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Chap.

We have now propounded such an Hypothesis of the Soul as - may render this thing called Freewill possible & very intelligible, The sum̄e whereof is this that we are to conceive as it were two stories or gradations & regions in the Soul, whereof one is simple & necessary Nature, the other the whole Soul redoubled upon itself, self-comprehensive, selfreflexive, self-recollective & self-exertive & therefore lastly self-determinative to wch second thing belongs that wch is com̄only called Will, wch therefore is not one particular & Private Faculty of the Soul coordinate wth ye rest whether necessarily determined by a foregoing necessary Vnderstanding, or chanceably & fortuitously by itself, in every thing wthout respect to any Light; but it is the whole Soul reciprocating & rebounding vpon itself, conscious of all its congruities & capacities whereby it becomes present wth itself, within itself & superiour to itself, & holding itself as it were in its own hande doth wield & turn itself, govern & direct its cogitations & Acti ons. I say Govern Cogitations as well as Actions, for if our Thoughts & Cogitatiōs did spin along necessarily by themselves according as the impulse of outward objects did excite them & give them the first hint, so that we ourselves had noe governm^t or com̄and over them at all to determine, turn them, fix them: & stop them, we could not be able to manage any Actions nor carry on any designes of Life nor indeed maintain converse & pertinēt com̄unication wth one another, but {illeg} be distracted, confounded, puzzled & moped things, having our witts allwayes to seek; & wanting Presence & recollections of Mind should be carryed away wth the galloping Carrier of ungovernable & unmanageable Thoughts we know not whither; & should be no more able to answer opportunely & readily pertinētly to every Question & to carry our selves decorously in respect of the various circumstances of outward Life, than a Machin would be so necessary a thīg is this Faculty ^of self-power to humane Life that wthout it we cannot be our selves nor have any desposall of our selves, But we affirm that this is not a blind Will, nor one single Private Faculty coordinate wth the rest, standing as it were in the same plain & levell wth thē it but the whole Soul reduplicated upon itself comprehending & wielding itself, wch after the Verdit of all other naturall Faculties given ^is sums vp all into a Conclusiō passes the descisive voat, determines volitiō & gives the Fiat to Action, & governs in the whole man.

And that there is really such ^{illeg} a {illeg} the Soul as we conceive it sufficiently evident from what we have allready declared, so we shall endeavour to make it further manifest from an ordinary Phænomenon ^not well vnderstood by wch it will appear that these two Powers of the Soul or two {illeg} of Life are seperable from one another, so that the Soul may act as simple Nature wthout reduplication self-comprehension & self-activity, & that is the Phænomenon of Sleep & Dreames wch no Phylosopher has yet so far as we know of ever pretended to give a satisfactory accompt {illeg}. Wherefore we say yt in Sleep & Dreames besides the Ligation of our outward senses com̄only taken notice off, {illeg} there is an {illeg} other Ligation or impedition in ye Soul itself, we haveing not then our witts about us, nor any recollection of Mind, are commanding Power over our Thoughts to steer them or direct them, or carry on any {illeg} designes & therefore we are so foold & imposd upon by our F{illeg} {illeg} things & that wthout any wonder {illeg} at all so that when we are awake we often reflect upon the Non-sense of those our dreames ^{illeg} <2> & looke upon ourselves then but as half ourselves & as having ourselves to seek & yet notwithstanding all this in our dreaming sleeps we do not only exercise that those lower facultyes of our Soul of Fancy & Imagination wch then is taken for externall sense, & of Appetites & Passions but have also sometime in us a sense of Conscience or the dictate of Honesty & do also exercise often the Faculty of Ratiocination though not wth so much vigour & so long continuance ^{illeg} together & coherence not makeing such a series of pertinent contextures of Ratiocinac~ons as when - we are awake. However since we are conscious that we do sometimes syllogyze & ratiocinate in Sleep, it cannot be said that the Faculty of Reason & Vnderstanding is quite bound up & consopited, wherefore we cannot possibly give any accompt of this Phænomenon of Sleep & Dreams wthout acknowledging something else in ye Soul besides what the vulgar Psicology takes notice off, it being most evident that besides ye relaxation of ye bodily nerves wch is the same thing wt that that is com̄only called the ligation of the outward senses, there is something else bound up & consopited in sleep we being not then all that wch we are wn awake externall sensation only {illeg}. I say there must be the relaxation & langor also of some higher & more inward power in the Soul itself And having before showed that there are two stories or gradations in the Soul according to this dichotomy we give a true ^& plain accompt of this difficulty that in sleep only the lower of them is acted in nothing than working but what is naturall & habituall & (for habit is a kind of an acquired nature, {illeg}) but the reduplicate self=comprehensive, self=attentive & self=exertive Power of the Soul is then consopited & relaxated the reason whereof is because this cannot be exercis’d wthout a greater agitation of corporeall spirits, than will consist wth that relaxation of the bodily nerves {illeg} are asleep Wherefore this being fatally & sympathetically charm’d in sleep & its tone remitted & consequently the inward tone or tention & exertion of the whole Soul & its Powers, relaxated from hence it comes to passe that we are conscious that our mind is but half itself in dreams {illeg} {illeg} There being then wanting that wch binds & knits all together & actuates the whole Soul {illeg} that self=attention, recollection & exertion that should invorgte all its the other Powers, so that the Ratiocinations that are then put forth are but weak, languid & flexing and things abrupt & incohærent, from whence it comes to passe that wn though never so strange monstrously & absurdly false things are obtruded upon us by Fancy we do not question the truth of them, nor conclude ourselves to be in a drea^m onely sometimes we have a suspition of such a mastery, thereof this ^whē we are is a kind of tendency to expergefactiō in us & proves often times an occasion of really wakening our selves Moreover frō hence it is likewise that Reminiscence is not exercisd in Dreams from the defect whereof it comes to passe that wthout Resistancy or demurre we assent to such thing as true wch otherwise we should know false wch thing Lucretius hath well observed Præterea meminisse jacet, languetque sopore, Nec dissentit enim mortis lætique politum Iam pridem quem mens verū se cornere credit.

We dream often of seeing & conversing wth such deceased Friends as living, wn our selves well know dead many years before, wthout gainsaying or contradicting the Truth of this Phantasm wch is because Memory & Reminiscence is for the time consopited, that ^either consisting in or requiring an active & a wakened exertion of the Soul itself, Now this reduplicate self=attentive & self=active Life of the Soul being that wch binds & knits the whole Soul together & puts the powers of it upon attomick exertion, wch directs them to one scope & makes the thoughts musicall & harmonious, no wonder if upon the remission thereof the same kind of Langour seize inwardly upon the Soul after a manner as possesseth the body in sleep, it having noe <3> self=wielding nor self=ruling Power in it for though that strings of the Soul, be {illeg} plaid upon yet they make no Musick at all ^but are assuredly incoherent It being nothing but loose Nature that doth now toyingly sport & act play in us, the soul being as much unbent as the Body & that wch properly we ourselves being silent sympathetically & charm charm’d unto a slumber From a tacite acknowledgm^t. of which ^Truth it is that Casuists will not arraign men as guilty for wtsoever passeth from them or seems to be done by them in sleep & Dreams, though otherwise very exorbitant wch is an Argument that they take it for granted that it is nothing but the lower nature that then loosely playes & layes in us (& that the Soul being as it were unbent) that it is not προαίρεσις Will & Election properly so called , but Nature & Spontaniety that then acts in us, the ende & informed parte of of ourselves but as we said before that higher vigorous & self-active Life of the Soul, cannot be exercised wthout such an agitation of the corporeall spirits as will unbind & unlock all our senses & rouse up & awaken all ye drowsy sentinells of the Body into Activity.

Tis true that Dreams are com̄on to men wth other Animalls & indeed as to Bruits we cannot be certain that sleep is any thing else wth them but only the relaxation of those bodily nerves & ye ligation of sense but we contend that in men that besides the feriac~on of externall sense there is another feriation of something more inward in the Soul itself, which what it is can never be well explain’d according to ye vulgar Psycology & therefore hath not been so much as attempted, that I know off hitherto by any Phylosopher We say ^therefore that ^in men there is a double tone relaxated in - sleep & commonly a double ligation or defect in us , first of the tone of the bodily nerves wch in vigilia are tense, by the inflation of the Animall Spirits from the brain but vpō the stoppage of them in sleep are relaxated wch causeth the defect of externall sense. 2:^ly the tone of the Soul as self=comprehensive & self=active, wch is a constant =exertion of the Soul itself & of its powers, directing the operations of it, not wthout ^a certain Labour & Cohesion, in wch respect that may be true wch Aristotle tells us that the old Phisiologers determined that our Life was a continuall labour & pain, though being - accustom’d to it we take noe notice of it, for this tone of the mind causeth a perpetuall agitac~on of the Spiritts & tone {illeg} in the Body likewise, so the latter Tone must needs {illeg} the former that & though there may be a tone in ye Body or nerves Mechanically caused wn the tone of the mind is in part relaxated, as in those musing tempers & brown studies wch men are in sometimes awake wn their Thoughts are directed by noe intenc~on but rove losely & at random, wch men do not differ from ymselves asleep, save only that the bodily tone of nerves is kept up ^with externall sense But the relaxation of the Tone of the Body wn caused mechanically must needs be accompanyed wth a sympatheticall relaxation of the tone of the Mind & an inward feriation in the soul because so long as that is exerted the tone of the Body cannot be relaxated Of all the antient Phylosophers only the Stoicks seemd to have had some hint of this Truth who were the only Persons that ^allsoe First tooke notice of that peculiar Faculty of the Soul the Hegemonicall wch can be no other than the Soul self=comprehensive & self=active, for ^in Laertius the life of Zeno there is This accompt of sleep given by them τὸν δὲ υπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκ λυομένου του αισθητικου τονοῦ περὶ τὸ ἡγεμόνικον <4> that Sleep is the relaxation of the sensitive Tone about the Hegemonicon that is wch is always wch allwayes accompanies the Tone of the Hegemonicon so that according to {illeg} & the Stoicks sleep was not only a relaxation of bodily sense as Aristotle {illeg} to make it but of two tones, of the tone of the Body & nerves, & also of a Tone in the Soul itself, of the Hegemonicon & ruling power in it, wch exerts invigorates & imployes all the other Powers of it -

And from above we are able to give an accompt also of that Problē long agoe propounded by Plato, in the Theotetus wch some acute Neoterick Phylosophers have - thought to be ^{illeg} {illeg} insoluble how we can certainly know ourselves to be awake at any time ^by any internall {illeg} & not to dream ^ They conceived that there is no inward difference in the things themselves by wch they are distinguishable from one another but only that we {illeg}de our selves to be awake by ratiocination ^& things to be really so without vs because the objects seem to be constantly the same wn we are awake whereas wn asleep the scene alters continually perpetually, but we do affirm that there is an inward difference also in the things themselves by wch according to internall sense we are im̄ediately conscious to ourselves of being awake, & that is from the exercise of our selfpower & self-attention & self-exertion, of com̄anding & directing our own Cogitations & Actions, that is wn awake by internall sense we plainly feel ourselves to be all ourselves & Tense whereas in sleep we feel ourselves to be but half ourselves, loose & relaxated, simple Nature wthout redoubled self-activity.

Wherefore from this Phenomenon of Sleep our Psicologicall Hypothesis seems to be confirmed in wch we make a Dichotomy of the Soul into simple Nature & reduplicate Self=activity, it appearing that these are two really distinct Powers in one & the same sence soul because they can be seperated from one another Neither is this self cōprehensive & self=active vigour of the Soul only relaxated thus in sleep wn Nature sportingly toyes in the exercise of other Powers, not only Imagination but also Reason itself & uninterrupted Cogitation wthout feriation, but we often find by exerience also that even in vigilia w~n we are awake it hath some lazy fitts comes upon it, as in those com̄only called wakeing Dreames, wn the Mind being not self=exerted, but loose & unbent, the Soul spins out an easy web of thoughts by itself wch are perfectly of the same nature wth Dreams & we differ noe otherwise than from ourselves in sleep but only that the bodily chaine tone is then mechanically exerted The minds of Men awake are often so unattentive, heedlesse & inadvertent to their own Actions that wt they do at such times proceeds from lower spontaniety & necessary nature & not from will in them Thus the Tone of the Hegemonick of the Soul cannot be exerted, but the tone of the Body must be needs intended wth it, yet when the Tone of the Body is mechanically intended then the Tone of the Mind may be relaxated But in both cases it appears that the attentive self=exertive & recollective - Power of the Soul that belongs to the hegemonick in us is a distinct - Power from that of Ratiocination as Nature in us & that wch quickens & invigorates it forasmuch as there may be one of these wthout ye other & therefore there are two such gradac~ons or Regions in the Soul as were before described.

Now because there are some writers that contend that there is no instance <5> of any thing ἐφ' ἡμιν or in nostra^ potestate but only in the Lucta or ^conflict that is in the Souls of Men betwixt the Animall & Divine Principle the dictate of Honesty & the dictate of selfish Appetite, but that in all other things we are determined by necessary spontaneity & have no self=power or Liberty at all we must the rather, here take notice of two degrees of Liberum Arbitrium ^autoxousy or self-power in us, first such as is contained wthin the compasse of the Animall Life only, wch for distinction sake we shall call Animall Free=will 2^ly such as ariseth from the difference or distraction there is in nature betwen the divine principle or dictate of Honesty & the lower Animall Inclinac~ons wch we shall call Freewill Morall First for the lower Animals Freewill i.e. that there is a That there is a reduplication of the Soul wthin the Animall Life, wch hath a sui potestas a power over itself or of determining itself is evident from internall sense, for in such Actions in wch Honesty is not at all concernd we are plainly conscious to our selves of such a redoubled self=power severall ways, first over our Cogitations in that we can intend ourselves more or lesse ^both in a way of speculation & deliberation as allso determine both the exercise & object of our Vnderstanding 2:^ly that in that lower kind of Conflict betwixt particar passions & inferiour Reason, respecting nothing but our own utility, we can exert more or lesse vigorous force to resist the violence of particular Lusts, Appetites & ὁρμὰ wn inclining us contrary to the Reason of our own Vtility according to - wch different exertion of our selves either Lust & Passion or inferiour Reason will prevail 3:^ly that in doubtfull cases both of speculac~on & Action & where we have no certain science we can determine both our Assents in speculative things & also our practicall Judgm:^ts, volitions & resolutions beyond necessary Nature & confirm ourselves in those opinions or resoluc~ons more or lesse Lastly that we can more or lesse intend our selves in externall Activity & execuc~on of Purposes com̄only called Industry & Diligence wch in matters belonging to the Animall Life only may be more or lesse exerted In wch respects we have not only an a Liberty of doing this or that if we will (i.e) if such a Will or Appetite doth necessarily invade us & seize upon us; we have ^^sometimes a Liberty of outward Impediment to execute the same but also that we have the liberty & Power of =determinaconnings of selves wch is that that is strictly called Will & a thing wch is vulgarly supposed not to be in Bruits who though they oftentimes ^have a Power of doing wt they will, the word & Will being taken improperly for Appetite (i.e.) a power of doing wt they have an Appetite or Inclinac~on to, yet are not thought to have any inward power of determining themselves one way ^rather wn they might have equally done it another, but are conceived to be & by ὁρμὰ or necessary Phantasies only antecedent as we ourselves are in passions & motions of Desire that obtrude themselves upō us

And that there is such a self-power in us wthin the compasse of the Animall Life is plainly witnessed by the Instincts of Nature leading men often to blame themselves as also to blame other men for having been wanting to themselves as to their own Vtility without ^respect to any Morall evill or Sin, if com̄endacon & blame be a good Argum^t: In the Instincts of Nature to prove Morall ffree=will than the same will also evinces that there is a lower Free=will Animall, <6> men being oft blamed & com̄ended by themselves & others for exerting themselves more or lesse in a way of considerac~on, vigour, resoluc~on & activity in order to their own private good wthout respect to any thing of Honesty or Dishonesty.

We shall a little further insist upon this one thing here, that besides the conflict that is in the Soul between the Divine & Animall Principle, the dictate of Honesty & selfish Appetite, there is another Distraction or conflict wch it is liable to ^within ye cōpas of ye Animal Life not only between severall coordinate Lusts & Appetites but also between two Principles ^ whereof one is by nature subordinate to the other, that is between particular passions, lusts & ὁρμὰ & that inferiour Reason wch is a larger comprehension of our own private Vtility than is in particular Appetites & passions, in respect of wch these ^Lusts & passions wch urge importunately towards their particular Objects wthout free considerac~on of all the Conveniencies & Inconveniencies thereof are com̄only said to be blind or narrow=sighted, thus whereas this Inferiour Reason hath a large & comprehensive view of what belongs to our Vtility considers all the conveniencyes & Inconvencies of things, compares the Future wth the present & discovers that some small present gratificac~on may procure a greater future Inutility wch Faculty of inferiour Reason is much improved by use & experience whereby we are sensible of Hurts we have formerly received by impotently yielding to the importunity of some present Lust or Pleasure That here is such a conflict as this wthin the compasse of the Animall Life, between such a Reason as doth not at all respect ^Honesty but only our own private Vtility & the impetuosity of particular Lusts, Appetites & Passions is plain, as for example wn men are distracted between a present sensuall Appetite of eating or drinking any & that Reason wch tells them this will probably procure afterward a greater pain of the Stone or Gout, wn^^ever the dispute is betwixt one certain Lust impetuously urging to an Act of Pleasure a large or more comprensive Reason that suggests the good of the present pleasure not to be Equall to those future greater evills of Disgrace & Infamy, Losse of Estate, ruine of bodily Health & danger of Death that will follow Wherefore I say that this conflict wch often happens in the lower Animall Life doth as well demōstrate liberum Arbitrium or self=power as that other that is between the divine & Animall Principle For here in like manner as well as there there is ^in the Soul a μεσοντι certain middle or Third thing between both that is conscious of both these Inclinations & attractions & is ^at first as i were puzzled & distracted between them wch accordingly as it doth autexousiously more or lesse exert its strength or force to assist the better Principle, inferior Reason, so is the Victory determined either way

Wherefore we see that the Soul is not perfectly ho^mogeneall & uniform in the Animall Life itself but subject to discord & schism betwixt a better & worser Principle the latter factiously & seditiously opposing the former wch is a kind of Heterogenesy in & Neurospasty in the Animall Life , wn a worser principle wch is least ourselves rebells against a better wch it ought to <7> be subject to & by reason of the remissenesse of the middle Power often getts the victory over it, such a broken & distracted, thing is Mankind in this lapsed state as that his Animall Life itself hath discordant & jarring principles in it, though here it be not wthout a superiour principle also wch can by {illeg} compose the strife by striking in & complying wth the better Part

However though there be such an Animall Freewill in men acknowledged by us, it doth not therefore follow that we must needs assent to Lucretius & Epicurus who asserted that all brute Animalls had a liberum Arbitrium in them, that there was Fatis a volsa voluntas a will free from Fatall & naturall Necessities & a self=determining Power in all other Animalls as well as man, & that as it is s~d of Man by Aristotle that he is ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀιτὶα πράξεων that he is the cause & prin ciple of Action the same must be said likewise of every Bruit There appearing to us no certain evidence that Bruit Animalls besides ὁρμὴ & φαντασία have in them many such other large comprehensive Faculties & as that inferiour Reason before spoken off in men whereby they can consider the Conveniencies & Inconveniencies of their Actions & compare the future with the present & consult & deliberate of wt is to be done, for as it is false concerning men what a late Phylosopher asserts that deliberacon in them is nothing but alternate passions where the Victory at last falls to that Passion whose necessary force is most preponderating, wch therefore he will have to be the only thing wch is called Will in them, so it may very well be true concerning Bruits that there is no other deliberation nor will in them yn such , & that all the discords that is in them is not only of things coordinate & standing upon the same levell, not of things subordinate to one another a discord between narrow & short=sighted passions tugging ag~st one another & alternately inclining the scale till the issue is at last determined - either way by their respective prevalency that there is noe one com̄on or third thing in them that takes notice of all, no reduplicate ^{illeg} principle that exerting itself more or lesse can oversway things one way or other.

But however if there were any such liberum Arbitrium in Bruits as Epicurus fancies it would not at all follow from thence that Bruits could be capable of any Morall Vertue or Vice Nay though we should be more liberall & grant unto Bruits as some do besides ffree=will discursive logicall Reason alsoe so as that they could make Syllogisms in mood & Figure unlesse they had some higher Principle superadded & consequently another kind of Free=will wch we called Morall they could not be capable of any duty or obligac~on properly so called, Honesty or Dishonest, Morall Vertue or Vice For the better illustration of wch we will suppose God to create a world either in the Moon or some other Planett of Creatures indued, not only wth humane shape & wth a power of deliberating according inferiour Reason, by considering all conveniences & Inconveniences all consequences & circumstances of Action & compare the present wth the Future & wth with Free <8> will {illeg}, but also wth a power of discoursing syllogistically concerning universall Theorems of speculative sciences as of Geometry & not only so but over & above all this that such - work=men as these should be indued also wth the notion of a the Deity likewise but only as an omnipotent self=willed Being that must be courted ^& flattered by externall worship or otherwise would impotently let fly his Thunder=bolts at them & consume them in Irefull Displeasure & therefore should accordingly build temples & erect altars & make supplicac~ons to him merely for their outward utilities sake & to appease such a wrathfull & morose Deity I say notwthstanding all this such imaginary Men as these that are so far elevated above the condic~on of Bruits would not be indued wth morality nor indeed by any more capable of true Vertue, Honesty & Piety than Monkeyes, Apes & Babouns they having really no Principle of Obligac~on in them otherwise than by selfish Appetite & private Vtility by wch all their Actions would be measured & circumscribed, Aristotle somewhere takes upon him to determine that the reason why Bruits are not capable of acracy or Incontinency is because they are not capable of Vnderstanding an universall proposition διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θιρμα ουκρατὴ ετι ουκ εχει των καθουλου υπολυχιν αλλα των καθεκεστα φαντασια και μνημον Bruits are therefore not capable of being incontinent because they have not an apprehension of Vniversalls but only a phancy & memory of singulars, and indeed, it is probable enough by the Phænomena that Bruits have no conception of Vniversalls but only a Phantasy of singulars & therefore are so far from syllogisticall Reasō that they are devoid of Axiomaticall judgm^t: & can neither affirm or deny any thing But however if it were otherwise & that besides Free=will they could explicity syllogize & demonstrate Vniversall Theorems all this would not capacitate them for Vertue or Vice properly so called as Aristotle supposeth, unlesse they had over & aboue anonother vitall principle in them superior to that of of selfish Appetite & - A private Vtility A Though ^In the meantime for my part I am far from thinking that there are de facto, any such Creatures any where made by God as are indued wth Logicall Reason that can demonstrate Geometricall Theorems & also wth Animall Freewill which yet are utterly uncapable of that Principle wherein the discrimen honestorū et Turp~m is founded

But we have the rather taken notice off this lower kind of liberū Arbitrium wch is wthin the Spear of the Animall Life & reacheth not to Honesty & Morality, because we have often observed a great æquivocac~on in the use of this word Liberū Arbitrium it being taken in that sense we have described for the lower Animall Freewill & yet many times that attributed to it that belonges to another species of liberum Arbitriū wch we call Morall, from wch æquivocation springs that vulgar error that there is no more required <9> for the begetting of Morality of Duty & obligac~on, Justice & Injustice in Actions than an Arbitrary Law externally promulgated - com̄anding outward Action & a liberum Arbitrium or ffree=will to do or not do the same. The Assertors of wch opinion understand by ffree=will nothing else but such a power of self-determinac~on as may be wthin the compasse of the Animall Life only & though they define their Will wch they would have to be free, to be a rationall Appetite or an Appetite following after Reason & deliberac~on, yet by reason & deliberac~on they mean nothing else but that ratio inferior before described, the reason of private Vtility wch at best is nothing but the sagacity of the Animall Life discoursing syllogistically about the fittest means for the attaining those Ends wch Animall Appetites suggests Wherefore the thing wch they assert is, that to a Being so far elevated above Bruits that it is not led - meerly by Fancies & Hormæ, but that it can also consider, ratiocinate & consult in order to its own utility & determine itself this way or that way, there is nothing more requisite to beget morall Obligation than only the giving an externall Law wth outward rewards & punishments annexed Whereas if there - were no other Principle in a Man than selfish Appetite & consequently noe other Free=will besides this Animall, though God himself should call all the Nac~ons of ye earth together as sometime he did the Israelites & appearing to them from the Top of some high Mountain, flaming wth Fire in a most terrible manner ^should promulgate Lawes to them wth the voice of Thunder threatning the greatest punishm^ts: imaginable to the violatours of them those Lawes could no otherwise operate or seize upon them: than by takeing hold of their Animall selfish Passions, the fear of Bodyly Punishm^t: & hope of outward reward and he that will allow of no other Morall Obligation than this utterly destroyes all Morality

