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Chap.

We have now propounded such an Hypothesis of y^e Soul as - may render this thing called Freewill possible & very intelligible, The sum̄e whereof is this y^t we are to conceive as it were two stories \or/ gradations & regions in y^e Soul, whereof one is simple & necessary Nature, y^e other y^e whole Soul redoubled upon itself, self-comprehensive, selfreflexive, self-recollective & self-exertive & therefore lastly self-determinative to wch latter \second thing/ belongs y^t wch is com̄only called Will, wch therefore is not one particular \& Private/ Faculty of y^e Soul coordinate wth ye rest whether necessarily determined by a foregoing necessary Vnderstanding, or or chanceably & fortuitously determined by itself, in every thing wthout respect to any Light; but it is y^e whole Soul reciprocating & rebounding vpon itself, conscious of all its congruities & capacities whereby it becomes present wth itself, within itself & superiour to itself, & holding itself as it were in its own hande doth wield & turn itself, govern & direct its cogitations & Acti ons. I say \Govern/ Cogitations as well as Actions, for if our Thoughts & Cogitatiōs either \did/ spin along necessarily by y^mselves according as y^e impulse of outward objects did excite y^m & give y^m y^e first hint, so y^t we ourselves had noe governm^t or com̄and over y^m at all to determine, turn y^m, fix y^m: & stop y^m, we could not be able to manage any \of o^r/ Actions nor carry on any designes of Life nor indeed maintain converse & \pertinēt/ com̄unication wth one another, but {illeg} be distracted, confounded, puzzled & moped things, having our witts allwayes to seek; & wanting Presents|ce| & recollections of Mind should be carryed away wth a|y^e| galloping Carrier of ungovernable & unmanageable Thoughts we know not where|ither|; we \&/ should be no more able to answer opportunely \per/ & readily \pertinētly/ to every Question & to carry our selves decorously in respect of y^e various circumstances of \outward/ Life, yⁿ a Machin would be so necessary \a thīg/ is this Faculty ^\of self-power/ to humane Life y^t wthout it we cannot be our selves nor have any despose|all| of our selves, b|B|ut we affirm |y^t| this \is/ not to be a blind Will, nor one single \Private/ Faculty coordinate wth y^e rest, standing as it were in y^e same plain & levell wth thē \it/ but y^e whole Soul reduplicated upon itself comprehending & wielding itself, wch after y^e Verdit of all other naturall Faculties given ^\is sums vp all into a Conclusiō/ passes y^e descisive voat, determines volitiō & gives y^e Fiat to Action, & governs in y^e whole man.

And y^t there is really such ^\{illeg}/ a reduplication of \{illeg}/ y^e Soul as we conceive it sufficiently evident from w^t we have allready declared, so we shall endeavour to make it further manifest from an ordinary Phænomenon ^\not well vnderstood/ by wch it will appear y^t these two Powers of y^e Soul \or two {illeg} of Life/ are seperable from one another, so y^t y^e Soul may act as simple Nature wthout reduplication self-comprehension & self-activity, & y^t is y^e Phænomenon of Sleep & Dreames wch no Phylosopher has yet so far as we know \of/ ever pretended to give a satisfactory accompt {illeg}. Wherefore we say yt in Sleep & Dreames besides y^e Ligation of our outward senses com̄only taken notice off, \{illeg}/ there is an \{illeg}/ other Ligation or impedition in ye Soul itself, we haveing not yⁿ our witts about us, nor any recollection of Mind, are commanding Power over our Thoughts to steer y^m or direct y^m, or carry on any \{illeg}/ designes & therefore we are so foold & imposd upon by our F{illeg} {illeg} things & y^t wthout any wonder {illeg} \{illeg}/ at all so y^t wⁿ we are awake we often reflect upon y^e Non-sense of those our dreames ^\{illeg}/ <2> & looke upon ourselves then but as half ourselves & \as/ having ourselves to seek & yet notwithstanding all this in our dreaming sleeps we do not only exercise y^t those lower facultyes of our Soul of Fancy & Imagination wch then is taken for externall sense, & of Appetites & Passions but have also sometime in us a sense of Conscience or y^e dictate of Honesty & do also exercise oftentimes y^e Faculty of Ratiocination though not wth so much vigour & so long continuance ^\{illeg}/ together & coherence & \not/ makeing such a series & \of/ pertinent contextures of Ratiocinac~ons as wⁿ - we are awake. However since we are conscious y^t we do sometimes syllogyze & ratiocinate in Sleep, it cannot be s^d y^t y^e Faculty of Reason & Vnderstanding is quite bound up & consopited, wherefore we cannot possibly give any accompt of this Phænomenon of Sleep & Dreams wthout acknowledging something else in ye Soul besides what y^e vulgar Psicology takes notice off, it being most evident y^t besides ye relaxation of ye bodily nerves wch is y^e same thing wt y^t y^t is com̄only called y^e ligation of y^e outward senses, there is something else bound up & consopited in sleep we being not yⁿ all y^t wch we are wn awake externall sensation only excepted \{illeg}/. I say there must be y^e relaxation & langor also of some higher & more inward power in y^e Soul itself And having before showed y^t there are two stories or gradations in y^e Soul according to this dichotomy we give a true ^\& plain accompt/ of this difficulty y^t in sleep only y^e lower of y^m is acted in nothing yⁿ working but what is naturall & habituall & \(for/ habit is a kind of an acquired nature, \{illeg}/) but y^e reduplicate self=comprehensive, self=attentive & self=exertive Power of y^e Soul is yⁿ consopited & relaxated y^e reason whereof is because this cannot be exercis’d wthout a greater agitation of corporeall spirits, yⁿ will consist wth y^t relaxation of y^e bodily nerves wch \{illeg}/ are asleep Wherefore this being fatally & sympathetically charm’d in sleep & its tone remitted & consequently y^e inward tone & \or/ tention & exertion of y^e whole Soul & \its/ Powers, relaxated from hence it comes to passe y^t we are conscious y^t our mind is but half itself in dreams \{illeg}/ \{illeg}/ There being yⁿ wanting y^t wch \binds &/ knits all together & actuates y^e whole Soul \{illeg}/ y^t self=attention, recollection & exertion y^t should invorgte all its \y^e other/ Powers, so y^t y^e Ratiocinations y^t are yⁿ put forth are but weak, languid & flexing \and/ things abrupt & incohærent, from whence it comes to passe y^t wn strange \though never so strange/ monstrously & absurdly false things are obtruded upon us by Fancy we do not question y^e truth of y^m, nor suspect or conclude ourselves to be in a drea^m but wn \onely/ sometimes we have in a suspition \of such a mastery/, thereof this ^\whē we are/ is a kind of tendency to expergefactiō in us & proves often times an occasion of \really/ wakening our selves Moreover frō hence it is likewise y^t Reminiscence is not exercisd in Dreams from y^e defect whereof it comes to passe y^t wthout Resistancy or demurre we assent to such thing as true wch otherwise tho we think \should know/ false wch thing Lucretius hath well observed Præterea meminisse jacet, languetq; sopore, Nec dissentit enim mortis lætiq; politum Iam pridem quem mens verū se cornere credit.

We dream often of seeing & conversing wth such deceased Friends as living, wn our selves well know dead many years before, wthout gainsaying or contradicting y^e Truth of this Phantasm wch is because Memory & Reminiscence is for y^e time consopited, y^t ^\either/ probably consisting in or requiring an active & a wakened exertion of y^e Soul itself, Now this reduplicate self=attentive & self=active Life of y^e Soul being y^t wch \binds &/ knits y^e whole Soul together & puts y^e powers of it upon attomick exertion, wch directs y^m to one scope & makes y^e thoughts musicall & harmonious, no wonder if upon y^e remission thereof y^e same kind of Langour seize inwardly upon y^e Soul after a manner as possesseth y^e body in sleep, it having noe <3> self=wielding nor self=ruling Power in y^m \it/ for though y^t strings of y^e Soul, be \{illeg}/ plaid upon yet they make no Musick at all ^\but are assuredly incoherent/ It being nothing but \loose/ Nature y^t doth now toyingly sport & act \play/ in us, y^e soul being as much unbent as y^e Body & y^t wch properly we ourselves being silent sympathetically & charm charm’d unto a slumber From a tacite acknowledgm^t. of which ^\Truth/ it is y^t Casuists will not arraign men as guilty for wtsoever passeth from them or seems to be done by y^m in sleep & Dreams, though otherwise very exorbitant wch is an Argument y^t y^ey take it for granted y^t it is nothing but y^e lower nature y^t yⁿ loosely playes & layes in us \(& y^t/ y^e Soul being as it were unbent\) y^t/ it is not προαίρεσις Will & Election properly so called y^t yⁿ act, but Nature & Spontaniety y^t yⁿ acts in us, y^e ende & informed parte of of ourselves but as we said before y^t higher vigorous & self-active Life of y^e Soul, cannot be exercised wthout an such an agitation of y^e corporeall spirits as may \will/ unbind & unlock all our senses & rouse up our & awaken’d Life all ye drowsy sentiments\tinells/ of y^e Body \into Activity./

Tis true y^t Dreams are com̄on to men wth other Animalls & indeed as to Bruits we cannot be certain y^t sleep is any thing else wth y^m but only y^e relaxation of those bodily nerves & ye ligation of sense but we contend y^t in men y^t besides y^e feriac~on of externall sense there is another feriation of something more inward in y^e Soul itself, which what it is can never be well explain’d according to ye vulgar Psycology & therefore hath not been so much as attempted, y^t I know off hitherto by any Phylosopher We say ^\therefore/ y^t ^\in men/ there is a double tone relaxated in - sleep & therefore \commonly/ a double ligation or defect in us men, first of y^e tone of y^e bodily nerves wch in vigilia are tense, by y^e inflation of y^e Animall Spirits from y^e brain but by \vpō/ y^e stoppage of y^m in sleep are relaxated wch causeth y^e defect of externall sense. 2:^ly y^e tone of y^e Soul as self=comprehensive & self=active, wch is a constant self=exertion of y^e Soul itself & of its powers, directing y^e operations of it, not wthout ^\a certain/ Labour & power\Cohesion/, in wch respect y^t is \may be/ true wch Aristotle tells us |y^t| y^e old Phisiologers determined y^t our Life is \was/ a continuall labour & pain, though being - accustom’d to it we take noet notice of it, for this tone of y^e mind causeth a perpetuall agitac~on of y^e Spiritts & tone \{illeg}/ in y^e Body likewise, so \the latter Tone must needs {illeg} y^e former/ y^t these two tones must needs be intended both together, y^e tone in ye Mind causing a tone in ye Body also, & though there may be a tone in ye Body or nerves Mechanically \caused/ wn y^e tone of y^e mind is in part relaxated, as in those musing tempers & brown studies wch men are in sometimes awake wn their Thoughts are directed by noe intenc~on but rove losely & at at random, wch men do not differ from ymselves asleep, save only y^t y^e bodily tone of nerves is kept up ^\with externall sense/ But y^e relaxation of y^e Tone of y^e Body wn caused mechanically must needs be accompanyed wth a sympatheticall relaxation of y^e tone of y^e Mind \& an inward feriation in y^e soul/ because so long as y^t is exerted y^e tone of y^e Body cannot be relaxated Of all y^e antient Phylosophers only y^e Stoicks seemd to have had some hint of this Truth who seemed to be \were/ y^e only Persons y^t ^\allsoe First/ tooke notice of y^t peculiar Faculty of y^e Soul y^e Hegemonicall wch can be no other yⁿ y^e Soul self=comprehensive & self=active, for ^\in/ Laertius in y^e life of Zeno there is This accompt of sleep given by y^m τὸν δὲ υπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκ λυομένου του αισθητικου τονοῦ περὶ τὸ ἡγεμόνικον <4> y^t Sleep is y^e relaxation of y^e sensitive Tone about y^e Hegemonicon y^t is \wch is always/ wch allwayes accompanies y^e Tone of y^e Hegemonicon so y^t according to {illeg} & y^e Stoicks sleep was not only a relaxation of bodily sense as Aristotle {illeg} to make \it/ but of two tones, of y^e tone of y^e Body & nerves, & also of a Tone in y^e Soul itself, of y^e Hegemonicon & ruling power in it, wch exerts invigorates & imployes all y^e other Powers of it -

And from above we are able to give an accompt also of y^t Problē long agoe propounded by Plato, \in y^e Theotetus/ wch some acute Neoterick Phylosophers have - thought to be ^\{illeg}/ {illeg} insoluble how we can certainly know ourselves to be awake at any time ^\by any internall {illeg}/ & not to dream ^ They conceived y^t there is no inward difference in y^e things y^mselves by wch they are distinguishable from one another but only y^t we {illeg}\{illeg}/de our selves to be awake by ratiocination ^\& things to be really so without vs/ because y^e objects seem to be constantly y^e same wn we are awake whereas wn asleep y^e scene alters \continually/ perpetually, but we do affirm y^t there is an inward difference also in y^e things y^mselves by wch according to internall sense we are im̄ediately conscious to ourselves of being awake, & y^t is from y^e exercise of our self-exertion \selfpower/ & self-attention & self-exertion, of our selfpower in \of/ com̄anding & directing our own Cogitations & Actions, y^t is wn at awake by internall sense we plainly feel ourselves to be all ourselves \& Tense/ whereas in sleep we feel ourselves to be but half ourselves, \loose & relaxated/, simple Nature wthout redoubled self-activity.

Wherefore from this Phenomenon of Sleep our Psicologicall Hypothesis is strongly \seems to be/ confirmed in wch we make y^t \a/ Dichotomy of y^e Soul into simple Nature & reduplicate Self=activity, it appearing y^t these are two really distinct Powers in one & y^e same sence soul because they can be seperated from one another Neither is this self cōprehensive & self=active vigour of y^e Soul only relaxated thus in sleep wn Nature sportingly toyes wthout in y^e exercise of all y^e other Powers, not only Imagination but also Reason itself & uninterrupted Cogitation wthout any feriation, but we often find by exerience also y^t even in vigilia w~n we are awake it hath some lazy fitts comes upon it, as in those com̄only called wakeing Dreames, wn y^e Mind being not self=exerted, but loose & unbent, y^e Soul spins out an easy web of thoughts by itself wch are perfectly of y^e same nature wth Dreams in sleep & we differ noe otherwise yⁿ from ourselves in sleep but only y^t y^e bodily chaine tone is yⁿ mechanically exerted The minds of Men awake are often so unattentive, heedlesse & inadvertent to their own Actions y^t wt they do at such times proceeds from lower spontaniety & necessary nature & not from will in y^m Thus y^e Tone of y^e Hegemonick of y^e Soul cannot be exerted, but y^e tone of y^e Body must be needs intended wth it, yet \when/ y^e Tone of y^e Body may \is/ be mechanically intended yⁿ y^e Tone of y^e Mind may be relaxated But in both cases it appears y^t y^e attentive self=exertive & recollective - Power of y^e Soul y^t belongs to y^e hegemonick in us is a distinct - Power from y^t of Ratiocination as Nature in us \& y^t/ wch quickens & invigorates it of y^e whole Soul forasmuch as there may be one of these wthout ye other & therefore y^t there are two such gradac~ons or Regions in y^e Soul as were before described.

Now because there are some writers y^t contend y^t there is no instance <5> of reduplicate self=activity or of any thing ἐφ' ἡμιν or in nostra^ potestate but only in y^e Lucta or ^\conflict/ contest y^t is in y^e Souls of Men betwixt y^e Animall & Divine Principle y^e dictate of Honesty & y^e dictate of selfish Appetite, but y^t in all other things we are determined by necessary spontaneity & have no self=power \or Liberty at all/ in any thing we must |y^e| rather, here take notice of two degrees of Liberum Arbitrium ^|autoxousy| or self-power in us, first such as is contained wthin y^e compasse of y^e Animall Life only, wch for distinction sake we shall call Animall Free=will 2^ly such as ariseth from y^e difference or distraction there is in nature betwen y^e divine principle or dictate of Honesty & y^e lower Animall Inclinac~ons wch we shall call Freewill Morall \First for y^e lower Animals Freewill i.e. y^t there is a/ That there is a reduplication of y^e Soul \wth/in y^e Animall Life, wch hath a sui potestas a power over itself or of determining itself is evident from internall sense, for in such Actions in wch Honesty is not at all concernd we are plainly conscious to our selves of such a redoubled self=power severall ways, first over our Cogitations in y^t we can intend ourselves more or lesse ^\both/ in a way of speculation & deliberation & thereby \as allso/ determine both y^e exercise & object of our Vnderstanding 2:^ly y^t in y^t lower kind of Conflict betwixt particar passions & inferiour Reason, respecting nothing but our own utility, we can exert more or lesse a vigorous force to resist y^e violence of particular Lusts, Appetites & ὁρμὰ wn inclining us contrary to y^e Reason of our own Vtility according to - wch different exertion of our selves either Lust & Passion or inferiour Reason will prevail 3:^ly y^t in doubtfull cases both of speculac~on & Action & where we have no certain science we can determine both our Assents in speculative things & also our practicall Judgm:^ts, volitions & resolutions beyond necessary Nature & confirm ourselves in those opinions or resoluc~ons more or lesse Lastly y^t we can more or lesse intend our selves in externall Activity & execuc~on of Purposes com̄only called Industry & Diligence wch in matters belonging to y^e Animall Life only may be more or lesse exerted In wch respects we have not only an hypotheticall |a| Liberty of doing this or y^t if we will (i.e) if such a Will or Appetite doth necessarily invade us & seize upon us; we have ^^sometimes a sufficiency of Power \Liberty of outward Impediment/ to execute y^e same but also y^t we have y^e liberty of & Power of inward self=determinacon\nings of Evil selves/ wch is y^t y^t is strictly called Will & a thing wch is vulgarly supposed not to be in Buruits who though they oftentimes ^\have/ a Power of doing wt they will, y^e word & Will being taken improperly for Appetite (i.e.) a power of doing wt they have an Appetite or Inclinac~on to, yet are not thought to have any inward power of determining y^mselves one way ^\rather or other/ wn they might have equally done it another, but are conceived to be & by ὁρμὰ or necessary Phantasies only antecedent as we ourselves are in passions & these first motions of Desire y^t obtrude y^mselves upō us

And y^t there is such a self-power in us wthin y^e compasse of y^e Animall Life is plainly witnessed by y^e Instincts of Nature wch leading men often to blame y^mselves as also to blame other men for having been wanting to y^mselves as to their own Vtility without any ^\respect to any/ Morall evill or Sin, if com̄endacon & blame used according to y^e Instincts of nature be a good Argum^t: \In y^e Instincts of Nature/ to prove Morall ffree=will yⁿ y^e same will also evinces y^t there is a lower Free=will Animall, <6> men being oft blamed & com̄ended by y^mselves & others for exerting y^mselves more or lesse in a way of considerac~on, vigor vigour, resoluc~on & activity in order to their own private good wthout respect to any thing of Honesty or Dishonesty.

We shall a little further insist upon this one thing here, y^t as there \besides y^e/ conflict y^t is in y^e Soul between y^e Divine & Animall Principle, y^e dictate of Honesty & selfish Appetite, there is another Distraction or conflict wch it is liable to ^\within ye cōpas of ye Animal Life/ not only between severall coordinate Lusts & Appetites but also between two Principles ^\subordinate/ whereof one is by nature subordinate to y^e other, y^t is between particular passions, lusts & ὁρμὰ & y^t inferiour Reason wch is a larger comprehension of our own private Vtility yⁿ is in particular Appetites & passions, in respect of wch these ^\Lusts &/ passions wch urge importunately towards their particular Objects wthout any free considerac~on of all y^e Conveniencies & Inconveniencies thereof are com̄only said to be blind or narrow=sighted, \thus/ whereas this Inferiour Reason hath a large & comprehensive view of what belongs to our Vtility considers all y^e conveniencyes & Inconvencies of things, compares y^e Future wth y^e present & discovers y^t some small present gratificac~on may procure a greater future Inutility wch Faculty of inferiour Reason is much improved by use & experience whereby we are sensible of Hurts we have formerly received by impotently yielding to y^e importunity of some present Lust or Pleasure That here is such a conflict as this wthin y^e compasse of y^e Animall Life, between such a Reason as doth not at all respect ^\Honesty/ but only our own private Vtility & y^e impetuosity of particular Lusts, Appetites & Passions is plain, as for example wn men are distracted between a present \sensuall/ Appetite of eating or drinking any thing set before y^m wch is y^e degree of a present sensuall pleasure & y^t Reason wch tells y^m this will probably procure after\ward/ a greater pain of y^e Stone or Gout, And wn^^ever y^e dispute is betwixt one certain Lust impetuously urging to an Act of Pleasure a large or more comprensive Reason y^t suggests y^e good of y^e present pleasure not to be comparable \Equall/ to those future greater evills of Disgrace & Infamy, Losse of Estate, ruine of bodily Health & danger of Death y^t will follow Wherefore I say y^t this conflict wch often happens in y^e lower Animall Life doth as well demōstrate liberum Arbitrium or self=power as y^t other y^t is between y^e divine & Animall Principle For here in like manner as well as there there is ^\in/ y^e Soul a μεσοντι a certain middle or Third thing between both y^t is conscious of both these Inclinations & attractions & is ^\at first/ as i were puzzled & distracted between y^m wch accordingly as it doth autexousiously more or lesse exert her \its/ strength or force to assist y^e better Principle, inferior Reason, so is y^e Victory determined either way

Wherefore we see y^t y^e Soul is not perfectly ho^\mo/geneall & uniform in y^e Animall Life itself but subject to discord & schism betwixt a better & worser Principle y^e latter factiously & seditiously opposing y^e former wch is a kind of Heterogenesy \in/ & Neurospasty in y^e Animall Life itself, wn a worser principle wch is least ourselves rebells against a better wch it ought to <7> be subject to & by reason of y^e remissenesse of y^e middle Power often getts y^e victory over it, such a broken & distracted, thing is Mankind as not in this lapsed state as y^t his Animall Life itself hath discordant & jarring principles in it, though here it be not wthout a \superiour/ principle also wch can \by {illeg}/ compose y^e strife & determines y^e clashing & Composition y^t is in nature by striking in & complying either wth one side or other |y^e better Part|

But However though there be such an Animall Freewill in men acknowledged by us, it doth not therefore follow y^t we must needs assent to Lucretius & Epicurus who asserted y^t all brute Animalls had a liberum Arbitrium in y^m, y^t there was Fatis a volsa voluntas a will free from Fatall & naturall Necessities & a self=determining Power in all other Animalls as well as man, & y^t as it is s~d of Man by Aristotle y^t he is ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀιτὶα πράξεων y^t he is y^e cause & prin ciple of Action y^t y^e same must be said likewise of every Bruit There appearing to us no certain evidence y^t Bruit Animalls besides ὁρμὴ & φαντασία have in y^m many such other large comprehensive Faculties & \as/ y^t inferiour Reason before spoken off in men whereby they can consider y^e Conveniencies & Inconveniencies of their Actions & compare y^e future with y^e present & consult & deliberate of wt is to be done, for as it is false concerning men what a late Phylosopher asserts that deliberacon in y^m is nothing but alternate passions where y^e Victory at last falls to y^t Passion whose necessary force is most preponderating, wch therefore he will have to be y^e only thing wch is called Will in y^m, so it may very well be true concerning Bruits y^t there is no other deliberation nor will in y^m yn such & y^t all y^e discord y^t is in y^m, \&/ y^t all y^e discords y^t is in y^m is not only of things coordinate & standing upon y^e same levell, not of things subordinate to one another a discord between b narrow & short=sighted passions tugging ag~st one another & alternately inclining y^e scale till y^e issue is at last determined - either way by their respective prevalency y^t there is noe one com̄on or third thing in y^m y^t takes notice of all, no reduplicate ^\{illeg}/ principle y^t vari exerting itself more or lesse can oversway things one way or other.

But however if there were any such liberum Arbitrium in Bruits as Epicurus fancies it would not at all follow from thence y^t Bruits could be capable of any Morall Vertue or Vice Nay though we should be more liberall & grant unto Bruits as some do besides ffree=will discursive logicall Reason alsoe so as y^t they could make Syllogisms in mood & Figure unlesse they had some higher Principle superadded & consequently another kind of Free=will wch we called Morall they could not be capable of any duty or obligac~on properly so called, Honesty or Dishonest, Morall Vertue or Vice For y^e better illustration of wch we will suppose God to create a world either in y^e Moon or some other Planett of Creatures indued, not only wth humane shape & wth a power of deliberating according inferiour Reason, by considering \all conveniences & Inconveniences/ all consequences & circumstances of Action & compare y^e present wth y^e Future & wth using \with/ Free <8> will & election \{illeg}/, but also wth a power of discoursing syllogistically concerning universall Theorems of speculative sciences as of Geometry & not only so but \over & above all this/ we will further suppose to all this y^t such - work=men as these should be indued also wth y^e |y^e| notion of a the Deity likewise but only as an omnipotent self=willed Being y^t must be worshiped & courted ^\& flattered/ by externall worship or otherwise would impotently let fly his Thunder=bolts at y^m & consume them in \Irefull/ wrathfull Displeasure & therefore they should accordingly build temples & erect altars & make supplicac~ons to him merely for their outward utilities sake & to appease such a wrathfull & morose Deity I say notwthstanding all this such imaginary Men as these y^t are so far elevated above y^e condic~on of Bruits would not be indued wth any true morality nor indeed by any more capable of true Vertue, Honesty & Piety yⁿ Monkeyes, Apes & Babouns they having really no Principle of Obligac~on in y^m otherwise yⁿ by selfish Appetite & private Vtility by wch all their Actions would be measured & circumscribed, Aristotle somewhere takes upon him to determine y^t y^e reason why Bruits are not capable of acracy or Incontinency is because they are not capable of Vnderstanding an universall proposition διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θιρμα ουκρατὴ ετι ουκ εχει των καθουλου υπολυχιν αλλα των καθεκεστα φαντασια και μνημον Bruits are therefore not capable of being incontinent because they have not an apprehension of Vniversalls but only a phancy & memory of singulars, and indeed, it is probable enough by y^e Phænomena y^t Bruits have no clear conception of Vniversalls but only a Phantasy of singulars & therefore are so far from syllogisticall Reasō y^t they are devoid of Axiomaticall judgm^t: \&/ can neither affirm or deny any thing But however if it were otherwise & y^t besides Free=will they could explicity syllogize & demonstrate Vniversall Theorems all this would not capacitate y^m for Vertue or Vice properly so called as Aristotle supposeth, unlesse they had over & aboue anonother vitall principle in y^m \superior to y^t of/ above y^m of selfish Appetite & - \A/ private Vtility \A/ Though ^\In y^e meantime for my part/ I am far from thinking y^t there are de facto, any such Creatures any where made by God as are indued wth Logicall Reason y^t can demonstrate Geometricall Theorems & also wth Animall Freewill & \which/ yet are utterly uncapable of y^t Principle wherein y^e discrimen honestorū et Turp~m is founded

But we have y^e rather taken notice off this lower kind of liberū Arbitrium wch is wthin y^e Spear of y^e Animall Life & reacheth not to Honesty & Morality, because we have often observed a great æquivocac~on in y^e use of this word Liberū Arbitrium it being many times taken in y^t sense we have described for y^e lower Animall Freewill & yet many times y^t attributed to it y^t belonges to another species of liberum Arbitriū wch we call Morall, from wch æquivocation springs y^t vulgar error y^t there is no more required <9> for y^e begetting of Morality of Duty & obligac~on, Justice & Injustice in Actions yⁿ an Arbitrary Law externally promulgated - com̄anding outward Action & a liberum Arbitrium or ffree=will to do or not do y^e same. The Assertors of wch opinion understand by ffree=will nothing else but such a power of self-determinac~on as may be wthin y^e compasse of y^e Animall Life only & though they define their Will wch they would have to be free, to be a rationall Appetite or an Appetite following after Reason & deliberac~on, yet by reason & deliberac~on they mean nothing else but y^t ratio inferior before described, y^e reason of private Vtility wch at best is nothing but y^e sagacity of y^e Animall Life discoursing syllogistically about y^e fittest means for y^e attaining those Ends wch Animall Appetites suggests Wherefore y^e thing wch they assert is, y^t to a Being so far elevated above Bruits y^t it is not led - meerly by Fancies & Hormæ, but y^t it can also consider, ratiocinate & consult in order to its own utility & determine itself this way or y^t way, there is nothing more requisite to beget morall Obligation yⁿ only y^e giving an externall Law wth outward rewards & punishments annexed Whereas if there - were no other Principle in a Man yⁿ selfish Appetite & consequently noe other Free=will besides this Animall, though God himself should call all y^e Nac~ons of ye earth together as sometime he did y^e Israelites & there appearing to y^m from y^e Top of some high Mountain, flaming wth Fire in a most terrible manner ^\should/ promulgate Lawes to y^m wth y^e voice of Thunder makes threatning y^e greatest punishm^ts: imaginable to y^e violatours of y^m those Lawes could no otherwise operate or seize upon y^m: y^m by takeing hold of their Animall selfish Passions, y^e fear of Bodyly Punishm^t: & hope of outward reward and he y^t will allow of no other Morall Obligation yⁿ this is utterly destroyes all Morality

