceth/ Thus, In actionibus quæ nec iustæ per se nec <71> vitiosæ sunt, et ad corpoream magis, quam spiritualē vitam spectant; (nonnulli Liberam homini Electionem concesserunt, magis vt arbitror quod e re nō magni momenti discerptare nolebant, quam quod asserere pro certo vellent illud ipsū quod concedunt Ego etsi eos qui nullus esse sibi ad Justitiū vires tenent, quod inprimis ad salutem cognitu {illeg}enariū est tenere fateor, nō tamē puto hāc quoque partē negligendum. Where he ^\would/ insinuates y^t these Lutheran Composers of y^e Augustane Confession though they granted liberty of Will as to Naturall & Civill things yet this was rather done by them because they would not contend about it as being a matter of Lesser moment then that they would assert it to be certainly soe and he grants y^t they who acknowledge men naturally have noe power as to spirituall things hold that w^ch is cheifly necessary to Salvation Nevertheless as for his part he thinks it necessary to declare his Judgm^t according to y^e Scripture concerning Externall Actions and all those w^ch are in their own nature indifferent \Instit. L.2. c.4. #6./ that these are alsoe ^\im̄ediately/ determined by God Almighty Equidē si sensu nostro reputamus rerū externarū adminsitrationē, nihil dubitabimus eatenus sub humano arbitrio sitas esseos, verū si aures 1st testmonijs probemus, quo Dominum in his quoꝗ regeor animes hominum clamant, arbitrium ipsū speciali Dei motioni subijcare nos cogent. And again afterward Quū scribit salomo Cvr regis quasi rivos aquarum in manu \#7./ sua tenere et inclinare quocunque voluerit, sub vna profecto spiere totū genus comprehendit. And si \{eni}/ Regia voluntas Dei manu flectitur, neque nostra eximetur ea conditione Where it is plaine y^t Calvines meaneth meaning was that y^e Wills of men in all Exeternall & Civill Actions were necessarily moved and determined by Divine Decrees from all Eternity because there ^\is/ no body y^t denyes but y^t God does sometimes either im̄ediately or by the ministry of Angells move and incline not onely y^e hearts of Kings but alsoe of private persons whether soever he pleaseth notwithstanding w^ch there may be some use of mens free-Will ordinarily left to them whereas Calvin supposeth mens wills in all Civill Actions to be soe determined by y^e Divine Will as y^t they have no Exercise of free choice or Election left to them And that indeed Calvin Exempted no humane Volitions whatsoever from the necessitation of Divine Decrees and Influences is evident from hence ^\y^t he doth not extract/ any of y^e most sinfull or wicked actions of men he writing thus in his Book <72> Booke De Prædesinatione Dei Quæ pupegasi et inuictè ab hominibus fiunt eadē esse recta et iusta Dei opera And Quod prevenesoidies faciunt non nisi Deo ordinante Oceri Scriptura docet. Deus reprobos in obsequiū cogit. Deus Satanī suo arbitris flectit a Deus author Satan Ministro Dicitur Satan excrecare infiditiū mentes sed vnde hoc nisi quod a Deo ipsi manat efficicia erroris. Inst. L.1. 18. But he soe plainly discovers himselfe and takes off all Mask & Vissard where he doth w^th such indignation reject and explode that opinion that y^e wicked Actions of men are not all to be imputed to Divine Destination and |Inst. L.1 c.18. #1.| Causality but y^t God does onely permit them & foreknow them Perperam mendacij patrocinio asserere tentant Dei Justitiam ab omni Sinistra nota. Absurdum videtur Volente ac Jubente De excæcari hominem, qui mox cæcitatis suæ pœnas daturus est. Tergiversando itaque effugiunt, Dei tantum Permissu, non etiam Voluntate hoc fieri. Ho vero palane se facere pronuntians, effugium illud repudiat. Quod ante nihil efficiunt nisi arcano Dei nutu, nec quicquam de liberando agitent nisi quod ipse iam apud si decreverit, et arcanâ suâ directione constituat innumeris et claris testimonijs probatur. And afterward Satis superque liquet nugarè eos et ineptire qui in locum Providentiæ Dei Nudam Permissionē substituunt, acsi in speculâ sedons expectaret fortuitos erentur, atque ita eius iudicia penderent ab hominum arbitrio. \B/ In like manner does he reject alsoe y^t of Prescience w^thout Decree he blameing y^e Ancients for this quod Religionus interdū simpliciū |L.2. c.4. #3.