It is true indeed that wn it is com̄only s~d that civill Lawes do necessarily suppose a liberum Arbitriū or ffree=will in Men, wthout wch it would be unreasonnable & unjust to punish any for Transgressions past since none could do otherwise than they did there is no necessity of understanding this concerning any other Freewill than is contained wthin the compasse of the Animall Life whereby they might have avoided such externall Actions forbidden And if there were any where a world of such men before menc~on’d as were not only indued wth humane shape but also wth a power of syllogisticall Reasoning wthout any higher principle in them to cause a discriminac~on of Morall Good & Evill there is no doubt but they might have Societies, Polities & Lawes & yt not only civill but also Ecclesiasticall & religious inferred wth punishm^ts: & rewards to good purpose, in order to the advantage of private Persons & the safety of the whole, wch is the very constituc~on of the Leviathan, I say they might have agreem^ts: & Lawes & a leviathan Common=wealth, but then there could be no other obligacon upon any to - keep those Lawes but only from their own private Vtility of wch themselves were Judges, no Obligac~on truly Morall in that wch would be called Injustice the breach of Lawes & Covenants

We have now declared that wthin the compasse of the Animall Life there is a liberum Arbitrium or ffree=will, that is, a redoubled self=activity wch also doth demonstrate itself in a Lucta or Conflict betwixt two subordinate principles of Action whereof one is inferiour Reason the other particular Appetites & Passions, there being μέσον τι a certain middle thing betwixt both a self=comprehensive, self=reflexive & self=active power whereby the Soul is conscious to itself of both & and can more or lesse exert itself to determine itself either way & accordingly deserve blame or Com̄endac~on The spring or rise of wch liberū Arbitrium is from a participac~on of a higher principle of Action than that of particular Appetites & Passions wch have but a narrow light in them & are determined to one, a freer, more elevated, enlarged comprehensive Principle, but so as it is neither this nor that æssentially but may determine itself to one or other & thereby ^more or lesse promote {illeg} Animall Good

But we are in the next place to observe that this is not the ^onely Freewill that is in us as some suppose erring again on this hand who allow no other Freewill than an indifferent Power, of doing or not doing any externall Action; but there is a higher redoubled self=activity or liberum Arbitriū in humane Souls wch we call Freewill Morall wch not only respects externall Actions & their Vtility or Inutility, but the inward dispositions of ye Mind & Will in wch Morall Goodnesse (as was before observed) properly consists, wch is a - thing that Aristotle seems to have taken notice off in this excellent passage of his having showed before that Vertue doth not consist - meerly in doing such outward Actions, but in doing them in such a manner, as Arts do not consists merely in doing things but in the manner of doing for he is not a Gram̄arian that doth it γραμματίκὸντι unlesse he do it γρμματικοντως & yet s~th he the case of Arts is different from that of Vertues {illeg} for the things wch are produc’d by Arts have their perfection in themselves & it is sufficient if the things themselves be in such a manner, but it is otherwise as to things produced by Vertues for it is not sufficiently to make them be done justly & temp~ately if they themselves, be in such a manner, but also the doer of them must be in such a manner affected, & qualified, as first that he do it knowingly & then that he chuse it for itself not by accident or for Vtilities sake & lastly that he do it wth a firm & constant Will Now this Morall Free=will is originated in the participation of a higher principle not only than particular Appetites & passions but also than the whole Animall Life & Reason of it wch is called by us superiour Reason & it is one & the same thing wch is sometimes called by a low name, το καλον the dictate of Honesty & again by a high name the τὸ Θείον in us by means whereof the Soul hath another kind of Autexousy or self power over the Animall Life, that is, not only over the particular passions & Appetites, but also over the Reason & wisedom of it For the better understanding whereof it is necessary to observe, that - <11> though there be in Man a divine Principle or the principle of a higher Light & life than the Animall yet it is not in him as in God & other impeccable Beings, if there be any such besides God, that is naturally necessary & essentially but only by way of participac~on We are not the same wth It, but We & It are two, we having something else besides an inferiour principle of Animall Life wch could not be of use were the other essentially & im̄utably. But {illeg} are indeed μέσον τι a Third & middle thing betwixt both {illeg} wherefore since we are not this by Nature nor im̄utable essence, we cannot be It any other wise than by self=active exertion & self=determinac~on, by voluntary adhæsion, by an {illeg}, {illeg} vigilant attention & fixed resolution we are not this by simple Nature but by ourselves, as reduplicated, In a word we are this by liberū Arbitrium by Autexousis suipotestas or self=power. Freewilled Beings are such as are not essentially good & Wise, but may by the different use of their Powre become either such or the contrary From these two subordinate vitall Principles whereof one is the instinct of the Animall Life, the other a divine Instinct, we being neither of them essentially - there doth necessarily emerge & result This μέσον τι this certain middle or Third thing between them both wch is the Soul self=comprehensive & reduplicatly selfactive. Free=will whether Animall or Morall doth arise from the participac~on of a higher & lower principle neither of wch the soul is Essentially B the lower whereof is either particular Appetites or the whole Animall Life the higher (though it be called by one & the same name of Reason) yet they are different things signified by ^this one equivocall word And though the Antients had some perception of this yet they were very - much confounded & at a losse to give a right definic~on of Will & Free-will, for whereas they com̄only make it to differ from sensitive Appetite in this ^onely that it is an appetite directed by antecedent Reason, consultation & deliberac~on, if this were true the Will - would allwayes act rationally, & then there could be no such thing as Fault or Sin, but this proceeded from not=understanding the reduplicac~on of the Soul, there is a higher & lower principle in all Free=willed Beings, wch makes them amphibious things And there is a reduplicac~on of the Soul upō them both whereby it can determin itself either way wch is its Will or Self=power

Chap.

Though we have now given a generall accompt of this Faculty of the Soul that is com̄only called Libertas Arbitrij, yet ^ it will be convenient to make a further & more particular inquiry into the nature of it & make it yet more clearly intelligible To w^ch purpose we must examine the vulgar Doctrine concerning it w^ch runs thus B,

W^ch active Indifferency is further thus described, to be a Power of doing or not=doing & of doing this or the contrary Indifferently after all things are put that are put that are antecedently requisite for Either, that is, that Indifferency of Contradiction ^or Exercize & an Indifferency of Contrariety ^or Specification w^ch latter ^in Creatures principally respects these contraryts of Morall Good & Evill & And amongst those prerequisites to Action w^ch being put, a Free Agent may {illeg} either act or not=act ^indifferently do this & the Contrary ^the great Champions of Freewill & ^{illeg} advancers of it in Man do com̄only place not only all outward Objects & Circumstances but also ^Diverse Premotions all inward Reasons & Motives & the ^last Practicall Judgment itself & {illeg} So that according to them a Free=Agent is such as till that very moment of his actuall Willing is not determined by any thing whatsoever antecedent ^ to will one thing rather than another, but is æqually Indifferent till it determine itself. Nay some of them talk so extravagantly as if a Free=Agent were not only Indifferent to do this or that of those things that were before under do = liberac~on but likewise at once Indifferent to Nothing in the ^whole world or to w^tsoever could be done, As if it were able at any time to make the Cogitation of any thing whatsoever, to come into {illeg} minds, & will it accordingly.

But this doth not seem to be a true & genuine Accompt of the Phænomenon of Free will nor the representation of any naturall true perfection, nor indeed of any naturall Power For first it is not easily conceivable how Indifferency can be active, nor how indeterminatation can determine 2ly It seems repugnant to the Phænomena æ experience that w^tsoever externall things are put w^thout a man should be ^still alike indifferent to do this or that, as if there were no such things for this is to suppose a man to be an absolute thing, by himself & to have no connexion w^th the Vniverse world nor dependence upon any thing w^thout him. But Whereas it is most evident that things w^thout us & such as are not in our own power have a great influence upon our Volitions I acting upon our nature or n̄rall propensions & Inclinac~ons, so that if these things had not been we should never have willed, so & so & those things being put as they are we could hardly will otherwise than we do, Hence it is that mens dispositiōs & Inclinac~ons are so much diversified by the diversity of things, w^thout them as by their different fortunes, course of Life conversation & temper of Body A wherefore the learned Origen did very iudiciously perstringe this wild & fluttering notion of Free=will , w^ch makes man by reason of his autexousion, an absolute thing by himself so that nothing that is out of his power hath any influence upon his volitions If any one would make Free=will in us to be a thing loose & disjoyed from the from the whole Vniverse so that by reason of such & such things happening to us, we do not will & chuse this or that ^w^ch otherwise we should not he hath forgot himself to be a part of the world, & that he is comprehended in the com of men & the whole Vniverse Wherefor he ads further to this purpose We willingly confesse that of many things that are in our own power, things out of our Power are the causes of them, w^ch things out of our power if they had not been such & such things w^ch are in our power, would never have been done for many things that are in our power are done or not done consequently upon some things going before not in our Power, so that if things had been otherwise they would have caused us to do otherwise than we do. Thus he. Whereas according to that wild conceit of Freewill before mentioned. Man as a Free=agent {illeg} be such a thing, as Let things w^thout him ^& out of his Power be wt they will is still as indifferent to do this or that, as if there were no such things, that is, he is απολελυμένον τι τοῦ παντὰ a thing disjoyned from & independent upon the whole Vniverse w^ch is so farre frō doing true of man that any we dare affirm that this <13> concerning Deity itself though be ^truly απολελυμένον {illeg} παντὲς and a solide thing by itself & disjoyned from all things w^thout him as independent upon them & though he be not no part of the world nor complicated w^thin the systeme of the Vniverse & of Rationall Beings & Man, I say notw^thstanding all this yet is no priviledge of his nature that all things w^tsoever being put w^thout him, he should be equally indifferent to will or act so or so, for his essentiall Wisdome Justice & Goodnesse, will oblige him in certain cases necessarily to act so & not otherwise, because ^In it is {illeg} the things w^thout him {illeg}doe not impose upon him, but only the Perfection of his own nature that determines his Volitions.

Moreover Thirdly if the τὸ εφ' ἡμιν were such an absolute thing as that all things w^tsoever being put antecedently ^{illeg} the Will & {illeg} indifferent to do this or that as if they were not then nature acted nothing at all ^in us & had no power upon us & we were not partly nature & partly self=activity as was before declared but all self=activity & self=power Then all our n̄rall propensions Appetites & Inclinations were in excess & to no purpose, nay Reason & Vnderstanding itself were {illeg}straneous ^would be Superfluous & it could be nothing but a meer mockery in nature to endue men ^thus w^th Faculties of Reason & Vnderstanding & to incline them to make long ^{illeg} deliberations concerning their future Actions if after all were done that w^ch sway'd concluded all ^in them were ἀπολελυμένον τὶ a loose & abosolute thing ^still equally indifferent to determine itself - either way. How can this be thought to be the perfection of a man or of any Being that is indued w^th Reason & Vnderstanding to be alike indifferent to act w^th Reasō or against it. Reason or vnderstanding And w^ch is yet more monstrous (if it were rightly understood) to be indifferent to follow or not=follow its own last practicall Judgment? Nay how can this be the most glorious of all Perfections or rather how can it be any n̄rall Power at all for a Being to be perfectly loose to its own Good & {illeg} indifferent ^either to its Good or Hurt for such is the indifferency of contrariety to Morall Good & Evill w^ch learned Doctors make to be the highest glory of Free=will Such an active Indifferency as this is to ones own Good & Hurt, what is it else but an active madnesse or the activity of blind ^{illeg} chance & Fortune of {illeg}ding in vs {illeg} so far from being the highest of all Perfections that it can hardly be conceived to be any innaturall Power to be indued with a great impetous & agitation or inclination to Action w^thout any byas to direct any {illeg} mark to aim at, such an active ^a Principle of {illeg} as this A of active nothing A B

B Further It is observable that many of these inconvenient Consequences w^ch are urged by these indifferent Free-willers ag^st the asserters of Necessity & the Wills following necessarily understanding may be retorted w^th greater ^or equall force upon ymselves {illeg} It is objected agst the Asserters of Necessity that this Doctrine takes away the use of all exhortations, for according to that Hypothesis exhortac~on must either be directed to the Vnderstanding or the Will, to exhort the Vnderstanding to understand is alltogether in vain, since it doth not understand by choice & cannot choose but understand whatsoever is clearly propunded to it, the understanding is only capable of Reason & Councells neither can exhortation be directed to the will because that necessarily followes the Judgm^t of the Vnderstanding & cannot do more or lesse than w^t other determines it unto. but this same inconvenience may be retorted ^as strongly upon the asserters of indifferent Free=will that they take away all use of exhortac~ons because after all things put antecedent to Volition & therefore after all exhortac~ons the Will is a like indifferent to do or not do as it was before. Nay the indifferent <14> Free=willers are here guilty of much greater absurdity than the Necessitarians themselves, forasmuch as they do not only take away the use of all exhortation, but also of all Councell & advice, all motives & Reasons & of Vnderstanding itself w^ch the the other do not because according to them Motives & Reasons do often necessitate Action & that cannot be thought in vain that necessitates the effect, but according to the indifferent Free=willers Councell & Advice, Motives & Reasons must needs be in vain because they effect nothing at all, & do not at all abate of the Indifferency of Will that determines Action & And the same may be s^d of Lawes ^Precepts Rewards & Punishm^ts w^ch are but Motives & antecedent requisites of Action & therefore can have no influence upon Free=willed Agents to make them do one thing rather than Another.

Again It is justly objected ag^st the Asserters of Necessity that they destroy the Nature of Sin & Morall Evill & take away all Praise & Dispraise, cannot w^thout Liberty of Will, yet according to that notion of Liberty that they have framed indiff^t Freew. haue fram. they will be as unable to give an accompt held by them Phenomena as the Necessitarians themselves -

For if the highest perfection of all rationall Beings be such an indifferent Liberty of contradiction & contrariety as was after all things put before described then w^tsoever they do in the use of this Liberty they can never Sin because they can never act contrary to their nature or the ^true perfection of their own B Being B there could not be any measure of Morall Good & Evill in the nature of Intellectuall Being themselves according to this Hypothesis of indifferent Liberty any more than according to that of Physicall & materiall Necessity Indeed other asserters of Necessity do notw^thstanding allow that their Paradigms in nature to w^ch Morall Good & Evill are referred they make a reall difference betwixt Virtue & Vice though they suppose that men were necessarily ^determined to both & none was Blame=worthy or Praise=worthy for them the same, but according to this Doctrine of indifferent Liberty made to be the highest perfection of all Intellectuall Beings there can be no Pattern or Paradigm of Morall Good, & Evill in nature of Intelligent Being, Whatsoever keeps its own nature never sins, nor erres; & if active Indifferency after all things put wthout - us or w^thin us, be the true nature of all Rationall Beings, w^tsoever Free=willed Beings do, they can never swerve or deviate from their nature) the exercise of infinite indifferent Liberty being their highest Perfection Wherefore it - will follow unavoidably from this Doctrine that Morall Good & Evill, Just & Vnjust do not spring from Nature, nor any {illeg} but only from positive Lawes & externall Institution & that they are indeed things contrary to nature curbs & shackles to hinder naturall Liberty & therefore Evill in {illeg} only submitted to out of necessity by reason of weaknesse & imbecillity, If this be the true Nature & perfection of the highest Principle, the hegemonicall or ruling power in us, after all the Dictates of Light & Reason to determine it self indifferently then their can be no foundac~on for Morality in the nature of man

Moreover ^according to this Hypothesis likewise {illeg} Praise & Dispraise, in that sense w^ch it supposeth the merit & A Demerit of the Persons A for active Indifferency is nothing else but active Chance & Contingency & if active Chance or Contingency determine the Actions of - Free=willed Beings, they would be no more culpable or blame=worthy for them then if they were determined by fatall necessity, For w^t could be no more Mastership, Lordship & Dominion over our Actions <15> under the rein of blind Indifferency, Chance & Contingency, then under the empire of Fatall necessity, If blind Chance itself was a positive efficient & cause of Actions & did ^with its hand turn mens wills this way & that way, all its determinac~ons would be as necessary to the will, as if they had been {illeg} to thē by Fate or Destiny; this Hypothesis is indeed utterly impossible that Indifferency & Chance should be the active causes or Efficients of any thing, for indifferent Contingency is so far from being a positive cause & principle of Action, that it is nothing but a name given to the defectivenesse & imperfection of Free=willed Agents, but yet if there could be any such thing, though it might seem to be a Paradox yet it is most true that - infinite contingency determining all Actions would be to us the same thing w^th fatall Necessity & leave us no more power over our selves & Actions

B

According to the Doctrine of Necessity there could be no Lucta or Conflict in the Soul, all things would go on easily because necessarily, ther could be no striving nor contention, no laborious conatous that we should be sensible off as our own w^ch if contrary to the Phænomena, but the same inconvenience doth likewise attend that other Hypothesis of active Indifferency according to w^ch Vertue & Vice would be nothing else, but the Wills nodding indifferently this way & that way w^th the same facility ^so long as the card or Hinge {illeg} one way or other upon w^ch it allwayes ^still the same turns ^ ^nothing but easy indifferency, Again {illeg} The this Hypothesis Will would not only have an equally facill flexibility to Good or Evill w^thout any laborious Contention, but it would be able also to passe to the greatest extreams of Vertue or Vice or w^tever it was capable off in a moment, so that if it were in this moment diabolically wicked it might become in the next Angelically holy, nothing could hinder the Will, being infinite Indifferency, from makeing such {illeg} skipps & strides as these are, as if one should suppose that a Being were at all times indifferent to be in any place whatsoever nothing could hinder it from striding im̄ediately from the Center of the earth or Sun to Saturn or the fixed stars or skipping from the lowest Hell to the highest Heaven in a moment. But it is plain according to the Phanomena & experience that the will hath not an equally facile flexibility to moral Good & Evill but must use Labour & Contention to the one, <16> whereas it easily slides & sinks down into the other & also that it is more slow pac'd ^in its {illeg} than that it can make such vast Leaps & Stepps in a moment & passe im̄ediately from one extream to another, a Freewilled Being once fixed in a vertuous state cannot upon a suddain & in a moment do an action that is enormously facinorous flagitious, & the same obdurately hardened in Evill by long Practice & Custome, finds itself incumbered wth an evill habit certain with to an Ephialtes or Nightmare lying upon it & or pressing that it can be hardly able to move or stirre towards Good. Besides all w^{ch there are further Inconveniences that still attend this Hypothesis}

For according to this notion of Free=will that it consists essentially in Indifferency after all things put that can be put besides the Volition itself the Will must needs be utterly uncapable of any Habits whether in things Morall or Naturall for as much as Habitts take away Indifferency & are inconsistent w^th it. It was an argument used by the antient Stoicks as Alexander Aphrodicens tells us against the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν or Free=will, be that Free=will Morall was neither in good men nor in vitious men & so nowhere. Not in good & vertuous men because they were not indifferent to do flagitious Actions, nor in vitious Persons because they had an - impotency & inability to good Actions, the difficulty ^of w^ch {illeg} ariseth only from a false anticipac~on concerning the nature of Free=will that it is an indifferent æquilibrious things ^after all things out constantly reciprocating this way & that way & for the same reason our modern Indifferent Free=willers are very much puzzled to give an accompt of the state of Angells & Saints confirmd in Holinesse how this should consist w^th Free=will, & are forced to determine, that these have lost their Free=will as to Morall Good & Evill, & that they are not now freely Good w^ch the Necessitarians taking for an absurdity, endeavour from hence ^{illeg} advātage to confirm their assertion that Free=will & necessity whether Naturall or Fatall may very well consist together, because Angells & Devills are at once freely & necessarily Holy & Wicked It is true indeed according to this Hypothesis of active Indifferency after all things put there can be besides the Volition itself, it is not conceivable how there should be any firm Habitts either of Vertue or Vice, nor consequently how there could be any such thing as Morality; for Free=willed Beings must then allwayes of necessity be, in an Indifferent, pendulous & æquilibrious state reciprocating this way & that way; in a fluttering uncertain Volatility, unfixt to any thing, having no habituall Inclinations to determine them, no firm & steady purposes or resolutions of Life whereas indeed Free=will is such a power as whereby rationall Creatures can fix their own Volatility ^ to determine themselves into firm resoluc~ons & settle themselves into Habituall Inclinac~ons this way & that way It is true indeed that Free=willed Beings are de of antecedent Necessity whether Naturall or Fatall, but yet they are liable to a kind of self=contracted subsequent Necessity, a Free=willed Being is that w^ch can form & fix itself into this or that & wⁿ it hath brought itself into that state that Vertue & Morall Goodnesse is become a kind of 2^dary factitious & self=made nature so that it cannot upon a suddain do flagitious Actions, it {illeg} as much of Freewill in this state, as wⁿ it was most pendulous & æquilibrious, it doth as much exercise self=power as a Faculty & it hath more of ^{illeg} Suipotence in it ^as a state w^ch is the result & consequence of the right exercise of that Faculty , I say there is as much of Free=will in this state ^of Habituall Goodnes & much more of true Liberty (w^ch is a different thing from the Faculty of Free=will) as in a state of Indifferency <17> to Morall Good & Evill. Indifferency to Good & Evill Morall is not the Faculty of Free=will itself, but it is only one state of it, it is a weak & - middle state of Free=willed Beings, neither the best, nor the worst it being much better than the state of obdurate Wickednesse & much inferiour to a state of confirmed Holinesse But it is an error w^ch we have observed ^some Learned Ethicall writers, to fall into, That there Free=will Morall, but only in a middle state of Indifferency, betwixt Vertue & Vice, whereas this is not the Faculty or Power of Free=will but ^(as we said before only one state of it, w^ch indeed is found in very few that they should be in a perfect equipoise or an ^absolute equality of warering alternac~ons & reciprocations either way & where it is it never continues long, but will quickly settle into an habituall preponderancy on one side or other that is into disposition to either Vertue or Vice. And it hath been observed that nobody continues so long in a state of perfect Indifferency either of Judgment or Inclinac~on as to any thing of Life, it being the nature of Free=willed Beings that they - love to determine themselves as to every thing

If the essence of Free=will consisteth in nothing but Indifferency, it would allwayes be a very weak & limber thing & the Freedom & Flexibility of it, would be but like the Flexibility of a Reed or ^ Rush or like the ^Reciprocall mobility of an Aspen Leaf, it could have no tone nor strength, no sinewes nor nervosity in it, noe firmitude & vigour of Self=power, it would be nothing but languid ^Flaccidity for w^t can be more weak & devoid of Tone or Strength then Indifferency or Chance is, but this again is confuted by experience w^ch plainly shewes that though will be a thing easily mutable by itself yet it hath notw^thstanding great strength & power also in it, for w^t is stiffer than Will? If Will were nothing but flaxccid & limber Indifferency than it could have no pertinacity of purposes, no stratnesse & Gallantry of Magnanimity Courage no invincible resolutions, no inexpugnable firmitude in - Vertue nor obdurate stiffnesse in Vice, no constant steadinesse in carrying on designes ^of Life all w^ch are plainly repugnant to the Phænomena; Love & Affection are either Will or something akin to it & of this we read that it is stronger than Death & more cruell than the Grave; & Plato in his Cratulus tells us that Will is a stronger Bond than Necessity, & it is a known Saying of one of the School=men, that Libero arbitrio post Deum nihil est potentius that after God nothing is stronger than Free=will. Free=will fixed habitually upon Good prooves often ^a thing more inexpugnable than Brasen Walls & Iron Barrs. We 2 conclude therefore that Free=will is not Indifferency but a Power & Contingency It I ill agrees w^th the Phænomena to make Free=will nothing - but Ludibrium, Fortunæ Fortunes Fool & Vassal, or the meer Tennis ball of Chance

It was no weak assault made against this opinion of the Wills being active Indifferency by a propugner of Necessity upon that Ground of the Wills following a necessary Vnderstanding, that vpō this Hypothesis a Man might will Evill as such, for if after all things put antecedent to the Volition, that is, after all appearance & worth of Good the Will be still indifferent to this or that thing; man may act w^tout w^thout considerac~on of Good but allso also against it, that is choose Evill as such; & indeed wnsoever he chooseth that w^ch the last practicall Judgm^t concludes to be lesse eligible, he chooseth Evill as such, a lesser Good comparatively <18> to a greater being Evill. & yet this is allowed by these Authors that the third Faculty of will may act cōtrary to all Judgment of Good -

Again such a Creature as this Free=will it would ^seem to be a thing alltogether inaccessable by divine Grace, Assistance & Providence, it being such a slippery thing as that it hath no Ausæ, no handles in it, that Gods can lay hold upon God having put it quite out of the reach of his own Power, Government & Jurisdiction & made it independent upon himself, so that God could not though he would never so fain by all his Omnipotence do any thing that might in the least promote or advance the Good & Sanctity of any Free=willed Being, nor cast in the least grain to turn the state of his Will towards Goodnesse & Honesty, no though he should stand by & soe all the Free=willed Creatures in the world at once miscarrying preciptating themselves into Sin & Wikcednesse & continnue in the Same.