It is true indeed y^t wn it is com̄only s~d y^t civill Lawes do necessarily suppose a liberum Arbitriū or ffree=will in Men, wthout wch it would be unreasonnable & unjust to punish any for Transgressions past since none could do otherwise yⁿ they did there is no necessity of understanding this concerning any other Freewill yⁿ is contained wthin y^e compasse of y^e Animall Life whereby they might have avoided such externall Actions forbidden And if there were any where a world of such men before menc~on’d as were not only indued wth humane shape but also wth a power of syllogisticall Reasoning wthout any higher principle in y^m to cause a discriminac~on in y^m of Morall Good & Evill there is no doubt but they might have civill Societies, Polities & Lawes & yt not only civill but also Ecclesiasticall & religious inferred wth punishm^ts: & rewards to good purpose, in order to y^e advantage of private Persons & y^e safety of y^e whole, wch is y^e very constituc~on of y^e Leviathan, I say they might have agreem^ts: & Lawes & a leviathan Common=wealth, but yⁿ there could be no other obligacon upon any to - keep those Lawes but only from their own private Vtility of wch y^mselves were Judges, no Obligac~on truly Morall in y^t wch would be called Injustice y^e breach of Lawes & Covenants

We have now declared y^t wthin y^e compasse of y^e Animall Life there is a liberum Arbitrium or ffree=will, y^t is, a redoubled self=activity wch also doth demonstrate itself in a Lucta or Conflict betwixt two subordinate principles of Action whereof one is inferiour Reason y^e other particular Appetites & Passions, there being μέσον τι a certain middle thing betwixt both a self=comprehensive, self=reflexive & self=active power whereby y^e Soul is conscious to itself of both & and as it doth \can/ more or lesse exert itself may \to/ determine itself either way & accordingly deserve blame or Com̄endac~on The spring or rise of wch liberū Arbitrium is from a participac~on of a higher principle of Action yⁿ y^at of particular Appetites & Passions {illeg} wch have but a narrow light in y^m & are determined to one, a freer, more elevated, enlarged comprehensive Being \Principle/, but so as it is neither this nor y^t æssentially but may determine itself to one or other & thereby ^\more or lesse/ promote their \{illeg}/ Animall Good

But we are in y^e next place to observe y^t this is not y^e ^\onely/ Freewill y^t is in us as some suppose erring again on this hand who allow no other Freewill yⁿ an indifferent Power, of doing or not doing any externall Action; but there is a higher redoubled self=activity or liberum Arbitriū in humane Souls wch we call Freewill Morall wch not only respects externall Actions & their Vtility & |or| Inutility, but y^e inward dispositions of ye Mind & Will in wch Morall Goodnesse (as was before observed) properly consists, wch is a - thing y^t Aristotle seems to have taken notice off in this excellent passage of his having showed before y^t Vertue doth not consist - meerly in doing such outward Actions, but in doing y^m in such a manner, as Arts do not consists merely in doing things but in y^e manner of doing for he is not a Gram̄arian y^t doth it γραμματίκὸντι unlesse he do it γρμματικοντως & yet s~th he y^e case of Arts is different from y^t of Vertues \{illeg}/ for y^e things wch are produc’d by Arts have their perfection in y^mselves & it is sufficient if y^e things y^mselves be in such a manner, but it is otherwise as to things produced by Vertues for it is not sufficiently to make y^m be done justly & temp~ately if they y^mselves, be in such a manner, but also y^e doer of y^m must be in such a manner affected, & qualified, as first y^t he do it knowingly & yⁿ y^t he chuse it for itself not by accident or for Vtilities sake & lastly y^t he do it wth a firm & constant Will Now this Morall Free=will is originated in y^e participation of a higher principle not only yⁿ particular Appetites & passions but also yⁿ y^e whole Animall Life |& Reason of it| wch is called by us superiour Reason & it is one & y^e same thing wch is sometimes called by a low name, \το καλον/ y^e dictate of Honesty & again by a high name y^e τὸ Θείον in us by means whereof y^e Soul hath another kind of Autexousy or self power over y^e Animall Life, y^t is, not only over y^e particular passions & Appetites, but also over y^e Reason & wisedom of it For y^e better understanding whereof it is necessary to observe, y^t - <11> though there be in Man a divine Principle or y^e principle of a higher Light & life yⁿ y^e Animall yet it is not in him as in God & other impeccable Beings, if there be any such besides God, y^t is naturally necessary & essentially but only by way of participac~on We are not y^e same wth It, but We & It are two, we having something else besides an inferiour principle of Animall Life wch could not be of use were y^e other essentially & im̄utably. \But/ {illeg} are indeed μέσον τι a Third & middle thing betwixt both \{illeg}/ wherefore since we are not this by Nature nor im̄utable essence, we cannot be It any other wise yⁿ by self=active exertion & self=determinac~on, by voluntary adhæsion, by an {illeg}, \{illeg}/ vigilant attention & fixed resolution we are not this by simple Nature but by ourselves, as reduplicated, In a word we are this by liberū Arbitrium by Autexousis suipotestas or self=power. Freewilled Beings are such as are not essentially good & Wise, but may by y^e different use \of their Powre/ become either such or y^e contrary From these two subordinate vitall Principles whereof one is y^e instinct of y^e Animall Life, y^e other of y^m a divine Instinct, we being neither of y^m essentially - there doth necessarily emerge & result \This/ μέσον τι a \this/ certain middle or Third thing between y^m both wch is y^e Soul self=comprehensive & reduplicatly selfactive. Free=will whether Animall or Morall doth arise from y^e participac~on of a higher & lower principle \neither of wch y^e soul is Essentially/ \B/ y^e lower whereof is either particular Appetites or y^e whole Animall Life y^e higher (though it be called by one & y^e same name of Reason) yet they are different things signified by ^\this/ one equivocall word And though y^e Antients had some perception of this yet they were very - much confounded & at a losse to give a right definic~on of Will & Free-will, for whereas they com̄only make it to differ from sensitive Appetite in this ^\onely/ y^t it is an appetite directed by antecedent Reason, consultation & deliberac~on, wch if it \this/ were true y^e Will - would allwayes act rationally, & yⁿ there could be no such thing as Fault or Sin, wch p|b|ut this proceeded from not=understanding y^e reduplicac~on of y^e Soul, there is a higher & lower principle in all Free=willed Beings, wch makes y^m amphibious things but \And/ there is a reduplicac~on of y^e Soul upō y^m both whereby it can determin itself either way wch is its Will or Self=power

Chap.

Though we have now given a generall accompt of this Faculty of the Soul y^t is com̄only called Libertas Arbitrij, yet |^| it will be convenient to make a further & more particular inquiry into y^e nature of it & make it yet more clearly intelligible To w^ch purpose we must examine y^e vulgar Doctrine concerning it w^ch runs thus \B/, y^t y^e essence of Liberum Arbitrium consists in Indifferency But because it is obvious here to object y^t indifferency only is a passive principle & therefore cannot be an active Power, they adde further y^t y^e essence of Free=will doth not consist in a passive but an active Indifferency

W^ch active Indifferency is further thus described, to be a Power of doing or not=doing & a Power of doing this or y^e contrary Indifferently after all things were \are/ put y^t were \are/ put y^t were \are/ antecedently requisite for Action \Either/, y^t is, y^t Indifferency of Contradiction ^\or Exercize/ & an Indifferency of Contrariety ^\or Specification/ w^ch latter ^\in Creatures/ principally respects these two contraryts of Morall Good & Evill & \And/ amongst those prerequisites to Action w^ch being put, a Free Agent may \{illeg}/ either act or not=act accordingly ^\indifferently do this & y^e Contrary/ ^y^e great Champions of Freewill & ^\{illeg}/ advancers of it in Man do com̄only place not only all outward Objects & Circumstances but also ^\Diverse Premotions/ all inward Reasons & Motives & y^e ^\last/ Practicall Judgment itself & \{illeg}/ also divine premotion, So y^t according to y^m a Free=Agent is such as till y^t very moment of his actuall Willing is not determined by any thing whatsoever antecedent ^ to will one thing rather yⁿ another, but is æqually Indifferent till it determine itself. Nay some of them talk so extravagantly as if a Free=Agent were not only Indifferent to do this or y^t of those things y^t were before under do = liberac~on but also were \likewise/ at once alike Indifferent to Nothing in y^e ^\whole/ world or \to/ w^tsoever could be done, As if he |it| were able at any time to make y^e Cogitation of any thing whatsoever, to come into {illeg} minds, & will it accordingly.

But this doth not seem to be a true & genuine Accompt of the Phænomenon of Free will nor y^e representation of any naturall true perfection, nor indeed of any naturall Power For first it is not easily conceivable how Indifferency can be active, nor how indeterminatation can determine itself 2\ly/ It seems repugnant to y^e Phænomena æ experience y^t w^tsoever externall things are put w^thout put a man should be ^\still/ alike indifferent to do this or that, as if there were no such things for this is to suppose a man to be an absolute thing, by himself & to have no connexion w^th y^e \Vniverse/ world nor dependence upon any thing w^thout him. \But/ Whereas it is most evident by dayly experience y^t things w^thout us & such as are not in our own power are y^e causes of many \have a great influence upon our/ Volitions \I/ acting upon our nature or n̄rall propensions & Inclinac~ons, so y^t if these things had not been we should never have willed, such & such things \so & so/ & those things being put as they are we could many times hardly will otherwise yⁿ we do, Hence it is y^t mens dispositiōs & Inclinac~ons are so much diversified by y^e diversity of things, w^thout y^m as by mens \their/ different fortunes, course of Life conversation & temper of Body \A/ wherefore y^e learned Origen did not w^thout cause \very iudiciously/ perstringe such a \this/ wild & fluttering notion of Free=will as this is, w^ch makes man by reason of his autexousion, an absolute thing by himself so y^t nothing y^t is out of his power hath any influence upon his volitions If any one would make Free=will in us to be a thing loose & disjoyed from y^e from y^e whole Vniverse so y^t by reason of such & such things happening to us, we do not will & chuse this or y^t ^\w^ch otherwise we should not/ he hath forgot himself to be a part of y^e world, & y^t he is comprehended in y^e com{illeg}\plexiō/ of men & y^e whole Vniverse w^ch he further explains thus \Wherefor he ads further to this purpose/ We willingly confesse y^t of many things y^t are in our own power, things out of our Power are y^e causes of y^m, w^ch things y^t are out of our power if they had not been such & such things w^ch are in our power, would never have been done for many things y^t are in our power are done or not done consequently upon some things going before not in our Power, so y^t if these things had been otherwise they would have caused us to do otherwise yⁿ we do. Thus he. Whereas according to y^t wild conceit of Freewill before mentioned. {illeg} of \Man as a/ Free=agent {illeg} be such a thing, as be all \Let/ things w^thout of his power & w^thout him ^\& out of his Power be/ w\t/ they will be is still alike \as/ indifferent to do this or y^t, as if there were no such things, y^t is, he is απολελυμένον τι τοῦ παντὰ a thing disjoyned from & independent upon y^e whole Vniverse w^ch is so farre frō doing true of man y^t any we dare affirm y^t this <13> is no essentiall perfection of y^e \concerning/ Deity itself though he be ^\truly/ απολελυμένον {illeg} παντὲς and a solide thing by itself & disjoyned from all things w^thout him as independent upon y^m & though he be not no part of y^e world nor complicated w^thin y^e systeme of y^e Vniverse \& of Rationall Beings/ & Man, yet \I say/ notw^thstanding \all this/ yet is no priviledge of his nature y^t all things w^tsoever being put w^thout him, he should be \thus/ equally indifferent to will or act so or so, for his essentiall Holinesse \Wisdome/ Justice & Goodnesse, will oblige him in certain cases to do necessarily to act so & not otherwise, because ^\In {illeg} cases it is {illeg}/ y^e things w^thout him \{illeg}/doe not impose upon him, but only y^e Perfection of his own nature |y^t determining|es| his Volitions.|

Moreover \Thirdly/ if y^e τὸ εφ' ἡμιν were such an absolute thing as y^t all things w^tsoever being put antecedently ^\{illeg}/ y^e Will & {illeg} indifferent to do this or y^t as if they were not yⁿ nature acted nothing at all ^\in us/ & had no power upon us & we were not partly nature & partly self=activity as was before declared but all self=activity & self=power Then all our n̄rall propensions Appetites & Inclinations were in excess & to no purpose, nay Reason & Vnderstanding itself were {illeg}straneous ^\would be Superfluous &/ it could be nothing but a meer mockery in nature to endue men ^\thus/ w^th those Faculties of Reason & Vnderstanding & to incline y^m to make long ^\{illeg}/ deliberations concerning their future Actions if after all were done y^t w^ch sway'd & determin'd \concluded/ all ^\in them/ were ἀπολελυμένον τὶ an abs loose & abosolute thing ^\still equally/ indifferent to determine itself - either way. How can this be thought to be y^e perfection of a man or of any Being y^t is indued w^th Reason & Vnderstanding to be alike indifferent to act w^th \Reasō/ or against it. \Reason or vnderstanding/ And w^ch is yet more monstrous (if it were rightly understood) to be indifferent to follow or not=follow its own last practicall Judgment? Nay how can this be y^e most glorious of all Perfections or rather how can it be any n̄rall Power at all for a Being to be perfectly loose to its own Good & \{illeg}/ indifferent ^\either/ to its own Good or Hurt for such is y^e indifferency of contrariety to Morall Good & Evill w^ch learned Doctors make to be y^e top of y^e \highest/ glory of Free=will Such an active Indifferency as this is to ones own Good & Hurt, what is it else but an active madnesse or y^e activity of blind ^\{illeg}/ chance & Fortune of \{illeg}ding in vs/ {illeg} so far from being y^e highest of all Perfections y^t it can hardly be conceived to be any innaturall Power to have \be indued with/ a great impetous & agitation or inclination to Action w^thout any byas to direct any {illeg} mark to aim at, such an {illeg} active power ^\a Principle of {illeg}/ as this would be a kind |A| of active nothing |A| |B|

|B| Whereas y^e indifferent Free=willers \Further/ It is observable y^t many of these inconvenient Consequences w^ch are urged by these indifferent Free-willers ag^st necessity y^e asserters of y^e Necessity & y^e Wills necessary following & necessarily understanding may be retorted w^th equall or greater ^\or equall/ force upon y\m/selves \{illeg}/ It is objected agst y^e Asserters of Necessity y^t this Doctrine takes away y^e use of all exhortations, for according to y^t Hypothesis exhortac~on must either be directed to y^e Vnderstanding or y^e Will, to exhort y^e Vnderstanding to understand is alltogether in vain, since it doth not understand by choice & cannot choose but understand whatsoever is clearly propunded to it, y^e understanding is only capable of Reason & Councells neither can exhortation be directed to y^e will because y^t necessarily followes y^e Judgm^t of y^e Vnderstanding & cannot do more or lesse yⁿ w^t other determines it unto. but this same inconvenience may be retorted ^\as strongly/ upon y^e asserters of indifferent Free=will y^t they take away all use of exhortac~ons because after all things put antecedent to Volition & therefore after all exhortac~ons y^e Will is a like indifferent to do or not do as it was before. Nay y^e indifferent <14> Free=willers are here guilty of much greater absurdity yⁿ y^e Necessitarians y^mselves, forasmuch as they do not only take away y^e use of all exhortation, but also of all Councell & advice, all motives & Reasons & of Vnderstanding itself as \w^ch y^e/ the other do not because according to y^m Motives & Reasons do often necessitate Action & y^t cannot be thought in vain y^t necessitates y^e effect, but according to y^e indifferent Free=willers motives & Councell & Advice, Motives & Reasons must needs be in vain because they effect nothing at all, & do not at all abate of y^e Indifferency of Will y^t determines Action & And y^e same may be s^d of Lawes ^\Precepts/ Rewards & Punishm^ts w^ch are but Motives & antecedent requisites of Action & therefore can have no influence upon Free=willed Agents to make y^m do one thing rather yⁿ Another.

\Again/ It is justly objected ag^st y^e Asserters of Necessity y^t they destroy y^e Nature of Sin & Morall Evill & take away all Praise & Dispraise, &|b|ut it is very hard for y^e indifferent Free=willers \{illeg}/ think those Phænomena to be salved \cannot/ w^thout Liberty of Will, yet according to y^t notion of Liberty y^t they have framed \indiff^t Freew. haue fram./ they will be as unable to give an accompt \held/ by y^m \Phenomena/ as y^e Necessitarians y^mselves -

For if y^e highest perfection of all rationall Beings be such an indifferent Liberty of contradiction & contrariety as was \after all things put/ before described yⁿ w^tsoever they do in y^e use of this Liberty they can never Sin because they can never act contrary to their nature or y^e ^\true/ perfection of their own |B| Being \B/ there could not yⁿ be any measure of Morall Good & Evill in y^e nature of Intellectuall Being y^mselves according to this Hypothesis of indifferent Liberty any more yⁿ according to y^t of Physicall & materiall Necessity There were Some \Indeed other/ asserters of Necessity do notw^thstanding allow of two \that their/ Paradigms in nature to w^ch Morall Good & Evill are to be referred they make a reall difference betwixt Virtue & Vice though they determine \suppose/ y^t men were necessarily ^\determined to/ both & none was Blame=worthy or Praise=worthy for y^m \y^e same/, but according to this Doctrine of indifferent Liberty made to be y^e highest perfection of all Intellectuall Beings there can be no Pattern or Paradigm of Morall Good, \& Evill/ in nature \of Intelligent Being/, Whatsoever keeps its own nature never sins, nor erres; & if active Indifferency after all things put either w\th/out - us or w^thin us, be y^e true nature of all Rationall Beings, y^t w^tsoever Free=willed Beings do, they can never swerve or deviate from their nature) y^e exercise of infinite indifferent Liberty being their highest Perfection Wherefore it - would\ill/ follow unavoidably from this Doctrine y^t Morall Good & Evill, Just & Vnjust do not spring from Nature, \nor any {illeg}/ but only from positive Lawes & externall Institution & y^t they are indeed things contrary to nature nothing but curbs & shackles to hinder naturall Liberty & therefore \Evill in {illeg}/ only submitted to out of necessity by reason of weaknesse & imbecillity, If this be y^e true Nature & perfection of y^e highest Principle, y^e hegemonicall or ruling power in us, after all y^e Dictates of Light & Reason to determine it self indifferently yⁿ their can be no foundac~on for Morality in y^e nature of man

Moreover ^\according to/ this Hypothesis likewise {illeg} Praise & Dispraise, in y^t sense w^ch it supposeth y^e merit & |A| Demerit of |y^e| Persons \A/ for active Indifferency is nothing else but active Chance & Contingency & if active Chance or Contingency determine y^e Actions of - Free=willed Beings, they would be no more culpable or blame=worthy for y^m yⁿ if they were {illeg} determined by fatall necessity, there \For w^t/ could be no more Mastership, Lordship & Dominion over our Actions <15> under y^e rein of blind Indifferency, Chance & Contingency, yⁿ under y^e empire of Fatall necessity, for If blind Chance itself was a positive efficient & cause of Actions & did ^\with its hand/ turn mens wills this way & y^t way, all its determinac~ons would be as necessary from to y^e will, as if they had been by fixed fatall \{illeg} to thē by Fate or/ Destiny; But this Hypothesis is indeed utterly impossible y^t Indifferency & Chance should be y^e active causes or Efficients of any thing, \for/ indifferent Contingency is so far from being a positive cause & principle of perfection \Action/, y^t it is nothing but a name given to y^e defectivenesse & imperfection of Free=willed Agents, but \yet/ if there could be any such thing, though it might seem to be a Paradox yet it is \most/ true y^t - infinite contingency determining all Actions would be to us y^e same thing w^th fatall Necessity & leave us as little \no more/ power over our selves & Actions

|B| \Again/ Agai \{illeg}/ If active Indifferency & Contingency were essentiall to y^e Wills of Rationall Beings, yⁿ it is plain they could not carry on any steady ^\& uniform/ designs of Life, nor have any firm purposes & resolutions, nor \they could not/ have any assurance \to themselves/ concerning their future Volitions & Actions \+/ because their wills being all wayes essentially indifferent ^\after all {illeg}/ there cannot possibly \& therfore Changeable & {illeg}/ be any certainty or \naturall/ assurance of their future determination, y^t is, we can have no selfpower, no Mastery over ourselves any more yⁿ we could have under Fatall Necessity whether divine or Physicall It is true indeed y^t if all our Actions & Volitions, all our Cogitations be \were/ determined by a constant streā of Atoms moving upon us from us w^thout yⁿ no man could have any tollerable assurance of his Will & purposes \for/ to Morrow & \or/ y^e next moment & y^e same inconvenience doth as much follow from y^t other Hypothesis of all active Contingency or Indifferency being y^e essence of Free=will

According to y^e Doctrine of Necessity there could be no Lucta or Conflict in y^e Soul, all things would go on easily because necessarily, ther could be no striving nor contention, no laborious conatous y^t we should be sensible off as our own w^ch if contrary to y^e Phænomenon|a|, but y^e same inconvenience doth likewise attend y^t other Hypothesis of active Indifferency according to w^ch Vertue & Vice would be nothing else, but y^e Wills nodding \indifferently/ this way & y^t way w^th y^e same facility ^\so long as/ y^e card or Hinge \{illeg} one way or other/ upon w^ch it allwayes ^\still y^e same/ turns ^ being ^\nothing but/ easy indifferency, \Again {illeg}/ The \this Hypothesis/ Will would not only have an equally facill flexibility to Good or Evill w^thout any laborious Contention, but it would be able also to passe to y^e greatest extreams of Vertue or Vice or w^tever it was capable off in a moment, so y^t if it were in this moment diabolically wicked it might become in y^e next Angelically holy, nothing could hinder y^e Will, being infinite & active Indifferency, from makeing such large \{illeg}/ skipps & strides as these are, as if one should suppose y^t a Being were at all times indifferent to be in any place whatsoever nothing could hinder it from striding im̄ediately from y^e Center of y^e earth or Sun to Saturn or y^e fixed stars or skipping from y^e lowest Hell to y^e highest Heaven in a moment. But it is plain according to y^e Phanomena & experience y^t y^e will hath not an equally facile flexibility to moral Good & Evill but must use Labour & Contention to y^e one, <16> whereas it easily slides & sinks down into y^e other & also y^t it is more slow pac'd ^\in its {illeg}/ yⁿ y^t it can make such vast Leaps & transitions \& Stepps/ in a moment & passe im̄ediately from one extream to another, a Freewilled Being once fixed in a vertuous state cannot upon a suddain & in a moment do an action y^t is enormously facinorous \flagitious/, & y^e same obdurately hardened in Evill by long Practice & Custome, will find|s| itself incumbered w\th/ an evill habit like \certain with/ to an Ephialtes or Nightmare lying upon it & \or/ pressing it y^t it was \can be/ hardly able to move or stirre towards Good. |Besides all w^{ch there are further Inconveniences yt still attend this Hypothesis}|

Again \For/ according to this notion of Free=will y^t it consists essentially in Indifferency after all things put y^t can be put besides y^e Volition itself y^e Will must needs be utterly uncapable of any Habits whether in things Morall or Naturall for as much as Habitts take away Indifferency & are inconsistent w^th it. It was an argument used by y^e antient Stoicks as Alexander Aphrodicens tells us against y^e τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν or Free=will, because \y^t/ Free=will Morall was neither in good men nor in vitious men \& so nowhere/. Not in good & vertuous men because they were not indifferent to do flagitious Actions, nor in vitious Persons because they had an - impotency & inability to good Actions, w^ch \y^e/ difficulty ^\of w^ch {illeg}/ ariseth only from a false anticipac~on concerning y^e nature of Free=will y^t it is an indifferent æquilibrious things ^\after all things out/ constantly reciprocating this way & y^t way & for y^e same reason our modern Indifferent Free=willers are very much puzzled to give an accompt of y^e state of Angells & Saints confirmd in Holinesse how this should consist w^th Free=will, & are forced to determine, y^t these have lost their Free=will as to Morall Good & Evill, & y^t they are not now freely Good w^ch y^e Necessitarians taking for an absurdity, endeavour from hence ^\{illeg} advātage/ to confirm their assertion y^t Free=will & necessity whether Naturall or Fatall may very well consist together, because Angells & Devills are at once freely & necessarily Holy & Wicked & there It is true indeed according to this Hypothesis of active Indifferency after all things put that \there/ can be besides y^e Volition itself, it is not conceivable how there should be any firm Habitts either of Vertue or Vice, nor consequently how there could be any such thing as Morality; for Free=willed Beings must \then/ allwayes of necessity be, in an Indifferent, pendulous & æquilibrious state allwayes reciprocating this way & y^t way; in a fluttering uncertain Volatility, unfixt to any thing, having no habituall Inclinations to determine y^m, no firm & steady purposes or resolutions of Life whereas indeed Free=will is \such/ a power y^t \as whereby/ rationall Creatures have to \can/ fix their own Volatility ^\deter/ to determine y^mselves into firm resoluc~ons & settle y^mselves into Habituall Inclinac~ons this way & y^t way It is true indeed y^t Free=willed Beings are \de/void of antecedent Necessity whether Naturall or Fatall, but yet they are liable to a kind of self=contracted subsequent Necessity, a Free=willed Being is y^t w^ch can form & fix itself into this or that & wⁿ it hath brought itself into y^t state y^t Vertue & Morall Goodnesse is become a kind of 2^dary factitious & self=made nature so y^t it cannot upon a suddain do flagitious Actions, it hath as \{illeg} as/ much of Freewill in this state, as it had wⁿ it was most pendulous & æquilibrious, it doth as much exercise self=power as a Faculty & it hath much more of ^\{illeg}/ Suipotence in it ^\as a state/ w^ch is y^e result & consequence of y^e right exercise of y^t Faculty w^ch is called Free=will & self=power, I say there is as much of Free=will in this state ^\of Habituall Goodnes/ & much more of true Liberty (w^ch is a different thing from y^e Faculty of Free=will) as in a state of Indifferency <17> to Morall Good & Evill. Indifferency to Good & Evill Morall is not the Faculty of Free=will itself, but it is only one state of it, it is a weak & - middle state of Free=willed Beings, neither y^e best, nor y^e worst it being much better yⁿ y^e state of obdurate Wickednesse & much inferiour to a state of confirmed Holinesse But it is an error w^ch we have often observed ^\some Learned/ Ethicall writers, \of the/ to fall into, to suppose y^t there is no \as if there were That there/ Free=will Morall, but only in a middle state of Indifferency, betwixt Vertue & Vice, whereas this is not y^e Faculty or Power of Free=will but ^\(as we said before/ only one state of it, w^ch indeed is found in very few y^t they should be in a perfect equipoise or an ^\absolute/ equality of warering alternac~ons & reciprocations either way & where it is it never continues long, but will quickly settle into an habituall preponderancy on one side or other y^t is into an habituall disposition to either Vertue or Vice. And it hath been observed y^t nobody continues so long in a state of perfect Indifferency either of Judgment or Inclinac~on as to any thing of Life, it being y^e nature of Free=willed Beings y^t they - love to determine y^mselves \as/ to all \every/ things

If y^e essence of Free=will consisteth in nothing but Indifferency, it would allwayes be a very weak & limber thing & y^e Freedom & Flexibility of it, would be but like y^e Flexibility of a Reed or Stone ^\{illeg} Rush/ or like y^e ^\Reciprocall/ mobility of an Aspen Leaf, it could have no tone nor strength, no sinewes nor nervosity in it, noe firmitude & vigour of Self=power, it would be nothing but languid flexility ^\Flaccidity/ for w^t could \can/ be more weak & devoid of Tone or Strength yⁿ Indifferency or Chance \is/, but this again is confuted by y^e Phænomena & experience w^ch plainly shewes y^t though will be a thing easily mutable by itself yet it hath notw^thstanding great strength & power also in it, for w^t is stiffer yⁿ Will? If Will were nothing but flax\cc/id & limber Indifferency yⁿ it could have no pertinacity of purposes, no stratnesse & Gallantry of Magnanimity \Courage/ no invincible resolutions, no inexpugnable firmitude in - Vertue nor obdurate stiffnesse in Vice, no constant steadinesse in carrying on designes ^\of Life/ all w^ch are plainly repugnant to y^e Phænomena; Love & Affection are either Will or something akin to it & of this we read y^t it is stronger yⁿ Death & more cruell yⁿ y^e Grave; & Plato in his Cratulus tells us y^t Will is a stronger Bond yⁿ Necessity, & it is a known Saying of one of y^e School=men, y^t Libero arbitrio post Deum nihil \est/ potentius y^t after God nothing is stronger yⁿ Free=will. Free=will fixed habitually upon Good prooves often ^\a thing/ more inexpugnable yⁿ Brasen Walls & Iron Barrs. We \2/ conclude therefore y^t Free=will is not Indifferency but a Power \& Contingency/ It \I/ ill agrees w^th y^e Phænomena to make Free=will nothing - but Ludibrium, Fortunæ Fortunes Fool & Vassal, or y^e meer Tennis ball of Chance

It was no weak assault made against this opinion of the Wills being active Indifferency by a propugner of Necessity upon y^t Ground of y^e Wills allwayes following & \a/ necessary Vnderstanding, y^t it would follow from hence \vpō this Hypothesis/ y^t a Man might choose \will/ Evill as such, for if after all things put antecedent to y^e Volition, y^t is, after all appearance \& worth/ of Good represented by y^e Vnderstanding \or Judgm^nt/ y^e Will be still indifferent \to this or that thing/; as y^e man |may| {illeg} act \w^tout/ w^thout respect to any considerac~on of Good so he may act \but allso/ also against it, y^t is choose Evill as such; & indeed w\n/soever he chooseth y^t w^ch y^e last practicall Judgm^t concludes to be lesse eligible, he chooseth Evill as such, a lesser Good comparatively <18> to a greater being Evill. |& yet this is allowed by these Authors y^t y^e third Faculty of will may act cōtrary to all Judgment of Good -|

Again such a Creature as this Free=will it would ^\seem to/ be a thing alltogether inaccessable by divine Grace, Assistance & Providence, it being such a slippery thing as y^t it hath no Ausæ, no handles in it, y^t Gods can lay hold upon God having put it quite out of y^e reach of his own Power, Government & Jurisdiction & made it independent upon himself, so y^t God could not though he would never so fain by all his Omnipotence do any thing y^t might in y^e least promote or advance y^e Good & Sanctity of any Free=willed Being, nor cast in y^e least grain to turn y^e state of their \his/ Will towards Goodnesse & Honesty, no though he should stand by & soe all y^e Free=willed Creatures in y^e world at once be miscarry\ing/ & preciptating y^mselves into Sin & Wikcednesse & continnue in y^e Same.