| veritatis Confessionē in hac partem formidant; not excepting S. Austin hims. Ne Augustinus quidē illa superstitionæ solutus, vbi dicit Indurationē non ad operationem Dei sed ad Præscientiam spectare – \A/ Neither \A/ did Calvin assert this onely concerning all y^e Sinnes ^\of/ men since the fall, y^t they were not onely permitted & foreknown, but alsoe ordained & appointed and efficatiously wrought by God himselfe; but alsoe concerning the first Sin of Adam \itself/ L.3. C23.7. Disectis verbis hoc extare negant Decretum fuisse a Deo vt suâ Defectione periret Adam Quasi verò idem ille Deus quem Scriptura prædicat facere quæcunque vult ambiguo fine condident nobilissimā ex suis Creaturis <73> Liberi Abritrij fuisse dicunt vt fortunā ipse sibi fingeret, Deū verò nihil destinasse nisi vt pro mente eū tractaret. Tam frigidū com̄entū si recipitur, vbi erit illa Dei omnipotentia, qua secundū arcanum consiliū quod aliunde non prudet omnia moderatur. Atqui Prædestinatio velent redint in posterei se prodit. Neque misu factū est Nadaratitur vt a Salute exciderent omnes vnius Parentis Culpa. Quid eos probibet faleri de vno homine quod inveti de toto humanæ genere concidūt &c \X/ & #8. Cur permittere dicemus nisi quià ita vult? Quanquam nec ipsum quidem per se probabile est Sola Dei Permissione, nulla Ordinatione, hominē sibi accersisse interitum. Quasi vero non constituerit Deus qua conditione præcipuam ex creaturis suis esse vellet. Non dubitabo igitur cum Augustino simpliciter fateri, Voluntatē Dei esse rerum necessitatem &c – Lapsus est primus homo, quia Dominus ità expedire censurat, cur censurrit nos latet. Certum tamē est non aliter censuisse, nisi quià videbat nomini sui Gloriam inde merito illustrari/ Again, {t,} Æterna Dei Providentia, in eam cui subiacet Calamitatem, Conditus est homo. Where Calamity in his sense includes as well Originall Corruption as y^e punishment thereof as he more fully declareth else where L3: Chap: 23 Sect: 4 Rursum excipiunt, Nonnec ad eam quæ nunc pro damnationis causa obtenditur corruptionem Dei ordinatione prædestinati antè furrant? Quā ergo in sua corruptione percunt, nihil aliud quam pornas tuunt euis Calamitatis in quam {illeg} \ipsius/ Prædestinatione lapsus est Adam, ac posteros suos præcipites suum traxit Annon itaque iniustus qui Creaturis suis tam crudeliter illudit se Fateor sane in hanc qua nunc illigatè sunt, conditionis miseriam, Dei voluntate decidisse vniverros filios Adam: atque id est quod principio dicebam, redeundū tandē semper esse ad solū Divinæ Voluntatis Arbititrium cuius causa sit in ipso abscondita \C/ \C/

The like doth he conclude also concerning The <74> Sinne & Fall of Angels. 3. 23. 4. Angelos qui obstetreunt in sua integrtate Paulus Etrites vocat Si eorum cōstantia in Dei Decrepta cito fundata fuit, aliorū Defectio arguit fuisse deretistos Cuius rei causa non potest alia adduci quem Reprobatio, quæ in arcano Dei Consitio abscondita est, the names of the doctrine suggested by him are cheifly these First because God could not possibly foreknow future Contingent Events unless as decreed by him 3.23 7 Pro præfivit quia Decreto suo se ordinaret, and often elsewhere Second because God would not be otherwise truely and properly Omnipotent; vnles he did actually do all things. L. Inst. 1. 16. 3. Omnipotentiam sibi vendicat ac deferri a nobis Vult Deus, non qualem Sophista fingunt otiosam et ferè sapitum, sed vigilere efficacē operosam, et quæ in continuo actu versitur – Ideò censetur omnipotens non quod possit quidem facere cesset tamen interim et desideat, sed quià certū et terram gubernans sic omnia moderatur vt nihil nisi eini consitio accidat – Lastly because God must be Omnivolent as well as Omnipotent, it being absurd to suppose things to be done Dei Potentia sed non Destinatione, by y^e Power of God without his Destination – vpō all w^ch accounts he concludes tha though things may be said to be both Fortuitous & Contingent to vs, yet in Respect of God nothing is so, But all Necessary & Designed or Appointed. And as if it were a kind of Blasphemy, to deny \or except against/ Gods efficacious working & necessitating Influence vpō Devils & wicked men as to all y^e sin̄s com̄itted by them, he writeth thus 1. c.18. #3 Fuerunt omnibus seculis impij et profani homines qui adversus hanc Doctrinæ partem Ore rabido latrarent.