Again from this Hypothesis it followes that the Will can never be free wⁿ it wills but only before it wills, because the essence of Freedome being Indifferency it was only indifferent before the Volition & not in that very moment wⁿ it wills for then its Indifferency & Indetermination ceaseth

If the essence of Free=will consisted in Indifferency after all motives & Argum^ts, reason & Judgm^t inclining one way then Free=willed Beings could never do any thing w^th a perfect & full will, because by how much more there is of Indifferency in our determinac~ons so much lesse is there of Will ^& Voluntareity. Indifferentia illa quam experior, cum nullæ me ratio in unam partem magis quam in alteram impellit, est infimus gradus Libertatis, et nullam in ea perfectionem sed tantūmodo incognitione defectū quendam testatur; Wherfore those indifferēt Freewillers endeavouring to {illeg} Will quite destroy it.

From these Absurdities suggested it may sufficiently appear that this ^active Indifferency after all things put is not a right & genuine but a false & spurious noc~on of the Faculty of Freewill, but the most effectually convincing way herof is by confining our thoughts only to naturall things, that is, to the Animall Life; And it is most true w^t we have before observed that there are two ^distinct degrees of Free=will in us one of w^ch we call Animall the other Morall though Writers upon this Argument have takē no notice of it this difference but jumbled them both together, the reason whereof seems to be this, because they com̄only suppose Morality to consist only in outward Actions done or not done according to an externall Rule. Let us therefore consider Free=will only in Naturall things or in externall Actions as they referre to the Interests of Animall Life Onely. Now here it will be so evident an absurdity to say that the highest Perfection & the Ruling Principle, in a man is nothing but active Indifferency & chance determining all his Actions, & that this is the great priviledge of a Man that wⁿ ^Inferior Reason plainly tells him, that this ought to be done in Inferēce to his Interest & Advantage rather than an other that {illeg} Indifferent determine himself fortuitously & contingently ^one way or other w^thout any respect at all to the reason of his own Good. that after all reason, deliberation & consultation used, irrationall Indifferency presiding in him should determines all, a Principle altogether carelesse & regardlesse of ones own Good as if it were a Perfection for a Man not no to direct & guide his steps <19> w^th discretion, but to have an Indifferent Liberty, to tumble down precipices & to dash himself against Walls & Posts, or as if a Traveller should coūt it a liberty not to be confined & determined to god in open {illeg} highwayes & to passe over Bridges ^& stiles but to take his way thorow deep Rivers Ditches {illeg} & Hedges, Inclosures & Thicketts W^ch is plainly nothing plainly the Perfectī of a Madman Madman. And what can now & nothing can seem more absurd non=sensicall , than to talke here as such a Freewill as this as some do that it is the most glorious priviledge & perfection of of Humane Nature, that it can thus act ^blindly wilfully & irrationally yet These are the words of a late famous Writer de Libero Arbitrio Hic est Libertatis humanæ apex, quòd se stultum et Brutum reddere possit homo si velit i.e. quòd ita eligere aliquid possit sine Judicio tanquam si ratione prorsus destitueretur, Bruti et Fatui instar. This is the top of humane Liberty that a man can in his Actings render himself Foolish & Brutish if he will, i.e. that he can so chuse w^thout Judgm^t as if he were altogether devoid of Reason like a fool or Bruit And again Ex eo liberi hujus dominij gloria {illeg} quòd homo possit sibi ipsi imperare, ne adhibeat Rationem in consilium sed ut feratur in objectum aliquod Bruti instar non aliter quàm si ratione et Judicio omni careret, hic est apex humanæ Libertatis quod homo possit hominem exuere et seipsum Brutum et irrationalem reddere The glory of this dominion & liberty shines forth out from hence that a man can com̄and himself not to call Reason at all into Counsell wⁿ he is about to choose any thing but that he can be carried to this or that object like a bruit no other wise than if he was utterly destitute of all Reason & Judgmt this is the top of humane Liberty that a man can devest himself of his Manhood & render himself Brutish & irrationall Now if this be nothing but downright madnesse in N^rall things & the concernment of the Animall life, to make this the most glorious priviledge & perfection Liberty & dominion of a Man that {illeg} devest himself of his manhood & act brutishly & irrac~onally wⁿsoever he pleaseth, certainly it is no lesse madnesse to assert the same in morall things that it is a glorious priviledge, Liberty & dominion to have εξουσιαν των αντικειμενων ^after all things Put Indifferēt Liberty of Contrariety as to Good & Evill; Just & Vnjust, & to be determined by Irrationall Indifferency either way, Though it be not so much diserned here because men are not so thorouwly convinced of these differencies of Morall Good & Evill as they are of the other differences of Good & Evill naturall.

This is the great mistake & error of those Indifferent Free=willers that they think Free=will consisteth in being free from Reason & acting Irrationally w^thout any regard to the dictate of Judgm^t & Vnderstanding ^^& that it is a Power that Supersedes the Vse of Reason whereas it is indeed a Faculty bestowed upon us by God & Nature for no other End or purpose but to inable us to intend the use of our Reason & Vnderstanding and advance it to the highest pitch as shall be showed afterwards.

But Aristotle never counts an error well confuted unlesse one shew also {illeg} some thing of Truth {illeg} & complicated w^th it . Wherefore we will shew also the occasion of this error & by w^t appearances of Truth these Authors were unwarily & un induced & fed into it. First therefore it is most true as we have before expressed that Free=will is such a Faculty whereby we are inabled to determine the various passive capability the Infinity & indifferency of one Nature & Nature presenting us w^th severall Congruities & capacities higher or lower we are inabled by it to determine ourselves to either And it is not improbable that these writers seeing a glimse of {illeg} but having an impartial {illeg} conception of it might bunglingly endeavour to expresse it after this manner that Free=will is the same thing w^th active Indifferency, Whereas it is not the Indifferency itselfe that is active, but there are these two Principles in the nature of all Free=willed Being, the first whereof is passive capability and Infinity & Indifferents w^ch is {illeg} nature in us the or matter of the Soul & the 2^d is the {illeg} reduplicable self=activity w^ch is the form that actuates & determines the rude passive & Indifferent Chaos of its nature into w^t it is

But we shall descend to something that is more {illeg} superficiall & is more easy & obvious in this businesse A I cannot be denyed but that there is something of Contingency & Indifferency included in the notion of Free=will, it being inconsistent w^th the necessity of either Naturall or fatall determination w^ch those Writers {illeg} know will not where {illeg} the place ( placed it in the Will itself after all things put that were antecedently requisite to the Volition of this or that, because objects & outward circumstances as also inward Inclinac~ons & Reasons - seem to be necessary wherefore they made the Indifferency & Contingency of Free=will to be seated in the Will itself after all things put besides the very Volition itself as it were sitting at the stern im̄ediately W govern & determine all the motions of the Soul, But this was very unskillfully done for as much as that Contingency that properly belongs to Free=will comes in rather amongst som antecedent Requisites, than the meer Volition or com̄and of Action, it lieing in that {illeg} first generall power w^ch the Soul hath over its whole self of - intending & exerting itself more or lesse That contingent Indifferency that is after all things put being then only allowable in Free=will wⁿ either things are perfectly equall or Reasons are so doubtfull on either side that we know not w^ch to preferre & therefore in this case do negligently & indifferently determine ourselves either way, w^ch is the lowest exercise of Free=will & may rather be called fortitiumion than Electumion But wⁿ in other cases men will negligently carelessly & Indifferently determine themselves either way, this is not the Power or Faculty of Free=will in generall but - only the voice of it. Indifferency & Contingency are no Power or Faculty w^ch can be the Active cause of any thing they are only , the manner of a cause & they have not but not subsistence but only Assistence <21> or adnascens to some positive thing, active Indifferency & Chance ^ruling all is little better that active nothing. A

^Wherefore Secondly another Error ^complicatiō here is that because Free=will is a noble Perfection in respect of brutish Necessity, they unskillfully mistake it for a pure & absolute Perfection w^ch hath not the least mixture or complicac~on of Imperfecc~on in it, as Goodnesse, Wisedome are. From whence it is that they conclude that the τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενοι the first Subject of Free=will is God himself, arguing after this manner that there could be no Free=will in Creatures if there were no Freewill first in god, as men commonly argue that there could be no wisedōe & Knowledge in Creatures if there were not first in God, whereas Freewill (as we shall show afterwards) is but a mixt & mungrell Perfection that hath a complication of Imperfection in it & there not warily distinguishing betwixt the Perfection & Imperfection of it is that w^ch hath caused the greatest obscurity about it & made so many prejudiced against the thing itself, For indeed to hear Men vaunt of the glorious priviledge & Perfection of this Free=will whereby man can Brute agree as we said before & whereby Homo eximitur divinæ Omnipotentiæ ut independetèr aborum aliâ re agat, ut possit nolle subjici Deo et contrarium vel en quod Deus ipsi p^recipit as the same famous Writer that Freewill it is a thing so far exempt from the divine Omnipotence that it can act independently upon every thing besides itself & refuse to be subject unto God & will the contrary to what he com̄ands it. I say to hear - Men thus boast of this as a most glorious Perfection in Free=will were enough to turn any sober mans stomach against it & to - make them endeavour to beat it down as a proud Gigantean thing ^that Swaggers with God himselfe but all this proceeds from grosse Ignorance concerning the true nature of this power w^ch is not a pure perfection but a thing w^ch riseth below God & in umbrâ Dei, in that shade of Nothingnesse & defect that is beneath him, as shall be showed afterwards

This last mistake thatwe have mentioned makes an easy way - for another to follow & that is that Liberum Arbitrium is the same thing w^th Liberty as it speaks pure Perfection & is synonimous to Happinesse ^whereas this latter thing in us ^Liberty is only a state & not a Faculty & the Faculty of Free=will is a Power by the right use of w^ch with the concurrence of divine grace the Soul may assert itself into this state of Liberty & be infranchized in the Freedome of divine Life ^or the sum of it, as the like manner it may again by the abuse of this doubtfull & versatill Power fetter & shackle itself in the greatest of all Bondates that of Sin & Wickednesse & the Very Chaines of Darknesse & make itself become propria - Libertate captivans by its miserable Liberty of Indifferency captive, wherby Indifferēcy, I mean not the power , but the vice ^Imperative of Freewill

And being thus far advanced to make the Faculty of Free=will the same thing w^th the pure Perfection of Liberty wch in Creatures <22> is not a Faculty but a state, here they are fudled & intoxicated w^th that old {illeg} that their first Progenitors, that the experimentall Knowledge of Good & Evill & loose Indifferency to both, is the only true perfective Liberty ^{illeg} that irrationall Liberty {illeg} from the supposed Bonds & shackles of Reason & Wisedom, Goodnesse & Truth, , that uncurbed Arbitrary Self=will is the highest Perfection in the Vniverse, so that God could not be God w^thout this & that this irrationall indifferent Self=will together w^th infinite Power so exists & subsists the same is enough to make vp a God, That is these writers do plainly mistake ffree=will, & Liberty, & Arbitrary Self=will to be all one & the same thing.

Now it is plain that where this Hypothesis is once admitted if men will adhere to the genuine consequences of it they must needs utterly explode Morality & the difference of Good & Evill, for if arbitrary selfwill be the Liberty & Perfection of ^{illeg} all Rationall Beings ^ then Righteousnesse & Holinesse cannot be Liberty & Nature, but ^imposed Force Law & Bondage; where indifferent, arbitrary & irrationall self=will are, the highest Law, there there can be no foundac~on for Morality. If Liberty as it is a pure Perfection of Nature consisted in an universall Indifferency both of Contradiction & Contrariety & therefore to Good & Evill Morall, then there would be equall Perfection in those things {illeg} called Vertue & Vice, Honesty & Dishonesty. If the Arbiter of the highest Hegemonicon in humane nature, that ought to rule & determine all Actions to be indifferent to all thing, then both it & humane n^re itself are alike free from Morality. i.e. Morality is not Nature but a shackle cast upon it, Nothing can beget a true & proper Obligac~on upon that w^ch is naturally free from all Obligac~on, Lawes arbitrarily made & written down upon Paper could not do any such thing. Indifferent Free=will is ^ such a soveraign Queen & absolute Empresse over herself & her own Actions that for her to suffer herself to be hamperd & yoked to Lawes & Com̄ands either of Men or God or to be imposd upon by any previos dictates of Judgm^t & Reason any thing besides itself ^any further then Imbecility & Necessity {illeg} would be nothing else but for her to abandon her own native Right & Royalty, her essentiall Priviledge & Perfection, w^ch God & Nature hath invested her wth & therefore the ^only Vnjustice & Nonnaturality that she could be guilty off To conclude, to suppose a Faculty of Will ^& Liberty whose naturall Perfection is to be indifferent to Reason & all Morall Good is all one as to say that that w^ch is called Righteousnesse & Holinesse, Duty & Obligac~on is not Nature & perfective Liberty, but Contra=naturality, Force & Bondage, ^or nether an externall but an hindrance of Liberty But according to simple Nature unsophisticated by Politicians, Law=makers & Theologers the top of humane Liberty can consist in nothing else but in being undetermined by any thing but our own Will & Appetite Indeed the <23> the Truth of the Scripture is herein verified w^ch made this that most dangerous & Powerfull Temptac~on by w^ch the Parents of mankind was at first seduced, this error having ever since rumed so much in the blood of - their Progeny so that the Poison of it having transfusd itself {illeg} into Phylosophy & Theology itself & generally imbued mens minds w^th an Opinion that the perfection of this naturall Faculty of Freewill in men is to be indifferent to Reason & that w^ch is called morall Good & that this is true Liberty & would be able alone to make us Gods if we had but power correspondent to it - neither could God himself could not be God w^thout it And From hence we may also gather no small Argument to confirm that Mankind is now generally in a lapsed state, since the most refined part of the world, the subtill Philosophers, & acute sharp=willed Theologers are so much inffected w^th this perswasion, for if the Parents of Mankind fell by reasō of that seductiō this false Persuasiō that to know Good & Evill & have an Indifferent Liberty is to become a God than certainly they be grovling still in the fallē state that are still so fuddled, & intoxicated wth the poisonous vapour of this Opinion -

But this is uncharitable constriction made of this Opinion & a groundlesse ^surmize suspition of our own may in part appear from hence in that a late learned & acute Writer endeavouring to give an accompt of this Indifferent Free=will to Morall Good & Evill layes his foundac~on here that ^Boni Honesti Nulla Est per se Justio the Good of Honesty & Justice so called is not a thing desireable in itself but only for the sake of some Pleasure & Vtility that may redound from it & that the delight w^ch riseth from it how great soever it be is not so great a Good as that the Soul of Man can rest in it as its End, but that Delicac~o quæ ex virtute et honesti, rectique studio existit, posterior est et posponenda naturæ ordine Delectac~oi quæ ex voluptatum carnalium com̄ercio est that that delight w^ch ariseth from Vertue & Honesty is inferior & to be postponed or put after that delight w^ch ariseth from carnall Pleasures according to the order of Nature Whence he concludes that , but it is no wonder if there be such a Faculty of Free=will in us as - whose Perfection consists in Indifferency to Morall Good & Evill And sliding thence he doth plainly conclude Honesty not to be a Naturall Good nor to have any setled nature of its own Virtus mandatur et Ꝑscribitur homini Naturalia autem non mandantur, quæ causa est et homo nunquam jubeatur appetere Bonū delectabile And again he useth that com̄on Argument Recti et Honesti species usque quaque certa non est quod enim huic populo, huic homini honestū et rectum - est, id alteri inhonestum est et turpe ad Bonū delectabile omnibus populis, nationibus, hominibus unum prorsus idemque est Now if there be no naturall Good of Honesty then nothing can hinder but that Indifferent, temerarious fortuitous, arbitrary self determinac~on should <24> be a pure Perfection & the highest Privilege of all Intellectuall Beings as well God as Men it having the greatest appearance of Power & Liberty in it.

But there are some of these Indifferent Philosophers more nasute & ingenious than the rest, who are sensible of those grosse absurdities before mentioned that must needs follow in the com̄on Life of Man, if from the active Indifferency or Contingency be made to be the highest perfection & the Hegemonick or swaying Power, w^ch Inconveniences notw^thstanding they suppose to arise from it not directly but by accident, because of our imbecility whereas if we had infinite Power then we might exercise this indifferent Liberty of doing what we list w^thout suffering any inconvenience therefrom

Moreover though there be no naturall Good of Honesty yet because an omnipotent Deity by his decrees & Lawes hath arbitrarily made something Just & Vnjust, Honest & Dishonest w^ch unlesse we observe in our Lives, we shall suffer greater Punishments Inconveniency afterwards therefore though Indifferent & Arbitrary Will be the greatest Good & Perfection in itself yet by Accident it is not so to us Creatures by reason of our Imbecillity, but it must be accompted our perfection who are such obnoxious things to be determined by the reason of our own Good & by the divine Lawes & the more necessarily we are determined to either the better it is But the case is far otherwise in God because e is omnipotent & irresistably powerfull & therefore in him pure Nature obtains w^thout any check or controll that w^ch is simply in itself the best is best to him & that is infinite Indifferency of Will determining all things because this is the exercise of the greatest - Power & Liberty & the very essence of absolute Indepesiency w^ch is the chief Character of a Deity confuts in it whereas if there were any - natures either of Goodnesse or Trueth im̄utable in itself they would be - independent upon God & God would be dependent upon them Whence a learned Author concludes that though in Creatures by reason of their Imbecillity their Perfection consisteth in complying w^th own ^Necessitous & obnoxious & condic~on ^of o^r state & acting accordingly for avoiding of those Evills w^ch we shall be otherwise liable to in God it is otherwise whose highest Perfection is absolute & infinite Indifferency of Will Sum̄a Indifferentia in Deo summū est ejus Omnipotentia argumentum Indeed & Nether would God could not be omnipotent of he were determined by any Necessary & im̄utable Nature of Goodnesse & Truth If he did not arbitrarily make not only all things w^thout him but also every thing wthin himself His words to this purpose Quantum ad Arbirtij Libertatem longe alia ejus ratio est in Deo quam in nobis repugnat enim Dei voluntati non fuisse ab æterne Indifferentem ad quæ facta sunt aut unquam fiaret quia nullum bonum vel verum, nullum credendum vel faciendum vel omittendum fingi potest cujus Idæa in Intellectu divino prius fuerit quam ejus voluntas sed determinares ad efficiendum ut ad tale esset neque hie loco - <25> prioritate temporis sed ne quidem priùs fuit ordine vel Naturâ vel ratione ratiocinatâ ut vocant ita scilicet ut ista bona Idæa sed sum̄a Indifferentia in Deo summmum est ejus Omnipotentiæ Argumentum + from whence he concludes that God did not do one thing in making of the world rather than another because one thing was better than another but he determin'd all things by an Indifferent Will & because he determin'd them therefore is every thing best as it is, he did not make the world in time because he saw it - was better it should be made in time than from Eternity, but because his Indifferent Will did determine to create it in time therefore this is better than if he had made it from eternity. neither did God will the three Angles of a Triangle to be equall to two right ones because it was necessarily true & could not be otherwise, but because he willed it to be so therefore it is now necessarily true Sed quantum ad Hominem cum naturâ omnis Boni et veri jam à Deo determinatam inveniat, nec in aliud ejus voluntas - ferri possit, evidens est ipsum eo libentius, ac proinde etiam liberias Bonum, et verum amplext, quo illud clarius videt, nunquam ne esse indifferentem, nisi quando quidnam fit melius aut verius ignorat, vel certè quandò - tam perspicuè non videt, quin de eo possit dubitare: Atque ita longe alia indifferentia humanæ Libertati convenit quàm divinæ. Indifferentia non pertinet ad essentia in humanæ Libertatis cùm non modo simus Liberi quando ignorantia Recti nos reddit indifferentes sed maximè etiam quando clara perceptio ad aliquid prosequendū impellit.

The result of all is this that absolutely in itself & to a Being devoid of all Imbecillity, indifferent, temerarious, fortuitous, arbitrary Will together w^th power are the highest Good & Perfection ^& Happines w^ch Indifferent Will of his is the first Law of all Truth & Goodnesse w^ch therfore must be {illeg} they are all mutable by him at Pleasure, for it is a childish thing to assert that he that arbitrarily made all Truth & Goodnesse should be necessarily determined thereby ^aftē he had made it & could not arbitrarily change w^t he had arbitrarily made Moreover if Gods Liberty & Perfection consists essentially in Indifference of Will, then he was must not be only once Indifferent for a moment but being allwayes free & perfect must needs continue allwayes Indifferent ^or otherwise not always happy And then no doubt but he would exercise this great Liberty & Perfection ^ever & anon us turning topsiturvij the ^whole frame of the world, hurling one Planet against another perpetually alter^g the position of the Zodiack, Æquator, & the Poles of the world, & not only change ^Position Religious but also all the reputed fundamentalls of it, all com̄on notions & the grounds of all Sceincies & make them no longer to be eternall Veritys, but whatsoever is trew to day make all that false to morrow which was true to day by his legislative Power upon Truths & some time after another

But certainly he must needs have a great deal of Charity that doth not think all this to be really nothing but Hypocriticall & disguised Atheism w^ch thus makes not only the frame of the whole Vniverse world but also all - Goodnesse & Truth of things to owe its originall to nothing but blind Indifferēcy ^ & Chance Omnipotent called by the name of God And this vulgar Doctrine of indifferent Free=will pursued is that w^ch may thus fairly lead one But this strange kind of Mysticall {illeg} the only Soveraign Deity in <26> the world is infinite blind Chance & fortuitous Contingēcy omnipotēt -

But the generality of those who assert this indifferent Free=will to be a pure perfection belonging to God as well as rationall Creatures do not go this way, but make a kind of jumble of things together, they both supposing that there is an essentiall Holinesse & Morality in the Deity w^ch it hath no indifferent Free=will to, but is necessary in respect of it, & yet notw^thstanding that there is an indifferent Free=will in God as to all other things & the most of things in w^ch God is not a Servant to his own Vnderstanding, Reason & Wisedome but by his will hath a Dominion ^& Mastership over it, ^{illeg} after all things are put {illeg}& notw^thstanding all motives & Reasons of his Vnderstanding, it remaining still indifferent to determine itself either way meerly because it will, this being such an essentiall Liberty & Prerogative that to deny this were to deny the very Godhead itself

Somethings they hold to be so Evill that God cannot do them & some things such that if God do but act ad extra he cannot but act according to them, as if he do make a world he cannot but make it wisely, & yet notw^thstanding, there are innumerable things left besides in w^ch God hath a scope to exercise that dominion of indifferent arbitrary Will, & that Deus non tenetur ad optimum, if God make things tolerably well so as they may but - serve the Turnes he is not bound to do them in the best manner possible & that God doth de facto use this arbitrary dominion of different will, they think to be be evident both from the whose system of the created Vniverse & also from the severall parts of it, for the whole world might have been made better than it is, as also the severall parts of it & therefore by arbitrary Will they were made thus as they are & no better there might also have been more worlds or one bigger than this is, & w^t necessity was there but that there might have been more Planets about the Sunne than now there are, that the Earth might not have had fower Moones or Secundary Planets as well as Jupiter hath, or that Mars migh not - have had one as well as the Earth, , why might not the fixed Starres been otherwise placed than they are in a more regular order w^ch would have made them a farre more delightfull spectacle to us men for whose sakes alone all thing were made, than that present, rude & carelesse disposition of them doth, but these the only Pair of this argumentation do indeed urge meaner & more triviall Instances Quis enim credat (s^th one) solem qui loties est terrâ major, non potuisse vel vnū digitum sive majorem esse, sive minorem, quis credat Litera maris non potuisse latum pedem latiora vel angustiora, mentes alliores aut minus allos, hoc potius in loco quàm in illo exstare fontes? And indeed he might as well have demanded straw Whether it were {illeg} might of necessity been in the same place & posture that now it is in, ^or they were not thus disposed by Arbitrary {illeg} as some of those things w^ch he instances in.