Again from this Hypothesis it followes y^t y^e Will can never be free wⁿ it acts \wills/ but only before it wills, because y^e essence of Freedome being Indifferency it was only indifferent before y^e Volition & not in y^t very moment wⁿ it wills for yⁿ its Indifferency & Indetermination \ceaseth/ is taken away

If y^e essence of Free=will consisted in Indifferency after all motives & Argum^ts, reason & Judgm^t inclining one way y^en Free=willed Beings could never do any thing w^th a perfect & full will, because by how much more there is of Indifferency in our determinac~ons so much lesse is there of Will ^\& Voluntareity/. Indifferentia illa quam experior, cum nullæ me ratio in unam partem magis quam in alteram impellit, est infimus gradus Libertatis, et nullam in ea perfectionem sed tantūmodo incognitione defectū quendam testatur; Wherfore those indifferēt endeav Freewillers endeavouring to {illeg} Will quite destroy it.

From these Absurdities suggested it may sufficiently appear y^t this ^\active Indifferency/ \after all things put/ is not a right & genuine but a false & spurious noc~on of y^e Faculty of Freewill, but y^e most effectually convincing way \herof/ to confute it is by confining our thoughts only to naturall things, y^t is, to y^e Animall Life; And it is most true w^t we have before observed y^t there are two ^\distinct/ degrees of Free=will in us one of w^ch we call Animall y^e other Morall though Writers upon this Argument have takē no notice of \it/ this difference but jumbled y^m both together, y^e reason whereof seems to be this, because they com̄only suppose Morality to consist only in outward Actions done or not done according to an externall Rule. Let us therefore consider Free=will only in Naturall things or in externall Actions as y^ey \they/ referre to y^e Interests of Animall Life \Onely./ Now here it will be so evident an absurdity to say y^t y^e highest Perfection & y^e Ruling Principle, in a man is nothing but active Indifferency & chance determining all his Actions, & y^t this is y^e great priviledge of a Man y^t wⁿ ^\Inferior/ Reason plainly tells him, y^t this ought to be done as conducing to his Good \in Inferēce to his/ Interest & Advantage & y^t \rather yⁿ an/ other to be avoided as noxious & hurtfull, to be \y^t {illeg}/ Indifferent to either & \{illeg}/ determine himself fortuitously & contingently ^\one way or other/ w^thout any respect at all to y^e reason of his own Good. y^t after all reason, deliberation & consultation used, irrationall Indifferency presiding in him \should/ determines all, a Principle y^t is altogether carelesse & regardlesse of ones own Good as if it were a Perfection for a Man not to be determined \no/ to direct & guide his steps <19> w^th discretion, but to have an Indifferent Liberty, to tumble down precipices & to dash himself against Walls & Posts, or as if a Traveller should coūt it a liberty y^t he is not \to be confined &/ determined to god in y^e open \{illeg}/ highwayes & to passe over Bridges ^\& stiles/ but to take his way thorow deep Rivers thorow Ditches \{illeg}/ & Hedges, Inclosures & Thicketts W^ch is plainly nothing but y^e Liberty or Indifferency of a \plainly y^e Perfectī of a Madman/ Madman. \And what can now/ & nothing can seem more \absurd/ non=sensicall to any one, yⁿ now to h talke here as {illeg} \such a Freewill as this/ of Freewill as this \as some do y^t it/ is y^e \most/ glorious priviledge & perfection of it \of Humane Nature/, y^t it can thus act ^\blindly/ wilfully \&/ irrationally \yet/ These are y^e words of a late famous Writer de Libero Arbitrio Hic est Libertatis humanæ apex, quòd se stultum et Brutum reddere possit homo si velit i.e. quòd ita eligere aliquid possit sine Judicio tanquam si ratione prorsus destitueretur, Bruti et Fatui instar. This is y^e top of humane Liberty y^t a man can in his Actings render himself Foolish & Brutish if he will, i.e. y^t he can so chuse w^thout Judgm^t as if he were altogether devoid of Reason as \like/ a fool or Bruit And again Ex eo liberi hujus dominij gloria elegisse \{illeg}/ quòd homo possit sibi ipsi imperare, ne adhibeat Rationem in consilium sed ut feratur in objectum aliquod Bruti instar non aliter quàm si ratione et Judicio omni careret, hic est apex humanæ Libertatis quod homo possit hominem exuere et seipsum Brutum et irrationalem reddere The glory of this dominion & liberty shines \forth/ out from hence y^t a man can com̄and himself not to call Reason at all into Counsell wⁿ he is about to choose any thing but y^t he can be carried to this or y^t object like a bruit no other wise yⁿ if he was utterly destitute of all Reason & Judgm\t/ this is y^e top of humane Liberty y^t a man can devest himself of his Manhood & render himself Brutish & irrationall Now if this be nothing but downright madnesse in N^rall things & y^e concernment of |y^e| Animall life, to make this y^e most glorious Liberty privid|l|edge & perfection Liberty & dominion of a Man \y^t {illeg}/ & devest himself of his manhood & act brutishly & irrac~onally wⁿsoever he pleaseth, \certainly/ it is no lesse madnesse to assert y^e same in morall things y^t it is a glorious priviledge, Liberty & dominion to have εξουσιαν των αντικειμενων ^\after all things Put Indifferēt/ Liberty of Contradiction & Contrariety as to Good & Evill; Just & Vnjust, & to be determined by active \Irrationall/ Indifferency either way, Though it be not so much diserned here because men are not so thorouwly convinced of these differencies of Morall Good & Evill as they are of y^e \other/ differences of Good & Evill naturall.

This is y^e great mistake & error of those Indifferent Free=willers y^t they think Free=will consisteth in being free from Reason & acting Irrationally w^thout any regard to y^e dictate of Judgm^t & Vnderstanding ^^\& y^t it is a Power y^t Supersedes y^e Vse of Reason/ whereas it is indeed a Faculty bestowed upon us by God & Nature for no other End or purpose but to inable us to intend y^e use of our Reason & Vnderstanding and advance it to y^e highest pitch as shall be showed afterwards.

But Aristotle never counts an error well confuted unlesse one shew also {illeg} some thing of Truth {illeg} & complicated w^th \it/ every error. Wherefore we will shew also y^e occasion of this error & by w^t appearances of Truth these Authors were {illeg} unwarily & unadvisedly tempted & drawn unto it \induced & fed into it/. First therefore it is most true as we have before expressed y^t Free=will is such a Faculty whereby we are inabled to determine y^e various passive capability y^e Infinity & indifferency of one Nature & Nature presenting us w^th severall Congruities \& capacities/ higher or lower we are inabled by it to determine ourselves to either And it is not improbable y^t these writers seeing a glimse of {illeg} but having an impartial {illeg} conception of it might bunglingly endeavour to expresse it after this manner y^t Free=will is y^e same thing w^th active Indifferency, Whereas it is not y^e Indifferency \itselfe/ y^t is active, th but there are these two Principles in y^e nature of all Free=willed Being, y^e first whereof is passive capability and Infinity & Indifferents w^ch is {illeg} nature in us y^e or matter of y^e Soul & y^e 2^d is \y^e {illeg}/ reduplicable self=activity w^ch is y^e form y^t actuates & determines y^e rude passive & Indifferent Chaos of its nature into w^t it is

But we will \shall/ descend to something y^t is more \{illeg}/ superficiall \& is more/ easy & obvious in this businesse \A/ I cannot be denyed but y^t there is something of Contingency & Indifferency included in y^e notion of Free=will, it being inconsistent w^th y^e necessity of either Naturall or fatall determination w^ch those Writers \{illeg}/ know \will/ not where \{illeg}/ the place (but {illeg} \placed it/ in y^e Will itself after all things put y^t were antecedently requisite to y^e Volition of this or y^t, because objects & outward circumstances as also inward Inclinac~ons & Reasons - seem to be necessary wherefore they made y^e Indifferency & Contingency of Free=will to be seated in y^e Will itself after all things \{illeg}/ put y^t were antecedently requisite, y^t is, all things \put/ besides y^e very Volition itself y^t yⁿ Indifferency & Contingency \& there/ as it were sitting at y^e stern did im̄ediately \W/ govern & determine all y^e motions of y^e Soul, But we shall afterwards shew this was very unskillfully done for as much as y^t Contingency y^t properly belongs to Free=will comes in rather amongst som of y^e antecedent Requisites, yⁿ y^e meer Volition or com̄and of Action, it lieing in y^t \{illeg}/ first generall power w^ch y^e Soul hath over its whole self of - intending & exerting itself more or lesse That contingent Indifferency y^t is after all things put being yⁿ only allowable in Free=will wⁿ either things are perfectly equall or Reasons are so doubtfull on either side y^t we know not w^ch to preferre & therefore in this case do negligently & indifferently determine ourselves either way, w^ch is y^e lowest exercise of Free=will & may rather be called fortitium\ion/ yⁿ Electum\ion/ But wⁿ in other cases men will negligently carelessly & Indifferently determine y^mselves either way, this is not y^e Power or Faculty of Free=will in generall but - only y^e voice of it. Indifferency & Contingency are no Power or Faculty w^ch can be y^e Active cause of any thing they are only , y^e manner of a cause & they have not only but not subsistence only but \only/ Assistence <21> or adnascens to some positive thing, active Indifferency & Chance ^\ruling all/ is little better y^t active nothing. \A/

^\Wherefore/ Secondly another ground of this Error ^\complicatiō here/ is y^t because Free=will is a noble Perfection in respect of brutish Necessity, they unskillfully mistake it for a pure & absolute Perfection w^ch hath not y^e least mixture or complicac~on of Imperfecc~on in it, as Goodnesse, Wisedome & Power are. From whence it is y^t they conclude y^t y^e τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενοι y^e first Subject of Free=will is God himself, arguing |after| this manner y^t there could be no Free=will in Creatures if there were not only Freewill first in god, as men commonly argue y^t there could be no wisedōe & Knowledge in Creatures if \there/ were not first in God, whereas Freewill (as we shall show afterwards) is but a mixt & mungrell Perfection y^t hath a complication of Imperfection in it & there not warily distinguishing betwixt y^e Perfection & Imperfection of it is y^t w^ch hath caused y^e greatest obscurity about it & made so many prejudiced against y^e thing itself, For indeed to hear Men vaunt of y^e glorious priviledge & Perfection of this Free=will whereby \man can Brute agree as we said before & whereby/ Homo eximitur divinæ Omnipotentiæ ut independetèr aborum aliâ re agat, ut possit nolle subjici Deo et contrarium vel en quod Deus ipsi p^recipit as y^e \same/ late famous Writer doth y^t \Freewill/ it is a thing so far exempt from y^e divine Omnipotence y^t it can act independently upon every thing besides itself & refuse to be subject unto God & will y^e contrary to what he com̄ands it. I say to hear - Men thus boast of this as a most glorious Perfection in Free=will were enough to turn any sober mans stomach against it & to - make y^m endeavour to beat it down as a proud Gigantean thing ^\that Swaggers with God himselfe/ but all this proceeds from grosse Ignorance concerning y^e true nature of this power w^ch is not a pure perfection but a thing w^ch riseth below God & in umbrâ Dei, in y^t shade of Nothingnesse & defect y^t is beneath him, as shall be showed afterwards

This last mistake y^twe have mentioned makes an easy way - for another \to follow/ & y^t is y^t Liberum Arbitrium is y^e same thing w^th Liberty as it speaks pure Perfection & is synonimous to Happinesse w^ch ^\whereas this/ latter thing in us ^\Liberty/ is only a state & not a Faculty & y^e Faculty of Free=will is a Power by y^e right use of w^ch & \with/ y^e concurrence of divine grace y^e Soul may assert itself into this state of Liberty & \be/ infranchized w^th \in/ y^e Freedome of divine Life ^\or y^e sum of it/, as the like manner it may \again/ by y^e abuse of this doubtfull & versatill Power fetter & shackle itself in y^e greatest of all Bondates y^t of Sin & Wickednesse w^ch are \& y^e Very/ Chaines of Darknesse & make itself become propria - Libertate captivans by this \its/ miserable Liberty & \of/ Indifferency captive, by w^ch still \wherby which Indifferēcy,/ I mean not y^e power & Perfection of Free=will, but y^e vice ^\Imperative/ of it \Freewill/

And being thus far {illeg} \advanced/ to make y^e Faculty of Free=will y^e same thing w^th y^e pure Perfection of Liberty w\ch/ in Creatures <22> is not a Faculty but a state, here they are madly \plainly fudled &/ intoxicated w^th y^t old {illeg} y^t their first Progenitors, were sick off y^t y^e experimentall Knowledge of Good & Evill & \loose/ Indifferency to both, is y^e only true perfective Liberty ^\{illeg}/ y^t irrationall Liberty \{illeg}/ from y^e supposed Bonds & shackles of Reason & Wisedom, Goodnesse & Truth, y^t is, y^t uncurbed Arbitrary Self=will is y^e highest Perfection in y^e Vniverse, so y^t God could not be God w^thout this & y^t this irrationall indifferent Self=will together w^th infinite Power \so exists & subsists y^e same is enough to/ {illeg} make vp a God, That is these writers do plainly mistake ffree=will, & Liberty, & \Arbitrary/ Self=will to be all one & y^e same thing.

Now it is plain y^t where this Hypothesis is once admitted if men will adhere to y^e genuine consequences of \it/ they must needs utterly explode Morality & y^e difference of Good & Evill, for if arbitrary selfwill be y^e Liberty & Perfection of ^\{illeg}/ all Rationall Beings ^ yⁿ Righteousnesse & Holinesse cannot be Liberty & Nature, but ^\imposed Force/ Law & Bondage; where indifferent, arbitrary & irrationall self=will are, y^e highest Law, there there can be no foundac~on for Morality. If Liberty as it is a pure Perfection of Nature consisted in an universall Indifferency both of Contradiction & Contrariety & therefore to Good & Evill Morall, then there must needs \would/ be equall Perfection in those things \{illeg}/ called Vertue & Vice, Honesty & Dishonesty. If y^e \Arbiter of y^e/ highest Hegemonicon in humane nature, y^t ought to rule & determine all Actions be \to be/ indifferent to all thing, yⁿ both it & humane n^re \itself/ are alike free from Morality. i.e. Morality is not Nature but a shackle cast upon it, Whatsoever casts an Obligation upon y^t w^ch is naturrally Nothing can \beget/ cast a true & proper Obligac~on upon y^t w^ch is naturally free from all Obligac~on, Lawes arbitrarily made & written down upon Paper could not do any such thing. Indifferent Free=will must needs be \is/ ^\would be/ such a soveraign Queen & absolute Empresse over herself & her own Actions y^t for her to suffer herself to be hamperd & yoked to Lawes & Com̄ands either of Men or God or to be imposd upon by any previos dictates of Judgm^t & Reason any thing besides itself ^\any further then Imbecility & Necessity {illeg}/ would be nothing else but for her to abandon her own native Right \& Royalty/, her essentiall Priviledge & Perfection, w^ch God & Nature hath invested her w\th/ & therefore y^e ^\only/ Vnjustice & Nonnaturality y^t she could be guilty off To conclude, to suppose a Faculty of Will ^\& Liberty/ whose naturall Perfection is to be indifferent to Reason & all Morall Good is all one as to say y^t y^t w^ch is called Righteousnesse & Holinesse, Duty & Obligac~on is not Nature & perfective Liberty, but Contra=naturality, Force & Bondage, ^\or nether/ an externall \but an/ hindrance of Liberty & And \But/ according to simple Nature unsophisticated by Politicians, Law=makers & Theologers y^e top of humane Liberty can consist in nothing else but in being undetermined by any thing but our own Will & Appetite Indeed y^e <23> y^e Truth of y^e Scripture is herein verified w^ch made this y^t most dangerous & Powerfull Temptac~on by w^ch y^e Parents of mankind was \at first/ seduced, this error having ever since rumed \so much/ in y^e blood of - their Progeny & \so y^t/ y^e Poison of it having transfusd itself \{illeg}/ into Phylosophy & Theology itself & generally imbued mens minds w^th an Opinion y^t y^e perfection of this naturall Faculty of Freewill in men is to be indifferent to Reason & y^t w^ch is called morall Good & y^t this is true Liberty if we & would \be able to alone to/ make us Gods if we had but power to execute y^e Same & \correspondent to it - neither could/ God himself could not be God w^thout it And From hence we may also gather no small Argument to confirm y^t Mankind is now generally in a lapsed state, since y^e most refined part of y^e world, the subtill Philosophers, & acute sharp=willed Theologers are so much inffected w^th this perswasion, for if y^e Parents of Mankind fell into a degenerate state by \reasō of y^t/ being seduced|tiō| \of it this false Persuasiō/ by this false perswasion y^t to know Good & Evill & have an Indifferent Liberty is to become a God yⁿ certainly they be grovling in y^e same state \still in y^e fallē state/ y^t are still \still/ so fuddled, & intoxicated w\th/ y^e poisonous vapour of it. |this Opinion -|

But y^t is not an uncharitable constriction made of this Opinion & a groundlesse ^surmize suspition of our own may \in part/ appear partly from hence in y^t a late learned \& acute Writer/ Author endeavouring to give an accompt of this Indifferent Free=will to Morall Good & Evill layes his foundac~on here y^t ^\Boni Honesti Nulla Est per se Justio/ y^e Good of Honesty & Justice so called is not a thing desireable in itself but only for y^e sake of some Pleasure & Vtility y^t may redound from it & y^t y^e delight w^ch riseth from it how great soever it be as y^t is not so great a Good as y^t y^e Soul of Man can rest in it as its End, but y^t Delicac~o quæ ex virtute et honesti, rectiq; studio existit, posterior est et posponenda naturæ ordine Delectac~oi quæ ex voluptatum carnalium com̄ercio est y^t y^t delight w^ch ariseth from Vertue & Honesty is inferior & to be postponed or put after y^t delight w^ch ariseth from carnall Pleasures according to y^e order of Nature Whence he concludes y^t Vertue & Honesty being not y^e cheif Good, but carnall or se Animall Pleasure being y^e first desireable thing it is no wonder if there be such a Faculty of Free=will in us as - whose Perfection consists in Indifferency to Morall Good & Evill And sliding thence he doth plainly conclude Honesty not to be a Naturall Good nor to have any setled nature of its own Virtus mandatur et Ꝑscribitur homini Naturalia autem non mandantur, quæ causa est et homo nunquam jubeatur appetere Bonū delectabile And again he useth y^t com̄on Argument Recti et Honesti species usq; qua certa non est quod enim huic populo, huic homini honestū et rectum - est, id alteri inhonestum est et turpe ad Bonū delectabile omnibus populis, nationibus, hominibus unum prorsus idemq; est Now if there be no naturall Good of Honesty yⁿ nothing can hinder but y^t Indifferent, temerarious fortuitous, arbitrary \self/ determinac~on should <24> be a pure Perfection & y^e highest Perfection \Privilege/ of all Intellectuall Beings as well God as Men it having y^e greatest appearance of Power & Liberty in it.

But there are some of these Indifferent Philosophers more nasute & ingenious yⁿ y^e rest, who are sensible of those \grosse/ absurdities before mentioned y^t must needs follow in y^e com̄on Life of Man, if \from y^e/ active Indifferency or Contingency be made to be y^e highest perfection & y^e Hegemonick or swaying Power, w^ch Inconveniences notw^thstanding they suppose to arise from it not directly but by accident, because of our imbecility w^ch would render us obnoxious whereas if we had infinite Power yⁿ we might exercise this indifferent Liberty of doing what we list w^thout suffering any inconvenience therefrom

Moreover though there be no naturall Good of Honesty yet because of |an| omnipotent Deity by his decrees & Lawes hath arbitrarily made something Just & Vnjust, Honest & Dishonesty w^ch unlesse we observe in our Lives, we shall suffer greater \Punishments/ Inconveniency afterwards therefore though Indifferent & Arbitrary Will be y^e greatest Good & Perfection in itself yet by Accident it is not so to us Creatures by reason of our Imbecillity, but it must be accompted our perfection to be determ who are such obnoxious things to be determined by y^e reason of our own Good & by y^e divine Lawes & y^e more necessarily we are determined to either y^e better it is But y^e case is far otherwise in God because e is omnipotent & irresistably powerfull & therefore in him pure Nature obtains w^thout any check or controll y^t w^ch is simply in itself y^e best is best to him & y^t is infinite Indifferency of Will determining all things because this is y^e exercise of y^e greatest - Power & Liberty & y^e very essence of absolute Indepesiency w^ch is y^e chief Character of a Deity depends \confuts/ in it whereas if there were any - natures either of Goodnesse or Trueth im̄utable in itself they would be - independent upon God & God \would be/ dependent upon y^m Whence a learned Author concludes \that though/ y^t is ^\Large/ alia raro Libertatis in ^\De quam in rebus/ Creaturis, alia in Deo in Creatures by reason of their Imbecillity their Perfection consisteth in complying w^th their own ^\Necessitous & obnoxious/ state & condic~on ^\of o^r state/ state & acting accordingly for avoiding of those Evills they are Anxious to \w^ch we shall be otherwise liable to/ but in God it is otherwise whose highest Perfection is absolute & infinite Indifferency of Will Sum̄a Indifferentia in Deo summū est ejus Omnipotentia argumentum Indeed & \Nether would/ God w\c/ould not be omnipotent of he were determined by any Necessary & im̄utable Nature of Goodnesse & Truth If he did not a|r|bitrarily make not only all things w^thout him but also every thing w\th/in himself His words to this purpose Quantum ad Arbirtij Libertatem longe alia ejus ratio est in Deo quam in nobis repugnat enim Dei voluntati non fuisse ab æterne Indifferentem ad quæ facta sunt aut unquam fiaret quia nullum bonum vel verum, nullum credendum vel faciendum vel omittendum fingi pot potest cujus Idæa in Intellectu divino prius fuerit quam ejus voluntas sed ut determinares ad efficiendum ut ad tale esset ne hie loco - <25> prioritate temporis sed ne quidem priùs fuit ordine vel Naturâ vel ratione ratiocinatâ ut vocant ita scilicet ut ista bona Idæa sed sum̄a Indifferentia in Deo summmum est ejus Omnipotentiæ Argumentum \+/ from whence he concludes y^t God did not do one thing in making of y^e world rather yⁿ another because one thing was better yⁿ another but he determin'd all things by an Indifferent Will & because he determin'd y^m therefore is every thing best as it is, he did not make y^e world in time because he saw it - was better it should be made in time yⁿ from Eternity, but because his Indifferent Will did determine to create it in time therefore this is better yⁿ if he had made it from eternity. neither did God will y^e three Angles of a Triangle to be equall to two right ones because it was necessarily true & could not be otherwise, but because he willed it to be so therefore it is now necessarily true Sed quantum ad Hominem cum naturâ omnis Boni et veri jam à Deo determinatam inveniat, nec in aliud ejus voluntas - ferri possit, evidens est ipsum eo libentius, ac proinde etiam liberias Bonum, et verum amplext, quo illud clarius videt, nunquam ne esse indifferentem, nisi quando quidnam fit melius aut verius ignorat, vel certè quandò - tam perspicuè non videt, quin de eo possit dubitare: Atq; ita longe alia indifferentia humanæ Libertati convenit quàm divinæ. Indifferentia non pertinet ad essentia in humanæ Libertatis cùm non modo simus Liberi quando ignorantia Recti nos reddit indifferentes sed maximè etiam quando clara perceptio ad aliquid prosequendū impellit.

The result of all is this y^t absolutely in itself & to a Being devoid of all Imbecillity, indifferent, temerarious, fortuitous, arbitrary Will together w^th power are y^e highest Good & Perfection ^\& Happines/ w^ch Indifferent Will of his is y^e first Law of all Truth & Goodnesse \w^ch therfore must be {illeg} {illeg}/ they are all mutable by him at Pleasure, for it is a childish thing to assert y^t he y^t made arbitrarily made all Truth & Goodnesse should be necessarily determined thereby ^\aftē he had made it/ & could not arbitrarily change w^t he had arbitrarily made Moreover if Gods Liberty & Perfection consists essentially in Indifference of Will, yⁿ he was \must/ not \be/ only once Indifferent for a moment but being allwayes free & perfect must needs continue allwayes Indifferent ^\or otherwise not always happy/ And if this was true \then/ no doubt but he would exercise this great Liberty & Perfection ^\ever & anon/ us turning topsiturvij y^e ^\whole frame of y^e/ world, hurling one Planet against another perpetually alter^g y^e position of y^e Zodiack, \Æquator/, & y^e Poles of y^e world, & not only change ^\Position/ Religious but also all y^e reputed fundamentalls of it, all com̄on notions & y^e grounds of all Sceincies & make y^m no longer to be eternall Veritys, \but whatsoever is trew to day/ make all y^t false to morrow which was true to day by his legislative Power upon Truths \& some time after another/

But certainly he must needs have a great deal of Charity y^t doth not think all this to be really nothing but Hypocriticall & disguised Atheism w^ch \thus/ makes not only y^e frame of y^e whole \Vniverse/ world but also all - Goodnesse & Truth of things to owe its originall to nothing but Omnipotent Indifferency |blind Indifferēcy ^ & Chance Omnipotent| called by y^e name of God The ground & pretence of w^ch Atheism & y^t w^ch might lead & invite men to it might be \And/ this vulgar Doctrine of indifferent Free=will \pursued is y^t w^ch/ is y^e pursued to y^e utmost leading men to this at last y^t \may thus fairly lead one But this strange kind of Mysticall {illeg}/ y^e only Soveraign Deity in <26> y^e world is infinite blind Chance & fortuitousnesse Contingēcy omnipotēt -

But y^e generality of those who assert this indifferent Free=will to be a pure perfection belonging to God as well as rationall Creatures do not go this way, but make a kind of jumble of things together, they both supposing y^t there is an essentiall Holinesse & Morality in y^e Deity w^ch it hath no indifferent Free=will to, but is necessary in respect of it, & yet notw^thstanding y^t there is an indifferent Free=will in God as to all other things & y^e most of things in w^ch God is not a Servant to his own Vnderstanding, Reason & Wisedome but by his will hath a Dominion ^\& Mastership/ over it, ^\{illeg}/ after all things are put \{illeg}& notw^thstanding/ all motives & Reasons of his Vnderstanding, it remaining still indifferent to determine itself either way meerly because it will, this being such an essentiall Liberty & Prerogative y^t to deny this were to deny y^e very Godhead itself

Somethings they hold to be so Evill y^t God cannot do y^m & some things such y^t if God do but act ad extra he cannot but act according to y^m, as if he do make a world he cannot but make it wisely, & yet notw^thstanding, there are innumerable things left besides in w^ch God hath a scope to exercise y^t dominion of indifferent arbitrary Will, & y^t Deus non tenetur ad optimum, if he \God/ make things tolerably well so as they may but - serve he \y^e Turnes he/ is not bound to do all things \them/ in y^e best manner possible & y^t God doth de facto use this arbitrary dominion of indifferent will, \they think to be/ be evident both from y^e \whose system of the created Vniverse/ Creation in generall & also from y^e severall parts of it, for y^e whole world might have been made better yⁿ it is, as also y^e severall parts of it & therefore by arbitrary Will they were made thus as they are & no better there might also have been more worlds or one bigger yⁿ this is, & w^t necessity was there but y^t there might have been more Planets about y^e Sunne yⁿ now there are, y^t y^e Earth might not have had fower Moones or Secundary Planets as well as Jupiter hath, or y^t Mars migh not - have had one as well as y^e Earth, hath, \why/ might not y^e fixed Starres been otherwise placed yⁿ they are in a more regular \& {illeg}/ order w^ch would have made y^m a farre more delightfull spectacle to us men for whose sakes alone all thing were made, yⁿ y^t present, rude & carelesse disposition of y^m doth, but y^es Author \y^e only Pair/ of this argumentation do indeed urge meaner & more triviall Instances Quis enim credat (s^th one) solem qui loties est terrâ major, non potuisse vel vnū digitum sive majorem esse, sive minorem, quis credat Litera maris non potuisse latum pedem latiora vel angustiora, mentes alliores vel \aut/ minus allos, hoc potius in loco quàm in illo exstare fontes? And indeed they \he/ might as well have demanded why every straw \Whether it were {illeg}/ might have of necessity been in y^e same place & posture y^t now it is in, ^\or they were not thus disposed by Arbitrary {illeg}/ as some of those other things w^ch they \he/ instances in.

But here we argue in this manner y^t either active Indifferency & arbitrary will is y^e highest perfection in y^e Deity or \else/ whether there \is/ be any - immutable nature of Good w\ch/ is y^e rule & measure of y^e divine Actions volitions & Actions, if Indifferent arbitrary Will be y^e highest Perfection yⁿ this ought not to be an confined any where in God; neither must we assert y^t God is necessary to any thing, from whence it followes y^t there can be no such things as Morality in y^e Deity, nothing unjust antecedently to his will w^ch therefore he hath not liberty to do \+/ Or else if there be any positive nature of morall Good, of Rectitude & Wisedome w^ch is y^e highest perfection of y^e Deity yⁿ it is plain y^t there can be no Indifferent Free=will in opposition to his naturall Goodnesse & Wisedome & to say y^t God is Indiffe <27> rent to do y^e Better or |y^e| worse, is to make him Indifferent to his own highest Perfection, \w^{ch is {illeg}}/ to his own Good, to his own being Better or Worse. Indeed \if th/where \be any/ things are exactly equall according to y^e Judgm^t of infinite Wisedome, so y^t there is not one gram of Goodnesse in one more yⁿ another here there would be no imperfection at all for y^e Deity to determine him\it/self indifferently, nor indeed any great dominion or Perfection would here consist in y^t he could ^{its being able} do this, this being not so much election as sortition; only y^t it seems \a/ there would be a necessity in - such a case {illeg} of determining one way or other But whether y^e divine Wisedome haveing contrived y^e Best Frame of y^e created Vniverse possible foreseeing all things y^t would result from it did not leave many of those minutall things w^ch we would needs ingage his particalar & absolute decrees about, to y^e ἀκολουθία & sequall of those things y^mselves is ^\frō whence his/ all comprehending Wisedome forseeing y^t nothing would result from thence \&/ y^t was ^\{illeg} inept/ enormous & \or/ incongruous in respect of y^e \to/ whole But y^e reason why men do so easily conclude y^t y^e whole Vniverse migh|t| have been made better yⁿ it is is partly from hence, because they know not y^e vastnesse of this \Gods/ Creation & partly from their narrow & short sightednesse, by reason whereof they cannot comprehend y^e End & Fitnesses ^\& congruitie/ of things: & w^{ch of those} \Now of those/ Atheists y^t have so constantly confidently affirmed y^t y^e world was not made by God (i e) by infinite Goodnesse & Wisedome ^\but by Chance/ could ever shew how \so much as/ y^e Organicall Mechanism of mans Body could have been mended in any one thing or indeed could discover y^e thousand'st part of y^t divine artifice & contrivance of it, w^ch y^e more it is inquired into by y^e curious & sagacious still appeares more & more.

All y^t can be ^\yet/ pretended for such a \Faculty/ Free=will as is ^\whose Perfectiō consists in being/ indifferent to y^e reason of ones own Good ^\& Understanding & Judgm^t both in God & Mē/ is this y^t though y^e no Being can be indifferent to its \own/ sumū Bonū y^t there are many lesser Goods w^ch it may have a Dominion over & a priviledge to determine itself either way indifferētly in respect of them Or else as others would have it though y^e Will is necessary in respect of y^e End w^ch is chiefly to be understood of y^e first End w^ch is never a means yet it hath a liberty to determine itself indifferently as to means w^thout being determined by any necessary Reason or Vnderstanding antecedent But to y^e first of these we reply y^t y^e true Sum̄um - Bonum or highest of all Goods as was before declared is y^e divine Life of Vertue w^ch it is plain y^t humane Souls are not necessary to & this is indeed y^e Nature of Free=willed Beings y^t they are such things as may possible degenerate & fall from their own highest Good & sinkn down into certain lower goods or Congruities Wherefore some late asserters of Free=will doe for this Reason, because it seems plausible to make y^e Will necessary to y^e summum Bonum but yet to have a Perfection of being contingently arbitrarily Free, they will needs determine y^t y^e sum̄um Bonum is not y^e Good of Honesty, but Animall Pleasure & self=preservation & from thence endeavour to shew how y^e Will is ^\becomes/ indifferently f free or indifferent to y^e Morall Good & Evill & y^t it is its perfection so to be because y^t w^ch is called Honesty is a Good not desired for itself but only for y^e sake of <28> an Animall Pleasure, y^tis, it is not an End but a Meanes And to say y^t y^e Will hath an indifferent Freedome to Meanes, is all - one as to say y^t it hath a Freedome to lesser Goods for as much as lesser Goods have but y^e Nature of meanes in order to y^e highest Good It is true as w may be granted to be true as was before shewed y^t y^e Animall Life & Congruity is y^e τὸ πρῶτον ὀικείον y^e first concililation of Nature as y^t w^ch lies more shallow & superficiall in y^e outside of us the referer putting itself forth first, but though y^t w^ch is naturall be first & afterwards y^t w^ch is Spirituall yet it doth not follow from thence but y^t y^e latter may be y^e highest Good And indeed to affirm y^t y^e Good of Honesty is not desireable in itself & y^t it is not a higher & more noble Good yⁿ y^t of Animall Congruities is but y^e Philosophy of a Bruit unworthy of a Theologer & since y^t kind of Liberum Arbitrium whose Perfection consists in Indifferency to Morall Good & Evill & to all Contrariety & contradiction after all things put, it is most deservedly to be exploded as a spurient\ou/ figment of mens Brains nothing being more certain yⁿ y^t y^e highest Good of all Intelligent Beings is y^e Good of Honesty or divine Morality w^ch indeed humane Souls & Angelicall Beings by reason of y^e imperfection & defectiveness of their Nature may lapse & fall from, but it is no glorious Power or Perfection y^t they have, as is fondly supposed \y^t/ they are indifferent to it But y^e Deity being a Being infinitely perfect is essentially y^t divine Life & can never fall from, nor hath any such indifferent Free=will towards it, as is by most of these writers y^mselves acknowledged, But to say y^t either God or Man have a naturall Priviledge or Perfection in y^m in respect of all lesser Goods y^t they can indifferently determine y^mselves proceeds from much childish Ignorance of their nature of y^t highest Good as if it were a narrow particular thing, whereas it is a certain Life y^t extends itself to all Actions & is y^e measure of y^m & all inferiour Goods Wherefore it can be no naturall Power or Perfection in any Vnderstanding Being to determine itself indifferently as to inferiour Goods Hic et Nunc they having allwayes a certain respect or Analogy to y^e highest Good Indeed there is a sense in w^ch it is very true y^t it is a noble power or Perfection of y^e Soul as a late Author contends to have an Indifferency to all lower Goods in order & tendency to y^e highest Good w^ch is indeed y^e true amplitude of y^e Soul And y^e same is to be s^d of Meanes y^t it is no perfective Power in any Being to be indifferent to any Meanes tending to this or y^t End but contrariwise y^e Perfection of y^e Rationall Nature requires as to choose y^e best End so to use y^e fittest & most congruous meanes to Ends resolv'd upon We conclude therefore y^t there is no naturall Faculty or Perfection in any Intellectuall Being whatsoever whereby it can act I hath a priviledge to act Indifferently in respect of its own Good, Reason & Vnderstanding, but such an indifferent Dominion as this is ever ones self is no Power or Dominion, no freedome or Liberty but only y^e vice of Free=willed Beings w^ch by reason of y^e imposture of y^e Animall Life is taken for Freedome & Perfection.

Chap:

It now remains y^t we give a true & clear accompt of y^e Nature of this Faculty of F=will a possible & intelligible Ideah ^\of it/ & such as will salve all y^e Phænomena's y^t belong to it ^ w^ch we shall do by severall steps & gradations

First therefore y^e genericall nature of Liberum arbitrium is this y^t it is a certain Power y^t a Being hath over itself & over its own ^\Volitions &/ Actions, thus y^t is rightly called by y^e Antiens ἀυτεξουσία & sui potestas \+ B/ some called \it/ by y^e name of Dominum to y^e same purpose, but because this word seems to imply \an absolute/ dispotick Power, therefore I conceive it not so proper here lest it should confirm \lead/ men in \to a/ y^t false apprehension as if this Faculty in man did imply y^t he had an absolute despotick Power over his whole Soul & \his/ morall Dispositions \to/ Good or Bad ^\{illeg}/ quite to change y^m in a moment as he pleaseth as if it were an infinite vertibility in us whereby we could at any time make ourselves Morally good or Evill as easily as we can turn our hand or head this way or y^t way & also therein did exercise equall Power either way whether to Good or Evill, but of this afterwards

It is true indeed y^t this self=power doth plainly imply in y^e notion of it a Freedome from all absolute ^\naturall/ Necessity, y^t is, so it hath something of Contingency in it w^ch if any one will need call by y^t improper name - of Indifferency we shall not contend w^th y^m \him/ about it, provided it be not taken in y^t sense before exploded, as if it were a naturall Power or pure Perfection to be alike indifferent to act w^th Reason or against it & to be fortuitously determined in all our Free=actions \to Good or Evill/ Self=power is a thing to w^ch something of Contingency doth adhere \& cleave/ παρα φυαδος εικος as an ad nascense to \it/ something else, for Contingency as well as Evill hath not ὑποστασιν but παρυπόστασιν only, \{illeg}/ it is not ἀιτία y^e cause or Efficient of any thing, but τροπος τῆς ἀιτιας y^e manner of a cau cause only, but how this Contingency is to be Vnderstood & how much there is to of this Contingency in Free=will'd Beings as also where it is lodged we shall discourse more afterwards

The genericall nature of Free=will is not rightly assigned to be Indifferency or Contingency acting for neither of these is a cause, but it is a \positive/ power or ability to w^ch Contingency ^\or Non-necessity/ hath παρυποστοσιν an ad sistem a thing y^t doth insinuate it self into \it/ & is an Affection of it.

Secondly all Power being for Good, for y^t w^ch tends to Evill is not Power but impotency, Free=will is a Power w^ch a Being hath over itself for Good τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι ἀαθοῦ χάριν ἐφνέται to be ones own, & at ones own disposall is desired only for y^e sake of Good, ουδεν οικοιοτερον αγαθὸν Good is most ourselves our Evill being heterogeneous to every Being & therefore not itself Wherefore Free-will according to y^e proper & genuine \notiō/ nature of it is a Power w^ch a Being hath w^ch \whereby it/ can contribute something from himself to promote itself towards Good & to sin & keep itself in y^e same self=power hath \is/ a Faculty w^ch a Being hath bestowed upon him by God & Nature whereby we are able to contribute something <30> of our own towards \in order to/ y^e procuring y^t suipotence w^ch is a state in us as happinesse w^ch is to all Free=will'd Beings, wⁿ they are habituall is fixed in y^e predominancy of y^e higher & p|b|etter principle for we {illeg} \{illeg}/ yⁿ only truly Power & Dominion over ourselves wⁿ y^e best thing y^t belongs to our Nature & y^e best thing in y^e Vniverse reignes in us It is a spurious notion of self=power to make it nothing but Indifferency & Contingency itself acting, as if infinite indeterminac~on were y^e highest perfection of any Being & consequently most itself & y^t is also a false Idolum of Power over ourselves w^ch is imagined by some w^thout respect to Good, Infinite Power over ourselves any way indifferently whether to Good or Evill \{illeg}/ for Power is not Power w^thout respect to Good Free=will or Self=power is nothing but a self=promoting Power to Good or a self=preserving Power to adde something to its own Perfection, of w^ch Action there are - those two degrees, first a Power of intending itself in a way of consideration, in recollection, self=attention or introspection in speculation about Truth & Falshood & deliberac~on about w^t is practically Good & Evill in Life, again in a way of \in a way/ vigorous exertion of itself, in a way \in to/ of strenth & force & resolution to resist y^e lower Inclinations & promote itself towards y^e higher principles 2^ly in accordingly determining its assents & Volitions or Actions Freewill'd Beings are \as/ reduplicated upon y^mselves & self=comprehensive, they have a self=intending & self=exerting Power w^ch is their strength to Good y^e Power of Free=will properly so called is to Good & ^\It was design'd & intended for this only/ Nature /sufficiently\ obtrudes y^e lower things upon us, but as to y^e higher things our own active premotion & exertion of our|A|selves towards y^m is expected from us. 3\ly/ this Power of Free|3|willed Beings w^ch they have over y^mselves for Good is but an imperfect Power, for perfect Power over ones self is no other yⁿ essentiall Goodnesse & Wisedom where y^e reduplicac~on of Free=willd Beings ceases & is swallowed up in y^e simplicity of absolute Perfection. - But it followes to be by unavoidable necessity y^t such a Being as has a power over itself to intend & exert itself must also have a Power (if it be a Power) not to do y^e same w^ch is y^e only indifferent liberty of Contradiction if it may be so called {illeg} antedecent {illeg} free=will therefore is a Power over ourselves to promote & fix our selves in Good, imperfect & self=determinable, it is such a Power as we ourselves have a Power over by meanes whereof we are able to make it a self=determined strength or weakenesse. {illeg} to exert it or not & consequently to use it or abuse it y it is per se a power of promoteing ourselves to y^e higher Good & fixing <31> ourselves in y^e same, but by ancient of Power, of languid self remission & consequently of selfdeterminac~on to y^e worser Principle w^ch latter Power is its impotency, & acting according to it is y^e |vn|naturall abuse of y^e \Naturall/ Power of Free=will whereby we are - guilty of Sin & Fault, become y^e causes of our own Hurt in y^t we might have done otherwise & deserve blame & punishment & And \But/ this hath been y^e grand & capitall errour of Writers upon this Argument y^t they have not taken notice of this διφυία in this Faculty of Free=will, nor distinguis'd between y^e Perfection & Imperfection of it, its Power & Impotency, its right use & abuse, but have taken it ^\all/ for a pure Power & Perfection & therefore have seated it first in God himself takeing \as if/ Free=will for \were/ one & y^e same thing w^th Liberty ^\& happinesse/ w^ch in Creatures is but a state & not a n^rallPower W^ch Hypothesis plainly destroyes all difference of Morall Good & Evill makeing all Actions alike to be y^e genuine & proper offspring of - Free=will as a n^rall Power & a pure perfection whereas \indeed/ Sin & Morall Evill are but y^e Spurious & bastardly Offspring ^\or a By-blow of it/ of free=will a thing of w^ch y^e power of Freewill is not y^e univocall but y^e equivocall cause only or a cause per Accidens, it proceeding not from y^e Power but from y^e impotency of it \therof/, so y^t Free=will is an imperfect perfection, a mungrell thing, a self=determinable Power & weakenesse, Liberum arbitrium is not Liberty but a certain n^rall Power according to y^e right use of w^ch we may rescue \assist/ & recover ourselves into a state of true Liberty & suipotence or inthrall or by y^e abuse of it may inthrall ourselves in y^e greatest Bondage

Fourthly it is an im̄ediate πάθος or essentiall property of this - ambiguous middle Power, this imꝐfect Ꝑfection of Freewill y^t by y^e use & abuse of it, a man may become either ἑαοτοῦ κρὶτων or {illeg} as y^e Greeks emphatically expresse it better or worse yⁿ ones self ie. a man may either advance & promote himself, be under God a subordinate cause of his own Good or else may damage & detriment himself & - become y^e proper cause & efficient of his own hurt, of Sin & Morall - Evill The chief Argument w^ch hath in all ages been used to prove y^t there was such a thing as Free=will was frō Cōendac~on & Blame not such a one as only seem signifies our approbac~on & dislike of |y^e| things y^mselves Cōmended & Blamed \absolutely/ but w^ch doth also reflect upon y^e persō of as y^e cause of either to himself wⁿ it was possible he might not - have been so And we have shewed before y^t such Praise & Dispraise Cōmendacon & Blame could not be founded in such an Indifferent Free=will whose Power & Perfection equally consisted in determining itself either way & indeed chiefly shined forth in being loose from - Light & Reason & being free from it, y^e glory of y^t Free=will consisting in this y^t it is not bound to any thing & therefore not to that w^ch <32> most pretends to have a right to binding & limiting our Actions i.e. Reason & Vnderstanding w^ch notion of Free=will is an impossible Idæa but Free=will being such a Power y^e various use of w^ch qualifies men either for Praise or Cōmendac~on, it is evident y^t it must be such a mungrell & ambiguous Power as we have allready described W^ch may abate y^t envy w^ch is in y^e minds of many against this thing called Free=will occasioned by a false representation of it.

Fifthly haveing now shewed y^t Free=will is such an imperfect Power as though intended by God & nature for Good y^t by it Freewilled Beings may be able to adde & contribute something to their own Good yet ^\such as y^t/ accidentally \{illeg}/ by y^e abuse of it, we \they/ may by it become y^e causes of our own Hurt & justly deserve Blame & Punishm^t we - should in y^e next place speake something \more/ concerning y^t w^ch is purely & properly y^e Power of it ^\its Power to Good/ & shew how far it doth extend w^ch is \It being/ so much extolled & advanced by many ^\Idolaters of Freewill/ as if it were a nat perfect Dominion & absolute despoticall Power over ourselves, a thing y^t is allwayes indivisibly y^e same, & never impareable or |X| diminishable by \vertuous or vitious/ wicked Actions \X/ For y^e better clearing of w^ch we must repent \again/ w^t was before suggested y^t full & absolute Power over ourselves is nothing but perfect Goodnesse & Wisedome w^ch being essentially in God he is therefore y^e only true autexousious or selfpowerfull Being ^\in y^t sense/ but because \as/ autexousy & self=power are commonly taken for Free=will in Beings reduplicated upon y^mselves therefore it may be also s^d of God as an antient Platonist expresseth it y^t he is πλεον ἤ ἀυτεξούσιος more yⁿ self=powerfull \& Freewilled/ or more yⁿ in his own Power; he being a simple Being & essentially y^e same thing w^th his own \Good/ Perfection so y^t he & it are not two & consequently is not reduplicated upon himself in a way of Composition, he is essentially Goodnesse & Wisedome itself But y^t w^ch in Free=willed Beings who are not essentially their own Perfection \is called self Power/ is not a perfect Lordship & Mastery \{illeg}/ over y^mselves; such Power as whereby with Labour Care ^\{illeg}/ & Attētion, they may Promote & preserve their own Good {illeg} by intending & exerting y^mselves w^th ^\much/ labour, pains & earnest attention they can promote their own Good.

In y^t other notion of Freewill w^ch is asserted by many whereby it is made nothing but Indifferency & Contingency itself turning y^e Will this way or y^t way either to Morall Good or Evill, as if there were equall Power in its turning both wayes there is nothing of laborious conac~on, striving or contenc~on in its moving towards Good towards Vertue & Wisedome \any more/ yⁿ to Evill, Ignorance & Vice, whereas this ^\doubtfull & double Nature/ doublefac'd thing Freewill puts forth itself very differently these two wayes in one \it is/ active & laborious self=intention & self=exertion, in y^e other sluggish self=remission, relaxac~on & langor

And Because Free-will'd Beings have an easy des <33> poticall Power & Cōmand over y^e executive faculty & rational organes w^ch w^th y^e \a/ meer beck of their Will they do easily determine to different motions this way or y^t way, w^thout any dispute or reluctancy therefore some have been \thus/ mistaken to make y^e Power of Freewill y^e - same ^\over y^e inward affections of y^e Soul & think/ as well to Good as Evill y^t they can as easily & w^th as litle labour & difficulty turn y^mselves to Good as they can turn y^r hand or nod y^r head this way or y^t way \& as easily as to evill & with as little adoe as they can to Evill/ whereas Free=will is only Power to Good, there it is active conation, tone & strength, but to Evill it is inert sluggishnesse - Flaccidity & langour

In y^e Animall life itself Free=will hath \as/ a Power to promote y^e Animall Good, consists in vigorous exertion & intention, in laborious conation, but y^e Evill for w^ch its actions are at any time blamed are imputed to nothing but inertnesse & want of putting forth or intending ourselves. Here our Power over our Cogitac~ons is not so despoticall & easy as it is over y^e locomotive Power of y^e Body there being labour not only in y^e intention of Speculation \meditatiō/ & consideration but also in y^e constant direction of our thoughts to y^e same scope w^ch will \are/ otherwise \apt to/ straggle & wander being interrupted w^th y^e continuall risings of involuntary thoughts obtruding y^mselves upon us & turning y^e course ano|X|ther way, \X/ but there is need of greater force & laborious exertion to prevail over suddain passions Appetites & Hormæ & contracted habituall Inclinac~ons clashing w^th Inferiour Reason, so y^t w^thin y^e compasse of this Animall - Life wee are plainly sensible y^t there is ὑτεροκινητον τι w^ch causes a Lucta & Conflict in y^e Soul, it doth not w^th indifferency & like ease turn itself either way to either to comply w^th indifferency & like ease turn itself either way to either to comply w^th inferiour Reason or w^th blind \lower/ Appetites but its motion to one is vigour & strength towards y^e other inertnesse, langor & remission.

But this appeares much more in Morall Free=will In y^e generality of mankind, but especially in those y^t have been long under vitious habits There is no such Power of Free=will as can despotically com̄and - those inclinacons & turn itself to Good w^th y^e same ease as one can nod his head or turn his hand, as y^e indifferent Free=willers suppose The Power of Morall Free=will cannot change such habituall vitious Inclinac~on as these in a moment & y^t w^thout any labour & contention it can only prevaill over y^m by degrees & by little & little by earnest ^\means/ striving & contention & constant laborious conation \{illeg}/ Wherefore it is a false notion of Freewill w^ch some have set up as if it were such an omnipotent thing y^t were {illeg} alike in all states & could despotically com̄and & turn y^e Soul to Good as well to Evill w^th y^e same facility as if it were nothing but \with/ nodding this way or y^et \It is/ such a thing as allwayes consisted in an Indivisible whose strength was \is/ both unincreasable & undiminishable & indeed such an absolute Power over our selves to Good as stood in no need at all of any divine assistence from whence it hath come to passe y^t y^e name & thing of Liberum Arbitrium hath come under so much odium & prejudice by reason of y^t false notion y^t hath been made of it as if every Free=willed Being was so much in his own hands & had such an absolute Power & Lordship over himself to turn himself either way as y^t he stood in no need at all of God or of is assistence. \X/

And indeed ^\it cannot be denied but y^t/ among y^e Philosophers there have not been wanting|ed| |not some| who have thought Free=will to be such a ^\self sufficiēt/ Power in Morall things <34> & so sufficient to itself as y^t it was a vain & foolish thing \for any {illeg}/ to implore y^e divine Assistence for y^e procuring of Vertue or a good mind or to \& y^t never did/ owe - any thanks. at all to y^e Deity for it, \{illeg} Though as for/ outward things indeed w^ch are called y^e gifts of Fortune they would acknowledge y^m to God & pay their thanks for y^m but as \yet/ for y^e inward ^\good/ dispositions of y^e Mind they thought y^t every man had such an absolute dominion & lordship over y^m by his own Freewill y^t he need neither seek y^m of God nor ascribe y^m to him, to this purpose is y^t of y^e Poet Hæc satis est orare Jovem quæ denat et aufert Det vitam det opes, æquum mihi animum ipse parabo.