But here we argue in this manner that either active Indifferency & arbitrary will is the highest perfection in the Deity or else there is - immutable nature of Good wch is the rule & measure of the divine volitions & Actions, if Indifferent arbitrary Will be the highest Perfection then this ought not to be confined any where in God; neither must we assert that God is necessary to any thing, from whence it followes that there can be no such things as Morality in the Deity, nothing unjust antecedently to his will w^ch therefore he hath not liberty to do + Or else if there be any positive nature of morall Good, of Rectitude & Wisedome w^ch is the highest perfection of the Deity then it is plain that there can be no Indifferent Free=will in opposition to his naturall Goodnesse & Wisedome & to say that God is Indiffe <27> rent to do the Better or the worse, is to make him Indifferent to his own Perfection, w^{ch is {illeg}} his own Good, . Indeed if thhere be any things are exactly equall according to the Judgm^t of infinite Wisedome, so that there is not one gram of Goodnesse in one more than another here there would be no imperfection at all for the Deity to determine itself indifferently, nor indeed any great dominion or Perfection would consist in he could ^{its being able} do this, this being not so much election as sortition; only a there would be a necessity in - such a case of determining one way or other But whether the divine Wisedome haveing contrived the Best Frame of the created Vniverse possible foreseeing all things that would result from it did not leave many of those minutall things w^ch we would needs ingage his particalar & decrees about, to the ἀκολουθία & sequall of things themselves ^frō whence his all comprehending Wisedome forseeing that nothing would result & that was ^ inept enormous or incongruous to whole But the reason why men do so easily conclude that the whole Vniverse might have been made better than it is is partly from hence, because they know not the vastnesse of Gods Creation & partly from their narrow & short sightednesse, by reason whereof they cannot comprehend the End & Fitnesses ^& congruitie of things: & Now of those Atheists that have so confidently affirmed that the world was not made by God (i e) by infinite Goodnesse & Wisedome ^but by Chance could ever shew how so much as the Organicall Mechanism of mans Body could have been mended in any one thing or indeed could discover the thousand'st part of that divine artifice & contrivance of it, w^ch the more it is inquired into by the curious & sagacious still appeares more & more.

All that can be ^yet pretended for such a Faculty Free=will ^whose Perfectiō consists in being indifferent to the reason ^& Understanding & Judgm^t both in God & Mē is this that though no Being can be indifferent to its own sumū Bonū that there are many lesser Goods w^ch it may have a Dominion over & a priviledge to determine itself either way indifferētly in respect of them Or else as others would have it though the Will is necessary in respect of the End w^ch is chiefly to be understood of the first End w^ch is never a means yet it hath a liberty to determine itself indifferently as to means w^thout being determined by any necessary Reason or Vnderstanding antecedent But to the first of these we reply that the true Sum̄um - Bonum or highest of all Goods as was before declared is the divine Life of Vertue w^ch it is plain that humane Souls are not necessary to & this is indeed the Nature of Free=willed Beings that they are such things as may possible degenerate & fall from their own highest Good & sinkn down into certain lower goods or Congruities Wherefore some late asserters of Free=will doe for this Reason, because it seems plausible to make the Will necessary to the summum Bonum but yet to have a Perfection of being contingently arbitrarily Free, they will needs determine that the sum̄um Bonum is not the Good of Honesty, but Animall Pleasure & self=preservation & from thence endeavour to shew how the Will ^becomes indifferently free or indifferent to the Morall Good & Evill & that it is its perfection so to be because that w^ch is called Honesty is a Good not desired for itself but only for the sake of <28> an Animall Pleasure, thatis, it is not an End but a Meanes And to say that the Will hath an indifferent Freedome to Meanes, is all - one as to say that it hath a Freedome to lesser Goods for as much as lesser Goods have but the Nature of meanes in order to the highest Good It may be granted to be true as was before shewed that the Animall Life & Congruity is the τὸ πρῶτον ὀικείον the first concililation of Nature as that w^ch lies more shallow & superficiall in the outside of us the referer putting itself forth first, but though that w^ch is naturall be first & afterwards that w^ch is Spirituall yet it doth not follow from thence but that the latter may be the highest Good And indeed to affirm that the Good of Honesty is not desireable in itself & that it is not a higher & more noble Good than that of Animall Congruities is but the Philosophy of a Bruit unworthy of a Theologer & since that kind of Liberum Arbitrium whose Perfection consists in Indifferency to Morall Good & Evill & to all Contrariety & contradiction after all things put, it is most deservedly to be exploded as a spurou figment of mens Brains nothing being more certain than that the highest Good of all Intelligent Beings is the Good of Honesty or divine Morality w^ch indeed humane Souls & Angelicall Beings by reason of the imperfection & defectiveness of their Nature may lapse & fall from, but it is no glorious Power or Perfection that they have, as is fondly supposed that they are indifferent to it But the Deity being a Being infinitely perfect is essentially that divine Life & can never fall from, nor hath any such indifferent Free=will towards it, as is by most of these writers themselves acknowledged, But to say that either God or Man have a naturall Priviledge or Perfection in them in respect of all lesser Goods that they can indifferently determine themselves proceeds from much childish Ignorance of the nature of that highest Good as if it were a narrow particular thing, whereas it is a certain Life that extends itself to all Actions & is the measure of them & all inferiour Goods Wherefore it can be no naturall Power or Perfection in any Vnderstanding Being to determine itself indifferently as to inferiour Goods Hic et Nunc they having allwayes a certain respect or Analogy to the highest Good Indeed there is a sense in w^ch it is very true that it is a noble power or Perfection of the Soul as a late Author contends to have an Indifferency to all lower Goods in order & tendency to the highest Good w^ch is indeed the true amplitude of the Soul And the same is to be s^d of Meanes that it is no perfective Power in any Being to be indifferent to any Meanes tending to this or that End but contrariwise the Perfection of the Rationall Nature requires as to choose the best End so to use the fittest & most congruous meanes to Ends resolv'd upon We conclude therefore that there is no naturall Faculty or Perfection in any Intellectuall Being whatsoever whereby it hath a priviledge to act Indifferently in respect of its own Good, Reason & Vnderstanding, but such an indifferent Dominion as this is ever ones self is no Power or Dominion, no freedome or Liberty but only the vice of Free=willed Beings w^ch by reason of the imposture of the Animall Life is taken for Freedome & Perfection.

Chap:

It now remains that we give a true & clear accompt of the Nature of this Faculty of F=will a possible & intelligible Ideah ^of it & such as will salve all the Phænomena's that belong to it ^ w^ch we shall do by severall steps & gradations

First therefore the genericall nature of Liberum arbitrium is this that it is a certain Power that a Being hath over itself & over its own ^Volitions & Actions, thus that is rightly called by the Antiens ἀυτεξουσία & sui potestas + B some called it by the name of Dominum to the same purpose, but because this word seems to imply an absolute dispotick Power, therefore I conceive it not so proper here lest it should lead men in to a that false apprehension as if this Faculty in man did imply that he had an absolute despotick Power over his whole Soul & his morall Dispositions to Good or Bad ^{illeg} quite to change them in a moment as he pleaseth as if it were an infinite vertibility in us whereby we could at any time make ourselves Morally good or Evill as easily as we can turn our hand or head this way or that way

It is true indeed that this self=power doth plainly imply in the notion of it a Freedome from all absolute ^naturall Necessity, that is, it hath something of Contingency in it w^ch if any one will need call by that improper name - of Indifferency we shall not contend w^th them him about it, provided it be not taken in that sense before exploded, as if it were a naturall Power or pure Perfection to be alike indifferent to act w^th Reason or against it & to be fortuitously determined in all our Free=actions to Good or Evill Self=power is a thing to w^ch something of Contingency doth adhere & cleave παρα φυαδος εικος as an ad nascense to it , for Contingency as well as Evill hath not ὑποστασιν but παρυπόστασιν only, {illeg} it is not ἀιτία the cause or Efficient of any thing, but τροπος τῆς ἀιτιας the manner of a cause only, but how this Contingency is to be Vnderstood & how much there is of this Contingency in Free=will'd Beings as also where it is lodged we shall discourse more afterwards

The genericall nature of Free=will is not rightly assigned to be Indifferency or Contingency acting for neither of these is a cause, but it is a positive power or ability to w^ch Contingency ^or Non-necessity hath παρυποστοσιν an ad sistem a thing that doth insinuate it self into it & is an Affection of it.

Secondly all Power being for Good, for that w^ch tends to Evill is not Power but impotency, Free=will is a Power w^ch a Being hath over itself for Good τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι ἀαθοῦ χάριν ἐφνέται to be ones own, & at ones own disposall is desired only for the sake of Good, ουδεν οικοιοτερον αγαθὸν Good is most ourselves Evill being heterogeneous to every Being & therefore not itself Wherefore Free-will according to the proper & genuine notiō nature of it is a Power w^ch a Being hath whereby it can contribute something from himself to promote itself towards Good & to sin & keep itself in the same self=power is a Faculty bestowed upon him by God & Nature in order to the procuring that suipotence w^ch is a state in us as happinesse is to all Free=will'd Beings, wⁿ they are habituall is fixed in the predominancy of the higher & better principle for we {illeg} then only truly Power & Dominion over ourselves wⁿ the best thing that belongs to our Nature & the best thing in the Vniverse reignes in us It is a spurious notion of self=power to make it nothing but Indifferency & Contingency itself acting, as if infinite indeterminac~on were the highest perfection of any Being & consequently most itself & that is also a false Idolum of Power over ourselves w^ch is imagined by some w^thout respect to Good, Infinite Power over ourselves any way indifferently whether to Good or Evill {illeg} for Power is not Power w^thout respect to Good Free=will or Self=power is nothing but a self=promoting Power to Good or a self=preserving Power to adde something to its own Perfection, of w^ch there are - those two degrees, first a Power of intending itself in a way of consideration, in recollection, self=attention or introspection in speculation about Truth & Falshood & deliberac~on about w^t is practically Good & Evill in Life, again in in a way vigorous exertion of itself, in to of strenth & force & resolution to resist the lower Inclinations & promote itself towards the higher principles 2^ly in accordingly determining its assents & Volitions or Actions Freewill'd Beings as reduplicated upon themselves & self=comprehensive, they have a self=intending & self=exerting Power w^ch is their strength to Good the Power of Free=will properly so called is to Good & ^It was design'd & intended for this only Nature sufficiently obtrudes the lower things upon us, but as to the higher things our own active premotion & exertion of ourAselves towards them is expected from us. 3ly this Power of Free3willed Beings w^ch they have over themselves for Good is but an imperfect Power, for perfect Power over ones self is no other than essentiall Goodnesse & Wisedom where the reduplicac~on of Free=willd Beings ceases & is swallowed up in the simplicity of absolute Perfection. - But it followes by unavoidable necessity that such a Being as has a power over itself to intend & exert itself must also have a Power (if it be a Power) not to do the same free=will therefore is a Power over ourselves to promote & fix our selves in Good, imperfect & self=determinable, it is such a Power as we ourselves have a Power over by meanes whereof we are able to to exert it or not & consequently to use it or abuse it it is per se a power of promoteing ourselves to the higher Good & fixing <31> ourselves in the same, but by ancient of Power, of languid self remission & consequently of selfdeterminac~on to the worser Principle w^ch Power is impotency, & acting according to it is the vnnaturall abuse of the Naturall Power of Free=will whereby we are - guilty of Sin & Fault, become the causes of our own Hurt in that we might have done otherwise & deserve blame & punishment & But this hath been the grand & capitall errour of Writers upon this Argument that they have not taken notice of this διφυία in this Faculty of Free=will, nor distinguis'd between the Perfection & Imperfection of it, its Power & Impotency, its right use & abuse, but have taken it ^all for a pure Power & Perfection & therefore have seated it first in God himself as if Free=will for were one & the same thing w^th Liberty ^& happinesse w^ch in Creatures is but a state & not a n^rallPower W^ch Hypothesis plainly destroyes all difference of Morall Good & Evill makeing all Actions alike to be the genuine & proper offspring of - Free=will as a n^rall Power & a pure perfection whereas indeed Sin & Morall Evill are but the Spurious & bastardly Offspring ^or a By-blow of it of a thing of w^ch the power of Freewill is not the univocall but the equivocall cause only or a cause per Accidens, it proceeding not from the Power but from the impotency therof, so that Free=will is an imperfect perfection, a mungrell thing, a self=determinable Power & weakenesse, Liberum arbitrium is not Liberty but a certain n^rall Power according to the right use of w^ch we may rescue assist & recover ourselves into a state of true Liberty & suipotence or by the abuse of it may inthrall ourselves in the greatest Bondage

Fourthly it is an im̄ediate πάθος or essentiall property of this - ambiguous middle Power, this imꝐfect Ꝑfection of Freewill that by the use & abuse of it, a man may become either ἑαοτοῦ κρὶτων or {illeg} as the Greeks emphatically expresse it better or worse than ones self ie. a man may either advance & promote himself, be under God a subordinate cause of his own Good or else may damage & detriment himself & - become the proper cause & efficient of his own hurt, of Sin & Morall - Evill The chief Argument w^ch hath in all ages been used to prove that there was such a thing as Free=will was frō Cōendac~on & Blame not such a one as only signifies our approbac~on & dislike of the things themselves Cōmended & Blamed absolutely but w^ch doth also reflect upon the persō as the cause of either to himself wⁿ it was possible he might not - have been so And we have shewed before that such Praise & Dispraise Cōmendacon & Blame could not be founded in an Indifferent Free=will whose Power & Perfection equally consisted in determining itself either way & indeed chiefly shined forth in being loose from - Light & Reason & free from it, the glory of that Free=will consisting in this that it is not bound to any thing & therefore not to that w^ch <32> most pretends to have a right to binding & limiting our Actions i.e. Reason & Vnderstanding w^ch notion of Free=will is an impossible Idæa but Free=will being such a Power the various use of w^ch qualifies men either for Praise or Cōmendac~on, it is evident that it must be such a mungrell & ambiguous Power as we have allready described W^ch may abate that envy w^ch is in the minds of many against this thing called Free=will occasioned by a false representation of it.

Fifthly haveing now shewed that Free=will is such an imperfect Power as though intended by God & nature for Good that by it Freewilled Beings may be able to adde & contribute something to their own Good yet ^such as that accidentally {illeg} by the abuse of it, they may by it become the causes of our own Hurt & justly deserve Blame & Punishm^t we - should in the next place speake something more concerning that w^ch is purely & properly the Power of it ^its Power to Good & shew how far it doth extend It being so much extolled & advanced by many ^Idolaters of Freewill as if it were a perfect Dominion & absolute despoticall Power over ourselves, a thing that is allwayes indivisibly the same, & never impareable or X diminishable by vertuous or vitious Actions X For that full & absolute Power over ourselves is nothing but perfect Goodnesse & Wisedome w^ch being essentially in God he is therefore the only true autexousious or selfpowerfull Being ^in that sense but as autexousy & self=power are commonly taken for Free=will in Beings reduplicated upon themselves it may be also s^d of God as a Platonist expresseth it that he is πλεον ἤ ἀυτεξούσιος more than self=powerfull & Freewilled or more than in his own Power; he being a simple Being & essentially the same thing w^th his own Good Perfection so that he & it are not two & consequently is not reduplicated upon himself in a way of Composition, But that w^ch in Free=willed Beings who are not essentially their own Perfection is called self Power is not a perfect Lordship & Mastery {illeg} over themselves; such Power as whereby by intending & exerting themselves w^th ^much labour, pains & earnest attention they can promote their own Good.

In that other notion of Freewill w^ch is asserted by many whereby it is made nothing but Indifferency & Contingency itself turning the Will this way or that way either to Morall Good or Evill, as if there were equall Power in its turning both wayes there is nothing of laborious conac~on, striving or contenc~on towards Good Vertue & Wisedome any more than to Evill, Ignorance & Vice, whereas this ^doubtfull & double Nature thing Freewill puts forth itself very differently these two wayes in one it is active & laborious self=intention & self=exertion, in the other sluggish self=remission, relaxac~on & langor

And Because Free-will'd Beings have an easy des <33> poticall Power over the executive faculty & rational organes w^ch w^th a meer beck they determine to different motions this way or that way, w^thout any dispute or reluctancy therefore some have been thus mistaken to make the Power of Freewill the - same ^over the inward affections of the Soul & think that they can as easily & w^th as litle labour & difficulty turn themselves to Good as they can turn their hand or nod their head this way or that way & with as little adoe as they can to Evill whereas Free=will is only Power to Good, there it is active conation, tone & strength, but to Evill it is inert sluggishnesse - Flaccidity & langour

In the Animall life itself Free=will as a Power to promote the Animall Good, consists in vigorous exertion & intention, in laborious conation, but the Evill for w^ch its actions are at any time blamed are imputed to nothing but inertnesse & want of putting forth or intending ourselves. Here our Power over our Cogitac~ons is not so despoticall & easy as it is over the locomotive Power of the Body there being labour not only in the intention of meditatiō & consideration but also in the direction of our thoughts to the same scope w^ch are otherwise apt to straggle & wander being interrupted w^th the continuall risings of involuntary thoughts obtruding themselves upon us & turning the course anoXther way, X but there is need of greater force & laborious exertion to prevail over passions Appetites & Hormæ & contracted habituall Inclinac~ons clashing w^th Inferiour Reason, so that w^thin the compasse of this Animall - Life wee are plainly sensible that there is ὑτεροκινητον τι w^ch causes a Lucta & Conflict in the Soul, it doth not w^th indifferency & like ease turn itself either way to comply w^th indifferency & like ease turn itself either way to comply w^th inferiour Reason or w^th lower Appetites but its motion to one is vigour & strength towards the other inertnesse, langor & remission.

But this appeares much more in Morall Free=will In the generality of mankind, but especially in those that have been long under vitious habits There is no such Power of Free=will as can despotically com̄and - those inclinacons & turn itself to Good w^th the same ease as one can nod his head or turn his hand, as indifferent Free=willers suppose The Power of Morall Free=will cannot change such habituall vitious Inclinac~on as these in a moment & that w^thout any labour & contention it can only prevaill over them by degrees & by little & little by earnest ^means striving & contention & constant laborious conation {illeg} Wherefore it is a false notion of Freewill w^ch some have set up as if it were such an omnipotent thing that were alike in all states & could despotically com̄and & turn the Soul to Good as well to Evill w^th the same facility with nodding this way or that It is such a thing as allwayes consisted in an Indivisible whose strength is both unincreasable & undiminishable & indeed such an absolute Power over our selves to Good as stood in no need at all of any divine assistence from whence it hath come to passe that the name & thing of Liberum Arbitrium hath come under so much odium & prejudice by reason of that false notion that hath been made of it as if every Free=willed Being was so much in his own hands & had such an absolute Power & Lordship over himself to turn himself either way as that he stood in no need at all of God or of is assistence. X

And indeed ^it cannot be denied but that among the Philosophers there wanted not some who have thought Free=will to be such a ^self sufficiēt Power in Morall things <34> as that it was a vain & foolish thing for any {illeg} to implore the divine Assistence for the procuring of Vertue or a good mind & that never did owe - any thanks. at all to the Deity for it, {illeg} Though as for outward things w^ch are called the gifts of Fortune they would acknowledge them to God & pay their thanks for them yet for the inward ^good dispositions of the Mind they thought that every man had such an absolute dominion & lordship over them by his own Freewill that he need neither seek them of God nor ascribe them to him, to this purpose is that of the Poet Hæc satis est orare Jovem quæ denat et aufert Det vitam det opes, æquum mi animum ipse parabo.

It is enough to pray to Jupiter for Life, Health & Richesw^ch are properly his Gifts, but a good Mind I will bestow upon myself Bonam mententem (s^th Seneca) stultū est extare cùm posses a te impetrare and Turpe est Deos fatigare quid vetis opus est facte ipse felicem. thus also Cotta in Cicero Judicium hoc omniū mortalium est fortunam à Deo petendam, à seipse sumendā esse sapientiam & agam Hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent omnē cōmoditatem prosperitatemque vitæ a Diis se habere Virtutem autem neme unquam acceptam Deo retulit No mā thanks God for Virtue, but {illeg} And that of Sinesius also the Christian sounds to this purpose Disturb Trouble not the Gods with thy Prayers Nay since thou mayst being be saved by thy self if thou wilt for every one may be the fountain of this, in willing to be God w^ch passages cannot be excused of the highest Insolence & Arrogancy though perhaps some might make this charitable construction of it that as if their meaning was that men must not attend upon prayers to God only w^thout Endeavours nor conceit that Vertue & Vice are things determined by Fate only the rather because some of these same Phylosophers sometimes spake otherwise Roga bonam mentem, bonam valetudinem animi deinde corporis, X Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano Who notw^thstanding adds afterwards Monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare as suppose these two to be consistant

But it cannot be denyed but that it is most true that if there were such a Free=will as is com̄only described as there could be really no such thing as Vertue or Vice, so in order to that w^ch is called Vertue & for all the guidance & direction of our Will, we should be absolute & compleat things in ourselves & such as could neither be helped nor hindred by the Deity Neither did the doctrine of Pelagius that tooke away all necessity of divine grace proceed from any other originall than this false notion of Free=will that it is an absolute power in the Soul of turning itself indifferently to Good or Evill But this Doctrine was cryed down by some of the very heathen Phylosophers themselves If God do not bestow Vertue upon men & that be a thing that we owe only to ourselves but only give Riches & Health w^thout Vertue he doth not profit or help men at all, forasmuch as Riches & health w^thout Vertue have no true Goodness in them & therefore if God do not contribute any thing ^at all to Vertue but only dispense Riches & Health & such outward Good things to us he doth not contribute any thing <35> at all to our true Good And to the same purpose that pious Emperour Marcus Antoninus L.9. Sect 40 Either the Gods cannot help at all or else they can help, if they cannot help why dost thou pray unto them? But if they can help men & promote their Good why dost thou not rather pray that they would inable thee neither to fear nor desire nor be grieved inordinately for any outward thing rather than these things should either happen or not happen to thee, for if God can help men at all then certainly he must needs be able to help them as to those things w^ch are the only true Goods But then he brings in an Objection concerning Free=will Αλλα {illeg} But perhaps (s^th he) you will object that God hath put these things in our own Power, that is, he hath given vs Free=will & hath made us fully Lords & Masters of our own Volitions so that though outward bodily things as Riches & Health be not in our Power for w^ch cause we pray unto God for them, yet Vertue consisting only in the Will itself we must needs have it perfectly in our power & need not implore Gods assistance in any such thing, to w^ch after some other things interposed Who - told thee that God doth not help in these things w^ch belong to theire own power or thy Free=will, as if he should say, This is notoriously false that Free=will is such a Power to Good so compleat & absolute as that it stands in no need at all of the divine assistence wherefore he earnestly exhorts men to pray for Gods help & assistance as to vertue & Morall things confidently assuring them of good successe therein begin to pray to God for these things & thou shall see w^t will follow; Let other men pray that they may enjoy this outward Pleasure or Vtility or be freed from this outward Evill, but do thou pray that thou maist not desire such things nor stand in need of them, nor fear the Contrary Contrary turn thy prayers altogether this way & see what will come of it And Epictetus himself in Arianus - though he elswhere attributes so much to Free=will & seems to make it such an absolute independent thing that he running out into this extravagant expression that Jupiter himself cannot conquer the Will, yet notw^thstanding he earnestly exhorts wⁿ they are strongly tempted & assaulted by their Lusts to call upon God & implore his divine assistance as also at the same time to put forth the utmost of their endeavours & to strive w^th all their might as being otherwise in danger of being over powred by such Appetites & Phantasies &c Stand to it, be not snatchd away by <36> thy Fancies Appetites & Passions, the contention is great the undertaking divine, it is for a Kingdome for Liberty, for Prosperity, for undisturbednesse of mind remember God, call upon him as thy helper & assistant as the Mariners call upon Castor & Pollux in a storm, for w^t greater storm can there be than that w^ch proceeds from strong Phantasies bearing down Reason From - whence it appeares that this Phylosopher did not take Free=will to be such absolute thing of we our selves to Good but that it was only a Power of Conation & striving w^ch by degrees might prevail more & more over the lower affections, & w^ch also stood in need of divine assistance or grace to strengthen it & help it forwards

We have shew'd before that Freewilled Beings are half nature, half Self=activity or Free=will & that nature goes a great way in us thē & therefore that things w^thout us thē laying hold upon our lower Appetites & natural Inclinations have a great Power upon us, this is that nurospastia that strongly drawes as it were w^th cords this way & that way & in this sense we are not perfectly ἀυτοκίνητος light & nimble {illeg} to turn ourselves to Good as we please w^thout any labour or difficulty, but we have πολυ ετεροκινητον in us, much Heterokinesy & Reluctancy & a weight that strongly presseth down another way ^To this mix be added all {illeg} Wherefore if things out ^of our Power have a great Power upon us Gods providence w^ch orders & disposeth these things must in this respect have a great force & Influence upon us, likewise To w^ch grace & Providence This belongs this not to lead us into temptation nor suffer us to be tempted above what we are able & to make all outward things to work for Good to a sincere & upright Heart, in w^ch respect of Gods {illeg} disposing outward things that of the Philosopher may be taken that Men do not so much order their own affairs nor dispose of their own Actions as God & Opportunity order all things, God & opportune Providence Besides w^ch there are other more inward & more im̄ediate actings of divine grace & Providence by ^internal motions & suggestions of Thoughts by strengthening & corroborateing Good Desires by inward {illeg} Inward convictions of Conscience & the like by w^ch divine Grace may effectually insinuate itself in us w^thout any Violacon of our Freedome or self=power not to speake here of that divine spirit of God himself w^ch is an inward principle of Life & Light in regenerate Persons & w^ch worketh all their works in them, of w^ch something afterwards.