It is enough to pray to Jupiter for Life, Health & Riches\w^ch are properly his Gifts/, but a good Mind I will bestow upon myself Bonam mententem (s^th Seneca) stultū est extare cùm posses a te impetrare and Turpe est Deos fatigare quid vetis opus est facte ipse felicem. thus also Cotta in Cicero Judicium hoc hoc omniū mortalium est fortunam à Deo petendam, à seipse sumendā esse sapientiam & agam Hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent omnē cōmoditatem prosperitatemq; vitæ a Diis se habere Virtutem autem neme unquam acceptam Deo retulit \No mā thanks God for Virtue, but {illeg}/ And y^t of Sinesius also y^e Christian sounds to this purpose Disturb \Trouble/ not y^e Gods \with thy Prayers Nay since thou mayst/ being able to be saved by thy self if thou wilt for if every one may be y^e fountain of this, in willing to be God w^ch passages cannot be excused of y^e highest Insolence & Arrogancy though perhaps some might make this charitable construction of it y^t as if their meaning was y^t men must not attend upon prayers \to God only/ w^thout Endeavours nor conceit y^t Vertue & Vice are things determined by Fate only y^e rather because some of these same Phylosophers sometimes spake otherwise Roga bonam mentem, bonam valetudinem animi deinde corporis, \X/ Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano Who notw^thstanding adds afterwards Monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare \as suppose these two to be consistant/

But it cannot be denyed but y^t it is most true y^t if there were such a Free=will as is com̄only described as there wer could be really no such thing as Vertue or Vice, so as for \in order to/ y^t w^ch is called Vertue as also \&/ for all y^e guidance & direction of our Will, we should be absolute & compleat things in ourselves & such as could neither be helped nor hindred by y^e Deity Neither did y^e doctrine of y^e Pelagian|u|s y^t tooke away all necessity of divine grace proceed from any other originall yⁿ this false notion of Free=will y^t it is an absolute power in a|y^e| Soul of turning itself indifferently to Good or Evill But this Doctrine was cryed down by some of y^e \very/ heathen Phylosophers y^mselves If God do not bestow Vertue upon men & y^t by be a thing y^t we owe only to ourselves but only give Riches & Health w^thout Vertue he doth not profit or help men at all, forasmuch as Riches & health w^thout Vertue have no true Goodness in y^m & therefore if God do not contribute any thing ^\at/ all to Vertue but only dispense Riches & Health & such outward Good things to us he doth not contribute any thing <35> at all to our true Good And to y^e same purpose y^t pious Emperour Marcus Antoninus L.9. Sect 40 Either y^e Gods cannot help at all or else they can help, if they cannot help why dost thou pray unto y^m? But if they can help men & promote their Good why dost y^ou not rather pray y^t they would inable thee neither to fear nor desire no nor be grieved inordinately for any outward thing rather yⁿ these things should either happen or not happen to thee, for if God can help men at all yⁿ certainly he can \must needs be able to/ help y^m as to those things w^ch are y^e only true Goods But yⁿ he brings in an Objection concerning Free=will Αλλα {illeg} But perhaps (s^th he) you will object y^t God hath put these things in our own Power, y^t is, he hath given him \vs/ Free=will & hath made us fully Lords & Masters of our own Volitions so y^t though outward bodily things as Riches & Health be not in our Power for w^ch cause we pray unto God for y^m, yet Vertue consisting only in y^e Will itself we must needs have it perfectly in our power & need not implore Gods assistance in any such thing, to w^ch after some other things interposed Who - told thee y^t God doth not help in these things w^ch belong to theire own power or are in thy Free=will, as if he should say, This is notoriously false y^t Free=will is such a Power to Good so compleat & absolute as y^t it stands in no need at all of y^e divine assistence wherefore he earnestly exhorts men to pray for Gods help & assistance as to vertue & Morall things confidently assuring y^m of good successe therein begin to pray to God for these things & thou shall see w^t will follow; Let other men pray y^t they may enjoy this outward Pleasure or Vtility or be freed from this outward Evill, but do y^ou pray y^t y^ou maist not desire such things nor stand in need of y^m, nor fear y^e Contrary Contrary turn thy prayers altogether this way & tha see what will come of it And Epictetus himself in Arianus - though he is thought to \elswhere/ attribute|s| so much to Free=will & seems to make it such an absolute independent thing \y^t he/ running out into this extravagant expression y^t Jupiter himself cannot conquer y^e Will, yet notw^thstanding contradicting this again he earnestly exhorts wⁿ they are strongly tempted & assaulted by their Lusts to call upon God & implore his divine assistance as also at y^e same time to put forth y^e utmost of their endeavours & to strive w^th all their might as being otherwise in danger of being over powred by \such/ Appetites & Phantasies &c Stand to it, be not snatchd away by <36> thy Fancies Appetites & Passions, y^e contention is great tho|e|ugh undertaking divine, it is for a Kingdome for Liberty, for Prosperity, for undisturbednesse of mind remember God, call upon him as thy helper & assistant as y^e Mariners call upon Castor & Pollux in a storm, for w^t greater storm can there be yⁿ y^t w^ch proceeds from strong Phantasies bearing down Reason From - whence it appeares y^t this Phylosopher did not take Free=will to be such absolute thing of we our selves to Good but y^t it was only a Power of Conation & striving w^ch by degrees might prevail more & more over y^e lower affections, & w^ch also stood in need of divine assistance or grace to strengthen it & help it forwards

We have shew'd before y^t Freewilled Beings are half nature, half Self=activity or Free=will & y^t nature goes a great way in us \thē/ & therefore y^t things w^thout us \thē/ laying hold upon our lower Appetites & natural Inclinations have a great Power upon us, y^e neurospastus this is y^t nurospastia y^t strongly drawes as it were w^th cords this way & that way & in this sense we are not perfectly ἀυτοκίνητος we are not perfectly light & nimble \{illeg}/ to turn ourselves to Good as we please w^thout any labour or difficulty, but we have πολυ ετεροκινητον in us, much Heterokinesy & Reluctancy & a weight y^t strongly presseth down another way ^\To this mix be added all {illeg}/ Wherefore if things w^thout ^\of our Power/ us have a great Power upon us Gods providence w^ch orders & disposeth these outward things must in this respect have a great force & Influence upon us, \likewise To/ If w^ch grace & Providence \This belongs/ this is in main part not to lead us into temptation nor suffer us to be tempted above what we are able & to make all outward things to work for Good to a sincere & upright Heart, in w^ch respect of \Gods {illeg}/ disposing outward things y^t of y^e Philosopher may be taken y^t Men do not so much order their own affairs nor dispose of their own Actions as God & Opportunity order all things, God & opportune Providence Besides w^ch there are other more inward & more im̄ediate actings of divine grace & Providence by ^\internal/ motions & suggestions of Thoughts \by/ strengthening & corroborateing Good Desires \by inward {illeg}/ Inward convictions of Conscience & y^e like by w^ch divine Grace may effectually insinuate itself in us w^thout any Violacon of our Freedome or self=power not to speake here of y^t divine spirit of God himself w^ch is an inward principle of Life & Light in regenerate Persons & w^ch worketh all their works in y^em, of w^ch something afterwards.

We conclude y^t Liberum Arbitrium according to y^e true notion of it being an Imperfect Power over ourselves doth no way exclude y^e assistance of divine Grace & Providence ^\w^ch takes care of all weak things in y^e world/ w^thout w^ch it would be insufficient of itself to keep men in a state of Vertue but much more to recover any y^t are deeply lapsed into Wickednesse to w^ch purpose y^e learned Origen well determines y^t y^e Good of - Free=willed Beings w^ch have but an imperfect Power over y^mselves doth not depend only upon τὰ προαιρετα y^e use of our own Free=will, but also stands in need ἀπροαὶρετον τι something else <37> w^ch is out of our own Power w^ch is y^e divine ^\Power &/ Grace \{illeg}/ As one may say y^t y^e Good of Agriculture in order to fruit is a mixt thing consisting partly of something w^ch is arbitrary to y^e husbandman his plowing & tilling y^e ground according to art & \partly/ something w^ch is not arbitrary & \nor/ in his Power, y^t Providence w^ch orders y^e temperature of y^e air & seasonable showers so y^e Good of Rationall Beings in order to Vertue may be s^d to be a mixt thing y^tis compounded of y^e Free=will of y^e Agent himself & of y^e divine grace conspiring, w^ch he illustrates also from y^t of y^e Psallmist unlesse y^e Lord build y^e house he laboureth in vain y^t buildeth it, & unlesse y^e Lord keep y^e City, he watcheth in vain \{illeg}/ y^t helpeth it wittily allegorizing it in this manner \He y^t builds a house/ every one y^t is a proficient in Vertue builds a house \He y^t Keeps a Citty/ & every one y^t is perfect in Vertue keeps a City, but y^e work \Labour/ of him y^t buildeth & y^e watch \{illeg}/ of him y^t keepeth are both in vain unlesse y^e Lord \both/ build & watch \with them/, when he whence he concludes y^t besides our own Free=will our Morall Good depends upon y^e divine Power & Assistence w^ch helps y^e building of him y^t builds & doth as it were rebuild w^th him y^t buildeth, who ^\by {illeg}/ alone was not able to finish his building & y^e same is to be s^d of y^e keeping of a City allready built Wherefore s^th he there is not only need of y^e Cons concurrence of our own Free=will & of divine \grace/ conspiring w^ch as to us is out of our Power) for y^e begetting of Vertue & Honesty but also for y^e keeping of y^e same And y^e most consumate in Vertue will ipso facto \consequently/ sink from y^t state if he make himself y^e cause & do not give due glory to him for w^ch cause s^th he y^e Apostle seeing y^t \w^t/ our Free=will contributes much lesse to morall Good \is much lesse/ yⁿ y^e divine Power & Grace s^th y^t it is not of him y^t willeth nor of him y^t runneth but of Gods y^t sheweth mercy not as if God had mercy on men y^t did not will nor runne but because our willing & running is nothing in comparison w^th y^e divine Grace & therefore we ought much rather to entitle y^e divine grace & Goodnesse yⁿ our own Free=will\ing/ in willing & running to Morall Vertue as \being/ y^e cause \of it/; and at last he concludes y^t y^e end of all this is to shew y^t we ought \both/ w^th \o^r own/ laborious endeavours & Prayers ^\to God for his Assistance/ loyalty to seek to attain spirituall Goods & to expell vitious evills from our Minds Besides Origen all y^e antient Doctors of Christianity did con \likewise/ unanimously assert y^e Concordia gratiæ et liberi Arbitrij y^e \{illeg} &/ friendly concord of Grace & Free=will together & y^t they were not contradictious to one ano <38> ther as many men suppose who wⁿ they hear of Freewill, think Grace is ^\presently/ excluded & wⁿ they hear of Grace think Freewill is destroyed whereas there is a friendly concord \most amiable assistance/ betwixt these two together as is plainly intimated in y^e holy Oracles in those expressions Work out your Salvac~on w^th fear & trembling for it is God &c I have labour'd more abundantly yⁿ they all, yet not so much I as y^e grace of God y^t was w\th/ me W^ch concurrence of Gods grace w^th our own Will & Indeavour y^e very Heathens y^mselves expressed in such passages as these God speeds y^e course of him y^t sets himself to run And Synesius tells us y^t by mens joyning of these - two together Wherefore it was rightly s^d by one of y^e Antients Tolle gratiam non salve erit quo salvetur Tolle Liberum Arbitrium non erit quod salvetur If \Take away/ grace be taken away there \there/ will not be \what one should be saved by/ y^t by will one can be saved & if \{illeg}/ Free will be taken away \&/ there will \not be y^t very thing left/ be nothing to be saved any {illeg} But lest that should be saved - For vertue & salvation belong onely to a selfactive Being - But many by Grace mean, Gods doing All both in vs & for vs, so as to leave nothing at all for vs to doe, as if we were but senseles Macins - And y^e Philosopher Epictetus ubbraids such as these after this ^\blunt/ manner 213. \That/ We betake ourselves to our Prayers o Lord God how shall I be freed from y^e power of strong Lusts & Pantasies, thou Fool hast y^ou not Hands & hath not God made y^m then for something sit down & pray now y^t thy potuitous excrements may not {illeg} \fall/ down out of thy nose or rather use thy hands & blow thy nose & accuse not y^e Deity, Is not y^e case just y^e same? Hath God given thee nothing here? Hath he not given thee magnanimity? Hath he not given thee Fortitude since y^ou hast so many hands Dost thou notw^thstanding sit still & - pray to God to {illeg} thee \or blow thy Nose for thee./ This is y^e very condition of those y^t hypocrytically pretending y^e Fall of Adam & originall Sin & y^e inability of depraved nature to any {illeg} supernaturall Good y^e confessing of w^ch ^\alone/ they think to be ^\propitiatory/ Sacrifice \& Holocaust most/ highly gratefull to y^e Allmighty in y^e mean time slothfully neglect to use y^t Power w^ch really they have w^ch is all one in this blunt language of y^e Stoick as if a man having hands should not use y^m to blow or wipe his nose but expect sit still expecting y^t God by Miracles should do it \y^t office/ for him, And there is another error concatinate w^th this y^t they think salvacon & holinesse to be an externall thing clapt upon men w^ch therefore must be done for y^m w^thout y^m

Though y^e essence of Free=will be not be nicer ^\of/ differency & contingency active, these being no active Powers, yet it is most true y^t Contingency or non=necessity is a πάθος or affection y^t intimately belongs |X| is this naturall Power in a certain sense \X/ But this is very much misunderstood by many as if this contingent Indifferency were also in y^e Will - itself after all things put besides y^e Volition itself & as if all Free=willed Actions were such as y^t till y^e very moment of doing of y^m there was no more probability of the thing to be done rather yⁿ another but y^e Agent was perfectly Indifferent to do this or y^t or to do & not do w^ch if it were true there could be no fixed habits either of Vertue or - Vice, nor no firm purposes, nor resoluc~ons of doing any thing, in life & every free=willd Being would be απολιλομενον τὶ a thing not only independent upon all things in y^e Vniverse besides him \self/ but also perfectly loose to his own Good, this one thing only excepted, y^t as y^ey say, a man cannot actually desire y^e et or chose y^e eternall misery of his whole man, his Body & Soul at once, Wherefore though it be most true y^t Free=will & self=power supposes some kind of Non=necessity, yet there is so not s|o|uch \much/ in sin contingency in all Volitions as is com̄only supposed whereas \For/ neither wisedome nor Vertue can \bring/ consist\ence/ w^th such a contingent uncertainty of all Actions as y^t it cannot be known before hand w^t such a man will do in such any case, \no/ nor indeed Vice itself

The Contingency of Free=willed Being is this y^t though they be fixed in never so habitts of Vertue or Vice so y^t there is no probability at present of their acting contrary to y^m, yet it is not absolutely impossible but y^t in length of time they may by little & little by their own s different use of their own self=active Power loosen & change y^mselves from either of those Habits to y^e contrary We speak of Free=willed Being in y^mselves seting aside a devine confirmation in Good & a vitious obdurac~on in Evill, we say in y^mselves y^t though there is a possibility of their continuing in vitious or vertuous Habits to all eternity yet there would be no absolue ^\{illeg}/ possibility to y^e contrary, but so as y^t it must be allwayes understood y^t their changing from Good to Evill by y^e neglect of their own - Free=power is to be ascribed wholy to y^mselves & their change - from Evill to Good though by y^e use of their own self=power, is notw^thstanding to be reputed principally to God & not to y^mselves, of w^ch more else where.

It will not be amisse to speake something here concerning Contingency in generall w^ch is a thing y^t Metaphysicians have writ so much of We conceive therefore y^t there are but these two Instances of Contingency or Non=necessity in y^e whole world y^e first is y^t w^ch is intimately essentiall to Free=willed Beings y^t they are not their own perfection by im̄utable nature, but by self=exertion & - - therefore are defectable or peccable, for though many Freewilled Beings will continue pure & happy to all Eternity, yet if we consider y^m only in their selves w^thout divine Grace there is no absolute impossibility but y^e most holy Saint or Angell migh \in/ at - length of decline time ^\{illeg}/ decline, defectibility or a possiblity of defection or declension is as essentiall to an imperfect Free=willed Creature as Indefectability & Impeccability to y^e Deity This is y^e first Instance of Contingency in our intending or not=intending ourselves or doing it more or lesse in a way of consideracon, vigorous exertion, resoluc~on & activity The 2^d Instance of it is in a negligent, carelesse indifferent determinac~on of action of w^ch there are three cases First wⁿ things propounded to our choice are exactly equall in Goodnesse or wⁿ meanes equally conduce, to y^e same end so y^t there can be no difference put betwen y^m at least by humane Vnderstanding w^ch things often occurre in Life, but \least/ of any should deny y^t there is any s such thing we shall propound a triviall Instance If two peeces of Gold of equall bignesse & exactly alike in colour & figure cast in y^e same mold should be placed at equall distance from y^e hand of him to whom it \this/ is offered & y^e choice given him to take w^ch he will, here being no imaginable difference to be found betwixt y^m nor reason to incline y^e choice to one rather yⁿ another it cannot be certainly ^\fore/known by any antecedent cause w^ch of y^m will be chosen, so y^t there must needs be a contingency in y^e Choice & y^e Choser must needs determine fortuitously, y^t is, w^thout any reason, negligently or carelessly this way or y^t way The 2^d case is something like to this & y^t is wⁿ things \though/ are not exactly equall in y^mselves but yet by reason of |y^e| defect of our Vnderstanding or want of considerac~on we do not clearly apprehend w^ch is best but \for/ for y^e present they seem to us there are reasons inclining both wayes & we are doubtfull w^ch to preferr & <41> we do in this case venturously & contingently determine ourselves to this or y^t not w^thout some Contingency And here there is no fault nor blame neither unlesse ^\onely where/ our doubtfullnesse did Ꝑceed for want of due & mature Considerac~on w^ch if we had used we might clearly have discovered a difference Lastly wⁿ men willfully resolve to neglect Reason & to act temperariously w^ch is a vice y^t Free=willed beings may be liable to, & though we happen to chose right or rong we are in this case blame=worthy for what we do, because by a due exertion of ourselves we might have complyed w^th y^t Reason w^ch tells us we ought not to determine ourselves temerariously in matters of moment, so y^t y^e only Contingency to w^ch blame & com̄endac~on doth belong is y^t w^ch consists in y^e exercise of our self=power or of intending or not intending ourselves.

From what we have declared all along it appeares y^t Liberum Arbitrium is but a subalternate or middle perfection w^ch hath a great mixture of Imperfection in it And it is not difficult now to give a true accompt of y^e originall of it w^ch those Authors y^t make it to be a pure perfection \placed/ w^ch is therefore originally in God himself, are no way able to do For whereas they pretend y^t as it is a pure perfection to be necessary to y^e highest Good so it is a pure Perfection likewise to be indifferent to all other Goods beside & determine ones self indifferently to this or y^t, this cannot be true, because wⁿever one lower Good hath a nearer relacon to y^e higher Good yⁿ another, it cannot be a perfection to be indifferent to y^e choice of either, It also implyes ignorance concerning y^e nature of y^e highest Good w^ch is not one particular thing but an universall Life w^ch measures all lower Goods & may be exercisd more or lesse in all actions w^tsoever, but ^\though/ Indifference to all lower Goods in order to y^e highest is an imperfection & vice though Indifference to all lower Goods w^thout respect to y^e highest Good be an imperfection & Vice, it being only y^e Indifference of Persons morally vitious, yet it may well be s^d y^t Indifferency to all lower Goods in ordine ad Bonum summum is true Perfection & Liberty

And whereas others pretend y^t y^e rise of Indifferency as a pure perfection is from hence because though Indifferency to y^e End is not a - Perfection, yet Indifferency to severall meanes tending to Ends is a Perfection, this is plainly false likewise yet \For/ Indifferency to meanes y^t tend to Good Ends can never be void of Imperfection unlesse it be wⁿ those meanes are exactly equall & wⁿ they are so there is no perfection in determining rather one way yⁿ another Thus we see it is impossible to give any <42> accompt of Contingent Freewill is a pure perfection unlesse we would ^\{illeg}/ resolve y^t Indifferency to all things is itself y^e highest Good & greatest of all Perfec & only Perfection & y^e essence of y^e - divine Will, w^ch is all one as to say y^t there is no Morall - Good & Evill at all.

But there is a deteminate Sum̄ū Bonū in nature w^ch ought to be y^e measure of all Wills & Liberum Arbitriū is but a mug|n|grell thing compounded of Perfection & Imperfection together, so y^t y^e genesis or generac~on of it is as y^e Philosopher observeth from a certain συμπλοκὴ τοῦ ὀντος καὶ μὴ ὀντος a complicac~on of Entity & Non-entity together It ariseth from hence because this middle rank of Free=willd Beings are not essentially their own Perfection they have a certain participac~on & Capability of y^e highest Good, but they are not essentially their own Perfection, but they & It are two, they are not It by im̄utable simple nature but by reduplicate self=activity & self=exertion they have a higher & a lower Principle in y^m & there is a great Latitude or compasse w^ch they have of being better or worse, more or lesse perfect, according as they actuate their own possibility more or lesse they are self=contractable & self=inlargeable & by this meanes may become vertuous or vitious, Wise or Foolish & be in very different states, so as y^t y^e cause thereof is in part\ly/ imputable to y^mselves, w^thout a continuall renovac~on of y^mselves by self=exertion they are apt continually to sink down lower & lower, y^e Good & Perfection of all Free=willd Beings because they are Imperfect Beings is not by im̄utable nature, but it is a self=exerted thing.

|B| And \B/ from he now it plainly appeares y^t Liberum Arbitriū taken in y^t sense as we have described belongs not to y^e Deity because no \it being an/ Imperfection belongs to him, \For/ he cannot actuate his possibility more or lesse he being perfect Act & his ὀυσία his ἐνεργα, his Essence his Operac~on, He cannot exert himself more or lesse, he cannot intend & remitt himself, he is necessarily all y^t w^ch he can be & hath no passive Capability in him, he is not defectable & capable of any Fault, neither Blame nor Com̄endacon belong to Him, whereas this {illeg} is y^t w^ch directly belongs to y^e Actions of Free=will as such y^t they deserve Com̄endacon or Blame - more or lesse, he is not ἐπάνιτος but τίμιος not praise=worthy but honourable, he cannot be com̄ended for doing well as if it had been possible for him to have done otherwise, he can adde nothing to his own Perfection w^ch is y^e priviledge of Free=willed Beings ^ & this S^t Jerom rightly determines Solus Deus est in quem peccatum non cadet cætera cùm sint Liberi Arbitrij possunt in utramq; partem suam flectere voluntatem

But as for y^t notion of Liberty y^t it consists in arbitrary self=will this I conceive to be much lesse in God yⁿ Liberum Arbitrium itself, for Freewill is a naturall Power & Perfection though it have some defectivenesse complicated in it but irrac~onall arbitrary self=will is no ^\n\rall// Power ^\at all/ but y^e vice of Free=willed Beings though there be many y^t think y^t God cannot be God w^thout it, yet this - doth but shew y^e Blindnesse & degeneracy of Mankind & y^e strange \blind intoxicating/ witchcraft of Vice y^t it makes men transfer not their very vices - upon y^e Deity because they are strongly facinated w^th this opinion y^t lawlesse unbounded arbitrary self=will is y^e greatest Liberty And if they could have together w^th this Infinite Power to execute y^e same w^thout being obnoxious to any inconvenience from it they would think y^mselves compleatly happy \Perfect Gods/ They therefore draw out a picture of God according to their - own dark & vitious apprehensions & make him to be nothing but arbitrary Self=will armed w^th infinite Power We are far from denying true Liberty of Will to God as it speakes any thing of Perfection or y^t he doth not act all things both in Heaven & Earth according to y^e Free councell of his own Will, but we cannot We must not conceive God to so \For we ought not to concurre of God as if he were/ under y^e necessity of nature of in all his actings ^\in such manner/ as Bruit Animalls are supposed to be, y^t are below Free=will & do not emerge to y^t degree of Perfection ^ as to be something of y^mselves & at their own disposall, who therefore are not properly {illeg} \accounted/ Actors in y^e world y^t is, their Actions & \nor/ y^e consequences thereof are not ^\of their actions/ imputed to y^mselves but it is rather \rather to Nature under whose/ supposed y^t they are under servitude \they are/ to nature acting in y^m I say God is not thus to be conceived as subject to necessity w^ch implies a plain Imperfection, nay herein {illeg} P. 744 he is not comprehended under necessity, but himself is y^e necessity & law of other things. God indeed is y^e most determinate Being in y^e whole Vniverse, free from fortuitous Chance & Conting\ency/ 741 \For/ Matter w^ch is conceived to be a thing infinitely undetermined is taken to be y^e greatest Imperfection & most opposite to God, wherefore \But/ God is y^e most determinate - Being ^\in their sense/ because he is one way; but not as if he were \vnder {illeg}/ frō necessity there for there is no necessity as yet, but necessity ariseth from those thing y^t follow God & are below him. And though God cannot be s^d to have y^t imperfect contingent Free=will y^t is in Creatures w^ch plainly imples defectability; yet he is most of all in his own Power ἀρχωκὶ κυριος ἑαυτοῦ a Prince & Lord of himself, he is most of all autexousious in a ^\simple/ refined sense under y^e Power of nothing but himself & his own Perfection, Free=willed Beings are not essentially their own perfection & therefore y^t self=power of Freewill is but an imperfect power over ones self, a staggering & uncertain thing

\Again/ Neither is God ^\is not/ to be conceived as if he were a serv^t to his own Nature in all his actings The Actions & Volitions of God being not a serv^ts to his nature or essence |are| most perfectly free, neither is God a serv^t to himself but he is most freely himself For as - his nature of Goodnesse & Wisdom may be s^d also y^t God Freely wills his own Nature 747 God doth not more will & act as his nature inclines him to will yⁿ his Nature is such as he wills & acts; therefore he is in y^e most perfect sense Lord of himself, his na having his nature perfectly in his own Power - it being no other yⁿ he willd it to be God must not be conceived to be something of necessity by his nature first w^ch afterwards determines his Will but it may be s^d of him y^t he willd his nature to be such as it is, or y^t his nature & his will are ^\one &/ y^e same thing In his essence was his Will & therefore there was nothing in him differing from his Essence nor nothing in him but w^t was Will - Wherefore he was all Will & there was nothing in him y^t was not willed by him or before his Will, so y^t God was first of all his own Will he was as he willed & such as he willed to be. Nay the Phylosopher ventures to adde further as if it might be said in a certain sense y^t God ^\eternally/ made himself by Will he is as it were \his own/ y^e work \{illeg}/ of his own Will for \because/ he is y^t w^ch he wills himselfe to be, nor would he be any thing else yⁿ w^t he is.

But notw^thstanding all this though we take so much care to free God from y^e servitude of nature & necessity as this may be apprehended to be an imperfection yet we must not on y^e other hand subject him to Contingency nor ^\Reson/ make his Will from his nature & make it a fortuitous ^\giddy/ temerarious & irrationall thing his - Will being y^e Will of y^t w^ch is. y^e best is no temerarious Will nor such as \did/ it happend to be ^\such as it is/ His will is not irrac~onall nor for fortuitous & such as came upon him but such as ought to be & there is nothing temperarious in him we cannot per\con/ceive it to be a perfection of God to have a random _ Will y^t is loose from his own nature, ^\his/ Goodnesse & Wisedom & contingent to y^e same It is no liberty to be able to act contrary to nature & Perfecc~on It is absurd to think a thing to be yⁿ free wⁿ it \can/ acts contrary to nature especially wⁿ this nature y^t y^e highest Good & greatest perfection To be able to do appe Contraries is neither Power nor Liberty but inability of persisting in y^e best Wherefore we cannot consent to y^t assertion of theirs who place this Liberty as a perfection in God y^t positis omnibus ad agendum <45> requisitis at posito quolibet Judicis in Intellectu, nihilominus tamen aliter possit agere aut noc aut illud agere for to be able to act contrary to his own Wisedome is is imbecility or inability of adhering \continuing its/ to y^e best, it is defectability & not Liberty Wherefore though God do all things according to y^e Councill of his own Will both in heaven & Earth yet certainly he wills to not agreeably to Wisdom in every thing. Necessity & nonnecessity or Contingency, may \as/ it may be taken in different senses may either imply y^e greatest imperfection or y^e greatest Perfection, y^e necessity of Bodyes in their action & moc~on wⁿ they are allwayes determined by something w^thout y^m is y^e greatest ImꝐfecc~on next to y^t is y^e dull necessity of Brutish Appetite & Hormæ stupidly fixed & determined to one, it \{illeg} actions/ having not Judgm^t ^\of nor power/ over itself nor Power over itself & Actions, it is not above y^m but a serv^t to y^m or to Nature in y^m & y^e \loose/ Contingency of Liberum arbitrium or Freewill is much a higher perfecc~on yⁿ this Bruitish necessity But \y^t/ this contingent Free=will is much \farre/ below y^e necessity of perfect im̄utable Goodnesse & Wisedome, such a Being as perfectly comprehends all & cannot possibly act unwisely or foolishly Necessity in all senses is \dos/ not ^\alwayes {illeg}/ imperfection, wherefore though it be \alwayes/ contradictious to Liberum Arbitrium because y^t is an imperfect & an incompleat power over our selves, & neither admitts of y^e lower nor higher necessity it being above one & below y^e other, yet it is no way contradictious to Liberty as y^t is taken for a pure perfection for it is a great mistake y^t Libertas & Liberū arbitrium, Liberty & Contingent or staggering Free=will ^\acting indifferētly any way/ are one & y^e same thing it is absurd to think y^t a Being immutably fixed in Goodnesse & Wisedome should be therefore in a state of Bondage, thralldome & Misery They y^t make pendulous, wavering & versatil Freewill to be an equall Perfection every way & to be an essentiall attribute of y^e Deity & conceited \it/ to be y^e most glorious prerogative thereof, not to be necessarily but to be contingenty determind to Goodnesse Justice & Wisedome \though/ thinking hereby to advance his Dominion Soveraignty & Liberty do exceedingly debase y^e excellency of his divine nature ignorantly transfering their own humane Imperfections & y^e Imperfections of Free=willd Beings y^t are a middle rank of defectable Beings & amphibious things, upon him & clos\th/ing him therew^th Nay they y^t make y^e top of all perfection to consist in an absolute indifferency of Will to Light & Vnderstanding Reason & Wisedome & y^t this is y^e most glorious Liberty to be able to act irrac~onally they do not make y^e Faculty but y^e \very/ Vice of Free=will \itself allso/ to be y^e greatest Ꝑfection they make infinite \lawles & vnbounded/ Lust & irrac~onall arbitrarinesse to be y^e Supream governesse & Moderatrix of all things y^e onely Deity in y^e world

To be free frō Goodnesse & Truth is to be free to irrationall Lust & Bruitish Appetites fortuitously & contingently determining all Volitions ā it proceeds only from y^e depravac~ons of mens natures & \these/ being ^\themselves/ captivated up under y^e Lust of arbitrary Dominion y^t they make this to be their highest Liberty, Dominion & authority, whereas y^e highest Power & Liberty w^ch \Perfections/ are y^e im̄table natures of Goodnesse & Wisedome w^ch are determining Principles, they \&/ take away contingency or ἀπειρία or|&| Infinity y^e Platonists determine y^t mens est principiū necessitatis y^e Principles of perfective Necessity & God is called by y^m περας & μετρον & νομος y^e Bound measure & Law of y^e whole Vniverse his endlesse Goodnesse & Wisedome having bounded & determined y^e loose Infinitude & possibility of things in\to/ y^e best order possible & \but/ απερία or Infinitude is ^\to them/ a name of y^e greatest imperfection w^th y^m w^ch they call Darknesse, Poverty, Informosity & y^e first Evill most infinitely remote from God y^e highest Perfection Now absolute Indifferency of Will contingently determined to any thing is nothing but ἀπερία itself & therefore most unsuitable unto y^e divine nature w^ch is y^e most determinate thing in y^e world, Goodnesse & Wisedome itself measuring & bounding all things Gods will is y^e id quod oportet y^t w^ch ought to be in every thing throughout y^e whole Vniverse ^\But it will not follow frō hence as some suppose/ However we must not be so im̄dest as to conclude from hence \y^t/ because Gods Will is y^t w^ch is best in every thing y^t therefore we are \may be/ able certainly to determine from hence in all cases w^tsoever, both w^t God hath done & also w^t he will do, I say we must not presume y^t we are able w^th our shallow Vnderstandings to resolve w^t is or was absolutely y^e best in every case And \some have so fair pretended/ Ꝑhaps it was not so much of Atheism as an affectac~on of this Phyloso \a ought {illeg}Pretense to this/ modesty in some Phylosophers y^t they would banish finall causes out of n̄rall Phylosophy this seeming to imply as if we were able to comprehend y^e divine Wisedomes & reach to y^e End of all things they think^g it not proꝐ for us to make y^e Ends supposed & conjectured by us to be y^e true \Reall/ & proper causes of all Phænomena because our Vnderstandings are finite & we were not y^e first contrivers y^e Architects or Master=builders of y^e Vniverse But if we are so well able from w^t is absolutely best in itself to demonstrate infallibly w^t is de facto yⁿ we should by this \{illeg}/ determine not only whether there were any more habitable worlds yⁿ this, but also how many they be & in what form every one of y^m is & also inform us \tell vs/ exactly w^t are all y^e Lawes of Providence <47> & of y^e divine Œconomy concerning Souls after this Life -

Chap 4.

But because this is a businesse of subtill COnsiderac~on & our explication of it is different from what is found in Writings y^t have been hitherto extant concerning this Argum^t we shall again propose a sum̄ary comprehension of y^e whole doctrine concerning it & though we shall repeat w^t hath been before suggested yet it will not be w^thout a further advantage & fuller explicac~on of y^e whole, First therefore it is ^\a thing/ plain\ly/ & a thing implyed in y^e very notion of Liberum Arbitrium y^t Freewilled Beings are such who are not meerly passive in their moc~on to y^e action of Agents w^thout y^m as Inanimate Bodyes are Machins & Neurospasts w^ch are all perfectly ἑτεροκίνετα moved by something w\th/out But Freewill implies some kind of Autokinesy, w\ch/ indeed it were superfluous to menc~on, were it not for this y^t y^e greatest Champions for Necessity as well \both/ antient as|nd| modern lay their foundation here y^t all moc~on & Action in y^e Vniverse w^tsoever, is perfect Heterokinesy & y^t there is no originall Action any where or such as springs frō y^e Agent itself, but y^t it all takes its \Life &/ Beginning from some other Agent w^thout, y^e meaning whereof is y^t there is no other Being in y^e world besides Body & Matter of w^ch it is truly s^d y^t it never moves itself but w^tsoever Body is moved is moved not from any Principle of motion in itself but it is allway passive to y^e Activity of something else ^\without/ upon it And if there were no other Substance in y^e world but Body yⁿ not only Bruits but men also must be acknowledged to be nothing but meer Machins & Neuropasts

But we have showed in y^e former part of this discourse y^t there is a certain kind of Autokinesy in all Cogitative Beings w\t/soever & therefore if Bruits be not meer senslesse Machins but have Cogitac~on in y^m they must needs have some Actiō or Energy w^ch is not put into y^m from w^thout but springs frō w^thin y^mselves, y^t is, they must needs have something above Mechanicall, Motion, above Body & Matter But this simple Autokinesy w^ch is \com̄on to/ included in y^e nature of all Cogitac~on, y^e action ^\& {illeg}/ of Cogitative Beings \cogitatiō it/ being \is/ internall or ^\Actiō/ in y^e essentiall profundity of y^t y^t thinks, & not a translac~on from place to place or ^\that/ outward change of distance {illeg} is not y^t thing w^ch we are now to enquire after in w^ch y^e nature of Freewill consisteth, but |y^t| is a peculiar mo kind of self=moc~on or self=activity whereby y^t w^ch moves doth not only act from w^thin itself but also upon itself determining & ^\govourning/ com̄anding its own moc~on, Sensitive Appetites, Passions & Hormæ w^ch are com̄only s^d to be spontaneous, have no power over y^mselves to stop or excite their own moc~on ^\& Come/ to retard or accelerate their Force no more yⁿ a stone flung out of sling hath, but are meer swinges & impetuosityes of Nature. By our own inward sense we are conscious to ourselves y^t these things invade us & obtrude y^mselves upon us & y^t they are so far frō having any governm^t of y^t higher principle in us Wherefore concerning these Hormæ, Appetites & Passions y^t in y^e \a/ late Book de Homine y^t may in some sense be acknowledg'd to be true Neꝗ appetitus noster, neꝗ fuga nostra causa est quare hoc vel illud cupimus vel fugimus h. e. non ideo potuimus quia volumus, nec fugimus quia nobimus sed quia tū appetitio tum aversio ab ipsis rebus cupitis vel exosis generata est, sequiturꝗ necessario præconceptum jucunditatis molestiæꝗ ab ipsis objectis adfuturæ, Quid enim - <48> An esurimus, cæteraꝗ naturæ necessaria appetimus quia volumus? An fines sitis et Cupidinas voluntariæ sunt^l appetentibus agere quidem libero esse potest ipsum autem appetere non potest Not as if this were true in y^e Authors sense y^t all these Animall Appetites (w^ch ^\{illeg}/ he calls Volitions) are nothing else but meer corporeall passion from y^e objects w^thout a locall motions mechanically produced For we have shewd before y^t in bodily sense itself & therefore much more in all APpetites & Passions there is something besides y^e Activity of y^e objects w^thout or locall moc~on frō y^m upō us, neither is sensitive conception y^e meer action of y^e thing conceived & y^e passion of y^e Conceiver there being in it besides y^e local mocon from w^thout to w^ch y^e Sentient is but passive, Fancy, appearance, perception w^ch is a moc~on of another kind & such not a locall moc~on or translac~on frō place to place as this Author ridiculously conceits all Cogitac~on to be; but a moc~on of a different kind, a motion y^t ariseth frō w^thin y^e sentient itself w^ch implies it not to be Body but incorporeall Substance. But because these - mocons do necessarily arise upon occasion of y^e corporiall moc~ons made upō externall Bodyes & because they cannot bound measure & moderate our\them/selves therefore we are no thought to be ^\so much to be/ y^e cause of y^m ourselves as Nature i in us; Wherefore it being supposd y^t Bruits have no other principle of Action in y^m yⁿ such particular Appetites & Hormetick Inclinac~ons w^ch are as it were by nature obtruded on y^m it seems consequent hereupon y^t though they may be s^d often to have a liberty to do w^t they have an appetite unto, wⁿ there is no externall impedim^t to hinder y^m, yet they cannot be s^d to have a liberty over their Appetites y^mselves nor a Power of determining their own Actions w^ch is y^t w^ch is com̄only meant by Liberum Arbitrium & they cannot properly be s^d to be y^e cause of their own Actions as men are so as to deserve Blame or Com̄endac~on, for w^t they do, it being not so much y^mselves y^t act as nature y^t acts in y^m.

Wherefore Freewilled Beings are not only elevated above y^e condicon of meer corporeall Machins w^ch y^e also y^e lowest Cogitative Beings are but they have also a higher Autokinesy & self-activity in y^m, yⁿ y^t of Brutish sense or Appetite, they being certain loosned & released things y^t feel y^mselves to be something by y^mselves, able to wield & turn y^mselves, to govern & dispose y^mselves & their own Actions W^ch is a certain higher emersion of Life above dull Bruitish fancy & appetite y^e latter whereof may be resembled to a straight line y^t is allway running outwards & forwards w^thout any Flexive turning in upon itself but y^e former to a reflected line or circle it being a certain Life y^t doth as it were return ^\into/ rebound & reeche upon itself y^e former is a shallow superficiall Life, but y^e latter such a Life as hath a certain inward & profundity in it, A Freewilled Being is not single but double, present w^th itself, w^thin itself & superiour to itself, acting upon itself, govourning & com̄anding itself & holding itself as it were in its own hand, it is a thing emancipated & manumitted from natures servitude & becomes sui Juris something of itself, its own {illeg} & at his own disposall y^t can act by & frō itself & is in a - peculiar sense αρχὴ καὶ ἀιτία πράξεων a principle & cause of Action in y^e world so y^t Acting & y^e consequences of it are imparted to it as y^e cause of it All inanimate Beings \Bodies/ are plainly nothing else but severall Limbs or members of nature y^t have no Activity at all in y^mselves for though some attribute Life to y^e whole corporeall Vniverse & would not have it to be a <49> Cadaverous thing or dead Mechanism yet it is only one com̄on plastick Life w^ch is supposed by y^m to act & form y^e whole corporeall Vniverse so as y^t all y^e particular parts of it taken by y^mselves are notw^thstanding utterly devoid of any activity And Bruits - though they have a certain Life of their own not only plasticall but sensitive whereby they are conscious to y^mselves of their - own moc~on yet they are not quite released from natures Bondage & servitude, they have not such an emersion of Life in y^m whereby they can feel y^mselves something of y^mselves, comprehend y^mselves, {illeg}ield & turn y^mselves, but are as it were in a state of pupillage in a state of \vnder Natures/ Gardianship w^ch do not act any thing by y^mselves, nor are accomptable for what they do, but nature is only accomptable for their Actions. These differ frō Freewill'd beings in a manner as y^e Zoophyta or plant Animals differ from other living Creatures y^t have liberty to move up & down wheresoever they please for though y^e former seem to have some sense & Vitality yet they continue fast rooted in y^e earth & cannot remove from y^e place where they are fixed & it is generally conceivd y^t Bruit Animalls though elevated above y^e condicen of Machins so y^t they can exert bodyly moc~on from y^m yet they are in a manner fastned to their - Mother nature as y^e Plant Animalls to y^e Earth being not Masters of their own Activity {illeg} or else they may be resembled to humane \Foetus/ Embrios in y^e Mothers womb who though they have some sense of their own yet they live as it were by y^e Life of y^e mothers with whom they are continued & w^th whose passions they sympathize The Embrio in y^e womb tyed by y^e Navell strings to y^e Mother is for y^t time accompted but part or piece of y^e Mother but after it hath broken loose out of those dark cloisters & y^e bands wherew^th it was tyed to y^e womb are cut in pieces it is no longer part of y^e Mother but something by itself So Bruits are like Embrios living in nature{illeg} womb or lap & those particular Appetites & Inclinac~ons y^t they have in y^m may be s^d in some sense to be rather Natures Activity yⁿ their own, but Freewilled Beings are like Infants brought forth into y^e world & broken loose frō y^e dark & narrow cloisters of their Mother Nature having their Navell strings cut, freed from y^e narrownesse & bondage of Natures \{illeg}/ Activity & now something of y^mselves & at their own dispose & therefore differ as much from Bruits \as/ a young Lamb|kin| or Kind y^t wantonly sports frisking up & down in a pasture differs frō itself wⁿ it was a young Foetus or Embrio tyed \vp/ in y^e dark womb. Freewilld Beings are like adult Persons brought out of y^e state of Pupillage from under Natures Tuition & Guardianship in w^ch they could not do any act of their own y^t was valid in Law or might justly be accompted theirs & manumitted into a state of Liberty & put under their own Governm\t/ Actors by y^mselves & their own men κάριοι πράξεων Masters of their own Actions not servants to Nature ^\& {illeg}/ but Free -

For y^e better explicating of w^ch Faculty we found it necessary to decline y^e vulgar Psicology w^ch first divides y^e soul into sensitive & raconal & yⁿ in y^e rationall makes only those two Facultyes of Vnderstanding & - Will This Hypothesis being not only insufficient to solve y^e Phænomenon of y^e τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν but also many other Phænomna of y^e soul for according to this Psicology y^e or ruling Principle in y^e Soul must either be a necessary Vnderstanding necessarily determining all Volition or else a perfectly blind & fortuitous Will must Ꝑside in it governing y^e Vnderstanding itself in it \&/ its exercise obiect & intention & determining all actions alike ie. y^e governour of y^e whole man must be given to a blind & fortuitous thing wherefore in stead of y^t Psicology {illeg} this other Hypothesis of distributing \{illeg}/ y^e Whole Soul & its Powers ^\are distributed/ into the dichotomy first of simple & necessary nature under w^ch are comprehended severall Faculties higher or lower ^\{illeg}/ & yⁿ of reduplicate self-activity For there being in y^e humane soul different Congruities higher & lower & a multiplicity of Capacities & Powers, {illeg} besides superiour & inferiour Reason & y^e speculative Vnderstanding many particular Appetites & Passions in y^e Animall y^t nature y^t often clash w^th one another there must of necessity be in y^e Soul one com̄on Focus or course in w^ch all these lines will \may/ meet, some one thing in w^ch all this diversity is recollected & knit up together, something y^t is conscious of all y^e cogitative Powers of y^e Soul (for y^e Plastick & Plantick\all/ ones (if there be any such) belong not to his Cognizance) of all Congruities & Capacities higher & lower, w^ch same thing will also wield, guide & steer y^e whole Soul - having y^e govournm^t & managem^t of it in its own hand; arbitrate all difference & determine all strife & discord in it. Now this can be no other yⁿ y^e whole Soul reduplicated upon itself, w^ch being as it were w^thin itself, comꝐhending itself & holding itself in its own hand hath a sui potestas a Power over it self & can determine & turn itself this way & y^t way This is y^e head summity & top in all those Beeings y^t are - called Freewilled, y^t is, Self-powerfull, this is y^t w^ch holds y^e whole frame & Machin of y^e Soul (if I may so call it) cohere together & makes it move & act coherently & consistently & therefore wⁿ this is relaxated or consopited into a langour (as it seems to be in sleep) all y^e other strings of y^e Soul play'd upon w^thout it makes no musick or harmony but thoughts prove absurdly \in/cohærent w^th one another. This is y^e Arbitrator of all differences y^e Vmpire of all Controversies & y^t where y^e ultimate defusion of all things is made This is y^t where our Personality is seated, it is y^e ἀυτὸ ἐκαστοι in everyone y^t w^ch is properly called we ourselves, for there are many things in us y^t are ours but are not We ^\o^rselves/ We have in us Animall Appetites & lower inclinac~ons as also dictates of Honessty & Conscience but we - are neither this nor y^t, otherwise yⁿ as by this self=active Power of y^e Soul we determine ourselves \to {illeg}/ y^t w^ch is concocted into y^e Soul reduplicated self=comprehensive & selfpowerfull, & y^t w^ch by this we form ourselves into, is our very selves & nothing else whatsoever morall disposition is lodged here denominates y^e whole man to be such This determines all y^e passive Capability of every mans nature & makes him to be w^t he is This precides in forms & actuates y^e whole Soul & all other things in it <51> are but {illeg} to it This is y^e whole Soul so collected & knit up together into itself hanging lite & loose, hovering & suspense acting upon itself & determining itself being nimbly self=flexible - this way & y^t way.

But to speak more particularly of it there are two properties - chiefly to be taken notice off in it Firstly y^t it is self comprehensive

|A| 2\ly/ y^t is self=active & self=powerfull |+| first I say it is self=comprehensive, y^t is, it is conscious of y^e severall Congruities in y^e Soul - higher & lower, y^t of particular ^\Animall/ Appetites of inferiour Reason & of y^e τὸ θειον y^e divine principlle in us as also of y^e superiority of y^e one ro y^e \of these one an/ other, conscious of its own power of putting forth & intending itself more or lesse, of \{illeg}/ {illeg} & turning y^e whole Soul of determin|^|ing Assents & actions |^| & lastly conscious of its own \volition &/ Action & consequently ^|hath| hereupon a gratefull or ungratefull sense w^thin itself is \being/ either pleased, or |B| displeased, satisfied or dissatisfied w^thin itself |B| This is y^t interiour Faculty of y^e Soul commonly called συνειδησις or Conscience in w^ch y^e Soul knowes w^th itself, i.e. takes notice of all y^t is w^thin itself & of its owne Actions & also judging \allso/ thereupon inwardly either blaming or approving itself, \accusing or excusing/ There is indeed some kind thing of Consciousnesse more or lesse in all Cogitations, y^t is, sense ^\in all/ Energies of y^e Soul above y^e Plastick Powers & therefore some conclude y^e essence of Cogitation to consist in Consciousnesse but this is ^\another thing it is not that Consciousnes/ one peculiar Power or Faculty of y^e Soul most inward to it whereby it reflects upon \on/ its volitions & Actions This is y^e Conscience is y^e com̄on sense of y^e whole Soul neither ought it to be restrained to religious or Morall things only, but it is a generall or universall Power & therefore as there are two degrees of Liberum arbitrium in - us according to y^e twofold \degrees of/ good of \in/ our Nature Animall & Morall so besides y^e Morall Conscience there is an Animall & Civill Conscience ^\aswell as a Morall/ for συνειδησις Conscience & Self=comprehension is a power y^t pervades y^e whole Soul belonging to y^t w^ch is y^e head & top of it.

Secondly besides Self=comprehension & self=consciousness it is self=active & self=powerfull w^ch consists chiefly in two things first a Power y^t y^e Soul hath over its whole self of puting forth, intending or exerting itself more or lesse, w^ch is \its/ a Power ^\y^t is {illeg}/ over y^e passive Capability of its own nature, its Power of actuating its own Possibility, w^ch is exerercised severall wayes first in self=recollection & self=attention 2^ly in \Particular/ Considerac~on whether speculatives or Practicall y^e latter of w^ch former of w^ch is com̄only called Contemplac~on, y^e latter deliberac~on 3^ly in exerting a vigorous force for y^e suppressing y^e lower Inclinac~ons & promoting y^e Soul towards y^e higher Principle & lastly in executive Activity In all these y^e Soul ^\Redoubled &/ self=comprehensive hath a Power over itself to intend actuate & put forth itself more or lesse

Another \further/ Branch of this self=active Power is consequent upon y^e former, \& y^t is/ of determining y^e Assents <52> in y^e Volitions \y^t Exercise of Cogitatio~/ & y^e Actions of y^e whole man ||by means wherof y^e soul is not a Servant to its own Actions but ^ master over them -

|A| This Power y^t y^e Soul as self=comprehensive self=intending & self=exerting itself more or lesse hath of determining y^e exercise of y^e Understanding, & all y^e Actions of Life is y^t w^ch is com̄only called Will concerning y^e moc~on whereof there are severall different Apprehensions for some call all Appetites & spontaneous Inclinac~ons w^tsoever by y^e name of Will according to whom to act freely & to act spontaneously is one & y^e same |tho| Others would restrain y^e name of Will only to y^e last prevaling Appetite y^t is wⁿ there is an Alternac~on of App different Appetites & Desires struggling together, or Hopes & Feares y^t w^ch is strongest & therefore Ꝑvalent over y^e rest they call by y^e name of Will Others will have y^t w^ch is called Will to be such an Affection as is y^e ^\Necessary/ result of ^|Necessary| Reason & necessary Vnderstanding y^t as Hormæ & Appetites depend upon Fancy in Bruits (w^ch latter seems to be in order of Nature before y^e other) so they say Will is a Rac~onall Appetite & Inclinac~on i.e. a ne|B|cecessary result from a necessary Vnderstanding |B| What \Now these {illeg}/ the words Reason & Vnderstanding are equivocall as was before showed they sometimes signified|ing| nothing but y^e dictate of Honesty & if Will were allwayes y^e result of this Reason then there could be no - dishonest & sinfull Volic~on, there could be no Voluntary act ag^st Conscience & Honesty, (for this \which/ is superiour Reason) sometimes by Reason & Vnderstanding is meant y^e Logicall discursive Power, speculating & deliberating inferring a Conclusions from certain Ꝑmises & if y^t affection & inclinac~on to Action y^t necessarily results from hence be y^e only true moc~on of Will ^\it would follow from Hence y^t/ yⁿ we could not Willingly rac~oncinate, speculate or liberate concerning this or y^t whereas y^e sense of y^t is gon all is acknowledged to be true w^ch y^e Scholastick writers expresse in these termes, y^t y^e Vnderstanding is determin'd by y^e Will both to its exercise & object, we being sensibe w^thin ourselves of a certaine Free=power y^t we have over our Cogitac~ons whereby we can determine ourselves to speculate & deliberate more or lesse concerning this or y^t, Now y^t Will y^t exercises such an Imperium over y^e Vnderstanding as to place to as to its exercise upon its particular objects cannot well be thought to be y^e consequent of y^t Vnderstanding itself, but something else in y^e Soul y^t is more generall & comprehensive yⁿ y^e whole Now all these severall \Inward/ Apprehensions concerning Will \alike/ tend to this y^t there is no Faculty of self=power in us & nether \liberty/, but necessary spontaniety in humane Actions; for if there be no other Will in us {illeg} Necessary spontaniety whether consisting frō {illeg} \it will be nothing but a {illeg} Necessary/ Reason & y^e Vnderstanding it is plain y^t there can be to such Power \thing/ in us as Power over ourselves or Actions, no internall selfflexibility but y^e whole Soul must be as stiff & unwieldy as any senslesse <53> corporeall Machin But y^e true noc~on of Will is this y^t it is y^e whole Soul reduplicated & self=comprehensive, conscious of all its Congruities higher & lower, its Power & Capacities y^t can actuate & intend itself more or lesse & wield & turn all y^e Powers of y^e Soul & determining its own Cogitations & actions

And this is y^e τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν {illeg} y^t w^ch hath y^e Principatus in y^e Soul, y^e ruling or swaying Principle. This word ἡγεμονικὸν \& y^e Notiō of it/ was first introducd by y^e Stoicks who were but bad Phylosophers & had \did/ not well \& clearly/ setled their own noc~ons, And we observe y^t there hath been an equivocac~on in y^e use of this word \aswell/ amongst y^e Antients as well as Moderns For some by y^e τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν understand y^t w^ch ought to rule or bear sway in us w^ch is y^t right Reason \or superior Reas/ y^t is taken for y^e same thing as Honesty Again it may be taken for y^t w^ch doth actually sway or bear rule ^\& bear sway/ in us & in this sense I conceive it ought to be taken wⁿ it is made a controversy w^t is y^e τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν of y^e Soul y^e τὸ κυριῦον y^e Principatus & y^e Principl|a|le Animæ for all these words are used by y^e Antients, not w^t ought to rule for y^t is a thing out of Question but w^t ^\kind of thing in vs/ it is y^t doth actually rule & sway in us to w^ch all actions are to be imputed & therefore bad as well as Good, y^t by w^ch y^e whole man ^\de facto/ is govourned & this I take to be y^t w^ch y^e Stoicks really intended by y^t w^ch they call y^e τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν w^ch Plotinus & all other Greeks avoiding all |y^t| ambiguity of y^e other word chose rather to call y^e τὸ ἡγεμονουν, y^t w^ch doth renum potiri in y^e Soul, actually rule & sway But y^e Stoicks as I s^d was bad Phylosophers & therefore gave but a confused definic~on of it as Diogenes in Zeno tells us P. 202 y^t y^e ruling & principall part of y^e Soul or y^e Regale Animæ is y^t in w^ch y^e Phantasies & Appetites are made & from whence Reason is sent forth w^ch is seated in y^e heart & as Plutarch interprets y^e Stoicks call y^e highest part of y^e Stoi Soul y^e ἡγεμονικὸν y^t w^ch amongst other things makes assents for as we shall show afterwards y^e judging Power belongs to it |X|as well as y^e willing \X/ Wherefore we affirm y^t y^e τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν or rather y^e τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν \{illeg} & y^e τὸ κυριῶον/ y^e actually swaying Power ov^r y^e whole Soul is y^t w^ch we have described

y^e Soul reduplicated self=comprehensive & self=active w^ch Stoicks made to be a distinct Power by itself y^t w^ch can stir up & turn itself this way or y^t way & make itself w^t it will

But there is one thing y^t belongeth to this ἡγεμονικὸν of y^e Soul ^\y^t is not com̄only takē notice of/ y^t it doth not only will & com̄and Action, but also judge assent & opine & y^t not only in practicalls but also in Theoreticalls for judgm^t doth not belong to y^e perceiving Power in us there being often false judgm^ts & Nature or n̄rall perception can never erre, but it is we ourselves y^t erre & w^t this ἡμεῖς or we ourselves is hath been sufficiently declared The perception of y^e Vnderstanding is something in us or of ours but it is not properly we ourselves but Judgm^t is y^e act of y^e whole Soul y^t w^ch is self=comprehensive & self=active & nothing passes thorow y^e whole Soul but it hath a stroke here, it must have something done correspondently to it in y^t w^ch is properly we ourselves, \or els it {illeg} it comes to nothing/ y^e n̄rall Vnderstanding can only perceive or not=perceive, it is capable of nothing but either Knowledge or Ignorance, Error & false Judgm^t is a thing of our - own w^ch ourselves cas superadde & cast in over & above to something of Nature in us This perhaps will be more easily granted in - such things as we have no clear Ꝑcepc~ons of either way - but our n̄rall Vnderstandings is doubtfull conc~ning y^m y^t we \casually/ attending to some Ꝑbability either on one side or other may determine our own assent \this or/ y^t way, but in ^\ether/ thing clearly Ꝑceived & w^ch there can be no doubt off as com̄on Noc~ons it might seem y^t there is no other judgm^t of y^m but only Concepc~on & Intellection But y^e case is otherwise for we being not essentially Knowledge but something w^ch Ꝑtakes of Knowledge & Vnderstanding are by this meanes liable to this duplicity of having Judgm^t & Assent besides y^e bare Ꝑception & Intellection whereas there is no such thing in y^t w^ch is Ꝑfectly wise & knowing \or Intellect/ or Mind & Knowledge itself. I say Soules y^t have but a participac~on of νους or Intellect in y^m have besides their imꝐfect knowing Power a Judging & Assenting Power also, w^ch belongs to y^t w^ch comprehends y^e whole Soul, nay there is hardly any thing w^ch we do so clearly Vnderstand as y^t we may not \ether/ upon this considerac~on y^t we have often found our selves deceived in such things as we did seem to have clearly understood, or from a surmise y^t it is possible our Faculties may be made false though we cannot judge it to be absolutely false yet we may suspend our assent to it But though we do necessarily assent to y^e truth of some com̄on noc~ons as y^t y^e same thing cannot be & not be wⁿ we attend to - <55> nothing else w^ch may cause a doubt or schepsis, yet it doth not - follow from hence y^t this Judgm^t considerd former|al|ly as such doth therefore belong to y^e necessary Vnderstanding because - we do in like manner necessarily will & nill some things The - Willing Power itself is not perfectly indifferent to all things any more yⁿ y^e \as shall be shewed/ Judging Power for \but/ both of y^m alike are sometimes necessary, neither indeed can there be any n̄rall Power ^\or active Faculty/ y^t is universally indifferent to all things in y^e whole world & hath no propension at all any more yⁿ there can be a Being w^thout any determinated Nature Now as there is some Good such y^t (to speak according to vulgar language) y^e Will cannot choose but imbrace & sence Evill such as y^t it cannot choose but shun & avoid in like manner there are some Truths so clearly perceived by y^e n̄rall & necessary Vnderstanding as y^t y^e Soul redoubled & self=comprehensive cannot choose but assent to y^e same so long as it attends only to y^e evidence of y^e thing in itself & takes notice of no other reason or considerac~on y^t might tend to weaken y^t assent or to beget a schepticall suspense in it as in other things where - there is a mixture of Good & Evill together of Congruity & Discongruity we have a latitude & liberty of Willing or not Willing so in doutfull cases & ^ⁱⁿ such ^\things/ as we have not clear & distinct Conceptions of their Truth or Falshood there we do uncertainly Judge & assent one way or other attending to some Ꝑbability y^t is on either side ^\consistently/ extending ourselves therein further yⁿ necessary nature & beyond clear perception & therefore frequently changing our opinions & Judgm^ts & from hence Error ariseth But though Error do often attend \{illeg}/ y^e exercise of this Autexousious Judging Power in speculative things beyond clear Ꝑception & whereof we have not Mathematicall Evidence yet notw^thstanding y^e Faculty is good in itself & it is highly necessary y^t in such Beings as we are whose Knowledge is unꝐfect & w^ch have an absolute certainty but of so very few things there should be such a Judgm^t \Power/ of extending our Assent & Judgm^t beyond our Vnderstanding Not y^t temerarious Judging or assenting to any thing indifferently as true or false is any n̄rall Power or Ꝑfectiō any more ^\thē thē/ temerarious indifferent & irrac~onal Willing is Mor y^t this opining Power should so busily & pragmatically interpose itself in every thing where there is no need of determining our assent either way no consequence of Life depending thereupon as it doth in some Persons who though they scarcly knew, y^t is, clearly Ꝑceive any thing at all, it will judge & determine every thing in y^e whole Vniverse thereby most frequently erring & never thinking true but by chance For there are many speculative Opinions upon w^ch huge moments of Life depend & yet very few if any in y^e whole world have any Mathematicall certainty either way in w^ch notw^thstanding imꝐtiall Reason discovers greater Ꝑbabilities one way yⁿ another & it is much more agreeable to y^e interest of Vertue & morality to hold one way yⁿ another here it is a true naturall Power w^ch y^e Soul hath of determining its assent & Judgm^t beyond its Vnderstanding as for example to y^e existence of a God or Providence; y^e Immortality of y^e Soul & future rewards & Punishments <56> for by this meanes ^\we \nature/ make|s| there is/ a supplement \made/ to y^e imꝐfection of our nature & y^e defectienesse of our Knowledge & this is y^t noble Power of Faith w^ch |y^t| in y^e holy Oracles are \is/ so highly extolled, w^ch is y^e really extending our Assents beyond clear Reason & evident comprehensions & there because there is something autexousious in it therefore Men are often blamed for y^e want of it, though indeed we are blamed also for speculative errors many times upon another accōpt because y^t things are such as y^t by ^\duly/ intending our Vnderstanding in a way of study considerac~on & meditation we might have arrived to a clear Knowledge & comprehension of y^e Truth of thē

But if y^e judging, opining & assenting Power ^\as to y^e truth & falshood/ of speculative things properly belong not to simple nature in us but to we ourselves or to y^e Soul reduplicated or self=comprehensive w^ch often acts contingently, yⁿ much more doth it in things Practicall i.e. concerning y^e Good & Evill of things & w^t is to be done or not done in Ꝑticular cases of Life, for it would be very strange if y^e same thing in us should not judge y^t willeth, but one thing in us should practically judge & another thing will & y^t y^t willeth should be indifferent to follow y^t y^t Judgeth & this should be y^e Liberty & Perfection of a man not to be necessarily determined by his own last practicall Judgm^t & to will w^thout any Judgm^t at all of w^t one \he/ willeth.