We conclude that Liberum Arbitrium according to the true notion of it being an Imperfect Power over ourselves doth no way exclude the assistance of divine Grace & Providence ^w^ch takes care of all weak things in the world w^thout w^ch it would be insufficient of itself to keep men in a state of Vertue but much more to recover any that are deeply lapsed into Wickednesse to w^ch purpose the learned Origen well determines that the Good of - Free=willed Beings doth not depend only upon τὰ προαιρετα the use of our own Free=will, but also stands in need ἀπροαὶρετον τι something else <37> w^ch is out of our own Power w^ch is the divine ^Power & Grace {illeg} As one may say that the Good of Agriculture in order to fruit is a mixt thing consisting partly of something w^ch is arbitrary to the husbandman his plowing & tilling the ground according to art & partly something w^ch is not arbitrary & nor in his Power, that Providence w^ch orders the temperature of the air & seasonable showers so the Good of Rationall Beings in order to Vertue may be s^d to be a mixt thing thatis compounded of the Free=will of the Agent himself & of the divine grace conspiring, w^ch he illustrates also from that of the Psallmist unlesse the Lord build the house he laboureth in vain that buildeth it, & unlesse the Lord keep the City, he watch in vain {illeg} wittily allegorizing it in this manner He that builds a house every one that is a proficient in Vertue builds a house He that Keeps a Citty & every one that is perfect in Vertue keeps a City, but the Labour of him that buildeth & the watch {illeg} of him that keepeth are both in vain unlesse the Lord both build & watch with them, whence he concludes that besides our own Free=will our Morall Good depends upon the divine Power & Assistence w^ch helps the building of him that builds & doth as it were rebuild w^th him , who ^by {illeg} alone was not able to finish his building & the same is to be s^d of the keeping of a City allready built Wherefore s^th he there is not only need of the concurrence of our own Free=will & of divine grace conspiring w^ch as to us is out of our Power) for the begetting of Vertue & Honesty but also for the keeping of the same And the most consumate in Vertue will ipso facto consequently sink from that state if he make himself the cause & do not give due glory to him for w^ch cause s^th he the Apostle seeing that w^t our Free=will contributes to morall Good is much lesse than the divine Power & Grace s^th that it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth but of Gods that sheweth mercy not as if God had mercy on men that did not will nor runne but because our willing & running is nothing in comparison w^th the divine Grace & therefore we ought much rather to entitle the divine grace & Goodnesse than our own willing & running to Morall Vertue as being the cause of it; and at last he concludes that the end of all this is to shew that we ought both w^th o^r own laborious endeavours & Prayers ^to God for his Assistance loyalty to seek to attain spirituall Goods & to expell vitious evills from our Minds Be all the antient Doctors of Christianity did likewise unanimously assert the Concordia gratiæ et liberi Arbitrij the {illeg} & friendly concord of Grace & Free=will together they were not contradictious to one ano <38> ther as many men suppose who wⁿ they hear of Freewill, think Grace is ^presently excluded & wⁿ they hear of Grace think Freewill is destroyed whereas there is a most amiable assistance betwixt these two as is plainly intimated in the holy Oracles in those expressions Work out your Salvac~on w^th fear & trembling for it is God &c I have labour'd more abundantly than they all, yet not so much I as the grace of God that was wth me W^ch concurrence of Gods grace w^th our own Will & Indeavour the very Heathens themselves expressed in such passages as these God speeds the course of him that sets himself to run And Synesius tells us that by mens joyning of these - two together Wherefore it was rightly by one of the Antients Tolle gratiam non erit quo salvetur Tolle Liberum Arbitrium non erit quod salvetur Take away grace there there will not be what one should be saved by be saved {illeg} Free will & there will not be that very thing left But lest that should be saved - For vertue & salvation belong onely to a selfactive Being - But many by Grace mean, Gods doing All both in vs & for vs, so as to leave nothing at all for vs to doe, as if we were but senseles Macins - And the Philosopher Epictetus ubbraids such as these after this ^blunt manner 213. That We betake ourselves to our Prayers o Lord God how shall I be freed from the power of strong Pantasies, thou Fool hast thou not Hands & hath not God made them then for something sit down & pray now that thy potuitous excrements may not fall down out of thy nose or rather use thy hands & blow thy nose & accuse not the Deity, Is not the case just the same? Hath God given thee nothing here? Hath he not given thee magnanimity? Hath he not given thee Fortitude since thou hast so many hands Dost thou notw^thstanding sit still & - pray to God to {illeg} thee or blow thy Nose for thee. This is the very condition of those that hypocrytically pretending the Fall of Adam & originall Sin & the inability of depraved nature to any supernaturall Good the confessing of w^ch ^alone they think to be ^propitiatory Sacrifice & Holocaust most highly gratefull to the Allmighty in the mean time slothfully neglect to use that Power w^ch really they have w^ch is all one in this blunt language of the Stoick as if a man having hands should not use them to blow or wipe his nose but sit still expecting that God by Miracles should do that office for him, And there is another error concatinate w^th this that they think salvacon & holinesse to be an externall thing clapt upon men w^ch therefore must be done for them w^thout them

Though the essence of Free=will be not nicer ^of differency & contingency , these being no active Powers, yet it is most true that Contingency or non=necessity is a πάθος or affection that intimately belongs X is this naturall Power in a certain sense X But this is very much misunderstood by many as if this contingent Indifferency were also in the Will - itself after all things put besides the Volition itself & as if all Free=willed Actions were such as that till the very moment of doing of them there was no more probability of the thing to be done rather than another but the Agent was perfectly or to do & not do w^ch if it were true there could be no fixed habits either of Vertue or - Vice, nor no firm purposes, nor resoluc~ons of doing any thing, in life & every free=willd Being would be απολιλομενον τὶ a thing not only independent upon all things in the Vniverse besides him self but also perfectly loose to his own Good, this one thing only excepted, that as they say, a man cannot actually desire or chose the eternall misery of his whole man, his Body & Soul at once, Wherefore though it be most true that Free=will & self=power supposes some kind of Non=necessity, yet there is not so much contingency in all Volitions as is com̄only supposed For neither wisedome nor Vertue bring consistence w^th such a contingent uncertainty of all Actions as that it cannot be known before hand w^t such a man will do in any case, no nor indeed Vice itself

The Contingency of Free=willed Being is this that though they be fixed in habitts of Vertue or Vice so that there is no probability at present of their acting contrary to them, yet it is not absolutely impossible but that in length of time they may by little & little by different use of their own self=active Power loosen & change themselves from either of those Habits to the contrary We speak of Free=willed Being in themselves seting aside a devine confirmation in Good & a vitious obdurac~on in Evill, we say in themselves that though there is a possibility of their continuing in vitious or vertuous Habits to all eternity yet there would be no absolue ^{illeg} possibility to the contrary, but so as that it must be allwayes understood that their changing from Good to Evill by the neglect of their own - Free=power is to be ascribed wholy to themselves & their change - from Evill to Good though by the use of their own self=power, is notw^thstanding to be reputed principally to God & not to themselves, of w^ch more else where.

It will not be amisse to speake something here concerning Contingency in generall w^ch is a thing that Metaphysicians writ so much of We conceive therefore that there are but these two Instances of Contingency or Non=necessity in the whole world the first is that w^ch is intimately essentiall to Free=willed Beings that they are not their own perfection by im̄utable nature, but by self=exertion & - - therefore are defectable or peccable, for though many Freewilled Beings will continue pure & happy to all Eternity, yet if we consider them only in their selves w^thout divine Grace there is no absolute impossibility but the most holy Saint or Angell migh in - length of time ^{illeg} decline, defectibility or a possiblity of defection or declension is as essentiall to an imperfect Free=willed Creature as Indefectability & Impeccability to the Deity This is the first Instance of Contingency in our intending or not=intending ourselves or doing it more or lesse in a way of consideracon, vigorous exertion, resoluc~on & activity The 2^d Instance of it is in a negligent, carelesse indifferent determinac~on of action of w^ch there are three cases First wⁿ things propounded to our choice are exactly equall in Goodnesse or wⁿ meanes equally conduce, to the same end so that there can be no difference put betwen them Vnderstanding w^ch things often occurre in Life, but least any should deny that there is any such thing we shall propound a triviall Instance If two peeces of Gold of equall bignesse & exactly alike in colour & figure cast in the same mold should be placed at equall distance from the hand of him to whom this is offered & the choice given him to take w^ch he will, here being no imaginable difference to be found betwixt them nor reason to incline the choice to one rather than another it cannot be certainly ^foreknown by any antecedent cause w^ch of them will be chosen, so that there must needs be a contingency in the Choice & the Choser must needs determine fortuitously, that is, w^thout any reason, negligently or carelessly this way or that way The 2^d case is something like to this & that is wⁿ things though not exactly equall in themselves but yet by reason of the defect of our Vnderstanding or want of considerac~on we do not clearly apprehend w^ch is best but for reasons inclining both wayes & we are doubtfull w^ch to preferr & <41> we do in this case venturously determine ourselves to this or that not w^thout some Contingency And here there is no fault nor blame neither unlesse ^onely where our doubtfullnesse did Ꝑceed for want of due & mature Considerac~on w^ch if we had used we might clearly have discovered a difference Lastly wⁿ men willfully resolve to neglect Reason & to act temperariously w^ch is a vice that Free=willed beings may be liable to, & though we happen to chose right or rong we are in this case blame=worthy for what we do, because by a due exertion of ourselves we might have complyed w^th that Reason w^ch tells us we ought not to determine ourselves temerariously in matters of moment, so that the only Contingency to w^ch blame & com̄endac~on doth belong is that w^ch consists in the exercise of our self=power or of intending or not intending ourselves.

From what we have declared all along it appeares that Liberum Arbitrium is but a subalternate or middle perfection w^ch hath a great mixture of Imperfection in it And it is not difficult now to give a true accompt of the originall of it w^ch those Authors that make it to be a pure perfection placed therefore originally in God himself, are no way able to do For whereas they pretend that as it is a pure perfection to be necessary to the highest Good so it is a pure Perfection likewise to be indifferent to all other Goods beside & determine ones self indifferently to this or that, this cannot be true, because wⁿever one lower Good hath a nearer relacon to the higher Good than another, it cannot be a perfection to be indifferent to the choice of either, It also implyes ignorance concerning the nature of the highest Good w^ch is not one particular thing but an universall Life w^ch measures all lower Goods & may be exercisd more or lesse in all actions w^tsoever, but ^though though Indifference to all lower Goods w^thout respect to the highest Good be an imperfection & Vice, it being only the Indifference of Persons morally vitious, yet it may well be s^d that Indifferency to all lower Goods in ordine ad Bonum summum is true Perfection & Liberty

And whereas others pretend that the rise of Indifferency as a pure perfection is from hence because though Indifferency to the End is not a - Perfection, yet Indifferency to severall meanes tending to Ends is a Perfection, this is plainly false likewise For Indifferency to meanes that tend to Good Ends can never be void of Imperfection unlesse it be wⁿ those meanes are exactly equall & wⁿ they are so there is no perfection in determining rather one way than another Thus we see it is impossible to give any <42> accompt of Contingent Freewill is a pure perfection unlesse we would ^{illeg} resolve that Indifferency to all things is itself the highest & only Perfection & the essence of the - divine Will, w^ch is all one as to say that there is no Morall - Good & Evill at all.

But there is a deteminate Sum̄ū Bonū in nature w^ch ought to be the measure of all Wills & Liberum Arbitriū is but a mungrell thing compounded of Perfection & Imperfection together, so that the genesis or generac~on of it is as the Philosopher observeth from a certain συμπλοκὴ τοῦ ὀντος καὶ μὴ ὀντος a complicac~on of Entity & Non-entity together It ariseth from hence because this middle rank of Free=willd Beings are not essentially their own Perfection they have a certain participac~on & Capability of the highest Good, but they are not essentially their own Perfection, but they & It are two, they are not It by im̄utable simple nature but by reduplicate self=activity & self=exertion they have a higher & a lower Principle in them & there is a great Latitude or compasse w^ch they have of being better or worse, more or lesse perfect, according as they actuate their own possibility more or lesse they are self=contractable & self=inlargeable & by this meanes may become vertuous or vitious, Wise or Foolish & be in very different states, so as that the cause thereof is partly imputable to themselves, w^thout a continuall renovac~on of themselves by self=exertion they are apt continually to sink down lower & lower, the Good & Perfection of all Free=willd Beings because they are Imperfect Beings is not by im̄utable nature, but it is a self=exerted thing.

B And B now it plainly appeares that Liberum Arbitriū taken in that sense as we have described belongs not to the Deity it being an Imperfection , For he cannot actuate his possibility more or lesse he being perfect Act & his ὀυσία his ἐνεργα, his Essence his Operac~on, He cannot exert himself more or lesse, he cannot intend & remitt himself, he is necessarily all that w^ch he can be & hath no passive Capability in him, he is not defectable & capable of any Fault, neither Blame nor Com̄endacon belong to Him, whereas this is that w^ch directly belongs to the Actions of Free=will as such that they deserve Com̄endacon or Blame - more or lesse, he is not ἐπάνιτος but τίμιος not praise=worthy but honourable, he cannot be com̄ended for doing well as if it had been possible for him to have done otherwise, he can adde nothing to his own Perfection w^ch is the priviledge of Free=willed Beings ^ & this S^t Jerom rightly determines Solus Deus est in quem peccatum non cadet cætera cùm sint Liberi Arbitrij possunt in utramque partem suam flectere voluntatem

But as for that notion of Liberty that it consists in arbitrary self=will this I conceive to be much lesse in God than Liberum Arbitrium itself, for Freewill is a naturall Power & Perfection though it have some defectivenesse complicated in it but irrac~onall arbitrary self=will is no ^nrall Power ^at all but the vice of Free=willed Beings though there be many that think that God cannot be God w^thout it, yet this - doth but shew the Blindnesse & degeneracy of Mankind & the blind intoxicating witchcraft of Vice that it makes men transfer their very vices - upon the Deity because they are strongly facinated w^th this opinion that lawlesse unbounded arbitrary self=will is the greatest Liberty And if they could have together w^th this Infinite Power to execute the same w^thout being obnoxious to any inconvenience from it they would think themselves Perfect Gods They therefore draw out a picture of God according to their - own dark & vitious apprehensions & make him to be nothing but arbitrary Self=will armed w^th infinite Power We are far from denying true Liberty of Will to God as it speakes any thing of Perfection or that he doth not act all things both in Heaven & Earth according to the Free councell of his own Will, For we ought not to concurre of God as if he were under the necessity of nature in all his actings ^in such manner as Bruit Animalls are supposed to be, that are below Free=will & do not emerge to that degree of Perfection ^ as to be something of themselves & at their own disposall, who therefore are not properly accounted Actors in the world nor the consequences ^of their actions imputed to them but rather to Nature under whose supposed that they servitude they are I say God is not thus to be conceived as subject to necessity w^ch implies a plain Imperfection, P. 744 he is not comprehended under necessity, but himself is the necessity & law of other things. God indeed is the most determinate Being in the whole Vniverse, free from fortuitous Chance & Contingency 741 For Matter w^ch is conceived to be a thing infinitely undetermined is taken to be the greatest Imperfection & most opposite to God, But God is the most determinate - Being ^in their sense because he is one way; but not as if he were vnder {illeg} necessity for there is no necessity as yet, but necessity ariseth from those thing that follow God & are below him. And though God cannot be s^d to have that imperfect contingent Free=will that is in Creatures w^ch plainly imples defectability; yet he is most of all in his own Power ἀρχωκὶ κυριος ἑαυτοῦ a Prince & Lord of himself, he is most of all autexousious in a ^simple refined sense under the Power of nothing but himself & his own Perfection, Free=willed Beings are not essentially their own perfection & therefore that self=power of Freewill is but an imperfect power over ones self, a staggering & uncertain thing

Again God ^is not to be conceived as if he were a serv^t to his own Nature in all his actings The Actions & Volitions of God being not serv^ts to his nature or essence are most perfectly free, neither is God a serv^t to himself but he is most freely himself For as - his nature of Goodnesse & Wisdom may be s^d also that God Freely wills his own Nature 747 God doth not more will & act as his nature inclines him than his Nature is such as he wills & acts; therefore he is in the most perfect sense Lord of himself, having his nature perfectly in his own Power - it being no other than he willd it to be God must not be conceived to be something of necessity by his nature first w^ch afterwards determines his Will but it may be s^d of him that he willd his nature to be such as it is, or that his nature & his will are ^one & the same thing In his essence was his Will & therefore there was nothing in him differing from his Essence nor nothing in him but w^t was Will - Wherefore he was all Will & there was nothing in him not willed by him or before his Will, so that God was first of all his own Will he was as he willed & such as he willed to be. Nay the Phylosopher ventures further as if it might be said in a certain sense that God ^eternally made himself by Will he is as it were his own work {illeg} because he is that w^ch he wills himselfe to be, nor would he be any thing else than w^t he is.

But notw^thstanding all this though we take so much care to free God from the servitude of nature & necessity as this may be apprehended to be an imperfection yet we must not on the other hand subject him to Contingency nor ^Reson his Will from his nature & make it a fortuitous ^giddy temerarious & irrationall thing his - Will being the Will of that w^ch is. the best is no temerarious Will nor did it happen to be ^such as it is His will is not irrac~onall nor fortuitous & such as came upon him but such as ought to be & there is nothing temperarious in him we cannot conceive it to be a perfection of God to have a random _ Will that is loose from his own nature, ^his Goodnesse & Wisedom & contingent to the same It is no liberty to be able to act contrary to nature & Perfecc~on It is absurd to think a thing to be then free wⁿ it acts contrary to nature especially wⁿ this nature that the highest Good & greatest perfection To be able to do Contraries is neither Power nor Liberty but inability of persisting in the best Wherefore we cannot consent to that assertion of theirs who place this Liberty as a perfection in God that positis omnibus ad agendum <45> requisitis at posito quolibet Judicis in Intellectu, nihilominus tamen aliter possit agere aut noc aut illud agere for to be able to act contrary to his own Wisedome is is imbecility or inability of continuing its to the best, it is defectability & not Liberty Wherefore though God do all things according to the Councill of his own Will both in heaven & Earth yet certainly he wills agreeably to Wisdom in every thing. Necessity as it may be taken in different senses may either imply the greatest imperfection or the greatest Perfection, the necessity of Bodyes in their action & moc~on wⁿ they are allwayes determined by something w^thout them is the greatest ImꝐfecc~on next to that is the dull necessity of Brutish Appetite & Hormæ stupidly fixed & determined to one, it {illeg} actions having not Judgm^t ^of nor power over itself over , it is not above them but a serv^t to them or to Nature in them & the loose Contingency of Liberum arbitrium or Freewill is much a higher perfecc~on than this Bruitish necessity But that this contingent Free=will is farre below the necessity of perfect im̄utable Goodnesse & Wisedome, such a Being as perfectly comprehends all & cannot possibly act unwisely or foolishly Necessity dos not ^alwayes {illeg} imperfection, wherefore though it be alwayes contradictious to Liberum Arbitrium because that is an imperfect & incompleat power over our selves, & neither admitts of the lower nor higher necessity it being above one & below the other, yet it is no way contradictious to Liberty as that is taken for a pure perfection for it is a great mistake that Libertas & Liberū arbitrium, Liberty & Contingent or staggering Free=will ^acting indifferētly any way are one & the same thing it is absurd to think that a Being immutably fixed in Goodnesse & Wisedome should be therefore in a state of Bondage, thralldome & Misery They that make pendulous, wavering & versatil Freewill to be an equall Perfection every way & to be an essentiall attribute of the Deity & conceited it to be the most glorious prerogative thereof, not to be necessarily but contingenty determind to Goodnesse Justice & Wisedome though thinking hereby to advance his Dominion Soveraignty & Liberty do exceedingly debase the excellency of his divine nature ignorantly transfering their own humane Imperfections & the Imperfections of Free=willd Beings that are a middle rank of defectable & amphibious things, upon him & clothing him therew^th Nay they that make the top of all perfection to consist in an absolute indifferency of Will to Light & Vnderstanding Reason & Wisedome & that this is the most glorious Liberty to to act irrac~onally they do not make the Faculty but the very Vice of Free=will itself to be the greatest Ꝑfection they make lawles & vnbounded Lust & irrac~onall arbitrarinesse to be the Supream governesse & Moderatrix of all things the onely Deity in the world

To be free frō Goodnesse & Truth is to be free to irrationall Lust & Bruitish Appetites fortuitously & contingently determining all Volitions ā it proceeds only from the depravac~ons of mens natures & these being ^themselves captivated under the Lust of arbitrary Dominion that they make this to be their highest Liberty, , whereas the highest Perfections are the im̄table natures of Goodnesse & Wisedome w^ch are determining Principles, & take away contingency or ἀπειρία & Infinity the Platonists determine that mens est principiū necessitatis Principle of perfective Necessity & God is called by them περας & μετρον & νομος the Bound measure & Law of the whole Vniverse his endlesse Goodnesse & Wisedome having bounded & determined the loose Infinitude & possibility of things into the best order possible & but απερία or Infinitude is ^to them a name of the greatest imperfection w^th them w^ch they call Darknesse, Poverty, Informosity & the first Evill most infinitely remote from God the highest Perfection Now absolute Indifferency of Will contingently determined to any thing is nothing but ἀπερία itself & therefore most unsuitable unto the divine nature w^ch is the most determinate thing in the world, Goodnesse & Wisedome itself measuring & bounding all things Gods will is the id quod oportet that w^ch ought to be in every thing throughout the whole Vniverse ^But it will not follow frō hence as some suppose that because Gods Will is that w^ch is best in every thing that therefore we may be able certainly to determine from hence in all cases w^tsoever, both w^t God hath done & also w^t he will do, I say we must not presume that we are able w^th our shallow Vnderstandings to resolve w^t is or was absolutely the best in every case And some have so fair pretended a {illeg}Pretense to this modesty that they would banish finall causes out of n̄rall Phylosophy this seeming to imply as if we were able to comprehend the divine Wisedomes & reach to the End of all things they think^g it not proꝐ for us to make the Ends supposed & conjectured by us to be the Reall & proper causes of Phænomena because our Vnderstandings are finite & we were not the first contrivers the Architects or Master=builders of the Vniverse But if we are so well able from w^t is absolutely best in itself to demonstrate infallibly w^t is de facto then we should by {illeg} determine not only whether there were any more habitable worlds than this, but also how many they be & in what form every one of them is & also tell vs exactly w^t are all the Lawes of Providence <47> & of the divine Œconomy concerning Souls after this Life -

Chap 4.