Good in generall is such a thing as y^t \though it be most talkt of of any thing in y^e world yet/ few men know any thing at all of it clearly & certainly for whereas y^e chief Good ought to be y^e measure of all other Goods, there hath not been more controversy nor uncertainty of Judgm^t ^\about of any thing/ in y^e whole world yⁿ it & Aristotle tells us y^t mankind have but ὁιον μάντομά τι a certain raticinac~on of it, Wherefore vitall Instinct & \or/ y^e instinct of morality is y^t w^ch we are \owe/ much more guided \to here/ by here yⁿ any logicall or mathematicall Reason, but there being two different vitall Instincts in us higher & lower Animall & divine y^e determinac~on of our Judgm^t & Will to this or y^t is an autexousious thing, it is not necessary nature & Vnderstanding y^t determines us either way, but y^e τὸ μίσον or middle things in y^e Soul y^e Soul comprehensive of all \its/ congruities higher & lower ^\partic. y^e / & by a certain inward sense distinguishing betwixt y^m^\i.e. between & / w^ch \and/ being self=powerfull doth judgingly & willingly determine itself to either, either, promoting itself to y^e higher or sinking down to y^e lower. Wherefore y^t of Aristotle is here most true y^t we are ἄιτιον πῶς τῆς φαντασίας we are in a manner y^e causes of y^e Phantasies & appearances of Good & τὸ φαινομενον ἀγαθὸν καὶ βέλτιρον y^e seeming Good & Best is not a thing \altogether/ imposd upon us by necessary nature & which we are wholy passive to, but we ourselves contribute something \{illeg}/ towards it nature begins & proposes variety to our choice exhibiting y^e Phantasies of two different Goods ^\ & inchoately/ but having given us a certain Power over y^e passive capability of our nature leaves us to act hereupon, & to determine <57> {illeg} Phantasy of Good to ourselves accordingly as we exert ourselves more or lesse & so to compose y^e strife to end y^e competition or distinction of nature this way or y^t way But in these colluctations & disputes between y^e higher & lower parts of y^e Soul as they are determinedly called, there is much wavering of y^e judging Power many {illeg} alternations & reciprocac~ons of incompleat practicall Judgments ^\this way & that way/ before y^e determination & y^e issue at last is according as y^e soul more or lesse exerting itself doth ^\at last finally & {illeg}/ hasten & acquiesce ^\{illeg} reson/ this way or y^t way we are not here passively determined to Good \to Good/ by a necessitating Light ^\necessitating this/ for yⁿ \{illeg}/ there would have been no laborious conatous in it, but by a self=exerted force Nature is ^\here/ distracted between two different Lights, y^e Light of two vitall Instincts, higher & lower, & logicall Reason hath little to do here but as we exercise y^t Power w^ch God & Nature hath given us over our own passive Capability & exert ourselves more or lesse so is y^e victory decided either way.

Here may all by frequent judging & acting contract a certain habituall Light or disposition to Judge this way or y^t way in Morall things - i.e. either a true or a false light, For y^t Ꝑticular actions do by little & little contribute every one of y^m something towards habits of Judging & \afterward/ willing is evident; y^e|The| Soul reduplicated & self=powerful tutcheth every thing as it were w^th pitchy fingers, every \fore/action leaving behind it a ^\little clammy/ disposition to - y^e same again w^ch by many reiterated & repeated Actions growes up at lenghth into y^e strength of a \Con/firm|ed| habit.

Now because this Judging Power in morall things is \in/ Ꝑtly autexousious there we are exhorted by y^e wisest & gravest Phylosophers to take great care of this \it/ & to watch over it continually & to govourn it aright i|I|t is a passage allready \before/ quoted \out of/ by Antoninus &c reverence the opining i.e. the assenting & Judging Power ^\concerning Good & Evill/ for all lies in this, y^t this Hegemonicon or ruling Power \Principle/ entertain no opinion y^t is disagreeable to nature & y^e right frame of a rationall Animall This is y^t Power w^ch is called \by others/ το χρηστικον ταις φαντασίους y^t w^ch can differently use y^e \lower/ Phantasies \{illeg}/ y^t we have of things according to y^e lower Animall Life & y|e|ither yield to y^m or master y^m & bear up itself ag\st/ y^m, & to this purpose Epictetus exhorts \vs/ so much to take heed \look to/ of our ^\{illeg} dogmata/ dogmata as not being things necessarily obtruded upon us but w^ch we have some Power over.

In like manner as to Actions concerning only y^e Animall Life & our own private Vtility, y^t w^ch Judgeth is not y^e necessary Vnderstanding only & clear Knowledge, for yⁿ we should never determine our Judgm^t in doubtfull cases; but it is something w^ch extends itself further yⁿ certain Knowledge It is plain y^t we make different Judgm^ts of - things as we intend ourselves more or lesse in considerac~on & deliberation he y^t \vpon y^e first/ as soon as he takes notice of a specious capability of Reason, for something to be done will presently determine <58> rashly ^\his Assent/ thereunto, will vsually \for y^e most part/ act otherwise yⁿ of suspending his Assent at first, he use mature deliberac~on before he resolve. Wherefore here is one contingency of our Judgm\ts/ arising from more or lesse deliberating w^ch is ἐφ' ἑμῖν in our own Power & belongs to y^e Soul as self=comprehensive & self active Another contingent uncertainty there is next wⁿ there seems to be equall probabilities on both sides in w^ch case we do venturously & stocastically & not w^thout contingency determine our Judgment to this or y^t. Judgm^t in us is not y^e result of & conclusion of y^e necessary Vnderstanding for yⁿ all Judgm^ts in life would be certain Knowledges of w^t was best to be done ^\But/ The practicall Judging it over in us is\ments in vs in vs are/ much of y^e same nature w\th/ forensick Judgm\ts/ decisions of Right y^e Interpretac~ons of Law & Determinac~ons of Controversies made in courts of Judicature, w^ch is \are/ not allwayes y^e same thing w^th Law & Justice itself because there may be false Judgm^ts & \w/rong decrees made & yet they must allwayes have some specious probability, or pretence of Law & Justice, wherefore they are conjecturall determinac~ons y^t have a mixture of Law & \all/ arbitrarinesse together wh^ch whether right or wrong must bear sway in y^e respective Comon=wealth till contrary Judgm^ts reverse y^m. The Lawes wⁿ obscure or defective must be applyed, interpreted & reked out by y^e living & speaking Judge in particular cases ^\because Justice itselfe cannot governe/ This in y^t little com~on=wealth of mans soul y^e n̄rall Vnderstanding & certaine Knowledge is y^e Law of Justice & Rule by w^ch it should be govourned in its Actions but this being to us imꝐfect & not extending itself thorowly to all Cases y^e Soul as self=comprehensive & self=powerfull is y^e Lex loquens y^e living Judge & Interpreter w^ch ^\in doubtfull/ venturously & stocastically ^\not without some {illeg}/ concludes in - doubtfull cases whose decisions notw^thstanding allwayes bear sway; till they be reversed by others, contrary thereunty This Judging Power {illeg} {illeg} certain \further {illeg} Imperfect/ Knowledge & in doubtfull cases adds some thing of - {illeg} its own to y^e moments of Reason & impulsive causes of Action or y^e evidence of things y^t appear on either side & so turns y^e scale thereby supplying y^e defect of naturall Knowledge & Vnderstanding by its self=determining Power; in like manner as y^e living forensick Judge supplies y^e defect of y^e dead Law & of infallible but silent Justice in Cities & Bodies Politick And this resemblance also holds good in another regard y^t as y^e forensick is Judge ^\or {illeg} Aribtrator/ is corruptible & bribable by partiall regards & private Interests, so - likewise is this Hegemonick, this ruling & Judging Power in y^e Soul obnoxious to y^e same Infirmity, Lust & Appetites often preventing & \uitiating &/ Ꝑverting its Judgm^t ag^st y^e dictate of suꝐiour & inferiour - Reason ^\{illeg}/.

This Hegemonick \Arbitriū/ of y^e Soul is not only Judging but Willing it is not one thing in us y^t Judgeth & another thing y^t wills w^thout Judging but they belong to one & y^e same, nay y^e conclusive practicall Judgm^t seems to be but one & \really/ y^e same thing w^th y^e volition as if they were <58A> two inadæquate conceptions of y^e same \one/ thing & y^e difference in y^m were not Rei but Rationis only or if they be distinguishable they are inseperable from one another, & both together make up y^t w^ch Aristotle calls or Election w^ch includes y^e last practicall Judgm^t in it But we must speak something more here concerning y^e nature of Will w^ch will also {illeg} ^\wherby we shall further/ illustrate ^\allso/ y^e nature of Judgm^t It is confessed by most Asserters of Free=will, y^t y^e Will is not free to every thing, but y^t it acteth in some things necessarily & in other things as free or having a Power over its own Actions, for w^ch cause Scholastick writers distinguish between Voluntas ut Natura & Voluntas ut Liberum Arbitrium so y^t Will & Free=will are not to be accompted termes equipollent to one another Wherefore we say y^t y^e Soul as self=comprehensive & self=active is not a thing utterly devoid of all naturality & necessity or \{illeg}/ a thing w^ch hath not other nature yⁿ to be in a perfect Indifferency to all things for this is a thing more unintelligible & impossible yⁿ y^t materia prima in Phisiologis, w^ch is defined \s^d/ to be nec quid, nec quale, nec quantum, since a passive Indifferency may be more easily conceived yⁿ an active As it is com̄only s^d y^t all moc~on is made upon something y^t all moc~on is made upon something y^t is im̄ovable so this movable & vertible principle of Free=will must needs have something firm to stand upon it must have some \fixed/ hinges fixed to turn upon it - must be founded upō something y^t is n̄rall & necessary The Will must needs have pondus aliquod a certain weight or biasse in it to incline it to moc~on No man chooseth meerly y^t he may choose & for no other Reason, nor Wills meerly y^t he may Will nor doth meerly y^t he may do - but choosing, Willing & Doing are allwayes for y^e sake of some Good both y^e beginning & End of all motion & action is something y^t is not moved but standeth unfixed W^ch Consideration may serve also by y^e way to remove an objection y^t may be made against our former Doctrine y^t Judging ^\doth/ cannot belong to y^e Vnderstanding as necessary nature but to y^e Soul as reduplicated & self=active, because it will \seem to/ follow from thence y^t therefore we may Judge what we will in every case, For it is not so much as true of o^r Will in this sense y^t it wills w^t it wills ^ in every case ^\& because it wills/ or y^t it hath nothing to incline it to will any thing nor to determine it to w^t it wills but only its will or y^t it wills for no other cause but y^t it may will

What therefore is y^t to wit y^e Will is by nature necessarily determin'd unto w^ch therefore it is not under y^e Dominion of it as they com̄only speak or ^\{illeg}/ w^ch y^e slipperinesse of y^e Will cannot make it|self| uncertain to And here some Phylosophers \& Theologers/ determine y^t besides Good in Generall w^ch is y^e formally Reason of all Appetibility y^e Will is allwayes necessary to y^e sum̄um Bonum but y^t it is its Ꝑfection to be free, & contingent to all other inferiour Goods w^tsoever |Now| because it is evident by experience y^t y^e Will is not necessary to y^e Bonum Honestatis y^e Good of Honesty or vertue for otherwise there could be no such thing as Sin or Vice therefore these Theologers boldly conclude y^t Vertue is not y^e chief Good of Rationall Beings, but y^t this is only desired by Accident for y^e sake of Animall Pleasure & Jucundity w^ch is y^e {illeg} <59> of all Goods nay they adde y^t sensuall & carnall Pleasure is a greater Good, yⁿ y^t of Vertue & according to order of Nature is to be desir'd before it Ipsum Bonum quod Honestū dicitur quodq; rationis superioris objectum est not appetitur ab homine pari et æquali amoris gradu cum bono delectabili sed tanquam medium solum quo ad delectabilis illius Boni primi fruitionem pervenitur Amatur enim eo tantum fine ut Bonum delectabile tanquam prœmium Amoris ^\per illud/ obtineatur, quod ipsum certissimū atq; infallibile signum est sum̄um hominis Bonum esse non posse quia sum̄um est quod omnia appelunt propter se & propter quod omnia alia appeluntur W^ch Author doth not here mean y^t y^e Pleasure of Vertue is y^e highest Good but y^t Animall Pleasure distinct from it as he explains himself Deletectatio quæ ex Virtutis actione percipitur ^\per se/ non est tale Bonum in quo anima hominis acquiescit & Delectatio quæ ex Virtute et honesti studio existit postponenda est, naturæ ordine, delectationi quæ ex voluptatum carnalium commercio est Right Epicurean Doctrine if it be not worse yⁿ his as some would perswade us who have of late defended Epicurus as if his meaning was y^t w^ch \the/ Pleasure of Vertue & tranquillity of Mind arising from thence was y^e chiefest of all Goods. But Torquatus in Tully & other of y^e antients Instructe us \vs/ y^t Epicurus did not acknowledg any other Pleasures of y^e Mind yⁿ such as did some way arise from y^e Pleasures of y^e Body present, future or past But we have before proved y^t y^e Good of Honesty & Morall Rectitude w^ch in Schripture language is is y^e highest & most soveraign Good of all Intellectuall Beings & y^t Pleasure of it w^ch some will needs distinguish from it \y^e thing itself/ & place Happinesse in it & not in y^e thing itself as Aristotle observeth is no adventitious Appendix to it distinct from it but meerly y^e sense & fruition of y^e thing itself W^ch if it be true yⁿ it must be granted y^t y^e Sum̄um Bonum is such a thing as y^s though we cannot Ꝑperly say y^t y^e Will hath a freedom & Liberty to it as if this were a perfection to be a Lord over it yet it is so loose towards it as y^t it may degenerate & be alienated from it & instead thereof court some faint & weak shadowes of it. This seeming to be an imperfection y^t belongs to all freewilled Beings & perhaps to all intellectuall Creatures w^tsoever y^t they are alienable from y^e highest Good as Origen hath determined y^t there is no Being im̄utably Good & Wise & absolutely impeccable in his own nature but God alone, all other things being - not good by nature but by participacon only & therefore by Freewill or self=active exertion And here by y^e way we may observe y^t this is no small sign y^t men are now under a lapsed state y^t they are sunk into so deep an oblivion of their true sum̄um Bonum as to think y^t Honesty is a Good only κατὰ συμβέβικος to use Aristotles language & no otherwise desireable yⁿ for y^e sake of some sensuall Pleasure y^t will be annexed to it as a reward y^t is, y^t happinesse consisteth only in y^e Animall Life For this \w^ch/ is supposed by a late Author to be a principle so necessary as y^t y^e true nature of Free=will cannot be explain'd w^thout it But it might be y^e same argum^t be demonstrated y^t Animall Delight & Pleasure is not y^e highest Good because y^e greatest bodily torments together w^th Death consequent thereupon are often <60> submitted to for y^e sake of Honesty as a greater Good, wⁿ inconsistent w^th & though some X^tians are apt to think y^t this \it/ is never done but only for y^e avoiding of greater & eternall torments & y^e obtaining of eternall sensuall Pleasures after this life yet y^e stories of Heathen times shew'd higher examples of bodily pains & Death being - submitted to & contemned in comparison w^th y^e beauty & excellency of Vertue it being not hard \difficult/ to fing amongst y^m such as have really born witnesse to y^t proverbiall ^\speech/ truth amongst y^m mentioned by Aristotle y^t it is better to die honestly yⁿ to live dishonestly & y^t y^t it is better to suffer & till \iniury/ yⁿ to do it.

But if y^e will be not n̄rall & necessary to y^e highest Good yⁿ it seems it is not necessary to any thing yⁿ it can have no firm Land to stand upon but will be like y^e floating Winds wandering w^thout End Nay rather there can be no such thing as Will at all, no desire nor - motion if there be no certain mark or scope to be aimed at, no - fixed centre to rest upon, to w^ch therefore we reply y^t Goodnesse in generall or confusedly apprehended under y^e notion of Congruity \is y^t/ w^ch all n̄rall as well as voluntary \& Free/ is carried out towards & Discongruity in generall w^ch it hath a n̄rall aversac~on from no Will w^tsoever whether of God or Creatures hath such a freedom as to imbrace Evill as Evill or refuse Good as Good, hence perfect Felicity conceive crudely & grosely as \generally concord/ a complexion of all congruities belonging to humane nature must meeds be wished for by all, but y^e pieces & members of it wherof it is made up being consider'd singly & apart there being something of Discongruity sometimes in y^e best of y^m appearing to our multifarious, mutable, allwayes uneasy & fastidious nature we being not allwayes in ourselves alike to y^t w^ch is alike in itself, it is not impossible but y^t we may reject it, but wⁿsoever extremities of bodyly Evill as Torment & Pain are proposed so as y^t there is nether y^e least appearance any Good of Honesty attained thereby nor any other Animall Good present or future to ourselves or relations, no good of Fame or glory or pride of showing our Liberty, here y^e aversac~on of y^e will would be as necessary as y^e descent of a Stone downwards In like manner bodily good things as freedom from Sicknesse, Pain Poverty or disgrace wⁿ there is no appearance of any Good to accrue from y^m are necessarily willed & desired & many such Instances occurre in humane Life in w^ch Animall Congruity having no mixture of other or Morall Discongruity takes away y^e Contingency of acting Besides y^t factitious or artificiall nature of Habits to w^ch y^e Will is liable unto both good & bad do for y^e time so much determine it as y^t it is easy to know w^thout y^e spirit of divinac~on w^t men will certainly do in such & such cases

And as we contribute more or lesse of our own self=active Power as we more or lesse exert ourselves so do we ourselves make this or y^t seem to be better to us The same temptac~on to a pleasant or profitable dishonest Action propounded to y^e same Ꝑson at several times hath not allwayes y^e same success because though y^t be alike to - him yet he is not y^e same & alike to it, he is sometimes more vigorously exerted as to Morall Good & yⁿ he rejects it for Evill sometimes more supine & languidly remisse & yⁿ he closeth w^th it as most congruous to him & y^e Good of Pleasure & Profit seems to be a greater Good yⁿ y^e Good of Honesty The same person also may at severall times be under different habits y^e one vitious y^e other vertuous whereby his judging Power will be differently determined to to accompt Pleasure & Profitt much a greater Good yⁿ Honesty & again to preferre Honesty infinitely before it, so y^t wⁿ vertuous he will necessarily reject such a temptation \{illeg}circumstance/, w^{ch being vitious} he did necessarily before close w^thall, but these different habits arising & being contracted to ourselves by a different use of our own self=power y^e different ^\at severall times/ is a thin not ^\{illeg}/ from necessary nature obtruded upon us but a thing |w^t| we are y^e causes of |it| to ourselves It is not necessary as some suppose in order to y^e asserting of L. A. to maintain y^t y^e Will is n̄rally indifferent to a greater or lesser Good w^ch is indeed all one as to make it Indifferent to Good \itself/ f|F|or though it be granted y^e Will is necessarily determin'd to y^e greater apparent ^\Good/ yet y^e last - apparent Good is not so necessary|ly| but we contribute something of - our own towards it w^ch we are not necessarily determin'd to neither is any other cause of it to be required besides ourselves y^e Soul hath an originall self=power in it w^ch is exercisd antecedently to all Volitions, whereby it can more or lesse intend itself in a way of Considerac~on & vigorous exertion & accordingly determine our selves to this or y^t as best For nothing is more plain yⁿ y^t one thing may seem best wⁿ we do not sufficiently deliberate & another thing w^ch we do, so y^t y^e difference is from ourselves, so as men do more or lesse exert \intend/ y^mselves to Morall Good as they are in a more or lesse exerted temper so will Honesty or Lust & Pleasure be \preferred/ judged to be y^e best y^e essence of Free=will chiefly consisteth in y^t originall Power w^ch y^e Soul as self=comprehensive hath over itself y^e Power of actuating its own passive capability more or lesse by reason whereof y^e very self=same things become different to us, w^ch intending or exerting ourselves more or lesse is not necessarily determind by any antecedent causes motivies of Reason or Appearances of Good but there is allwayes something of it \but/ in our own hand|s| of whose different exercise & determinac~on |A| there is no cause assignable yⁿ|but| ourselves In all Volitions there is - something of Nature acting necessarily determining as to Good <62> & y^e greater Good ^\we being never able to go out of some Naturall Congruity or other/ this is, y^t by w^ch this Free=power is circumscribed & there is something of our own w^ch we are in a manner κύριοι or Masters of, y^e power of actuating our own possibilities y^t is of |A| intending or exerting ourselves more or lesse, \& determing a Capability/ A

To conclude therefore we shall observe where y^e higher & lower Good conspire where lower Appetites superiour & inferiour \& Superior/ Reason agree where Pleasure self=preservac~on & Honesty clearly dictate one & y^e same thing & where more or lesse consideracon will not alter y^e case, here y^e Actions of men in their wits are equall uniform & necessarily & it might be certainly \{illeg}/ known w^t they would do \in such sense/ but in all other cases where more or lesse intention of ourselves \will not alter/, there there is great uncertainty & contingency, \All/ Volitions are neither also \b/ necessary as some would have y^m nor also \all so/ contingent as others, but there is a certain mixture of both \together/ in y^m as there is in ourselves who are partly necessary nature, partly self=activity par something y^t we are κύριοι ^\Masters/ of & something y^t we are not.

\This must come in before Pag:/ We have now declared w^t is y^e τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν & y^e τὸ κυριῶον y^t y^t swayes y^e whole Soul y^t |is| in us, y^t Judgeth, willeth & determineth all Actions It is true indeed y^t if our Vnderstandings were infinitely perfect comprehending all thing infallibly yⁿ there - would be no repugnance but such a necessary Vnderstanding should be y^e Hegemonick in us & determine all Action, but our Vnderstandings being so imperfect y^t can but think of one thing at once if they should be necessarily determind to every thing they think of & could never intend y^mselves more or lesse nothing can be more absurd yⁿ to make y^m y^e Hegemonick & y^e ruling Power in us w^ch acting y^mselves necessarily must necessarily determine all Volition & Action For besides y^t most of y^e Action of Life will be yⁿ taken away it being not conceivable how a necessary Vnderstanding where itself is doubtfull & hath not certaine Knowledge of w^t is best should necessarily cause any Volition this way or y^t way & we have certain Knowledge but of very little I say besides this if such an imperfect necessary Vnderstanding necessarily determining all Volitions were y^e Hegemonick of y^e Soul yⁿ it is plain y^t we could have no self=recollective Power in us our Thoughts & Cogitac~ons would not be our own, \There would be nothing {illeg}/ we could not be our own men or have any Govournm^t of ourselves being not able to intend ourselves or our Actions more or lesse, we could use no self=exertive conation \or {illeg}/ we could \st/ not set ourselves to any thing nor put forth ourselves moreor-lesse, we could not put forth our own activity, there could be no - striving nor laborious contention after Vertue & Knowledge, we - should find no diffculty w^thin ourselves because all would be necessary & nothing could be more or lesse yⁿ it is, we could have no Power over Purposes & resolutions, we should not be w^thin ourselves but be meer outsides only, there could be no Lucta or contention <63> betwixt y^e superiour & inferiour part of y^e Soul, there could not be such disagreem^t w^th ourselves as is in Persons continent & Incontinent w^ch |y^t| are in a middle betwixt Temperance & IntemꝐance for asmuch as there would be no duplicitis in us, all would be necessary nature & none would be reduplicate self=activity

Writers concerning this Argum^t whether Ancient or Modern have taken notice of nothing in L. A. but only y^e self=determinacon of Volitions in y^e Actions of Life or y^e Contingency of Volic~ons y^mselves & y^t Power y^t we have over y^m but they have not observed y^t w^ch is y^e principall ^\thing/ in it, y^t more interiour power w^ch y^e Soul hath first over itself - before its power over Volitions & Acc~ons w^ch is its Power over its own - possibility & passive capability to actuate it more or lesse, its power of intending it self more or lesse in recollection, self=excitac~on, self=attention speculac~on & deliberac~on as also of vigorous exertion of force & strength to suppresse y^e lower Inclinac~ons & to promote itself towards y^e higher principles from whence y^e Contingency of Freewill in Volic~ons & Actions doth ^\chiefly/ arise Wherefore y^e Antients was wont to define L. A. no otherwise yⁿ thus to be a power of doing Contraries or Contradictories in w^ch no doubt they included all y^t w^ch y^e Moderns expressed more anxiously & nicely in this bipertipe manner a Power of Contrarietie & Contradiction & it must needs be granted there is such a thing as this in free Agents Aristotle speaking of y^e motions of Animalls as such, w^ch in some sense are αυτοκινητα or self=moving writes after this manner if a thing move itself - it is absurd to suppose that they should allwayes move one way If it were in y^e power of Fire to move itself upward yⁿ it is manifest y^t it could move it self downward also & y^t w^ch is to itself a cause of walking may also be a cause of not=walking Wherefore in this sense all Animalls may be s^d to have ἐξουσίαν των αντικριμενων a power of Contraries & Contradictories notw^thstanding w^ch they are not αρχη καὶ ἀιτία πραξεων y^e principle & cause of Action as Freewill'd Beings ꝐꝐly so \called/ are neither are the consequences of Action so imputed to y^m as y^t they receive Blame or Com̄endacon for y^e same, though Bruits are self=moving in one sense y^t they are not moved as Machins & Neurospasts but they have certain inward vitall principles of moc~on Fancy Appetite & Horæ, |&| though they do not allwayes act one way as Inanimate things do, yet they have not any inward self=flexibility of their own but are necessitated by Fancy & Appetite in like cases allwayes to do alike, as being alike hungry & having meat before y^m allwayes to eat, but Freewilled Beings have a more inward power of Contrarietie & Contradiction in their Actions so y^t y^e same objects being put w^thout & y^e same Animall Appetites & Inclinac~ons w^thin they may possibly act differently in w^ch sense it is s^d of y^m by y^e Antients y^t they have a power of doing y^e contrary to w^t they do & they explained it further after this manner y^t y^t y^e same things <66> being circumstant they could act sometimes one way & sometimes another And y^e Antient Stoicks who denyed y^e τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν stated y^e point in this manner That we are Masters of nothing but allwayes follow y^e circumstāt things allwayes yielding to y^m & consenting w^th y^m & do w^t we do because we must of necessity do these things & no other it being impossible for us such things being circunstant to do otherwise yⁿ we do because we are not able to resist y^e circunstant things, by w^ch it is evident y^t S^t Austin & other of y^e Antients were very much mistakē concerning y^e first Stoicks wⁿ they affirmed y^m to assert Liberty of Will because as Alex Aphrodiciensis tells us they did assert y^e names of Freewill & Contingency wⁿ they destroyd y^e thing but y^e contrary to all this is y^t w^ch was maintained by y^e Antient \first/ Opposers of this Stoicall fate necessity y^t nature & fate do not merely act in us but y^t we are something of ourselves & Masters of something & we do not allwayes so follow y^e circumstant things being overcomd by y^m as y^t we could not possibly do - otherwise at any time yⁿ we do, but y^t y^e same things being circunstant in y^e same cases & circumstances & wⁿ we have y^e same Animall Inclinac~ons we may be able sometimes to act one way & sometimes another they being able to resist both y^e outward objects & their inward Animall Affections

And if modern writers concerning Liberty of Will had kept close to this definic~on of y^e Antients ^\though reaching not to try Nature/ they had \not/ been {illeg}reprehensible |&| if they would understand y^t of theirs positis omnibus ad agendum reuqisitis posse agere vel non=agere in no other sense yⁿ y^s of y^e Antients before menc~ond y^t y^e same thing being circunstant they might sometimes act one way sometimes another they could not be found faulty ^\w^th/ but they generally declaring their sense otherwise so |as| y^t by their Omnia ad agendum requisita they do not only mean παντα περιεστῶτα All circunstant things being put y^t might incline to Action but also all internall things w^tsoever besides y^e Action itself, all motives & Reasons & inward exertions \& Practicall Judgment/ y^t still & y^t still notw^thstanding all this y^e Will remains equally indifferent to chuse this or y^e contrary as if this was y^e great Ꝑfection of Freewill to be irrationally & fortuitously determin'd any way, here they have both quite mistaken y^e thing & y^e \{illeg}/ sense of y^e Antients \{illeg}/ For it is most true w^t they asserted y^t wⁿ all outward objects & Circumstances are put y^e same Animall Inclinacons, Free-willed Agents may possibly act differently because they can more or lesse intend y^t power y^t they have over their own - passive Capability they can consider speculate & consult more or lesse & therefore wⁿ they consider more \they/ discover reason to determine y^mselves otherwise yⁿ they should wⁿ they had considerd lesse they might sometimes be more watchfull & circumspect yⁿ at others sometimes exert y^mselves <67> more vigorously towards y^e higher Principle of superiour & Inferiour reason & strive more ag^st their lower inclinac~ons at other times according to w^ch differences arising wholy from w^thin y^mselves their Volic~ons & Actions in y^e same cases might be much diversified So y^t y^e Antients did warily & cautiously enough expresse y^mselves but y^e Moderns defining Liberty of will by \{illeg}/ perfect Indifferency after all things put besides y^e Volic~on itself & so after y^e very last practicall Judgm^t w^ch they make to belong to another Faculty of Vnderstanding blindly, irrac~onally & fortuitously determining itself have clearly missed y^e true notion of it And some Neotericks have been sensible hereof who therefore declining y^t vulgar definition of Free will of active Indifferency of all things put y^t ought to be put besides y^e Volic~on itself - have more cautiously expressd y^mselves thus \more/ agreeably to y^e Antients & to y^e Truth y^t a Free Agent is y^t y^t can ad vim et motum causæ àquâ fuerat impulsus aliquid adjicere et impetum, quem aliunde non acceperat addere, can contribute something of its own to y^e impulsive causes & Reasons of Action, & adde some force & moment of its own w^ch it had not receivd of \frō/ any thing else; i.e. a Free Agent is such w^ch is not meerly passive to objects w^thout him & to nature & a necessary imꝐfect understanding in him but w^ch can adde something of its own more or lesse to all these by his self=intending & self=exerting Power To w^ch purpose is y^t of of AP. Aphrodiciensis, y^t Man is a principle & cause of these Actions y^t are done by him & this is to be a Man to have a Principle of doing so & so w^thin himself, & \a)/ this is to be a Sphere or Globe to roll & tumble down a declivity wherefore all other Animalls beside Man ^\altogether/ follow y^e outward|ly| & besetting & circumstant causes but man doth not because his essence consists in this in having a principle & cause of Action w^thin himself & therefore not being necessarily determind to follow y^e circumstant things about him as being - meerly passive to y^m {illeg} ^\Our selfe/ determinac~on of our volitions consists in this y^t we are not meerly passive in y^m but can adde \some/ more form or impetus of our own more or lesse to w^t we suffer from w^thout & to necessary nature in us & accordingly diversifie y^e same And of this w^ch is ꝐꝐly our own w^ch we superadde there is no other cause to be inquired after but every Ꝑticular Free=Agent himself P. 83 ως γαρ ουσι τουμεν for as we do not seek any other cause for w^ch heavy Bodies are carried downwards or for w^ch a Bruit Animall doth w^t it doth acting according to Appetite for as much as every one of these things contributes y^e ^\a/ cause to these Acti things frō y^mselves having such a Nature in it so neither is there any other cause to be requird of those things w^ch are done by a man sometimes one way, sometimes another besides y^e Man himself for this is to be a Man to be y^e <68> y^e cause & principle of these things w^ch are done by him W^ch yet must be understood w^th moderac~on not as if things circunstāt w^thout us & our own nature in us did act nothing at all upon us & did not contribute any thing at all so much as to incline us one way or other, but for yⁿ all Councell & Instruction, Reason & Considerac~on & deliberac~on itself would signify nothing at all but y^t we have a certain active power of our own w^ch as it is exerted more or lesse upon y^t w^ch is Nature in us will much diversifie our actions & of ^\y^e exercise of/ this w^ch is properly our own Activity no other cause is to be inquired but ourselves

The Life of Freewilled Beings consist in a kind of continuall self=exertion more or lesse either in a way of Considerac~on or vigorous self=promoting force or executive activity & Contingency whereof lies in y^e very foundac~on of our Being & y^e uncertainty of it is y^t only Indifferency w^ch is essentiall to Freewilled Beings for a constant ^\Indifferency/ Inclinac~on of Will Inclinac~on & purpose to every thing cannot be essentiall to any perceptive Being but belongs to y^m only in doubtfull cases where Nature is distracted or y^e Vnderstanding Ꝑceives equall moments of Reason both wayes. But we are not only conceived to determine our own Actions & to be ourselves ἀρχὴ καὶ αιτία y^e principle & cause of y^m in such cases but also whereafter the exerc~on of ourselves after Consultacon & deliberac~on all doubtfullnesse is remooved because though y^e reason of Consultac~on & deliverac~on be in itself necessary in w^ch sense y^t of y^e Antient Stoicks may be allowed to be true y^t there is no selfpower in y^e reason of Consultation yet we had a Power over ourselves to consult & deliberate more or lesse & to use a greater or lesser Intention in it & therefore y^t Volition w^ch doth result at length from clear \& necessary/ Knowledge from after long consultac~on may well be s^d to be ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our own power & be imputed to ourselves as y^e cause of it because Consultacon was not y^e necessary cause of y^t so much Consultac~on as Aristotle hath observed but it was ^\contingently/ determined by an immediate self=power, as, for example, though a Sword doth necessarily cut & slash wⁿ there is force put to it yet y^e Action w^ch a Man doth by it in fighting a duell is to be imputed to y^e Doer of it because it was in his power to use it so or not This y^e Aphridiciensick Phylosopher hath observed rightly He y^t by reason of ratiocinate collection made by himself in consultac~on doth assent to any thing or resolve will any action & resolve upon any design is to himself y^e cause of y^t Assent Volition & resoluc~on because he should not have done it if he had not consulted so much And hence it is y^t Men are commended for Knowledge & Wisedome because though Knowledge & Vnderstanding be necessary in itself yet y^e more or lesse improvm^t of our Vnderstanding by diligence in meditation & study is to be imputed to their own self=power -

This Power of self=determinac~on is com̄only cryed up as one \of y^e/ great^\est/ perfection|s| y^t any perceptive Being is capable of & it is indeed a great Priviledg y^t men have comparativly w^th Bruites y^t they are not Senses \{illeg}/ to Objects & Nature & led by necessary Appetites to w^tsoever they do but have a power of Judging as to their own Actions & determining their own Volitions, yet it is far from being a pure perfection it being only y^e perfection of ImꝐfect Beings & in respect of y^t higher {illeg} of Being y^t must be some where in y^e world y^t is im̄utable Good Ꝑfectly Knowing & wise & whose operac~on is his Essence, it is an imꝐfect thing for self=determinac~on in Judgm^ts & Assents is de\fect/ facto \of/ Wisdom & Knowledge & where Knowledge|ing| is absolutely Ꝑfect there is no Judging Assenting |+| & Opining distinct from it \+/ A Being infinitely wise doth never consult & deliberate what to do nor after deliberac~on venturously & stocastically trembling & doubtfully determine itself A Being ^\cōpleatly/ perfectly Good doth never use any self=exerted Conac~on laborious striving & endeavouring for this is from defect of Power & Strength Free=willed Beings are such as are continually Ꝑsu|p|ring & pursuing after their own perfection & w^thout a continuall exertion & renovac~on of y^mselves they will \sink/ decline & sink {illeg} ^\degenerate {illeg}/ of y^e Antients speaking of this Power of Contrariety wⁿ in y^e very same Circumstances, a Being is as it were |in|different to do this or y^e Contrary quite removes this Power from God as speaking - much Imperfection Power & Liberty in God is not so to be conceived as to be indifferent to Contraries & Contradictories but God Power & Liberty is y^e Power of im̄utable Goodnesse & Wisedome w^ch is most of all Power wⁿ it doth not depart from being one for to be able to do Contraries is neither Power nor Liberty but Infirmity & Inability of adhering allwayes to the best, this ^\contingent self{illeg}/ y^e Power of Contraries & Contradictories in y^e same case, is such \that/ Power as if \to/ w^ch Peccability or a possibility of sinning, is an essentiall property & an inseparable appendix for though Freewilled Beings may be so fixed in a state of Good as y^t there may be a certainty they shall never fall - from it yet this is not from y^mselves but from divine Grace as shall be showed afterwards for defectibility is an imperfection y^t necesarily cleaves to all reduplicate autexousious Beings

For y^e right Vnderstanding y^e nature of Freewilled Beings it must be diligently observed w^t we have before declared y^t they are Ꝑ compounded of two things & y^t they are Ꝑtly nature & Ꝑtly self=activity They y^t take away all Liberty of Humane Actions make all in us to be necessary Nature & many others who assert Freewill would make us to be all self=activity whereas in truth we are ^\neither solely but/ a mixture of both together If we were all self=activity & nothing but Contingent indifferency in Acting as some suppose yⁿ objects occasions, n̄rall Appetites & Inclinations <70> motives & Reasons exhortacons & Ꝑswasions Councell & Advice would signify nothing at all & could have no force upon us If Contingent Indifferency were y^e essence of Freewilld Beings yⁿ that {illeg} would be no parts of nature or y^e Vniverse, he y^t would have ^\this is to make/ y^e a thing lose from nature & y^e whole Vniverse a thing w^ch hath no Ausæ or handles in it for God \himself/ to lay hold on so y^t he cannot any way promote their Good w^thout y^e destruction of their very n̄re nay indeed their highest Good would be no better \Other/ yⁿ this \to be/ in being loose to God & all things, an absolute things by itself, this being fancyed ^\by those Philos/ to be y^e very thing in w^ch Godship ^\chiefly/ consisteth But there is no such infinite Liberty & self=flexibility as this possibly in nature \so farre is it frō being/ much lesse will y^e highest power Ꝑ y^e highest power & perfective Liberty y^t a Being should be able w^th infinite Indifferency to turn itself to all things in y^e whole world or w^tsoever it was capable of for perfect power & Liberty is nothing but perfect Goodnesse, But \Freewilld Beings/ we are not all self=activity but one half of y^m vis nature, \Nature hath a great share in vs/ object, Appetites, Naturall Inclinac~ons Councells Reasons & Ꝑsuasions have a great force upon y^m. Nature also circumscribes y^m w^thin a certain compasse of Good or Congruity w^ch they can never go out off wⁿ y^ey act most loosly & at random, most arbitrarily & irrationally making their Will their only Law, yⁿ they \alwayes/ pursue an appearance of Good here in dominion, ^Liberty absolutenesse & indipency, they can never will for Wills sake only w^thout respect to any Good, nay they are yⁿ most of all captivated under bruitish Lust & Appetite wⁿ they think y^mselves so perfectly free

But we are not all nature, but we |X| are partly self=activity & something of our own \X/ Nature doth but prelude in us & \thē/ we ourselves ^\come in to and/ conclude & determine & \we/ are a cause & - principle of Action \allso/ so y^t Nature concludes nothing in us w^thout ourselves Though outward things be not accompted in our own power - yet we having some power over ourselves & ourselves being - something we are also w^th nature & providence causes of something there, & contribute \{illeg}/ to a difference of Events & successes by exerting ourselves more or lesse in a way of prudence, cauc~on & circumspection, diligence & activity, but for those internall things w^ch are not subject to outward casualty though nature acts here |A|also yet it can conclude lesse w^thout ourselves |A| we do not affirm y^t here we are Ꝑfectly in our own hands as if Grace & providence did do nothing here we are a certain mixt thing \made up/ of our own selfactivity & y^e conspiring divine Power Providence & Grace And because things are not done here wholy w^thout our own self=activity therefore we may be s^d \to/ form & frame ourselves into w^t we are ^\& to be selfmade either way/ P. 105. Those things are proper to a rac~onall Soul, it sees itself, it forms & frames itself & makes itself such as it will & itself reaps & injoyes y^e fruit y^t it beares to w^ch purpose was y^t also before alledged <71> where this is properly referred to y^e Hegemonick or ruling power in y^e Soul y^e Hegemonick is y^t w^ch can recollect stir up & excite itself y^t can turn itself & can make it self to be such as it will & can make things y^t happen to seem to itself w^t it will ^\w^ch yet is not so to be vnderstood as if it had {illeg}/ not any but hath an absolute despotick Power over its inward Morall Affections & dispositions ^\to Good/ but y^t by laborious self=exertion conac~on & - striving it can by little & little adde something to itself & so make a further Ꝑgresse to Good As it is said to be y^e cause also of its own evill by its self=neglect & not=exerting y^t Power w^ch it hath w^ch latter is solely to be imputed to itself but not y^e former This is y^t w^ch is y^e cause of its own Good & hurt & there is nothing else in y^e whole world to w^ch his own Evill is to be imputed as y^e cause of it but only this Autexousy or self=power & in this consists y^e formality of Sin This is y^t y^t settles itself into habits Good & Evill begits in itself an habituall disposition of Judging so & so in Morall things w^ch is y^e Criterion & y^e hegemonick of y^e Soul. i.e. y^e Soul as reduplicated self=comprehensive & self=active is y^e & & y^e Judging Power, Inward sense & eye of y^e Soul w^ch being \may/ by itself |be| wrought into different habituall Dispositions so as to be able to Judge well or ill in Morall things as y^e Eye of y^e Body may be either clear so as to Judge aright of Colours or else ill=affected & vitiated to see every thing in a wrong colour w^ch similitude our Saviour make use of to y^e same purpose to show y^t y^e κριτήριον of y^e Soul may be in like manner vitiated w^th an ill tincture so as to Judge wrongly of morall things whose very Light in y^m is s^d to be Darknesse w^ch {illeg} these Heathen Phylosophers y^t had any Wit in y^m have taken notice off & Aristotle himself who was far from canting often observes - P. 553 This thing is evident from matters of sense for y^e same thing cannot seeem sweet to one & bitter to another unlesse y^e organes of sense & Criticall Power be corrupted & vitiated wherefore y^e true measure of Tast is y^e Pallat of those y^t are in health & not \of/ y^e others, y^e case is y^e very same concerning Morall things - Good & Evill Honest & Dishonest \i.e./ y^t some men {illeg} are are vitiated & depraved as to their Pallat, their sense & Criticall Power of these things & therefore these are not y^e true measure of Good & Evill but y^e other y^t he declares in his Ethicks y^t <72> A good man is y^e measure, of w^t is to be done or not done, he also tells us elsewhere y^t y^t wickednesse corrupts y^e Principles of y^e mind Others tell us y^t this Criticall Power of y^e Soul in y^e Knowledge of speculative things may be likewise variously affected \hindred or promoted/ from mens Life \Purificatiō disposes mē to y^e knowledge of y^e best things/

Every particular Action in w^ch Morality is concernd leaves something behind it after it is gone it begets some little disposic~on & Inclinacon in y^e Soul to Judge & will y^e same again w^ch being repeated receiving many such new \like/ additions frō repeated Action grows up by degrees & by little & little into a confirm|A| ed Habit \A/ W^ch Habits whether Good or Bad \A/ are notie of y^m absolutely unalterable so long as y^e faculty of self=power remains, y^e soul still keeping its self=changing Power so long as L. A. remains in it y^e exercise whereof \of w^ch Faculty/ cannot be allwayes s^d to be essentiall to a man there being a ligac~on of it ^\not only/ in sleep but also in Infancy so y^t it cannot be denyed but y^t y^e divine power may possibly reduce Free & Raconall Creatures into such a state as y^t their Life for Ages together might not differ from y^t of dreaming, nor be much advanced above y^e Condicon of Inf Bruits Infants & Embrios; but whether there be ever any such sad providence as this as a Nemesis attending upon humane Souls, for y^e abuse of their freewill is best known unto him, who hath contrived & framed those fatall Lawes y^t belong to y^e Œconomy of Rationall Creatures ^\w^ch are y^e best y^t can & for y^e good of y^e whole/ However those Changes & Revolucons of Freewilld Being from habits of Vertue & Vice are not perhaps so short & swift as some conceive.

Though there be two \species or/ Degrees of L. A. as we have declared, Animall & Morall, yet they being both of y^e same kind, & y^e former being included & cōprehended in y^e Latter, we do not every where scrupulously distinguish between these -

We shall now endeavour to set down y^e chief ProꝐties or Powers \Passions/ of this Faculty called L. A. First therefore it is not a Power whose Perfection consisteth in doing any thing indifferently and at random as \this/ conceived to be a liberty, (whereas indeed \it is not)/ there is no such thing) a Power \whose Actings have/ {illeg} {illeg} |no| relac~on to Good or Evill in it, Better or Worse, as if these things were extrinsically clapt upon it ^\onely/ by Lawes or arbitrary religious & Instituc~ons, but it is a Power whose moc~on according to his n̄rall tendency |its Nature| is ^\always toward/ Better or Worse more or lesse Ꝑfections improvm^t ^\& advancement/ or imparem^t & diminuc~on \&/ it is y^e souls actuating & informing itself more or lesse; y^e Issue ^\& sum̄e/ whereof is two wayes so as y^t the form do \either/ master &|or| overcome y^e Matter & subdue it under it\selfe/ or else y^t it is as it were \{illeg}/ overcome by matter & informosity; it is a tugging & contesting between |2|Perfection & ImꝐfection Act & inert Passivenesse or dull Potentiality \2/ freewilled Beings are not passive to an equall & necessary Light ^\obtruding itself vpō them &/ allwayes ruling & leading y^m on easyly w^th out any difficulty or labour of self=conac~on but they have an active Power over their own Light itself so y^t they can intend it more or lesse & actuate y^e Potentiality of y^e Knowing Power they can put forth y^mselves more or lesse & promote y^mselves towards y^e higher principle in their <73> nature or faculty degenerate & decline, they are things y^t are accomptable \{illeg}/ for y^e managem^t of y^mselves better or worse ^\{illeg} in their own hand/ are either pleased or displeased w^th y^mselves for their own actions they either accuse & blame \condemne/ y^mselves & are thereupon full of Despondency ^\{illeg}/ suspc~on & mistrust being apt to fear {illeg} or else they approve justifie & congratulate y^mselves being full of feare & expectac~on of Good possessed w^th inward peace tranquillity & {illeg} they are such things as deserve from y^t equity & Justice y^t moderates \{illeg}/ y^e whole Vniverse either reward or punishm^t The different use of this Faculty is y^t by w^ch we one becomes either or better or worse \{illeg}/ yⁿ himself either prevailing over y^e imꝐfection of his nature getting y^e better of it & mastering it or being worsted & conquered by it, in some it strives for undefiled rewards returning God his own w^th increase & Vsury in other it lasily & sluggishly succumbs under y^e imꝐfection of its nature \{illeg}/ & lets y^e worser - principle \Part/ get ground & prevail, lets y^e or non=entity y^e defect of its nature prevail over y^e Entity & active power of it & sinking down lower & lower into degeneracy \to/ captivate & fetter it in y^e {illeg} chaines of darknesse, this gives Being to y^t w^ch is called distributive Justice in y^e world w^ch otherwise could have its object to \display itself/ act upon, it is y^t to y^e different actings whereof n̄rally belongs Com̄endac~on & Blame, a man is com̄ended for good Actions otherwise yⁿ a good Horse is com̄ended for running ^\swiftly/ or a pen for writing well or a Watch for going rightly, Freewilled Beings are com̄ended or blamed not for their Nature or w^t they could not but be, but because they are y^e active causes of their own Will or Ill, Culpa & y^e malum Culpæ belongs only to this Being y^e Evill & Fault of Sin is \can be/ no where else This kind of Being is y^t only w^ch hath a reflexive Judgm^t upon his own Actions, it is y^t whereby a Being feels itself something by itself & to be so itself as y^t it hath a crazy staggering & uncertain hold of itself & its own Perfection, w^ch is to \be/ maintained by a constant awakened self self=exertion, diligence & Watchfullnesse or otherwise would slip away from it; an imperfect Perfection, these are such Beings as had a possibility in y^m of doing otherwise yⁿ they do doe in Bodyes considerd alone by y^mselves nothing is possible but w^t necessary, here something might have been otherwise yⁿ it is better or worse, here is ambiguous possibity both wayes w^thout absolute necessity of nature either way, here uncertain Contingency of being Better or Worse, rowles & tumbles up & down whilst other ^\perceptive/ Beings are either below it by ^\reasō of/ dull stupidity of Nature or else above it by im̄ovable perfection

Freewilled Beings have a higher & a lower principle in y^m & they are amphibious thing y^t sometimes live in one Element sometimes in another they have a vast - compasse of Capability in y^m a scale of many degrees higher & lower ^\in respect of vice & vertue Wisdom & Folly/ they are capable of many degrees \gradations/ of Proficiency or degeneracy & are liable to many alternac~ons of motion upward & downward. There are severall states belonging to y^m, for ^\First/ they may either by self=exerted conacon ^\& striving/ at last arrive to a state of Suipotence & self=power a state of Victory & Mastery over their worser part & imꝐfection & so to have an easy <74> govournm^t of y^mselves in Good ^\For y^e End of all striving is some Mastery or Victory./ {illeg} state of Suipotency is y^e End for w^ch y^e faculty of Suipotestas or self=power is designed or intended by God & Nature for however some men bost \{illeg}/ of their Faculty of Freewill as if this by itself was an absolute dominion & Mastery over y^mselves & - true Liberty yet this is but a doubtfull & ambiguous power by y^e right use of w^ch they may either attain to a state of \true/ Suipotence for \w^{ch is a state of perfectiō}/ for Men yⁿ only raign over y^mselves wⁿ their highest Good & Perfection reignes or \or else secondly/ by y^e neglect & abuse of it \that Power/ as it were by a back=stroke of their Freewill, they may enthrall y^mselves in y^e greatest bondage & fetter y^mselves in a state of ^\perfect/ self=impotency w^ch is y^e lowest state of Freewilled Beings, into w^ch though by their own Power or rather their Impotence (though \though/ not necessary \but/ & invincible) they sink y^mselves yet they cannot raise y^mselves meer from thence, to y^t higher state & - exaltation of \true/ suipotence meerly by their own power w^thout y^e assistance of divine power & grace: \& which God will not be behindhand with/ between these two states y^e Apogy & Perogy y^e Aux. & there are many intermediate degrees of a middle state & y^t of different tendency either ^\vpward or downward/ ascending or descending much reciprocac~on & alternac~on, much labour & tugging in y^e Ascending motion; In this intermediate space (w^ch is y^e \stage/ case y^t Freewilled Beings run in) they have many different affection & - Passions according as either y^e Better or Worser prevails in y^m - & as they feel y^mselves either gaining or loosing, here they are sometimes in a very confounded state, puzzled & distracted ^\condition/ between severall \cōtrary/ Inclinations, often kenning y^e better not w^thout wishes of arriving at it, & yet at y^e same time perceiving \feeling/ y^mselves draggd as it were by a certain violence & ponderous pressure of lower principles another way, so as to do y^t w^ch they would not ^\& to act willingly & unwillingly at once/ by w^ch it appeares y^t though men com̄only think y^t there is so much L^dship & dominion over y^mselves in y^s Faculty of Freewill \yet/ y^t it is but a mixture of Power & Impotency of strength & weaknesse ^\together/ & y^t there is much of Heterokinesy \{illeg}/ mingled w^th y^e Autokinesy of it in some states; for its \their our/ proper self=motion ^\selfactivity/ is only to Good, to w\ch/ there is much in y^m contumaciously refractory w^ch in some sense is their Heterokinesy ^\{illeg} & Neurospasm/ their being moved by something besides y^my^e \true & their Good/ selves, or by a contrary Biasse & weight, They y^t think Freewill can in all states w^th equall ease turn it self to Good as to Evill & y^t it can indifferently y^t its strength is allway equall & alike & y^t it can indifferently nod either way are very much deceived concerning y^e nature of it y^e steering of this winged chariot of y^e Soul in its assent upward is hard & difficult but it easily slides or rather tumbles downward y^e mocon of Free will to Good is laborious intenc~on & \self/ exerc~on but its motion to Evill is \selfe/ remission & relaxacon, y^e strength vigour & activity of Freewill is only towards y^e higher & better Principle but its motion towards y^e worser Possi Principle is \by a way of/ nothing but passive langor <75> & sluggish Inactivity or y^e perfection ^\of Freewilled Beings/ is only kept up by self=exertion upon y^e remission whereof Imperfection & Degeneracy steals upon thē further & further \& unravells all/ y^e lower Life of Lusts & Affections needs not \{illeg}/ our \any/ self=exertion ^\{illeg}/ but it obtrudes itself upon us & invades us but ^\as for/ y^e higher principle though Nature make some offer of it towards us, yet this will prove alltogether ineffectuall unlesse it be assisted & carryed on by our own self=active exertion vigorous endeavours strivings & contention The lower Principle prevailes upon us by its own activity but nature doth but show us as it were a glimpse of y^e higher Good in inviting us & beckoning to us ^\with y^e {illeg}/ to put forth our own self=active Conation towards ^\{illeg}/ it & by striving & Contention to win y^t prize w^ch will recompense \all/ our pains & Labour - Facilis descensus Averni Sed revocare gradum superasq; evadere ad auras Hic labor, hoc opus est -