But because this is a businesse of subtill COnsiderac~on & our explication of it is different from what is found in Writings hitherto extant concerning this Argum^t we shall again propose a sum̄ary comprehension of the whole doctrine concerning it & though we shall repeat w^t hath been before suggested yet it will not be w^thout a further advantage & fuller explicac~on of the whole, First therefore it is ^a thing plainly implyed in the very notion of Liberum Arbitrium that Freewilled Beings are such who are not meerly passive in their moc~on to the action of Agents w^thout them as Inanimate Bodyes are Machins & Neurospasts w^ch are all perfectly ἑτεροκίνετα moved by something wthout But Freewill implies some kind of Autokinesy, wch indeed it were superfluous to menc~on, were it not for this that the greatest Champions for Necessity both antient and modern lay their foundation here that all moc~on & Action in the Vniverse w^tsoever, is perfect Heterokinesy & that there is no originall Action any where or such as springs frō the Agent itself, but that it all takes its Life & Beginning from some other Agent w^thout, the meaning whereof is that there is no other Being in the world besides Body & Matter of w^ch it is truly s^d that it never moves itself but w^tsoever Body is moved is moved not from any Principle of motion in it but is allway passive to the Activity of something else ^without upon it And if there were no other Substance in the world but Body then not only Bruits but men also must be acknowledged to be nothing but meer Machins & Neuropasts

But we have showed in the former part of this discourse that there is a certain kind of Autokinesy in all Cogitative Beings wtsoever & therefore if Bruits be not meer senslesse Machins but have Cogitac~on in them they must needs have some Actiō or Energy w^ch is not put into them from w^thout but springs frō w^thin themselves, that is, they must needs have something above Mechanicall, Motion, above Body & Matter But this simple Autokinesy w^ch is com̄on to all Cogitac~on, cogitatiō being is internall ^Actiō in the essentiall profundity of that that thinks, & not a translac~on from place to place or ^that outward change of distance is not that thing w^ch we are now to enquire after in w^ch the nature of Freewill consisteth, but that is a peculiar kind of self=moc~on or self=activity whereby that w^ch moves doth not only act from w^thin itself but also upon itself determining & ^govourning its own moc~on, Sensitive Appetites, Passions & Hormæ w^ch are com̄only s^d to be spontaneous, have no power over themselves to stop or excite their own moc~on ^& Come to retard or accelerate their Force no more than a stone flung out of sling hath, but are meer swinges & impetuosityes of Nature. By our own inward sense we are conscious to ourselves that these things invade us & obtrude themselves upon us & that they are so far frō having any governm^t of that higher principle in us Wherefore concerning these Hormæ, Appetites & Passions that in a late Book de Homine may in some sense be acknowledg'd to be true Neꝗ appetitus noster, neꝗ fuga nostra causa est quare hoc vel illud cupimus vel fugimus h. e. non ideo potuimus quia volumus, nec fugimus quia nobimus sed quia tū appetitio tum aversio ab ipsis rebus cupitis vel exosis generata est, sequiturꝗ necessario præconceptum jucunditatis molestiæꝗ ab ipsis objectis adfuturæ, Quid enim - <48> An esurimus, cæteraꝗ naturæ necessaria appetimus quia volumus? An fines sitis et Cupidinas voluntariæ sunt^l appetentibus agere quidem libero esse potest ipsum autem appetere non potest Not as if this were true in the Authors sense that all these Animall Appetites (w^ch ^{illeg} he calls Volitions) are nothing else but meer corporeall passion from the objects w^thout a locall motions mechanically produced For we have shewd before that in bodily sense itself & therefore much more in all APpetites & Passions there is something besides the Activity of the objects w^thout or locall moc~on frō them upō us, neither is sensitive conception the meer action of the thing conceived & the passion of the Conceiver there being in it besides the local mocon from w^thout to w^ch the Sentient is but passive, Fancy, appearance, perception w^ch is not a locall moc~on or translac~on frō place to place as this Author ridiculously conceits all Cogitac~on to be; but a moc~on of a different kind, a motion that ariseth frō w^thin the sentient itself w^ch implies it not to be Body but incorporeall Substance. But because these - mocons do necessarily arise upon occasion of the corporiall moc~ons made upō externall Bodyes & because they cannot bound measure & moderate themselves therefore we are no thought ^so much to be the cause of them ourselves as Nature in us; Wherefore it being supposd that Bruits have no other principle of Action in them than such particular Appetites & Hormetick Inclinac~ons w^ch are as it were by nature obtruded on them it seems consequent hereupon that though they may be s^d often to have a liberty to do w^t they have an appetite unto, wⁿ there is no externall impedim^t to hinder them, yet they cannot be s^d to have a liberty over their Appetites themselves nor a Power of determining their own Actions w^ch is that w^ch is com̄only meant by Liberum Arbitrium & they cannot properly be s^d to be the cause of their own Actions as men are so as to deserve Blame or Com̄endac~on, for w^t they do, it being not so much themselves that act as nature that acts in them.

Wherefore Freewilled Beings are not only elevated above the condicon of meer corporeall Machins w^ch the lowest Cogitative Beings are but they have also a higher Autokinesy & self-activity in them, than that of Brutish sense or Appetite, they being certain loosned & released things that feel themselves to be something by themselves, able to wield & turn themselves, to govern & dispose themselves & their own Actions W^ch is a certain higher emersion of Life above dull Bruitish fancy & appetite the latter whereof may be resembled to a straight line that is allway running outwards & forwards w^thout any Flexive turning in upon itself but the former to a reflected line or circle it being a certain Life that doth as it were return ^into rebound & reeche upon itself the former is a shallow superficiall Life, but the latter such a Life as hath a certain inward & profundity in it, A Freewilled Being is not single but double, present w^th itself, w^thin itself & superiour to itself, acting upon itself, govourning & com̄anding itself & holding itself as it were in its own hand, it is a thing emancipated & manumitted from natures servitude & becomes sui Juris something of itself, its own & at his own disposall that can act by & frō itself & is in a - peculiar sense αρχὴ καὶ ἀιτία πράξεων a principle & cause of Action in the world so that Acting & the consequences of it are imparted to it as the cause All inanimate Bodies are plainly nothing else but severall Limbs or members of nature that have no Activity at all in themselves for though some attribute Life to the whole corporeall Vniverse & would not have it to be a <49> Cadaverous thing or dead Mechanism yet it is only one com̄on plastick Life w^ch is supposed by them to act & form the whole corporeall Vniverse so as that all the particular parts of it taken by themselves are notw^thstanding utterly devoid of any activity And Bruits - though they have a certain Life of their own not only plasticall but sensitive whereby they are conscious to themselves of their - own moc~on yet they are not quite released from natures Bondage & servitude, they have not such an emersion of Life in them whereby they can feel themselves something of themselves, comprehend themselves, {illeg}ield & turn themselves, but are as it were in a state of pupillage vnder Natures Gardianship w^ch do not act any thing by themselves, nor are accomptable for what they do, but nature is only accomptable for their Actions. These differ frō Freewill'd beings in a manner as the Zoophyta or plant Animals differ from other living Creatures that have liberty to move up & down wheresoever they please for though the former seem to have some sense & Vitality yet they continue fast rooted in the earth & cannot remove from the place where they are fixed & it is generally conceivd that Bruit Animalls though elevated above the condicen of Machins so that they can exert moc~on from them yet they are in a manner fastned to their - Mother nature as the Plant Animalls to the Earth being not Masters of their own Activity or else they may be resembled to Foetus Embrios in the Mothers womb who though they have some sense of their own yet they live as it were by the Life of the mothers with whom they are continued & w^th whose passions they sympathize The Embrio in the womb tyed by the Navell strings to the Mother is for that time accompted but part or piece of the Mother but after it hath broken loose out of those dark cloisters & the bands wherew^th it was tyed to the womb are cut in pieces it is no longer part of the Mother but something by itself So Bruits are like Embrios living in nature{illeg} womb or lap & those particular Appetites & Inclinac~ons that they have in them may be s^d in some sense to be rather Natures Activity than their own, but Freewilled Beings are like Infants brought forth into the world & broken loose frō the dark & narrow cloisters of their Mother Nature having their Navell strings cut, freed from the narrownesse & bondage of Natures {illeg} Activity & now something of themselves & at their own dispose & therefore differ as much from Bruits as a young Lambkin or Kind that wantonly sports frisking up & down in a pasture differs frō itself wⁿ it was a Foetus or Embrio tyed vp in the dark womb. Freewilld Beings are like adult Persons brought out of the state of Pupillage from under Natures Tuition & Guardianship in w^ch they could not do any act of their own that was valid in Law or might justly be accompted theirs & manumitted into a state of Liberty & put under their own Governmt Actors by themselves & their own men κάριοι πράξεων Masters of their own Actions not servants to Nature ^& {illeg} but Free -

For the better explicating of w^ch Faculty we found it necessary to decline the vulgar Psicology w^ch first divides the soul into sensitive & raconal & then in the rationall makes only those two Facultyes of Vnderstanding & - Will This Hypothesis being not only insufficient to solve the Phænomenon of the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν but also many other Phænomna of the soul for according to this Psicology the or ruling Principle in the Soul must either be a necessary Vnderstanding necessarily determining all Volition or else a perfectly blind & fortuitous Will must Ꝑside in it governing the Vnderstanding itself in it & its exercise obiect & intention & determining all actions ie. the governour of the whole man must be given to a blind & fortuitous thing wherefore in stead of that Psicology {illeg} this other Hypothesis {illeg} the Whole Soul & its Powers ^are distributed into the dichotomy first of simple & necessary nature under w^ch are comprehended severall Faculties higher or lower ^{illeg} & then of reduplicate self-activity For there being in the humane soul different Congruities higher & lower & a multiplicity of Capacities & Powers, besides superiour & inferiour Reason & the speculative Vnderstanding many particular Appetites & Passions in the Animall nature that often clash w^th one another must of necessity be in the Soul one com̄on Focus or course in w^ch all these lines may meet, some one thing in w^ch all this diversity is recollected & knit up together, something that is conscious of all the cogitative Powers of the Soul (for the Plastick & Plantall ones (if there be any such) belong not to his Cognizance) of all Congruities & Capacities higher & lower, w^ch same thing will also wield, guide & steer the whole Soul - having the govournm^t & managem^t of it in its own hand; arbitrate all difference & determine all strife & discord in it. Now this can be no other than the whole Soul reduplicated upon itself, w^ch being as it were w^thin itself, comꝐhending itself & holding itself in its own hand hath a sui potestas a Power over it self & can determine & turn itself this way & that way This is the head summity & top in all those Beeings that are - called Freewilled, that is, Self-powerfull, this is that w^ch holds the whole frame & Machin of the Soul (if I may so call it) together & makes it move & act coherently & consistently & therefore wⁿ this is relaxated or consopited into a langour (as it seems to be in sleep) all the other strings of the Soul play'd upon w^thout it make no musick or harmony but thoughts prove absurdly incohærent w^th one another. This is the Arbitrator of all differences the Vmpire of all Controversies & that where the ultimate defusion of all things is made This is that where our Personality is seated, it is the ἀυτὸ ἐκαστοι in everyone that w^ch is properly called we ourselves, for there are many things in us that are ours but are not We ^o^rselves We have in us Animall Appetites & lower inclinac~ons as also dictates of Honessty & Conscience but we - are neither this nor that, otherwise than as by this self=active Power of the Soul we determine ourselves to {illeg} that w^ch is concocted into the Soul reduplicated self=comprehensive & selfpowerfull, & that w^ch by this we form ourselves into, is our very selves & nothing else whatsoever morall disposition is lodged here denominates the whole man to be such This determines all the passive Capability of every mans nature & makes him to be w^t he is This precides in forms & actuates the whole Soul & all other things in it <51> are but {illeg} to it This is the whole Soul so collected & knit up together into itself hanging lite & loose, hovering & suspense acting upon itself & determining itself being nimbly self=flexible - this way & that way.

But to speak more particularly of it there are two properties - chiefly to be taken notice off in it Firstly that it is self comprehensive

A 2ly that is self=active & self=powerfull + first I say it is self=comprehensive, that is, it is conscious of the severall Congruities in the Soul - higher & lower, that of particular ^Animall Appetites of inferiour Reason & of the τὸ θειον the divine principlle in us as also of the superiority of the of these one an other, conscious of its own power of putting forth & intending itself more or lesse, of {illeg} {illeg} & turning the whole Soul of determin^ing Assents & actions ^ & lastly conscious of its own volition & Action & consequently ^hath hereupon a gratefull or ungratefull sense w^thin it being either pleased, or B displeased, satisfied or dissatisfied w^th itself B This is that interiour Faculty of the Soul commonly called συνειδησις or Conscience in w^ch the Soul knowes w^th itself, i.e. takes notice of all that is w^thin itself & of its owne Actions judging allso thereupon inwardly either blaming or approving itself, accusing or excusing There is indeed some thing of Consciousnesse more or lesse in all Cogitations, that is, ^in all Energies of the Soul above the Plastick Powers & therefore some conclude the essence of Cogitation to consist in Consciousnesse but this is ^another thing it is not that Consciousnes one peculiar Power or Faculty of the Soul most inward to it whereby it reflects on on its volitions & Actions This Conscience is the com̄on sense of the whole Soul neither ought it to be restrained to religious or Morall things only, but it is a generall or universall Power & therefore as there are two degrees of Liberum arbitrium in - us according to the two degrees of in our Nature Animall & Morall so besides the Morall Conscience there is an Animall & Civill Conscience ^ for συνειδησις Conscience & Self=comprehension is a power that pervades the whole Soul belonging to that w^ch is the head & top of it.

Secondly besides Self=comprehension & self=consciousness it is self=active & self=powerfull w^ch consists chiefly in two things first a Power that the Soul hath over its whole self of puting forth, intending or exerting itself more or lesse, w^ch is its Power ^ over the passive Capability of its own nature, its Power of actuating its own Possibility, w^ch is exerercised severall wayes first in self=recollection & self=attention 2^ly in Particular Considerac~on whether speculatives or Practicall the former of w^ch is com̄only called Contemplac~on, the latter deliberac~on 3^ly in exerting a vigorous force for the suppressing the lower Inclinac~ons & promoting the Soul towards the higher Principle & lastly in executive Activity In all these the Soul ^Redoubled & self=comprehensive hath a Power over itself to intend actuate & put forth itself more or lesse

A further Branch of this self=active Power is consequent upon the former, & that is of determining the Assents <52> in that Exercise of Cogitatio~ & the Actions of the whole man by means wherof the soul is not a Servant to its own Actions but ^ master over them -

A This Power that the Soul as self=comprehensive self=intending & self=exerting more or lesse hath of determining the exercise of the Understanding, & all the Actions of Life is that w^ch is com̄only called Will concerning the moc~on whereof there are different Apprehensions for some call all Appetites & spontaneous Inclinac~ons w^tsoever by the name of Will according to whom to act freely & to act spontaneously is one & the same tho Others would restrain the name of Will only to the last prevaling Appetite that is wⁿ there is an Alternac~on of different Appetites & Desires struggling together, or Hopes & Feares that w^ch is strongest & therefore Ꝑvalent over the rest they call by the name of Will Others will have that w^ch is called Will to be such an Affection as is the ^Necessary result of ^Necessary Reason as Hormæ & Appetites depend upon Fancy in Bruits (w^ch latter seems to be in order of Nature before the other) so they say Will is a Rac~onall Appetite & Inclinac~on i.e. a neBcecessary result from a necessary Vnderstanding B Now these the words Reason & Vnderstanding are equivocall as was before showed they sometimes signifiing nothing but the dictate of Honesty & if Will were allwayes the result of this Reason then there could be no - dishonest & sinfull Volic~on, there could be no Voluntary act ag^st Conscience & Honesty, ( which is superiour Reason) sometimes by Reason & Vnderstanding is meant the Logicall discursive Power, speculating & deliberating inferring Conclusions from certain Ꝑmises & if that affection & inclinac~on to Action that necessarily results from hence be the only true moc~on of Will ^it would follow from Hence that then we could not Willingly rac~oncinate, speculate or liberate concerning this or that whereas the sense of that is gon all is acknowledged to be true w^ch the Scholastick writers expresse in these termes, that the Vnderstanding is determin'd by the Will both to its exercise & object, we being sensibe w^thin ourselves of a certaine Free=power that we have over our Cogitac~ons whereby we can determine ourselves to speculate & deliberate more or lesse concerning this or that, Now that Will that exercises such an Imperium over the Vnderstanding as to its exercise upon particular objects cannot well be thought to be the consequent of that Vnderstanding itself, but something else in the Soul that is more generall & comprehensive than the whole Now all these Inward Apprehensions concerning Will alike tend to this that there is no Faculty of self=power in us & nether liberty, but necessary spontaniety in humane Actions; for it will be nothing but a {illeg} Necessary Reason & the Vnderstanding it is plain that there can be to such thing in us as Power over ourselves or Actions, no internall selfflexibility but the whole Soul must be as stiff & unwieldy as any senslesse <53> corporeall Machin But the true noc~on of Will is this that it is the whole Soul reduplicated & self=comprehensive, conscious of all its Congruities higher & lower, its Power & Capacities that can actuate & intend itself more or lesse & wield & turn all the Powers of the Soul & determining its own Cogitations & actions

And this is the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν {illeg} that w^ch hath the Principatus in the Soul, the ruling or swaying Principle. This word ἡγεμονικὸν was first introducd by the Stoicks who were but bad Phylosophers & did not well & clearly setled their own noc~ons, And we observe that there hath been an equivocac~on in the use of this word aswell amongst the Antients as Moderns For some by the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν understand that w^ch ought to rule or bear sway in us w^ch is that right Reason or superior Reas that is taken for the same thing as Honesty Again it may be taken for that w^ch doth actually rule ^& bear sway in us & in this sense I conceive it ought to be taken wⁿ it is made a controversy w^t is the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν of the Soul the τὸ κυριῦον the Principatus & the Principale Animæ for all these words are by the Antients, not w^t ought to rule for that is a thing out of Question but w^t ^kind of thing in vs it is that doth actually rule & sway in us to w^ch all actions are to be imputed & therefore bad as well as Good, that by w^ch the whole man ^de facto is govourned & this I take to be that w^ch the Stoicks really intended by that w^ch they call the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν w^ch Plotinus & all other Greeks avoiding that ambiguity of the other word chose rather to call the τὸ ἡγεμονουν, that w^ch doth renum potiri in the Soul, actually rule & sway But the Stoicks as I s^d was bad Phylosophers & therefore gave but a confused definic~on of it as Diogenes in Zeno tells us P. 202 that the ruling & principall part of the Soul is that in w^ch the Phantasies & Appetites are made & from whence Reason is sent forth w^ch is seated in the heart & as Plutarch interprets the Stoicks call the highest part of the Soul the ἡγεμονικὸν that w^ch amongst other things makes assents for as we shall show afterwards the judging Power belongs to it Xas well as the willing X Wherefore we affirm that the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν or rather the ἡγεμονοῦν & the τὸ κυριῶον the actually swaying Power ov^r the whole Soul is that w^ch we have described

the Soul reduplicated self=comprehensive & self=active w^ch Stoicks made to be a distinct Power by itself that w^ch can stir up & turn itself this way or that way & make itself w^t it will

But there is one thing that belongeth to this ἡγεμονικὸν of the Soul ^that is not com̄only takē notice of that it doth not only will & com̄and Action, but also judge assent & opine & that not only in practicalls but also in Theoreticalls for judgm^t doth not belong to the perceiving Power in us there being often false judgm^ts & Nature or n̄rall perception can never erre, but it is we ourselves that erre & w^t this ἡμεῖς or we ourselves is hath been sufficiently declared The perception of the Vnderstanding is something in us or of ours but it is not properly we ourselves but Judgm^t is the act of the whole Soul that w^ch is self=comprehensive & self=active & nothing passes thorow the whole Soul but it hath a stroke here, it must have something done correspondently to it in that w^ch is properly we ourselves, or els it it comes to nothing the n̄rall Vnderstanding can only perceive or not=perceive, it is capable of nothing but either Knowledge or Ignorance, Error & false Judgm^t is a thing of our - own w^ch ourselves superadde & cast in over & above to something of Nature in us This perhaps will be more easily granted in - such things as we have no clear Ꝑcepc~ons of either way - but our n̄rall Vnderstandings is doubtfull conc~ning them that we casually attending to some Ꝑbability on one side or other may determine our own assent this or that way, but in ^ether thing clearly Ꝑceived & w^ch there can be no doubt off as com̄on Noc~ons it might seem that there is no other judgm^t of them but only Concepc~on & Intellection But the case is otherwise for we being not essentially Knowledge but something w^ch Ꝑtakes of Knowledge & Vnderstanding are by this meanes liable to this duplicity of having Judgm^t & Assent besides the bare Ꝑception & Intellection whereas there is no such thing in that w^ch is Ꝑfectly wise & knowing or Intellect & Knowledge itself. I say Soules that have but a participac~on of νους or Intellect in them have besides their imꝐfect knowing Power a Judging & Assenting Power also, w^ch belongs to that w^ch comprehends the whole Soul, nay there is hardly any thing w^ch we do so clearly Vnderstand that we may not ether upon this considerac~on that we have often found our selves deceived in such things as we did seem to have clearly understood, or from a surmise that it is possible our Faculties may be made false though we cannot judge it to be absolutely false yet we may suspend our assent to it But though we do necessarily assent to the truth of some com̄on noc~ons as that the same thing cannot be & not be wⁿ we attend to - <55> nothing else w^ch may cause a doubt or schepsis, yet it doth not - follow from hence that this Judgm^t considerd formally as such doth therefore belong to the necessary Vnderstanding because - we do in like manner necessarily will & nill some things The - Willing Power itself is not perfectly indifferent to all things any more than the as shall be shewed Judging Power but both of them alike are sometimes necessary, neither indeed can there be any n̄rall Power ^or active Faculty that is universally indifferent to all things in the whole world & hath no propension at all any more than there can be a Being w^thout any determinated Nature Now as there is some Good such that (to speak according to vulgar language) the Will cannot choose but imbrace & sence Evill such as that it cannot choose but shun & avoid in like manner there are some Truths so clearly perceived by the n̄rall & necessary Vnderstanding as that the Soul redoubled & self=comprehensive cannot choose but assent to the same so long as it attends only to the evidence of the thing in itself & takes notice of no other reason or considerac~on that might tend to weaken that assent or to beget a schepticall suspense in it as in other things where - there is a mixture of Good & Evill together of Congruity & Discongruity we have a latitude & liberty of Willing or not Willing so in doutfull cases & ^ⁱⁿ such ^things as we have not clear & distinct Conceptions of their Truth or Falshood there we do uncertainly Judge & assent one way or other attending to some Ꝑbability on either side ^consistently extending ourselves therein further than necessary nature & beyond clear perception & therefore frequently changing our opinions & Judgm^ts & from hence Error ariseth But though Error do often attend {illeg} the exercise of this Autexousious Judging Power in speculative things beyond clear Ꝑception & whereof we have not Mathematicall Evidence yet notw^thstanding the Faculty is good in itself & it is highly necessary that in such Beings as we are whose Knowledge is unꝐfect & w^ch have an absolute certainty but of so very few things there should be such a Power of extending our Assent & Judgm^t beyond our Vnderstanding Not that temerarious Judging or assenting to any thing indifferently as true or false is any n̄rall Power or Ꝑfectiō any more ^thē thē temerarious indifferent & irrac~onal Willing is Mor that this opining Power should so busily & pragmatically interpose itself in every thing where there is no need of determining our assent either way no consequence of Life depending thereupon as it doth in some Persons who though they scarcly knew, that is, clearly Ꝑceive any thing at all, it will judge & determine every thing in the whole Vniverse thereby most frequently erring & never thinking true but by chance For there are many speculative Opinions upon w^ch huge moments of Life depend & yet very few if any in the whole world have any Mathematicall certainty either way in w^ch notw^thstanding imꝐtiall Reason discovers greater Ꝑbabilities one way than another & it is much more agreeable to the interest of Vertue & morality to hold one way than another here it is a true naturall Power w^ch the Soul hath of determining its assent & Judgm^t beyond its Vnderstanding as for example to the existence of a God or Providence; the Immortality of the Soul & future rewards & Punishments <56> for by this meanes ^ there is a supplement made to the imꝐfection of our nature & the defectienesse of our Knowledge & this is that noble Power of Faith that in the holy Oracles is so highly extolled, w^ch is really extending our Assents beyond clear Reason & evident comprehensions & because there is something autexousious in it therefore Men are often blamed for the want of it, though indeed we are blamed also for speculative errors many times upon another accōpt because that things are such as that by ^duly intending our Vnderstanding in a way of study considerac~on & meditation we might have arrived to a clear Knowledge & comprehension of the Truth of thē

But if the judging, opining & assenting Power ^as to the truth & falshood speculative things properly belong not to simple nature in us but to we ourselves or to the Soul reduplicated or self=comprehensive w^ch often acts contingently, then much more doth it in things Practicall i.e. concerning the Good & Evill & w^t is to be done or not done in Ꝑticular cases of Life, for it would be very strange if the same thing in us should not judge that willeth, but one thing in us should practically judge & another thing will & that that willeth should be indifferent to follow that that Judgeth & this should be the Liberty & Perfection of a man not to be necessarily determined by his own last practicall Judgm^t & to will w^thout any Judgm^t at all of w^t he willeth.

Good is such a thing as that though it be most talkt of of any thing in the world yet few men know any thing at all of it clearly & certainly for whereas the chief Good ought to be the measure of all other Goods, there hath not been more controversy nor uncertainty of Judgm^t ^about of any thing in the whole world than it & Aristotle tells us that mankind have but ὁιον μάντομά τι a certain raticinac~on of it, Wherefore vitall Instinct & or the instinct of morality is that w^ch we owe much more to here than any logicall or mathematicall Reason, but there being two different vitall Instincts in us higher & lower Animall & divine the determinac~on of our Judgm^t & Will to this or that is an autexousious thing, it is not necessary nature & Vnderstanding that determines us either way, but the τὸ μίσον or middle things in the Soul the Soul comprehensive of all its congruities higher & lower ^partic. the & by a certain inward sense distinguishing betwixt them^i.e. between & and being self=powerfull doth judgingly & willingly determine itself to either, , promoting itself to the higher or sinking down to the lower. Wherefore that of Aristotle is here most true that we are ἄιτιον πῶς τῆς φαντασίας we are in a manner the causes of the Phantasies & appearances of Good & τὸ φαινομενον ἀγαθὸν καὶ βέλτιρον the seeming Good & Best is not a thing altogether imposd upon us by necessary nature & which we are wholy passive to, but we ourselves contribute something {illeg} towards it nature begins & proposes variety to our choice exhibiting the Phantasies of two different Goods ^ & inchoately but having given us a certain Power over the passive capability of our nature leaves us to act hereupon, & to determine <57> {illeg} Phantasy of Good to ourselves accordingly as we exert ourselves more or lesse & so to compose the strife to end the competition or distinction of nature this way or that way But in these colluctations & disputes between the higher & lower parts of the Soul as they are called, there is much wavering of the judging Power many {illeg} alternations & reciprocac~ons of incompleat practicall Judgments ^this way & that way before the determination & the issue at last is according as the soul more or lesse exerting itself doth ^ finally & {illeg} hasten & ^ reson this way or that way we are not here passively determined to Good by Light ^necessitating for then {illeg} there would be no laborious conatous in it, but by a self=exerted force Nature is ^ distracted between two different Lights, the Light of two vitall Instincts, higher & lower, & logicall Reason hath little to do here but as we exercise that Power w^ch God & Nature hath given us over our own passive Capability & exert ourselves more or lesse so is the victory decided either way.

Here may all by frequent judging & acting contract a certain habituall Light or disposition to Judge this way or that way in Morall things - i.e. either a true or a false light, For that Ꝑticular actions do by little & little contribute every one of them something towards habits of Judging & afterward willing is evident; The Soul reduplicated & self=powerful tutcheth every thing as it were w^th pitchy fingers, every foreaction leaving behind it a ^little clammy disposition to - the same again w^ch by many reiterated & repeated Actions growes up at lenghth into a Confirmed habit.

Now because this Judging Power in morall things is in Ꝑt autexousious we are exhorted by the wisest & gravest Phylosophers to take great care of it & to watch over it continually It is a passage before quoted out of Antoninus &c reverence the opining i.e. the assenting & Judging Power ^concerning Good & Evill for all lies in this, that this Hegemonicon or ruling Principle entertain no opinion that is disagreeable to nature & the right frame of a rationall Animall This is that Power w^ch is called by others το χρηστικον ταις φαντασίους that w^ch can differently use the lower Phantasies {illeg} that & either yield to them or master them & bear up itself agst them, & to this purpose Epictetus exhorts vs so much to look to of our ^{illeg} dogmata dogmata as not being things necessarily obtruded upon us but w^ch we have some Power over.

In like manner as to Actions concerning only the Animall Life & our own private Vtility, that w^ch Judgeth is not the necessary Vnderstanding only & clear Knowledge, for then we should never determine our Judgm^t in doubtfull cases; but it is something w^ch extends itself further than certain Knowledge It is plain that we make different Judgm^ts of - things as we intend ourselves more or lesse in considerac~on & deliberation he that vpon the first capability of Reason, for something to be done will determine <58> rashly ^his Assent thereunto, will for the most part act otherwise than of suspending his Assent at first, he use mature deliberac~on before he resolve. Wherefore here is one contingency of our Judgmts arising from more or lesse deliberating w^ch is ἐφ' ἑμῖν in our own Power & belongs to the Soul as self=comprehensive & self active Another contingent uncertainty there is next wⁿ there seems to be equall probabilities on both sides in w^ch case we do venturously & stocastically & not w^thout contingency determine our Judgment to this or that. Judgm^t in us is not the result & conclusion of the necessary Vnderstanding for then all Judgm^ts in life would be certain Knowledges of w^t was best to be done ^But The practicall Judgments in vs are much of the same nature wth forensick Judgmts decisions of Right the Interpretac~ons of Law & Determinac~ons of Controversies made in courts of Judicature, w^ch are not allwayes the same thing w^th Law & Justice itself because there may be false Judgm^ts & wrong decrees made & yet they must allwayes have some specious probability, or pretence of Law & Justice, wherefore they are conjecturall determinac~ons that have a mixture of Law & arbitrarinesse together wh^ch whether right or wrong must bear sway in the respective Comon=wealth till contrary Judgm^ts reverse them. The Lawes wⁿ obscure or defective must be applyed, interpreted & reked out by the living & speaking Judge in particular cases ^because Justice itselfe cannot governe This in that little com~on=wealth of mans soul the n̄rall Vnderstanding & certaine Knowledge is the Law of Justice & Rule by w^ch it should be govourned in its Actions but this being to us imꝐfect & not extending itself thorowly to all Cases the Soul as self=comprehensive & self=powerfull is the Lex loquens the living Judge & Interpreter w^ch ^in doubtfull venturously & stocastically ^not without some {illeg} concludes in - doubtfull cases whose decisions notw^thstanding allwayes bear sway; till they be reversed by others, contrary thereunty This Judging Power further {illeg} Imperfect Knowledge & in doubtfull cases adds some thing of - its own to the moments of Reason & impulsive causes of Action or the evidence of things that appear on either side & so turns the scale thereby supplying the defect of naturall Knowledge & Vnderstanding by its self=determining Power; in like manner as the living forensick Judge supplies the defect of the dead Law & of infallible but silent Justice in Cities & Bodies Politick And this resemblance also holds good in another regard that as the forensick is Judge ^or Aribtrator is corruptible & bribable by partiall regards & private Interests, so - likewise is this Hegemonick, this ruling & Judging Power in the Soul obnoxious to the same Infirmity, Lust & Appetites often uitiating & Ꝑverting its Judgm^t ag^st the dictate of suꝐiour & inferiour - Reason ^{illeg}.

This Hegemonick Arbitriū of the Soul is not only Judging but Willing it is not one thing in us that Judgeth & another thing that wills w^thout Judging but they belong to one & the same, nay the conclusive practicall Judgm^t seems to really the same thing w^th the volition as if they were <58A> two inadæquate conceptions of one thing & the difference in them were not Rei but Rationis only or if they be distinguishable they are inseperable from one another, & both together make up that w^ch Aristotle calls or Election w^ch includes the last practicall Judgm^t in it But we must speak something more here concerning the nature of Will ^wherby we shall further illustrate ^allso the nature of Judgm^t It is confessed by most Asserters of Free=will, that the Will is not free to every thing, but that it acteth in some things necessarily & in other things as free or having a Power over its own Actions, for w^ch cause Scholastick writers distinguish between Voluntas ut Natura & Voluntas ut Liberum Arbitrium so that Will & Free=will are not to be accompted termes equipollent to one another Wherefore we say that the Soul as self=comprehensive & self=active is not a thing utterly devoid of all naturality & necessity or {illeg} a thing w^ch hath not other nature than to be in a perfect Indifferency to all things for this is a thing more unintelligible & impossible than that materia prima in Phisiologis, w^ch is s^d to be nec quid, nec quale, nec quantum, since a passive Indifferency may be more easily conceived than an active As it is com̄only s^d that all moc~on is made upon something that all moc~on is made upon something that is im̄ovable so this movable & vertible principle of Free=will must needs have something firm to stand on it must have some fixed hinges to turn upon it - must be founded upō something that is n̄rall & necessary The Will must needs have pondus aliquod a certain weight or biasse in it to incline it to moc~on No man chooseth meerly that he may choose & for no other Reason, nor Wills meerly that he may Will nor doth meerly that he may do - but choosing, Willing & Doing are allwayes for the sake of some Good both the beginning & End of all motion & action is something that is not moved but standeth fixed W^ch Consideration may serve also by the way to remove an objection that may be made against our former Doctrine that Judging ^doth not belong to the Vnderstanding as necessary nature but to the Soul as reduplicated & self=active, because it will seem to follow from thence that therefore we may Judge what we will in every case, For it is not so much as true of o^r Will in this sense that it wills w^t it wills ^ in every case ^& because it wills or that it hath nothing to incline it to will any thing nor to determine it to w^t it wills but only its will or that it wills for no other cause but that it may will

What therefore is that to wit the Will is by nature necessarily determin'd unto w^ch therefore it is not under the Dominion of it as they com̄only speak or ^{illeg} w^ch the slipperinesse of the Will cannot make itself uncertain to And here some Phylosophers & Theologers determine that besides Good in Generall w^ch is the formally Reason of all Appetibility the Will is allwayes necessary to the sum̄um Bonum but that it is its Ꝑfection to be free, & contingent to all other inferiour Goods w^tsoever Now because it is evident by experience that the Will is not necessary to the Bonum Honestatis the Good of Honesty or vertue for otherwise there could be no such thing as Sin or Vice therefore these Theologers boldly conclude that Vertue is not the chief Good of Rationall Beings, but that this is only desired by Accident for the sake of Animall Pleasure & Jucundity w^ch is the {illeg} <59> of all Goods nay they adde that sensuall & carnall Pleasure is a greater Good, than that of Vertue & according to order of Nature is to be desir'd before it Ipsum Bonum quod Honestū dicitur quodque rationis superioris objectum est not appetitur ab homine pari et æquali amoris gradu cum bono delectabili sed tanquam medium solum quo ad delectabilis illius Boni primi fruitionem pervenitur Amatur enim eo tantum fine ut Bonum delectabile tanquam prœmium Amoris ^per illud obtineatur, quod ipsum certissimū atque infallibile signum est sum̄um hominis Bonum esse non posse quia sum̄um est quod omnia appelunt propter se & propter quod omnia alia appeluntur W^ch Author doth not here mean that the Pleasure of Vertue is the highest Good but that Animall Pleasure distinct from it as he explains himself Deletectatio quæ ex Virtutis actione percipitur ^per se non est tale Bonum in quo anima hominis acquiescit & Delectatio quæ ex Virtute et honesti studio existit postponenda est, naturæ ordine, delectationi quæ ex voluptatum carnalium commercio est Right Epicurean Doctrine if it be not worse than his as some would perswade us who have of late defended Epicurus as if his meaning was that the Pleasure of Vertue & tranquillity of Mind arising from thence was the chiefest of all Goods. But Torquatus in Tully & other of the antients Instructe vs that Epicurus did not acknowledg any other Pleasures of the Mind than such as did some way arise from the Pleasures of the Body present, future or past But we have before proved that the Good of Honesty & Morall Rectitude w^ch in Schripture language is is the highest & most soveraign Good of all Intellectuall Beings & that Pleasure of it w^ch some will needs distinguish from the thing itself & place Happinesse in it as Aristotle observeth is no adventitious Appendix to it distinct from it but meerly the sense & fruition of the thing itself W^ch if it be true then it must be granted that the Sum̄um Bonum is such a thing as this though we cannot Ꝑperly say that the Will hath a freedom & Liberty to it as if this were a perfection to be a Lord over it yet it is so loose towards it as that it may degenerate & be alienated from it & instead thereof court some faint & weak shadowes of it. This seeming to be an imperfection that belongs to all freewilled Beings & perhaps to all intellectuall Creatures w^tsoever that they are alienable from the highest Good as Origen hath determined that there is no Being im̄utably Good & Wise & absolutely impeccable in his own nature but God alone, all other things being - not good by nature but by participacon only & therefore by Freewill or self=active exertion And here by the way we may observe that this is no small sign that men are now under a lapsed state that they are sunk into so deep an oblivion of their true sum̄um Bonum as to think that Honesty is a Good only κατὰ συμβέβικος to use Aristotles language & no otherwise desireable than for the sake of some sensuall Pleasure that will be annexed to it as a reward that is, that happinesse consisteth only in the Animall Life w^ch is supposed by a late Author to be a principle so necessary as that the true nature of Free=will cannot be explain'd w^thout it But it might be the same argum^t be demonstrated that Animall Delight & Pleasure is not the highest Good because the greatest bodily torments together w^th Death consequent thereupon are often <60> submitted to for the sake of Honesty as a greater Good, wⁿ inconsistent w^th & though some X^tians are apt to think that it is never done but only for the avoiding of greater & eternall torments & the obtaining of eternall sensuall Pleasures after this life yet the stories of Heathen times shew'd higher examples of bodily pains & Death being - submitted to & contemned in comparison w^th the beauty & excellency of Vertue it being not difficult to fing amongst them such as have really born witnesse to that proverbiall ^speech amongst them mentioned by Aristotle that it is better to die honestly than to live dishonestly & that that it is better to suffer iniury than to do it.

But if the will be not n̄rall & necessary to the highest Good then it seems it is not necessary to any thing then it can have no firm Land to stand upon but will be like the floating Winds wandering w^thout End Nay rather there can be no such thing as Will at all, no desire nor - motion if there be no certain mark or scope to be aimed at, no - fixed centre to rest upon, to w^ch therefore we reply that Goodnesse in generall or confusedly apprehended under the notion of Congruity is that w^ch all n̄rall as well as voluntary & Free is carried out towards & Discongruity in generall w^ch it hath a n̄rall aversac~on from no Will w^tsoever whether of God or Creatures hath such a freedom as to imbrace Evill as Evill or refuse Good as Good, hence perfect Felicity generally concord a complexion of all congruities belonging to humane nature must meeds be wished for by all, but the pieces & members of it wherof it is made up being consider'd singly & apart there being something of Discongruity sometimes in the best of them appearing to our multifarious, mutable, allwayes uneasy & fastidious nature we being not allwayes alike to that w^ch is alike in itself, it is not impossible but that we may reject it, but wⁿsoever extremities of bodyly Evill as Torment & Pain are proposed so as that there is nether any Good of Honesty attained thereby nor any other Animall Good present or future to ourselves or relations, no good of Fame or glory or pride of showing our Liberty, here the aversac~on of the will would be as necessary as the descent of a Stone downwards In like manner bodily good things as freedom from Sicknesse, Pain Poverty or disgrace wⁿ there is no appearance of any Good to accrue from them are necessarily willed & desired & many such Instances occurre in humane Life in w^ch Animall Congruity having no mixture of other or Morall Discongruity takes away the Contingency of acting Besides that factitious or artificiall nature of Habits to w^ch the Will is liable unto both good & bad do for the time so much determine it as that it is easy to know w^thout the spirit of divinac~on w^t men will certainly do in such & such cases

And as we contribute more or lesse of our own self=active Power as we more or lesse exert ourselves so do we ourselves make this or that seem to be better to us The same temptac~on to a pleasant or profitable dishonest Action propounded to the same Ꝑson at several times hath not allwayes the same success because though that be alike to - him yet he is not the same & alike to it, he is sometimes more vigorously exerted as to Morall Good & then he rejects it for Evill sometimes more supine & languidly remisse & then he closeth w^th it as most congruous to him & the Good of Pleasure & Profit seems to be a greater Good than the Good of Honesty The same person also may at severall times be under different habits the one vitious the other vertuous whereby his judging Power will be differently determined to to accompt Pleasure & Profitt much a greater Good than Honesty & again to preferre Honesty infinitely before it, so that wⁿ vertuous he will necessarily reject such a temptation {illeg}circumstance, w^{ch being vitious} he did necessarily before close w^thall, but these different habits arising & being contracted to ourselves by a different use of our own self=power the different ^at severall times is not ^{illeg} from necessary nature but w^t we are the causes of it to ourselves It is not necessary as some suppose in order to the asserting of L. A. to maintain that the Will is n̄rally indifferent to a greater or lesser Good w^ch is indeed all one as to make it Indifferent to Good itself For though it be granted the Will is necessarily determin'd to the greater apparent ^Good yet the last - apparent Good is not so necessaryly but we contribute something of - our own towards it w^ch we are not necessarily determin'd to neither is any other cause of it to be required besides ourselves the Soul hath an originall self=power in it w^ch is exercisd antecedently to all Volitions, whereby it can more or lesse intend itself in a way of Considerac~on & vigorous exertion & accordingly determine our selves to this or that as best For nothing is more plain than that one thing may seem best wⁿ we do not sufficiently deliberate & another thing w^ch we do, so that the difference is from ourselves, so as men do more or lesse intend themselves to Morall Good as they are in a more or lesse exerted temper so will Honesty or Lust be preferred the essence of Free=will chiefly consisteth in that originall Power w^ch the Soul as self=comprehensive hath over itself the Power of actuating its own passive capability more or lesse by reason whereof the very self=same things become different to us, w^ch intending or exerting ourselves more or lesse is not necessarily determind by any antecedent causes motivies of Reason or Appearances of Good but there is allwayes something of it but in our own hands of whose different exercise & determinac~on A there is no cause assignable but ourselves In all Volitions there is - something of Nature acting necessarily determining as to Good <62> & the greater Good ^we being never able to go out of some Naturall Congruity or other this is, that by w^ch this Free=power is circumscribed & there is something of our own w^ch we are in a manner κύριοι or Masters of, the power of actuating our own possibilities that is of A intending or exerting ourselves more or lesse, & determing a Capability A

To conclude therefore we shall observe where the higher & lower Good conspire where lower Appetites inferiour & Superior Reason agree where Pleasure self=preservac~on & Honesty clearly dictate one & the same thing & where more or lesse consideracon will not alter the case, here the Actions of men in their wits are equall uniform & necessari & it might be certainly {illeg} known w^t they would do in such sense but in all other cases where more or lesse intention of ourselves will not alter, there there is great uncertainty & contingency, All Volitions are neither b necessary as some would have them nor all so contingent as others, but there is a certain mixture of both together in them as there is in ourselves who are partly necessary nature, partly self=activity something that we are κύριοι ^Masters of & something that we are not.

This must come in before Pag: We have now declared w^t is the τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν & the τὸ κυριῶον that that swayes the whole Soul that is in us, that Judgeth, willeth & determineth all Actions It is true indeed that if our Vnderstandings were infinitely perfect comprehending all thing infallibly than there - would be no repugnance but such a necessary Vnderstanding should be the Hegemonick in us & determine all Action, but our Vnderstandings being so imperfect that can but think of one thing at once if they should be necessarily determind to every thing they think of & could never intend themselves more or lesse nothing can be more absurd than to make them the Hegemonick & the ruling Power in us w^ch acting themselves necessarily must necessarily determine all Volition & Action For besides that most of the Action of Life will be then taken away it being not conceivable how a necessary Vnderstanding where itself is doubtfull & hath not certaine Knowledge of w^t is best should necessarily cause any Volition this way or that way & we have certain Knowledge but of very little I say besides this if such an imperfect necessary Vnderstanding necessarily determining all Volitions were the Hegemonick of the Soul then it is plain that we could have no self=recollective Power in us our Thoughts & Cogitac~ons would not be our own, There would be nothing {illeg} we could not be our own men or have any Govournm^t of ourselves being not able to intend ourselves or our Actions more or lesse, we could use no self=exertive conation or {illeg} we could st not set ourselves to any thing nor put forth we not put forth our own activity, there could be no - striving nor laborious contention after Vertue & Knowledge, we - should find no diffculty w^thin ourselves because all would be necessary & nothing could be more or lesse than it is, we could have no Power over Purposes & resolutions, we should not be w^thin ourselves but be meer outsides only, there could be no Lucta or contention <63> betwixt the superiour & inferiour part of the Soul, there could not be such disagreem^t w^th ourselves as is in Persons continent & Incontinent w^ch that are in a middle betwixt Temperance & IntemꝐance for asmuch as there would be no duplicitis in us, all would be necessary nature & none would be reduplicate self=activity

Writers concerning this Argum^t whether Ancient or Modern have taken notice of nothing in L. A. but only the self=determinacon of Volitions in the Actions of Life or the Contingency of Volic~ons themselves but they have not observed that w^ch is the principall ^thing in it, that more interiour power w^ch the Soul hath first over itself - before its power over Volitions & Acc~ons w^ch is its Power over its own - possibility & passive capability to actuate it more or lesse, its power of intending it self more or lesse in recollection, self=excitac~on, self=attention speculac~on & deliberac~on as also of vigorous exertion of force & strength to suppresse the lower Inclinac~ons & to promote itself towards the higher principle from whence the Contingency of Freewill in Volic~ons & Actions doth ^chiefly arise Wherefore the Antients was wont to define L. A. no otherwise than thus to be a power of doing Contraries in w^ch no doubt they included all that w^ch the Moderns expressed more anxiously & nicely in this bipertipe manner a Power of Contrarietie & Contradiction & it must needs be granted there is such a thing as this in free Agents Aristotle speaking of the motions of Animalls as such, w^ch in some sense are αυτοκινητα or self=moving writes after this manner if a thing move itself - it is absurd to suppose that they should allwayes move one way If it were in the power of Fire to move itself upward then it is manifest that it could move it self downward also & that w^ch is to itself a cause of walking may also be a cause of not=walking Wherefore in this sense all Animalls may be s^d to have ἐξουσίαν των αντικριμενων a power of Contraries & Contradictories notw^thstanding w^ch they are not αρχη καὶ ἀιτία πραξεων the principle & cause of Action as Freewill'd Beings ꝐꝐly so called are neither are the consequences of Action so imputed to them as that they receive Blame or Com̄endacon for the same, though Bruits are self=moving in one sense that they are not moved as Machins & Neurospasts but they have certain inward vitall principles of moc~on Fancy Appetite & Horæ, & though they do not allwayes act one way as Inanimate things do, yet they have not any inward self=flexibility of their own but are necessitated by Fancy & Appetite in like cases allwayes to do alike, as being alike hungry & having meat before them allwayes to eat, but Freewilled Beings have a more inward power of Contrarietie & Contradiction in their Actions so that the same objects being put w^thout & the same Animall Appetites & Inclinac~ons w^thin they may possibly act differently in w^ch sense it is s^d of them by the Antients that they have a power of doing the contrary to w^t they do & they explained it further after this manner that that the same things <66> being circumstant they could act sometimes one way & sometimes another And the Antient Stoicks who denyed the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν stated the point in this manner That we are Masters of nothing but allwayes follow the circumstāt things allwayes yielding to them & consenting w^th them & do w^t we do because we must of necessity do these things & no other it being impossible for us such things being circunstant to do otherwise than we do because we are not able to resist the circunstant things, by w^ch it is evident that S^t Austin & other of the Antients were very much mistakē concerning the first Stoicks wⁿ they affirmed them to assert Liberty of Will because as Alex Aphrodiciensis tells us they did assert the names of Freewill & Contingency wⁿ they destroyd the thing but the contrary to all this is that w^ch was maintained by the Antient first Opposers of this Stoicall fate necessity that nature & fate do not merely act in us but that we are something of ourselves & Masters of something & we do not allwayes so follow the circumstant things being overcomd by them as that we could not possibly do - otherwise at any time than we do, but that the same things being circunstant in the same cases & circumstances & wⁿ we have the same Animall Inclinac~ons we may be able sometimes to act one way & sometimes another they being able to resist both the outward objects & their inward Animall Affections

And if modern writers concerning Liberty of Will had kept close to this definic~on of the Antients ^though reaching not to try Nature they had not been reprehensible & if they would understand that of theirs positis omnibus ad agendum reuqisitis posse agere vel non=agere in no other sense than this of the Antients before menc~ond that the same thing being circunstant they might sometimes act one way sometimes another ^w^th but they generally declaring their sense otherwise so as that by their Omnia ad agendum requisita they do not only mean παντα περιεστῶτα All circunstant things being put that might incline to Action but also all internall things w^tsoever besides the Action itself, all motives & Reasons & inward exertions & Practicall Judgment & that still notw^thstanding all this the Will remains equally indifferent to chuse this or the contrary as if this was the great Ꝑfection of Freewill to be irrationally & fortuitously determin'd any way, here they have both quite mistaken the thing & the {illeg} sense of the Antients {illeg} For it is most true w^t they asserted that wⁿ all outward objects & Circumstances are put the same Animall Inclinacons, Free-willed Agents may possibly act differently because they can more or lesse intend that power that they have over their own - passive Capability they can consider speculate & consult more or lesse & therefore wⁿ they consider more they discover reason to determine themselves otherwise than they should wⁿ they had considerd lesse they might sometimes be more watchfull & circumspect than at others sometimes exert themselves <67> more vigorously towards the higher Principle of superiour & Inferiour reason & strive more ag^st their lower inclinac~ons at other times according to w^ch differences arising wholy from w^thin themselves their Volic~ons & Actions in the same cases might be much diversified So that the Antients did warily & cautiously enough expresse themselves but the Moderns defining Liberty of will by {illeg} perfect Indifferency after all things put besides the Volic~on itself & so after the very last practicall Judgm^t w^ch they make to belong to another Faculty of Vnderstanding blindly, irrac~onally & fortuitously determining itself have clearly missed the true notion of it And some Neotericks have been sensible hereof who therefore declining that vulgar definition of Free will of active Indifferency of all things put that ought to be put besides the Volic~on itself - have more cautiously expressd themselves thus more agreeably to the Antients & to the Truth that a Free Agent is that that can ad vim et motum causæ àquâ fuerat impulsus aliquid adjicere et impetum, quem aliunde non acceperat addere, can contribute something of its own to the impulsive causes & Reasons of Action, & adde some force & moment of its own w^ch it had not receivd frō any thing else; i.e. a Free Agent is such w^ch is not meerly passive to objects w^thout him & to nature & a necessary imꝐfect understanding in him but w^ch can adde something of its own more or lesse to all these by his self=intending & self=exerting Power To w^ch purpose is that of of AP. Aphrodiciensis, that Man is a principle & cause of these Actions that are done by him & this is to be a Man to have a Principle of doing so & so w^thin himself, & a) this is to be a Sphere or Globe to roll & tumble down a declivity wherefore all other Animalls beside Man ^altogether follow the outwardly besetting & circumstant causes but man doth not because his essence consists in this in having a principle & cause of Action w^thin himself & therefore not being necessarily determind to follow the circumstant things about him as being - meerly passive to them {illeg} ^Our selfe determinac~on of volitions consists in this that we are not meerly passive in them but can adde some form or impetus of our own more or lesse to w^t we suffer from w^thout & to necessary nature in us & accordingly diversifie the same And of this w^ch is ꝐꝐly our own w^ch we superadde there is no other cause to be inquired after but every Ꝑticular Free=Agent himself P. 83 ως γαρ ουσι τουμεν for as we do not seek any other cause for w^ch Bodies are carried downwards or for w^ch a Bruit Animall doth w^t it doth acting according to Appetite for as much as every one of these things contributes ^a cause to these things frō themselves having such a Nature in it so neither is there any other cause to be requird of those things w^ch are done by a man sometimes one way, sometimes another besides the Man himself for this is to be a Man to be the <68> the cause & principle of these things w^ch are done by him W^ch yet must be understood w^th moderac~on not as if things circunstāt w^thout us & our own nature in us did act nothing at all upon us & did not contribute any thing at all so much as to incline us one way or other, for then all Councell & Instruction, Reason & Considerac~on & deliberac~on itself would signify nothing at all but that we have a certain active power of our own w^ch as it is exerted more or lesse upon that w^ch is Nature in us will much diversifie our actions & of ^the exercise of this w^ch is properly our own Activity no other cause is to be inquired but ourselves

The Life of Freewilled Beings consist in a kind of continuall self=exertion more or lesse either in a way of Considerac~on or vigorous self=promoting force or executive activity & Contingency whereof lies in the very foundac~on of our Being & the uncertainty of it is that only Indifferency w^ch is essentiall to Freewilled Beings for a constant ^Indifferency of Will Inclinac~on & purpose to every thing cannot be essentiall to any perceptive Being but belongs to them only in doubtfull cases where Nature is distracted or the Vnderstanding Ꝑceives equall moments of Reason both wayes. But we are not only conceived to determine our own Actions & to be ourselves ἀρχὴ καὶ αιτία the principle & cause of them in such cases but also whereafter the exerc~on of ourselves after Consultacon & deliberac~on all doubtfullnesse is remooved because though the reason of Consultac~on & deliverac~on be in itself necessary in w^ch sense that of the Antient Stoicks may be allowed to be true that there is no selfpower in the reason of Consultation yet we had a Power over ourselves to consult & deliberate more or lesse & to use a greater or lesser Intention in it & therefore that Volition w^ch doth result at length from clear & necessary Knowledge after long consultac~on may well be s^d to be ἐφ' ἡμῖν in our own power & be imputed to ourselves as the cause of it because Consultacon was not the necessary cause of that so much Consultac~on as Aristotle hath observed but it was ^contingently determined by an immediate self=power, as, for example, though a Sword doth necessarily cut & slash wⁿ there is force put to it yet the Action w^ch a Man doth by it in fighting a duell is to be imputed to the Doer of it because it was in his power to use it so or not This the Aphridiciensick Phylosopher hath observed rightly He that by reason of ratiocinate collection made by himself in consultac~on doth assent to any thing or will any action & resolve upon any design is to himself the cause of that Assent Volition & resoluc~on because he should not have done it if he had not consulted so much And hence it is that Men are commended for Knowledge & Wisedome because though Knowledge & Vnderstanding be necessary in itself yet the more or lesse improvm^t of our Vnderstanding by diligence in meditation & study is to be imputed to their own self=power -

This Power of self=determinac~on is com̄only cryed up as one of the great^est perfections that any perceptive Being is capable of & it is indeed a great Priviledg that men have comparativly w^th Bruites that they are not Senses {illeg} to Objects & Nature & led by necessary Appetites to w^tsoever they do but have a power of Judging as to their own Actions & determining their own Volitions, yet it is far from being a pure perfection it being only the perfection of ImꝐfect Beings & in respect of that higher {illeg} of Being that must be some where in the world that is im̄utable Good Ꝑfectly Knowing & wise & whose operac~on is his Essence, it is an imꝐfect thing for self=determinac~on in Judgm^ts & Assents is defect of Wisdom & Knowledge & where Knowing is absolutely Ꝑfect there is no Judging Assenting + & Opining distinct from it + A Being infinitely wise doth never consult & deliberate what to do nor after deliberac~on venturously & stocastically trembling & doubtfully determine itself A Being ^cōpleatly perfect doth never use any self=exerted Conac~on laborious striving & endeavouring for this is from defect of Power & Strength Free=willed Beings are such as are continually spring & pursuing after their own perfection & w^thout a continuall exertion & renovac~on of themselves they will sink decline & ^degenerate {illeg} of the Antients speaking of this Power of Contrariety wⁿ in the very same Circumstances, a Being is as it were indifferent to do this or the Contrary quite removes this Power from God as speaking - much Imperfection Power & Liberty in God is not so to be conceived as to be indifferent to Contraries & Contradictories but God Power & Liberty is the Power of im̄utable Goodnesse & Wisedome w^ch is most of all Power wⁿ it doth not depart from being one for to be able to do Contraries is neither Power nor Liberty but Infirmity & Inability of adhering allwayes to the best, this ^contingent self{illeg} the Power of Contraries & Contradictories in the same case, is that Power to w^ch Peccability or a possibility of sinning, is an essentiall property & an inseparable appendix for though Freewilled Beings may be so fixed in a state of Good as that there may be a certainty they shall never fall - from it yet this is not from themselves but from divine Grace as shall be showed afterwards for defectibility is an imperfection that necesarily cleaves to all reduplicate autexousious Beings

For the right Vnderstanding the nature of Freewilled Beings it must be diligently observed w^t we have before declared that they are compounded of two things & that they are Ꝑtly nature & Ꝑtly self=activity They that take away all Liberty of Humane Actions make all in us to be necessary Nature & many others who assert Freewill would make us to be all self=activity whereas in truth we are ^neither solely but a mixture of both together If we were all self=activity & nothing but Contingent indifferency in Acting as some suppose then objects occasions, n̄rall Appetites & Inclinations <70> motives & Reasons exhortacons & Ꝑswasions Councell & Advice would signify nothing at all & could have no force upon us If Contingent Indifferency were the essence of Freewilld Beings then that {illeg} would be no parts of nature or the Vniverse, ^this is to make a thing lose from nature & the whole Vniverse a thing w^ch hath no Ausæ or handles in it for God himself to lay hold on so that he cannot any way promote their Good w^thout the destruction of their very n̄re nay indeed their highest Good would be no Other than this to be in being loose to God & all things, an absolute things by itself, this being fancyed ^by those Philos to be the very thing in w^ch Godship ^chiefly consisteth But there is no such infinite Liberty & self=flexibility as this possibly in nature so farre is it frō being the highest power & perfective Liberty that a Being should be able w^th infinite Indifferency to turn itself to all things in the whole world or w^tsoever it was capable of for perfect power & Liberty is nothing but perfect Goodnesse, But Freewilld Beings are not all self=activity but one half of them nature, Nature hath a great share in vs object, Appetites, Naturall Inclinac~ons Councells Reasons & Ꝑsuasions have a great force upon them. Nature also circumscribes them w^thin a certain compasse of Good or Congruity w^ch they can never go out off wⁿ they act most loosly & at random, most arbitrarily & irrationally making their Will their only Law, they alwayes pursue an appearance of Good here in dominion, ^Liberty absolutenesse & indipency, they can never will for Wills sake only w^thout respect to any Good, nay they are then most of all captivated under bruitish Lust & Appetite wⁿ they think themselves so perfectly free

But we are not all nature, but we X are partly self=activity & something of our own X Nature doth but prelude in us & thē we ourselves ^come in and determine & we are a cause & - principle of Action so that Nature concludes nothing in us w^thout ourselves Though outward things be not accompted in our own power - yet we having some power over ourselves & ourselves being - something we are also w^th nature & providence causes of something there, & contribute {illeg} to a difference of Events & successes by exerting ourselves more or lesse in a way of prudence, cauc~on & circumspection, diligence & activity, but for those internall things w^ch are not subject to outward casualty though nature acts here Aalso yet it can conclude lesse w^thout ourselves A we do not affirm that here we are Ꝑfectly in our own hands as if Grace & providence did do nothing here we are a certain mixt thing made up of our own selfactivity & the conspiring divine Power Providence & Grace And because things are not done here wholy w^thout our own self=activity therefore we may be s^d to form & frame ourselves into w^t we are ^& to be selfmade either way P. 105. Those things are proper to a rac~onall Soul, it sees itself, it forms & frames itself & makes itself such as it will & itself reaps & injoyes the fruit that it beares to w^ch purpose was that also before alledged <71> where this is properly referred to the Hegemonick or ruling power in the Soul the Hegemonick is that w^ch can recollect stir up & excite itself that can turn itself & can make it self to be such as it will & can make things that happen to seem to itself w^t it will ^w^ch yet is not so to be vnderstood as if it had {illeg} not any but hath an absolute despotick Power over its inward Morall Affections & dispositions ^to Good but that by laborious self=exertion conac~on & - striving it can by little & little adde something to itself & so make a further Ꝑgresse to Good As it is said to be the cause also of its own evill by its self=neglect & not=exerting that Power w^ch it hath w^ch latter is solely to be imputed to itself but not the former This is that w^ch is the cause of its own Good & hurt & there is nothing else in the whole world to w^ch his own Evill is to be imputed as the cause of it but only this Autexousy or self=power & in this consists the formality of Sin This is that that settles itself into habits Good & Evill begits in itself an habituall disposition of Judging so & so in Morall things the hegemonick of the Soul. i.e. the Soul as reduplicated self=comprehensive & self=active is the & & the Judging Power, Inward sense & eye of the Soul w^ch may by itself be wrought into different habituall Dispositions so as to be able to Judge well or ill in Morall things as the Eye of the Body may be either clear so as to Judge aright of Colours or else ill=affected & vitiated to see every thing in a wrong colour w^ch similitude our Saviour make use of to the same purpose to show that the κριτήριον of the Soul may be in like manner vitiated w^th an ill tincture so as to Judge wrongly of morall things whose very Light in them is s^d to be Darknesse w^ch these Heathen Phylosophers have taken notice off & Aristotle himself who was far from canting often observes - P. 553 This thing is evident from matters of sense for the same thing cannot seeem sweet to one & bitter to another unlesse the organes of sense & Criticall Power be corrupted & vitiated wherefore the true measure of Tast is the Pallat of those that are in health & not of the others, the case is the very same concerning Morall things - Good & Evill Honest & Dishonest i.e. that some men are are vitiated & depraved as to their Pallat, their sense & Criticall Power of these things & therefore these are not the true measure of Good & Evill but the other that he declares in his Ethicks that <72> A good man is the measure, of w^t is to be done or not done, he also tells us elsewhere that that wickednesse corrupts the Principles of the mind Others tell us that this Criticall Power of the Soul in the Knowledge of speculative things may be likewise hindred or promoted from mens Life Purificatiō disposes mē to the knowledge of the best things

Every particular Action in w^ch Morality is concernd leaves something behind it after it is gone it begets some little disposic~on & Inclinacon in the Soul to Judge & will the same again w^ch receiving many such like additions frō repeated Action grows up by little & little into a confirmA ed Habit W^ch Habits whether Good or Bad A are notie of them absolutely unalterable so long as the faculty of self=power remains, the soul still keeping its self=changing Power so long as L. A. remains in it the exercise of w^ch Faculty cannot be allwayes s^d to be essentiall to a man there being a ligac~on of it ^not only in sleep but also in Infancy so that it cannot be denyed but that the divine power may possibly reduce Free & Raconall Creatures into such a state as that their Life for Ages together might not differ from that of dreaming, nor be much advanced above the Condicon of Bruits Infants & Embrios; but whether there be ever any such sad providence as this as a Nemesis attending humane Souls, for the abuse of their freewill is best known unto him, who hath contrived & framed those fatall Lawes that belong to the Œconomy of Rationall Creatures ^w^ch are the best that can & for the good of the whole However those Changes & Revolucons of Freewilld Being from habits of Vertue & Vice are not perhaps so short & swift as some conceive.

Though there be two species or Degrees of L. A. as we have declared, Animall & Morall, yet they being both of the same kind, & the former being included & cōprehended in the Latter, we do not every where scrupulously distinguish between these -

We shall now endeavour to set down the chief ProꝐties or Passions of this Faculty called L. A. First therefore it is not a Power whose Perfection consisteth in doing any thing indifferently and at random as this conceived to be a liberty, (whereas indeed it is not) a Power whose Actings have {illeg} no relac~on to Good or Evill in it, Better or Worse, as if these things were extrinsically clapt upon it ^onely by Lawes arbitrary religious & Instituc~ons, but it is a Power whose moc~on according to its Nature is ^always toward Better or Worse more or lesse Ꝑfections improvm^t ^& advancement or imparem^t & diminuc~on & it is the souls actuating & informing itself more or lesse; the Issue ^& sum̄e whereof is two wayes so as that the form do either master or overcome the Matter & subdue it under itselfe or else that it is {illeg} overcome by matter & informosity; it is a tugging & contesting between 2Perfection & ImꝐfection Act & inert Passivenesse or dull Potentiality 2 freewilled Beings are not passive to an equall & necessary Light ^obtruding itself vpō them & allwayes ruling & leading them on easyly w^th out any difficulty or labour of self=conac~on but they have an active Power over their own Light itself so that they can intend it more or lesse & actuate the Potentiality of the Knowing Power they can put forth themselves more or lesse & promote themselves towards the higher principle in their <73> nature or faculty degenerate & decline, they are things that are accomptable {illeg} for the managem^t of themselves better or worse ^{illeg} in their own hand are either pleased or displeased w^th themselves for their own actions they either accuse & blame condemne themselves & are thereupon full of Despondency ^{illeg} suspc~on & mistrust apt to fear {illeg} or else they approve justifie & congratulate themselves being full of feare & expectac~on of Good possessed w^th inward peace tranquillity & {illeg} they are such things as deserve from that equity & Justice that moderates {illeg} the whole Vniverse either reward or punishm^t The different use of this Faculty is that by w^ch one becomes either or better or worse {illeg} than himself either prevailing over the imꝐfection of his nature getting the better of it & mastering it or being worsted & conquered by it, in some it strives for undefiled rewards returning God his own w^th increase & Vsury in other it lasily & sluggishly succumbs under the imꝐfection of its nature {illeg} & lets the worser - Part get ground & prevail, lets the or non=entity the defect of its nature prevail over the Entity & active power of it & sinking down lower & lower into degeneracy to captivate & fetter it in the chaines of darknesse, this gives Being to that w^ch is called distributive Justice in the world w^ch otherwise could have its object to display itself act upon, it is that to the different actings whereof n̄rally belongs Com̄endac~on & Blame, a man is com̄ended for good Actions otherwise than a Horse is com̄ended for running ^swiftly or a pen for writing well or a Watch for going rightly, Freewilled Beings are com̄ended or blamed not for their Nature or w^t they could not but be, but because they are the active causes of their own Will or Ill, Culpa & the malum Culpæ belongs only to this Being the Evill & Fault of Sin can be no where else This kind of Being is that only w^ch hath a reflexive Judgm^t upon his own Actions, it is that whereby a Being feels itself something by itself & to be so itself as that it hath a crazy staggering & uncertain hold of itself & its own Perfection, w^ch is to be maintained by a constant awakened self self=exertion, diligence & Watchfullnesse or otherwise would slip away from ; an imperfect Perfection, these are such Beings as had a possibility in them of doing otherwise than they do doe in Bodyes considerd alone by themselves nothing is possible but w^t necessary, here something might have been otherwise than it is better or worse, here is ambiguous possibity both wayes w^thout absolute necessity of nature either way, here uncertain Contingency of being Better or Worse, rowles & tumbles up & down whilst other ^perceptive Beings are either below it by ^reasō of dull stupidity of Nature or else above it by im̄ovable perfection

Freewilled Beings have a higher & a lower principle in them & they are amphibious thing that sometimes live in one Element sometimes in another they have a vast - compasse of Capability in them a scale of many degrees higher & lower ^in respect of vice & vertue Wisdom & Folly they are capable of many gradations of Proficiency or degeneracy & are liable to many alternac~ons of motion upward & downward. There are severall states belonging to them, for ^First they may by self=exerted conacon ^& striving at last arrive to a state of Suipotence & self=power a state of Victory & Mastery over their worser part & imꝐfection & so to have an easy <74> govournm^t of themselves in Good ^For the End of all striving is some Mastery or Victory. {illeg} state of Suipotency is the End for w^ch the faculty of Suipotestas or self=power is designed or intended by God & Nature for however some men bost {illeg} of their Faculty of Freewill as if this by itself was an absolute dominion & Mastery over themselves & - true Liberty yet this is but a doubtfull & ambiguous power by the right use of w^ch they may attain to true Suipotence w^{ch is a state of perfectiō} Men then only raign over themselves wⁿ their highest Good & Perfection reignes or else secondly by the neglect & abuse of that Power as it were by a back=stroke of their Freewill, they may enthrall themselves in the greatest bondage & fetter themselves in a state of ^perfect self=impotency w^ch is the lowest state of Freewilled Beings, into w^ch though by their own Power or rather their Impotence ( though not necessary but vincible) they sink themselves yet they cannot raise themselves from thence, to that higher state & - exaltation of true suipotence meerly by their own power w^thout the assistance of divine power & grace: & which God will not be behindhand with between these two states the Apogy & Perogy the Aux. & there are many intermediate degrees of a middle state & that of different tendency either ^vpward or downward ascending or descending much reciprocac~on & alternac~on, much labour & tugging in the Ascending motion; In this intermediate space (w^ch is the stage that Freewilled Beings run in) they have many different affection & - Passions according as either the Better or Worser prevails in them - & as they feel themselves either gaining or loosing, here they are sometimes in a very confounded , puzzled & distracted ^condition between cōtrary Inclinations, often kenning the better not w^thout wishes of arriving at it, & yet at the same time feeling themselves draggd as it were by a certain violence & ponderous pressure of lower principles another way, so as to do that w^ch they would not ^& to act willingly & unwillingly at once by w^ch it appeares that though men com̄only think that there is so much L^dship & dominion over themselves in this Faculty of Freewill yet that it is but a mixture of Power & Impotency of strength & weaknesse ^together & that there is much of Heterokinesy {illeg} mingled w^th the Autokinesy of it in some states; for their proper self=motion ^selfactivity is only to Good, to wch there is much in them contumaciously refractory w^ch in some sense is Heterokinesy ^ & Neurospasm their being moved by something besides the true & their Good selves, or by a contrary Biasse & weight, They that think Freewill can in all states w^th equall ease turn it self to Good as to Evill & that its strength is allway equall & alike & that it can indifferently nod either way are very much deceived concerning the nature of it the steering of this winged chariot of the Soul in its assent upward is hard & difficult but it easily slides or rather tumbles downward the mocon of Free will to Good is laborious intenc~on & self exerc~on but its motion to Evill is selfe remission & relaxacon, the strength vigour & activity of Freewill is only towards the higher & better Principle but its motion towards the worser Principle is by a way of passive langor <75> & sluggish Inactivity the perfection ^of Freewilled Beings is only kept up by self=exertion upon the remission whereof Imperfection & Degeneracy steals upon thē further & further & unravells all the lower Life of Lusts & Affections needs not {illeg} any self=exertion ^{illeg} but it obtrudes itself upon us & invades us but ^as for the higher principle though Nature make some offer of it towards us, yet this will prove alltogether ineffectuall unlesse it be assisted & carryed on by our own self=active exertion vigorous endeavours strivings & contention The lower Principle prevailes upon us by its own activity but nature doth but show us as it were a glimpse of the higher Good in inviting us & beckoning to us ^with the {illeg} to put forth our own self=active Conation towards ^{illeg} it & by striving & Contention to win that prize w^ch will recompense all our pains & Labour - Facilis descensus Averni Sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras Hic labor, hoc opus est -